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In this thesis I investigate the evolving figure of the holy fool as a critical 
figure in European cinema. Three national cinemas - Soviet and post-Soviet cinema, 
French cinema, and Danish cinema – form the primary focus of my analysis. These 
cinemas correspond broadly to the three main orientations in European Christianity: 
Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant. 
The cinematic holy fool of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is 
interpreted in this thesis as a protean figure through which different European 
religious and intellectual traditions percolate (chapters one and two). Against this 
varied cultural background, I investigate the way in which the figure of the holy fool 
is used by filmmakers as a means of responding to and critiquing aspects of the 
modern world. To this end I analyse how filmmakers have represented different 
types, features and uses of the holy fool in interaction with their particular cultural 
and religious backgrounds. In particular, I examine how the cinematic holy fool is 
used to critique the religious and social status quo, the contemporary political power 
structures, and the abuse of reason.  
An apparently anachronistic figure, I argue that the holy fool has proved a 
versatile modern device, employed to question established secular and religious 
worldviews, from the Soviet regimes (chapters three and four) to contemporary 
Western European democracies (chapters five, six and seven). Through this thesis I 
identify how the modern holy fool is one without authority; a figure whose critical 
function has largely outgrown its confessional traditions, even if indebted to them. 
Nonetheless, in diverse secular and religious settings, I demonstrate how the fool’s 
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A young man is gazing at a travelling wagon in the middle of a village 
square. Defying the silent and almost motionless crowd gathered around, he ventures 
inside the vehicle to see the exhibition it hosts. Closely following the young man, the 
camera reveals that most of the internal space is taken up by an extraordinary exhibit: 
an enormous stuffed whale with decrepit skin like an old map bearing the marks of 
time, and yet sporting open eyes that seem alive. Fascinated, the young man returns 
for a surreptitious nocturnal visit to see this leviathan. In this second scene the 
whale’s penetrating eye unexpectedly appears as the focal point of the camera in a 
striking chiaroscuro close-up. After several long seconds during which we gaze into 
the beast’s eye, the man’s profile enters the screen from the side and addresses the 
creature with an inquisitive look, exclaiming: ‘See how much trouble you have 
caused!’  
These memorable scenes come from the Hungarian director Béla Tarr’s art 
house film Werckmeister Harmonies (2000) which, at the dawn of the new 
millennium, generated much debate over its encrypted meaning. For some critics it 
seemed that János Valushka, the protagonist and young man in these two scenes, was 
playing a particular cinematic type - that of a holy fool.1 What prompted such an 
identification? Even by his own admission director Béla Tarr has no religious faith.2 
But this does not mean that his meditations on the human condition avoid religious 
references. On the contrary, the image of the stuffed whale offers one of the most 
                                                
1 John Orr, ‘Béla Tarr circling the whale’, Sight & Sound, 4 (2001), 22-24; Jonathan Romney, 
‘Werckmeister Harmonies’, Sight & Sound, 4 (2003), 32-33;  Peter Hames, ‘The melancholy of 
resistance: The films of Béla Tarr’, Kinoeye, 1.1 (2001) < 
http://www.kinoeye.org/01/01/hames01.php> [accessed 11 October 2010]; Alan Pavelin, 
‘Werckmeister Harmonies’, Talking Pictures, 
<www.talkingpix.co.uk/ReviewsWerckmeisterH.html#Alan> [accessed 11 October 2010]; Ian 
Johnston, ‘Seeking order in disorder: Béla Tarr’s “Werckmeister Harmonies”’, Unspoken: Journal 
for Contemplative Cinema (2009) <www.unspokenfilmjournal.wordpress.com/i-tarr-
contents/seeking-order-in-disorder-bela-tarr’s-werckmeister-harmonies> [accessed 12 October 
2010]; Michael Wilmington, ‘“Harmonies” depicts a world out of joint’, Chicago Tribune (28 
December 2001) 
2 Béla Tarr, ‘In search of truth: Béla Tarr interviewed’, interview by Phil Ballard, Kynoeye, 4.2 (2004)  
<http://www.kinoeye.org/04/02/ballard02.php>  
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powerful cinematic metaphors of religious desolation in a film which is itself a 
meditation on modern society. How might this be possible?  
A few words about the film will help to set the context. Its action is placed in 
a small village, somewhere in central Europe, set in a pastoral landscape seemingly 
oblivious to the modern world, which is suddenly thrown into eschatological 
anticipation. The source of the commotion is the arrival of a strange wagon 
displaying ‘wonders of nature’, its greatest attractions being ‘the world’s biggest 
whale’ and an enigmatic and malefic Prince.  Frightened by alarming rumours of 
strange happenings that preceded the arrival of the wagon, no villager summons the 
courage to enter the show. The sole exception is the village postman, János 
Valushka.  
In spite of a lack of cues in the narrative, there are visual elements which 
render the film readable as a commentary on the state of religion in the contemporary 
world.  If the small village is taken as a microcosm, we see János as the only person 
of religious sensibility left.  He is the only one who shows a genuine interest in the 
whale, which, for him, is far more than a stuffed exhibit. While the villagers 
understand its presence as ominous, for János it is a sign of divine mystery and 
creative power: ‘How mysterious is the Lord that He amuses Himself with such 
strange creatures!’ he exclaims. The framing of the creature’s immobile but 
seemingly real eye in close up brings to our mind representations of the Divine Eye. 
If the beast is a metaphor for God, as has been suggested, then the state of a whale, 
stuffed and decrepit, appears to reinforce the idea of a dead God.3 In this spiritual 
wasteland, the modern ‘holy fool’ Valushka is not a person of absolute religious 
faith, but rather the last human being in which the divine sense has not completely 
atrophied. His modernity, therefore, is indebted to his relevance to Nietzsche’s ‘fool’ 
announcing the death of God, rather than to the older Christian hagiographic 
tradition of holy foolishness.4  
Traditionally, the figure of the holy fool has appeared in Christian tradition as 
a counterpoint to mainstream society. Standing outside accepted social norms, holy 
                                                
3 Alan Pavelin, ‘Werckmeister Harmonies’ 
<www.talkingpix.co.uk/ReviewsWerckmeisterH.html#Alan> [accessed 11 October 2010], (para. 6 
out 8) 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 
181-182 
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fools have been well positioned to offer a powerful critique of contemporary 
behaviours and ideas. If Valushka represents a modern variant of the holy fool figure 
in cinema, does he also retain the critical function of his foolish predecessors? In 
Tarr’s political parable Valushka’s complex role is indeed grounded in the way he 
offers a contrasting vision to the world around him. The critical function is retained, 
even though it corresponds to the particular circumstances of his own epoch and 
place. Firstly, it is through Valushka that the contrast between darkness and light 
becomes apparent, and a moral perspective is introduced. He is neither led by his 
passions like the crowds that want to destroy every sign of civilization, nor by the 
theoretical intelligence of the ivory tower musicologist for whom he provides food 
and care. Valushka is guided instead by his moral sense into attending to the needs of 
the others. Secondly Valushka’s simplicity, appearing to the people as folly, stands 
out against the world around him as a beacon of unspoilt humanity. In contrast with 
his meek mode of being, other characters seem driven by ideologies, functioning as 
either manipulators or the manipulated. More dangerously, it exposes the conniving 
workings of the social and political powers at work while remaining essentially 
apolitical. In the film Valuska turns into a potential threat for the new political order, 
represented by Tunde, the wife of the musicologist whom Valushka looks after. 
Tunde sees Valushka as a threat; as one who observes her secret movements and 
destablilizes her obsession with securing law and order. In an allusion to the 
silencing of dissidents behind the Iron Curtain, Valushka is pursued by helicopters in 
a surrealistic sequence, before being institutionalized in a mental hospital. Tarr 
employs his holy fool character in a way which allows him to offer a double critique: 
firstly against the social and political power structures that oppress the individual, 
and secondly against an abstract rationality that underpins these structures.  
I have chosen Tarr’s film for these introductory remarks because it provides 
an exemplary insight into the questions investigated in this thesis. Firstly, Tarr is 
using a recurring dramatic figure in European cinema: the holy fool, transformed for 
a modern context but still bearing the scars of two millennia of secular and religious 
history. Secondly, Tarr’s film is illuminating because it demonstrates how the critical 
function of the holy fool is being continually updated to meet the needs of 
contemporary society. We have seen in Werckmeister Harmonies how Vanuska’s 
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function is to expose contemporary trends of thinking, including the secularization of 
the world. Tarr employs his character in a Janus-like manner: both as an evocation of 
the spiritually void totalitarian ideology which ravaged Central and Eastern Europe 
for half a century, and, with an acute sociological insight, as a warning that danger is 
never past and vigilance is always required.  
No matter how opaque a holy fool can appear in real life, once he/she is 
framed in a story, the character acquires a certain critical function within the 
narrative. This follows from the fact that the holy fool character is structurally 
unaccommodated to the ways of the world, hence his/her perceived foolishness. If 
the holy fool has always fulfilled a critical function, it is also the case that the 
function has been context-specific. The frequent use of the holy fool figure in 
European cinema reflects its versatility as a device for commentary on the world 
around us, and its deep-rootedness in the artistic traditions of the continent. This 
leads us to the central question addressed in this thesis: How is the critical function 
of the holy fool performed in the European cinematic world?  
In order to explore this problem, we need first to understand the origins and 
development of the holy fool as a figure in European culture and performing arts. By 
establishing the varieties of divine folly across the continent, it will then be possible 
to compare the way in which holy foolishness has been used in European cinema: 
that most modern of the performing arts. A comparative approach will be used here, 
unpicking the critical function of the holy fool across three very different European 
cinematic cultures, so as to provide an understanding of how the figure is used across 
the continent. In so doing, the thesis will shed new light on this important and 
neglected artistic form, and the way in which it reflects the continuing interplay 
between the religious and the secular in modern European culture. 
The structure of my thesis reflects this methodology. The world of cinematic 
holy fools is multilayered, a result not only of the idiosyncratic visions of various 
directors but also the ways they draw on different European confessional or cultural 
traditions. Synchronic variations across religious and national divides are naturally to 
be expected, in spite of the increasing globalization of a new age inaugurated by the 
Lumière brothers. To understand these previous forms, however, and to unlock the 
ways in which they have developed as a result of historical and cultural changes, we 
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need to uncover the origins of the holy fool as a figure in European culture and 
performing art. For this reason the first two chapters are dedicated to the 
phenomenon at large and its interpretation in the scholarly literature. 
The first chapter of the thesis – Holy Fools and Folly: Literature Review and 
Methodology - will perform a three-fold task: descriptive, evaluative and 
methodological. It will offer an outline of the range of meanings, functions and 
forms that the holy fools have been said to exhibit across Eastern (Orthodox) and 
Western (Latin) Christianity. The material is divided into four sections, which look at 
the fool and its holy variant from different perspectives: the historical and socio-
cultural, the theological, the literary and the cinematic. Each section is followed by 
an evaluation of the contribution of these insights to the analysis of cinematic holy 
foolishness, providing a framework for evaluating continuities and discontinuities 
between cinematic holy fools and their predecessors.  
The methodological discussion in this first chapter reflects developments in 
recent scholarship. I proceed by reviewing new approaches in the study of the 
intersection of film with biblical studies: approaches which inform this thesis. 
Intertextuality offers a framework through which the cinematic figures can enter into 
dialogue not only with the biblical text but with their cultural precursors as well. 
Meaning is formed in the space opened up by this intertextual dialogue. These 
precursors of the cinematic fools will therefore be interpreted as forming a tradition 
and each film will be analysed within the particular cultural tradition of a national 
cinema. It is this national cinema, I argue, that mobilises the religious and cultural 
myths of a country and the category will prove its usefulness particularly in the case 
of Russian cinema. This analysis of this cultural context will enrich the meaning of 
film embedded in narrative and encoded in film-specific techniques. 
 Having set out the methodology I will explain the development of the holy 
fool figure in Europe out of Christian tradition. The second chapter - The Pauline 
Holy Fool and its successors - provides an historical excursus on the genesis and 
evolution of the idea of holy foolishness in European Christianity. The chapter opens 
with an analysis of the biblical text that is considered foundational for the practice 
and theory of holy foolishness: the apostle Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians. 
My aim is to highlight the countercultural thrust of the letter. Rather than setting out 
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in search of a univocal meaning of the biblical text I highlight its versatility to cover 
a range of meanings, depending on the cultural assumptions within each society. This 
potentially enables the reader to develop a cultural critique based on the text at any 
point in time, by permanently updating the meaning of St Paul’s argument. This 
argument, running through my first four chapters, has at its centre the ‘message of 
the cross’ which inverts all human values, and therefore elevates the foolish, weak 
and base things. The meaning of his paradoxical foolish wisdom is revealed in the 
fourth chapter of the Epistle where St Paul speaks in more concrete terms, indicating 
the model for the foolishness he preaches as the apostles themselves, whom he places 
at the bottom of the social hierarchy and in the midst of all depravations. Holy 
foolishness therefore is not another theory of knowledge but takes on an experiential 
meaning, in which the body participates through suffering in the fate of the lowest 
and the despised of the world. Crucially, St Paul relates this experience in theatrical 
terms, with the apostles becoming a spectacle for the world, an allusion picked up in 
the Byzantine practice of holy foolishness. With this established, the chapter explains 
how the idea of holy foolishness was developed through patristic and medieval 
sources into a cultural form.  
 Having established the main parameters of the Christian idea of holy 
foolishness I turn to its use in performative practice, focussing particularly on the 
holy fools in Byzantine and Russian tradition. I begin by demonstrating that their 
practice is actually based on a literal interpretation of the fourth chapter of the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians. Following this, I highlight the differences that appeared 
when the phenomenon was translated from Byzantium to medieval Russia. What was 
happening in the West in the meantime? The West had its own tradition, I will argue, 
whose prototype is St Francis of Assisi. A scholarly variant is represented by the 
holy idiot, who captures the imagination of the theologians as an anti-scholastic 
figure. In the remainder of the chapter I will explain how the holy fool, through these 
prototypes, came to be redefined as a means of confronting modernity, therefore 
ensuring the survival of the concept and the practice of holy foolishness into the late-
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.5 To this purpose I will highlight the importance 
                                                
5 By modernity I understand here the period that historically started with the Enlightenment and 
intellectually is defined by a questioning of the traditional foundations of society. 
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of three nineteenth-century figures which updated the model: Dostoevsky’s idiot, 
Nietzsche’s fool and Kierkegaard’s knight of faith.  
  Refashioned in this way, the holy fool was ready to confront modernity as 
witnessed in various European cinematic traditions. To evaluate this development, 
and how it affected the critical function of the holy fool, the rest of the thesis will 
focus on three contrasting national cinemas from different ends of the continent. 
Given the Christian origins of the holy fool in Europe, these choices reflect different 
confessional cultural spaces: Russian cinema as indebted to the Orthodox confession, 
French cinema’s reflection of a Catholic heritage, and Danish cinema drawing on a 
Protestant cultural tradition. For the first of these national explorations, I investigate 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russian cinema: an area in which the traditional model of the 
holy fool has impacted the culture in a singular way. My third chapter: Speaking 
Truth to Power: The Holy Fool in Soviet and Russian Cinema therefore draws 
heavily on the traditional paradigm of the holy fool but at the same time deals with 
figures that are not hagiographical, with the introduction of the category of ‘stylized’ 
holy fools. The cinematic material is thus divided into films that use the hagiographic 
figure of the iurodiviy, which offers me the possibility of a study in iconology, and 
films which rework the figure, adapting it to their own purposes while making use of 
its culturally charged inheritance. The first category of films employ the holy fool as 
an historical figure, without much innovation, and drawing on the traditional role of 
the figure as an antipode to the tsar and antidote to his autocratic policies, a political 
role whose significance is explicated within the religious-nationalistic narrative 
known as the ‘Russian idea’. There is one notable exception: Pavel Lungin’s The 
Island (2006). Primarily a film promoting Orthodox spirituality, The Island also uses 
the voice of its protagonist to admonish the slackness of the Church at the spiritual 
level and the brainwashing of the individual by the secular state of 1970s. The 2009 
film Tsar by the same director demonstrates how holy foolishness has become a 
recognized idiom in Russia, to the extent that it can be employed for deceptive 
purposes. More ‘stylized’ versions bear the mark of the Soviet era: in these films the 
religious content had to be evacuated and the iurodiviy becomes a trope through 
which to make a social and political critique of the Soviet state. 
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 Perhaps the greatest of these Russian directors, Andrei Tarkovsky, will be 
singled out in the fourth chapter, as a result of his outstanding contribution to the 
modernisation of the figure. Holy foolishness is a recurrent theme in his work, 
running through Andrei Rublev (1969), Stalker (1979), Nostalgia (1983) and 
Sacrifice (1986). I trace the development of the theme in Tarkovsky’s cinematic 
imagination, which progressed towards a modernization of the holy fool. Part of this 
modernization, I argue, is a drive towards a universalization of the figure, distilled 
down to its elemental religious significance as a figure of absolute faith. Tarkovsky 
begins his cinematic career with a holy fool refashioned in a traditional mould and 
ends with a type of existentialist holy fool with the attributes of a saviour. In order to 
support this interpretation I outline the affinities between Tarkovsky and Christian 
existentialism, and particularly the significance of the philosophy of Søren 
Kierkegaard. Reading Tarkovsky through a Kierkegaardian lens will help illuminate 
Tarkovsky’s critique of rationality in the modern age, and his use of the holy fool 
figure to provide a radical attack on contemporary society. 
 Having explored the Russian space as characteristically Orthodox, in the fifth 
chapter: The Suffering Fool in French Cinema I will move to compare and contrast 
the function of holy foolishness in the French Catholic world. After pulling together 
various theological and cultural strands, I will argue that the dominant note of holy 
foolishness in the Latin world is to be found in the notions of self-sacrifice and 
suffering. In visual terms the suffering body becomes a locus of meaning. I will 
highlight the role played by Pascal in shaping the religious discourse in French 
cinema, and particularly its manifestation in the films of Robert Bresson. The holy 
fool appears as a person of absolute faith. I first address this question through two 
works of Rohmer, Perceval and My night at Maud’s. A large part of the chapter is 
dedicated to the Bressonian religious figures who lend themselves to an 
interpretation as holy fools. His theological vision will be explored as part of an 
argument that his holy fools gradually evolve from Catholic models (as in Diary of a 
Country Priest and The Trial of Joan of Arc) towards non-traditional, ethically 
problematic forms (as in The Devil, Probably). However, it is Bresson’s Jansenistic 
imagination which accounts for the overly pessimistic turn in his later works. 
Ultimately the holy fools are the innocent victims of a society which is beyond 
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redemption, and from which the Bressonian holy fool attempts to escape. I will then 
cast a look at two portrayals of holy foolishness in 1980s, when French cinema 
witnessed a relatively significant increase in the number of religiously themed films. 
Alain Cavalier’s saint in Thérèse (1986) offers a luminous contrast to Maurice 
Pialat’s guilt-ridden priest in Under Satan’s Sun (1987) but both are linked by the 
common theme of self-inflicted suffering. Suffering and foolishness are again 
connected in Marion Laine’s A Simple Heart (2008). As in the films of Bresson, the 
function of holy fools in these films is to reveal through their suffering the injustice 
and immorality of an uncaring world.  
 To complement the Russian and French perspectives, Danish cinema, the 
subject of the final two chapters, will be taken as a means of exploring a Protestant 
cultural space. The opening section of the sixth chapter The Performance of the Holy 
Fool in Danish Cinema sketches the Danish religious context, highlighting the 
different theological stances taken with regard to human reason and how they can be 
interpreted as an oblique discourse on holy foolishness. I then examine the cinematic 
context, in which special attention will be given to the directors Carl Theodor Dreyer 
and Lars von Trier, whose work is particularly marked by the theme in The Passion 
of Joan of Arc, The Word, and Breaking the Waves respectively, whereas different 
feature films (Gabriel Axel’s Babette’s Feast, Anders Thomas Jensen’s Adam’s 
Apples) will be treated independently of their author’s personality. With most of 
these films, the possibility of an alternative spiritual reading insinuates itself towards 
the climax, when a miraculous event or a decisive act performed in the hope of the 
‘impossible’ casts a new perspective on the whole narrative. I argue that in the 
Protestant and particularly the Scandinavian context of Danish cinema, holy 
foolishness acquires two critical functions: first, it is used as a means to deconstruct 
worldly power structures and, second, it is a way of signalling the presence of 
another kingdom to come – a radically different order most commonly revealed in a 
metaphor as the reverse of the present world. 
The final chapter: Idiocy as Technique: the Dogme 95 Movement traces the 
vestiges of idiocy within the Danish Dogme 95 cinematic movement and uncovers 
the significance of this rediscovery of the idiot figure: not as a figure of 
entertainment but as something more profound. With Dogme 95 and its emblematic 
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Idioterne/The Idiots (1998) directed by Lars von Trier, who was the mastermind 
behind the whole movement, the idiot figure made a spectacular return into the 
limelight in European film, though in a far from triumphalist sense. I argue that the 
return of the figure of the fool in the Dogme films The Celebration (1998), The Idiots 
(1998), Mifune (1999), The King is Alive (2000), Truly Human (2001), and In Your 
Hands (2004) signifies a return of transcendence in the cinematic world as an 
affirmation of reality beyond the visible. This transcendence cannot be 
conceptualised but only experienced, which is why it comes to be expressed through 
the means of idiocy. Transcendence is no longer predicated on the inconvenient 
position of oppressive authority, a setting to which it was condemned by 
postmodernism. Under the mask of idiocy, the ‘truth’ for which the Dogme 95 
movement claimed to be striving is to be found in extreme humility. 
In this final chapter my proposition is that we should view Lars von Trier and 
the movement he initiated within the phenomenology of the holy fool paradigm. The 
advantage presented by this interpretation is that it can allow us to reconcile two 
apparently contradictory dimensions which frequently appear in discussion: the irony 
and the seriousness of the whole Dogme 95 project. While holy foolishness preserves 
playful elements, seriousness is rescued by reinterpreting this ‘game’ on a higher 
metaphysical level. In this new context, the critical function of the holy fool is 
therefore to indict the loss of the transcendental dimension of life in modern society, 
and to call attention to those on the margins of this world, excluded by their 
nonconformity. 
 By way of conclusion, I will summarise the findings from these explorations, 
which highlight the pervasive nature of the holy fool in contemporary cinema. By 
contrasting the wide variety of holy fools in European cinema, it will be possible to 
see which are indebted to traditional moulds, and which keep only a loose similarity 
to their precursors. The holy fool still holds an ethico-religious function in cinema, 
adapted to the contemporary context, and as I argue in the final chapter, its power 
promises to surprise and challenge conformity in the cinematic medium for some 




Holy Fools and Folly: Literature Review and 
Methodology 
 
 In the penultimate sequence of Tarkovsky’s last film Sacrifice, the great 
director portrays a man scrambling around, throwing objects onto a table, creating a 
pile of debris which looms larger and larger. The man searches for matches, and it 
becomes clear that he means to light a bonfire. The realisation dawns on us that he is 
setting his own house on fire! From a distance he then watches with insouciant calm 
as the raging flames devour the house while around him the family panics. In the 
mêlée an ambulance arrives, and the paramedics seize the man and take him away to 
be sectioned: this is the fate of the mad. No resistance is offered, and he remains 
silent, for he has pledged to give up everything. Having witnessed the opening stages 
of a nuclear holocaust, the man has promised to God that he will sacrifice all he 
owns if this disaster can be undone. The man is Alexander; an aesthetics professor 
and a former actor who played both Dostoevsky’s protagonist in Idiot - Prince 
Myshkin - the personification of foolish goodness, and Shakespeare’s Richard III, 
the quintessence of evil. His sacrificial gesture appears to the outside world as 
undeniably foolish, and his folly represents one of the key character types in modern 
cinema: the holy fool. Like most cinematic holy fools, Alexander has a powerful 
critical function: in this case, to highlight the lack of faith in the modern world and 
its inability to atone for tragedy. 
The world of cinematic holy foolishness is variegated and yet the figure appears 
in recognizable forms right across the European cultural space. This does not so 
much reflect the individual visions of a wide variety of directors, as points to the fact 
that the figure has developed according to particular confessional and cultural 
traditions. To understand these traditions, and the place of the holy fool within 
European culture, we must begin by addressing some fundamental questions about 
the figure. What do we mean by such a term as holy foolishness, and how are we to 
understand its character? To what extent is the holy fool representative of either 
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traditional or modern values? And how typical is his location in a moral framework 
where he can be used as a critical device to help the audience make a distinction 
between good and evil?  
In unpicking these questions this thesis will begin by locating the holy fool in 
European culture and perfomative art. In order to establish these foundations it is 
first necessary to explore the phenomenon of the holy fool at large and its 
interpretation in scholarly literature. This will allow me to explain my methodology 
in this thesis, and the way in which my approach is indebted to recent scholarship in 
the fields of film and religion. The first part of this chapter will be devoted to 
outlining the reasons why the holy fool has developed such a range of meanings and 
functions in European culture, drawing on insights from the disciplines of socio-
cultural studies, theology, literature and film studies. These insights will provide a 
framework for evaluating the continuities and discontinuities between the cinematic 
holy fools and their predecessors. The second part of the chapter explains the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis, and the techniques I will be using to 
analyse the critical function of the holy fool in European cinema. At the heart of my 
approach is the use of intertexuality which permits a dialogue between the cinematic 
holy fools and their cultural predecessors. Meaning is formed in the space opened by 
this dialogue, providing a new understanding of the critical functions of the holy 
fool. The precursors of the cinematic fools, rooted in particular national and cultural 
contexts, enable each film to be analysed within the particular cultural tradition of a 
national cinema. It is this national cinema, I will argue, that mobilizes the religious 
and cultural myths of a country, and enables insights to be drawn from the 
comparative approach taken in this thesis, in which I focus on film in three very 
different nations with distinct confessional traditions: Russia, France and Denmark. 
The emphasis in this thesis on cultural context will allow an enriched understanding 
of the functions of the holy fool, even where this has been embedded in particular 
narrative and film-specific techniques. 
The following literature review is located at the intersection between research 
on the secular fool, whose foolishness is determined by either madness or idiocy 
(whether feigned or not) and the holy fool, who is integrated into a moral or theistic 
framework that elevates him/her to a transcendental level. I will therefore provide a 
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catalogue of various perspectives in order to unpick the range of meanings found in 
modern scholarship. A caveat should be given here from the outset: the fool is an 
archetypal figure endowed with a great capacity for proliferation and metamorphosis. 
The studies covered here are not only drawn from numerous disciplines, but consider 
variants of the figure located in many different historical and cultural contexts. The 
material is organized comparatively to reflect the synchronic and diachronic 
continuities and discontinuities of the holy fool figure in Eastern and Western 
Christianity. Furthermore, the criteria applied when selecting scholarship for 
discussion include the applicability of the scholar’s insights to cinematic criticism. 
To further this purpose, two other premises have influenced the selection. First, that 
the scholarship should have a degree of applicability to the holy fool, which among 
other characteristics, is aligned with an experience of the transcendental, particularly 
within a European Christian context. Second, the research should provide an 
opportunity to better understand the holy fool as it appears in the cinematic medium. 
As the analysis below will demonstrate, although a great deal of attention has been 
paid to the holy fool as a hagiographic and literary character, the figure has received 
comparatively little attention in cinematic scholarship or in the field of film and 
religion.  
The holy fool has variously been classified as an anthropological, social, 
religious and literary type. Much more recently, it has been recognised in cinematic 
typology as a distinct category linked to the imitation and representation of Christ.1 
The principle of organization for this literature review will be dictated by these areas 
of research. Given that the fool is a universally attested type both in traditional and 
modern cultures, I will begin with insights into the phenomenon from the perspective 
of scholarship in social and cultural studies. Secondly, the theological dimension will 
be introduced, in order to explain how the idea of holiness comes to the fore as a 
feature of folly. Finally, I will uncover how the figure has been treated in scholarship 
on literature and the performing arts. Drawing from these sources, it will be possible 
                                                
1 Lloyd Baugh in Imaging the Divine: Jesus and Christ-Figures in Film (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 
1997) appears to be the first scholar to acknowledge the character typology of the Christ-like figure 
in cinema. This does not mean that the term has not been used before him to describe certain 
cinematic characters. 
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to explain why it is important to uncover the various functions of the fool, and 
particularly the holy fool, as an important device in modern cinema. 
 
Sociological and cultural perspectives  
The history of the fool in human society is rooted deep in cultural practices, 
and appears in a number of forms. Anthropogical and social studies have revealed 
that there are affinities between these forms stemming from the ways in which they 
have their own autonomy and challenge logical norms. The following studies will 
map the forms of folly in European societies, revealing a multiplicity of functions 
that range from comic relief to truth-revealer. In his serious hypostasis, the fool is 
mainly confined to the ethical sphere, where he holds up a mirror to human vices and 
exposes the pretence of his fellows. It is interesting that early scholarship on folly did 
not immediately pick up a consistent historical or fictional figure through which 
foolishness and madness were aligned. This suggests that the figure of the holy fool 
was not a clearly defined type in the Western popular and cultured imagination. In 
more recent studies, perhaps under the influence of the Eastern European paradigm, 
historians have begun to pay closer attention to this figure as a clear type.  
In one of the earliest sociological studies, Enid Welsford’s The Fool: His 
Social and Literary History (1935) documented the presence of the fool - in his 
variants of buffoon, court-fool and stage clown - across centuries and cultures but her 
main focus remained that of Europe. Her study encompasses both historical fools – 
either natural or artificial - and fictional fools. The first part traces back the historical 
figure of the buffoon, or the jesting parasite, to Greece and Rome and follows him 
later to Byzantium and through the Middle Ages in Italy, England, France and 
Germany. She argues that the origins of the medieval buffoon can be found in the 
East, in collections of Arab stories and jokes from before the 10th century. Stories of 
the buffoon percolated throughout Europe during the Middle Ages, the most famous 
character being Till Eulenspiegel. The second part of the study looks at the court-
fool, who is distinguished from the buffoon through his abnormal appearance 
(physical deformity was sometimes associated with mental deficiency) and social 
isolation. His history is traced back to the court of the Pharoahs in Egypt and the 
Graeco-Roman world. The closest Welsford gets to the figure of the holy fool is in a 
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chapter on the fool as poet and clairvoyant. Here, she considers the special reverence 
that has been given the madman in antiquity and later in the Slav and Arab world; 
this was transferred to Ireland in the Middle Ages in the distinctive figure of the 
clairvoyant poet, who also had the characteristics of a holy man. After analysing the 
function of the court-fool as an entertainer and truth-teller during the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance in Europe and England, she looks at the Feast of Fools (staged 
on the day of Epiphany by the lower clergy under the presidium of a lord of Misrule, 
who conducted a mock mass in which the church hierarchy was reversed) and the 
French fool-fraternities. Emerging from such societies the fool came to permeate 
literature in two ways: either as a theme of meditation or as a stylized comic figure. 
Beginning with the 13th century the fool populated the sotties, a type of comedy in 
which the fool played the role of a critic of society. He then entered the morality 
plays and religious mystery plays as a secondary character. Two major contributions 
to the fool-literature were Sebastian Brant’s satire Narrenschiff (1494) and 
Desiderius Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly (1509), followed in the Elizabethan period 
by Shakespeare’s As You Like It and King Lear. The last part of Welsford’s book is 
dedicated to the most resilient variant of the fool, the clown, who from Antiquity to 
Charlie Chaplin has acted as a corrective to the pretentious ways of officialdom and 
as a safety valve for popular unruliness. 
Welsford’s study introduced the idea that the fool was a constant presence in 
European cultural life from the Middle Ages onwards, but it was a French post-war 
study that first paid serious attention to the fool’s critical role in relation to state 
power. In Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (1961) Michel 
Foucault narrates the history of freedom and the confinement of folly [the French 
term folie has a much broader meaning than its usual translation as ‘madness’]. In the 
Middle Ages folly was vocal, ubiquitous, multifaceted and ambivalent. A whole host 
of vices are attributed to folly in tales and satires. At the same time the fool in farces 
and sotties is seen as the guardian of truth. If, Foucault suggests, during the Middle 
Ages folly was just one of numerous vices, in Renaissance it comes to the fore as the 
originator of all. Brant’s Narrenschiff and Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly teem with 
vicious fools. It was the neo-classical age, he suggested, that reduced folly to silence, 
the symbolic year in this process being 1657, when the Hôpital Général was founded 
16 
by royal decree with the aim to confine the outcasts of Paris. The 18th century 
continued the process of confinement with attempts to protect the lights of reason 
from being engulfed by the darkness of madness. Only the Romantics succeeded 
partially in rehabilitating its aura, but in practice from the early 19th century madness 
came to be designated as a mental illness. This marks a very important departing 
point in the history of folly, since from this moment foolishness came to bear the 
stigma of mental sickness. I should be clear that medical discourse does not concern 
this literature review, since it does not illuminate the nature and significance of holy 
foolishness. A clinical assessment would identify and classify mental abnormalities, 
but in the end would remain silent about that essential part: the ‘holiness’ of the 
‘patient’.2 More relevant are the confinement and repression of folly which Foucault 
identifies with the medical institutions, especially when they make an alliance with 
the state power.  
In Foucault’s history, holy folly - the folly of the Cross - finds its place, but 
rather as a theme than a practical function. In the 17th century, he argues, the great 
theme of the folly of the cross, which had captured the Renaissance imagination, 
began to recede in Western Europe, with its final stronghold to be found in the 
austere musings of Blaise Pascal and the Jansenists. Before this it was a question of 
reason abandoning its pride and surrendering itself to the madness of self-sacrifice. 
In early Christianity the folly of the Cross is opposed to false reason and simply 
equated with a wisdom not recognized by the Roman state. The scandal of the Cross, 
of Christian faith and Christian abnegation, was lost in a European world that had 
become wholly Christian, Foucault argues, only to re-emerge with Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche. Surprisingly, Foucault does not mention here Kierkegaard whose critique 
has affinities with his own. In exchange, the Cross began to teach a different lesson. 
During his life Christ kept company with the mad people, while on the cross he 
embraced folly as the lowest point of humanity, where it meets bestiality. Therefore 
folly has been sanctified by Christ and deserves respect, as do all the fools or mad 
people residing in the houses of confinement, as St Vincent de Paul (1581 –1660) 
                                                
2 One example is Movies & Mental Illness: Using Films to Understand Psychotherapy, Danny 
Wedding, Mary Ann Boyd, and Ryan M. Niemiec (Cambridge, Mass: Hogrefe and Huber, 2005). 
Here Konchalovski’s House of Fools is illustrative of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders and 
Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of Arc represents a controversial subject for the historians interested in 
psychopathology treatment 
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advised. The lesson that madness taught was ultimately one about mankind’s fall and 
salvation.3  
 Other sociologists have taken Foucault’s suggestion further that the fool is a 
threat to modern social norms and authorities. For the sociologist Orin E. Klapp, life 
is a continuous process of fool-making. Having ascribed the role of the fool as a 
descent in status, the fool continuously destabilises social relations. His/her deviation 
from the norm reveals three characteristics: it is an extreme exaggeration of 
deficiency; it is an evidence of weakness and irresponsibility; and it is an offence 
against propriety. When it is a part of the social structure, the fool’s status is low, 
ridiculed, but tolerated and licensed. This is a paradoxical situation since he/she can 
be valued and depreciated at the same time.4 Klapp’s classification of fools seems to 
be based on empirical identification of the types, without any unifying criterion: the 
antic fool, the comic rogue, the rash fool, the clumsy fool, the deformed fool, the 
simple fool, the weak fool, the comic butt, the pompous fool and the mock hero. In 
his impressive gallery of types, the holy fool does not feature at all.   
In spite of this apparent inflation of fools, other social theorists raise the 
question of their very existence in the present age. In his Reality in a Looking-Glass: 
Rationality through an Analysis of Traditional Folly (1982) sociologist Anton C. 
Zijderveld analyses the phenomenon of folly in medieval Europe, from popular fools 
of common origin (clerical and intellectual misfits, lower clergy, peasants and 
burghers) to professional court fools, the permanent companions (and licensed 
critics) of absolutist power. Because of the fools’ position outside of normative 
conduct, he suggests that folly is an agent of modernity through its tendency towards 
secularism and materialism, individualism, and relativism. Finally, Zijderveld asks 
whether true folly is still possible in modernity. His line of argument leads to a 
negative answer. The worldview and ethos of folly, he suggests, has always been 
parasitical in the sense that it develops a counter-reality to the current situation. In a 
cultural climate where there is a plurality of competing worldviews and where 
religiosity is not necessarily linked to an institution, folly can no longer establish 
such a counter-reality. The extinction of folly, first announced by the loss of the 
                                                
3 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. by 
Richard Howard (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 80-81 
4 Orrin E. Klapp, ‘The Fool as a Social Type’, American Journal of Sociology, 55 (1949), 157-162 
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fool’s ‘magical aura and the heuristic surplus value’ at the beginning of the 
Enlightenment, is now a fait accompli.5 This thesis will challenge Zijderveld’s 
assumptions, particularly his belief that folly is always an agent of relativism and 
materialism. This is to paint the folly too narrowly, and to misunderstand the cultural 
origins of the holy fool. The ethical and transcendental aspects of the holy fool, I will 
explain, have retained their critical force on account of their ability to throw 
modernity into relief, and challenge contemporary norms.  
The performative dimension of the holy fool in European culture is explored 
in more recent social studies. Sandra Billington’s A Social History of the Fool (1984) 
focuses chiefly on England, from the Middle Ages until the beginning of the 20th 
century. Of interest is the chapter dedicated to the theological and philosophical 
attitudes towards the fool. She notes that the initial meaning of ‘fool’ was a witless 
person, the court jester being known as joculator or minstrel. The witless man was 
considered closer to God, according to an Anglo-Saxon translation of Pope 
Gregory’s Liber Pastoralis from the 6th century. Moreover, people could hear St 
Paul’s first Letter to the Corinthians, verses 19-23, in which he referred to himself as 
speaking as a fool, prior to Shrovetide. In the mystery plays, particularly the 
Wakefield Buffeting of Christ and the York plays of the Lytsteres and Tyllemakers, 
Christ is made to participate in a foolish game and is taken for an idiot. 
The sociological analysis of the Christian model of holy foolishness has 
revealed intriguing insights into its critical possibilities. As Harvey G. Cox notices, 
representing Christ in a motley costume was made possible by the re-emergence of 
the clown in the public imagination.6 The figure of the clown has offered a new 
idiom for articulating the concept of divine foolishness in theological and artistic 
discourse as well. The anthropologist Don Handelman, for instance, in a chapter 
dedicated to the ‘symbolic types’ in his Models and mirrors: towards an 
anthropology of public events (1990), identifies the clown figure in this role and 
locates it in the ritual context of archaic societies. He counts it as a ‘symbolic type’, 
which is characterised by the fact that it does not engage in a process of negotiation 
                                                
5 Anton C. Zijderveld, Reality in a Looking-Glass: Rationality through an Analysis of Traditional 
Folly (London: Routledge, 1982) and On Clichés: the Supersedure of Meaning by Function in 
Modernity, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 10 
6 Harvey G. Cox, The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on Festivity and Fantasy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972) 
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with roles, personae and context; it is self-sufficient and autonomous, which makes it 
consistently and entirely true to its own logic of internal composition. The radicalism 
of the symbolic type comes from its power to shape the context according to its own 
logic. In an essay entitled ‘Arrange Me into Disorder: Fragments and Reflections of 
Ritual Clowning’7 the cultural scholar Barbara A. Babcock speculates over this 
relation between ironic and playful ways of philosophising, and ritual clowning. All 
of them, in her opinion, displace the dialectical reasoning by playful and paralogical 
thought and the logical argument is replaced by paradox. As such they can be 
considered hypothetical and subjunctive modes of culture. In a public event 
foolishness can disrupt the expected logic and create a space for questioning and 
dialogue. Particularly in its comic form, the fool transcends the mundane in the name 
of a radically transformed reality. Folly presents a counter-world, an upside-down 
world. It takes an act of faith, however, to pass from the escapist world of the comic 
into the counter-world of faith. This I think sets the right framework for considering 
the theological dimension of folly. 
 
Theological perspectives 
The socio-cultural literature provides a good way of locating the holy fool on 
a larger social and cultural canvas, on which it is clear that in European culture there 
have been a multiplicity of follies. In this field, however, there is limited treatment of 
holy foolishness, and particularly its relation to European Christian traditions. The 
study of holy foolishness has almost exclusively been the preserve of theological 
scholarship. This should not surprise us when we consider that it was the religious 
context that gave rise to and shaped the practices of the holy fool in Europe. 
However, a certain imbalance has arisen due to the dominance of the figure of the 
holy fool in Orthodox Christian spirituality, with the result that a great number of 
such studies are dedicated to the hagiographic fools, mainly Russian and Greek, that 
are held as archetypal.8 Theologians of Western Christianity have not remained blind 
                                                
7 Barbara A. Babcock, "Arrange Me into Disorder: Fragments and Reflections on Ritual Clowning," 
in Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals towards a Theory of Cultural Performances, ed. by 
John J. MacAloof, Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human  Issues, 1984, pp. 102-128 
8 Ioan Kovalevski, Fericiti nebuni pentru Hristos, trans. by Boris Buzilă (Bucharest: Anastasia, 1992) 
Sergei A. Ivanov, Holy Fools in Byzantium and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
George P. Fedotov, ‘The Holy Fools’ in The Russian Religious Mind, vol. 2, The Middle Ages: The 
20 
to this peculiar version of sanctity and there have been attempts either to demonstrate 
the existence of a Western counterpart9 to the Orthodox holy fool, or to advocate 
through them the recovery of a lost sense of festivity and counter-world.10 Such 
theological scholarship identifies the forms that holy foolishness takes, and allows us 
to consider how holy fools might differ across the different confessional worlds in 
Europe.  
I will say much more about the Christian origins of holy foolishness in the 
following chapter, but it is worth noting the dominance of Orthodox, particularly 
Russian, theological studies of holy foolishness in the literature. The first theological 
exploration of Russian holy foolishness was undertaken by Ioann Kovalevskii in his 
Iurodstvo o Khriste i Khrista radi iurodivye Vostochnoi I Russkoi Tserkvi (1895). It 
is an uncritical collection of the lives of the Russian holy fools gathered from 
standard hagiographical texts, and is introduced by the author’s considerations on the 
topic in the context of Orthodox spirituality. Kovalevskii outlines the prima facie 
characteristics of this ascetic practice as resulting from the hagiographies: the 
relinquishing of human reason, flaunting of human conventions, and acquisition of 
the gift of clairvoyance, all of which recommended their mode as one of protest 
against the excessive attraction towards worldly cares and an indicator of a higher 
purpose of human life. More recently the cultural historian G. P. Fedotov has offered 
a selective account of the lives of the Russian holy fools in his The Russian Religious 
Mind, The Middle Ages: The Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries (1966), 
                                                                                                                                     
Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 316-
343; Svitlana Kobets, ‘Foolishness in Christ: East vs. West’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 34 
(2000), 337-363, ‘The Russian Paradigm of Iurodsto and Its Genesis in Novgorod’, Canadian-
American Slavic Studies, 34 (2000), 337-364; Elena Volkova and Dana Heller, ‘The holy fool in 
Russian and American culture: a dialogue’, American Studies International, 41 (2003), pp. 152-178; 
Dana Heller, ‘Holy Fools, Secular Saints, and Illiterate Saviors in American Literature and Popular 
Culture’, Comparative Literature and Culture: A WWWeb Journal, 5.3 (2003) 
<http://clcwebjournal.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb03-3/heller03.html>; Lennart Ryden, ‘The Holy Fool’ 
in The Byzantine Saint: 14th Spring symposium: Papers, ed. by Sergei Hackel (University of 
Birmingham: Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, 1981); Derek Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool: 
Leontius’s Life and the Late Antique City (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1996) 
9 John Saward in Perfect Fools (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) is particularly interested in 
demonstrating the existence of a Western counterpart. Kallistos Ware in The Inner Kingdom 
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2000) dedicates a chapter to the Eastern paradigm.  
10 Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools; Peter L. Berger, Redeeming Laughter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1997)  
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considering the phenomenon ‘the most radical form of Christian kenoticism’11 whose 
paradoxical expression (scandalous behaviour and feign immorality) is meant to lay 
bare the radical contradiction between Christian truth and common sense and 
morality. He also notes that the prophetism of holy fools in the 16th century acquired 
the social and political role that the church and holy men had had in previous 
centuries. 
Most theological studies dedicated to holy fools take for granted that the 
Orthodox world has a monopoly over the paradigm. However, more recently 
attention has been paid to the existence of a Western, Catholic tradition of holy 
foolishness. John Saward’s Perfect Fools (1980) strives to demonstrate the existence 
of an equivalent phenomenon in Western Christianity. Saward’s study is important 
for pointing out a different emphasis in Western Christianity, thus allowing for a 
variant of the paradigm. It can be inferred that the concept that opposes worldly 
wisdom in the West is simplicity rather than foolishness: ‘The literature of early 
monasticism furnishes us with examples of two distinct, though closely related, kinds 
of ‘holy unwisdom’, namely, holy idiocy and folly for Christ’s sake.’12 In this case 
the one who professes it is more likely to appear as a holy idiot rather than a 
madman. Saward’s definition of holy foolishness or what he calls ‘holy unwisdom’ 
allows the concept to embrace both the Eastern foolishness and the Western idiocy: 
as he declares, ‘Folly for Christ’s sake is a kind of dispossession, the surrender of 
worldly wisdom for Christ’s sake.’13  
The Russian Byzantinologist Alexei A Ivanov’s monograph Holy Fools in 
Byzantium and Beyond (2006), initially published in 1994 under the title Vizantiiskoe 
iurodstvo, offers a cultural (though not less theological) history of foolishness for 
Christ (salia) in Byzantium, widening its scope with references not only to its 
Russian heritage and the Western counterpart, but also, with some caveats, Islamic 
variants. His textual analysis uncovers the different stages of development of the 
practice with the corresponding behavioural specifics and theological justifications. 
The hagiographical texts range from the first description of foolish behaviour in the 
Egyptian and Syrian monasticism to paradigmatic holy fools and finally figures who 
                                                
11 Fedotov, p. 316 
12 Saward, p. 12 
13 Saward, p. 68 
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only partially meet the criteria for a holy fool. He argues that the practice spread 
from the monasteries throughout the Eastern part of the Roman Empire by wandering 
monks and only in a later third stage developed into an urban phenomenon.  
Ivanov’s study on Russian holy foolishness reflects the way in which recent 
scholarship is providing useful information about the evolution of the phenomenon 
during several centuries across different regions of Russia. Such studies are allowing 
us to see the specific differences and, more importantly, to assess the dynamism and 
multifariousness of the phenomenon. They also challenge the widely held 
assumption that there is one paradigm of holy foolishness in European Christianity. 
Svetlana V. Kobets’s doctoral thesis Genesis and Development of Holy Foolishness 
as a Textual Topos in Early Russian Literature (2001) offers such a historic 
exploration. She not only discussed Russian foolishness for Christ (iurodstvo) 
against the background of its pre-dating Byzantine models, highlighting the elements 
of originality, but she also outlines the developmental stages in the formation of the 
paradigm. Importantly, Kobets identifies the ways in which the discourse of the 
Russian holy fool has come to be claimed by non-practitioners as a critical device, 
utilizing the position of cultural and moral authority that the holy fool enjoys.14  
The development of the holy fool as a critical device is further explored in 
Andrew Thomas’s doctoral dissertation The Holy Fools: a Theological Enquiry 
(2009) in which he conducts, under the influence of Foucaultian interrogations, a 
complex study of the significance of the practices of holy foolishness against the 
background of the Christian monasticism in the 4th to 7th centuries. He argues that 
holy fools gave expression to a critique of the institutions and practices that 
supported knowledge in both the religious and secular spheres. In this respect their 
practices are similar to apophatic theology. Through their provocative behaviour they 
also challenge moral knowledge and deny the configuration of holiness as conceived 
both in monasticism and the city, refusing to circumscribe holiness to a particular 
ascetic practice and God to a certain perimeter.15  
                                                
14 Kobets, Svitlana, ‘Genesis and development of holy foolishness as a textual topos in early Russian 
literature’, doctoral thesis (University of Illinois, 2001), pp. 209-292 
15 Andrew Thomas, ‘The holy fools: a theological enquiry’, doctoral thesis (University of Nottingham, 
2009) 
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These studies alert us to the importance of the cultural and literary 
conventions that govern the hagiographical genre of holy fools. The character of the 
holy fool is not usually taken to be fictional but access to his life is mediated and his 
life is shaped into a certain pattern. The hagiographer has already translated the 
significance of holy fools’ actions into words, disclosing the intention behind them 
and offering criteria for interpretation. There is a sense in which the narrative is more 
than a simple account since it interprets itself theologically. Furthermore it is not 
only a question of conventions but also of the biographer’s own agenda that is given 
expression through the way he attaches an interpretation to the life of the fool. As 
Paul Magdalino pointed out some of the holy fool figures are literary constructs 
employed to convey the hagiographer’s message, which acquired a particular 
historical significance. 16 
On a closer look the hagiographic studies alert us to the fact that holy 
foolishness is a relational concept, by which I mean that it engages with the cultural 
context in order to acquire a particular meaning. It is neither a homogenous nor a 
fixed phenomenon: the core meaning is preserved but its form is under constant 
negotiation in time and space17. While it is profitable to draw on previous 
understandings and different perspectives in order to develop a fully-fledged image 
of the ideas that have enriched its paradigm in time, special attention should be given 
to investigating the specific connotations it has acquired in contemporary society, 
with particular reference to literature and cinema as important arenas for negotiating 
meaning. Literature and cinema make use of their right to freely and creatively 
transfigure the theological model.  
                                                
16 Paul Magdalino, ‘What we heard in the Lives of the saints we have seen with our own eyes: holy 
man as literary text in tenth-century Constantinople’ in The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, ed. by James Howard-Johnston and Paul Antony Hayward (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 83-112 
17 In spite of John Saward’s efforts to accredit the idea of a similar phenomenon in the West, Jean-
Marie Fritz has demonstrated in Le discours du fou au Moyen A ̂ge: XIIe ̳-XIIIe ̳ sie ̀cles (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1992) that there are important nuances: feigning folly is assumed as a 
penitential work and it does not constitute an aim in itself – it is rather understood as a stage. Then, 
in most cases holy foolishness is performed within the constraints of respectability, striking a much 
graver note that in the East.  Moreover, within the apparently monolithic Eastern paradigm there are 
variations between the Byzantine and the Russian holy fool. As Sergei A Ivanov has shown, in the 
context of Russia, the latter acquires a political significance that the Byzantine did not know. The 
paradigm is not only enriched, but even changed under popular pressure. In Russia no pathological 
connotation was attached to mental illness so it did not constitute a barrier against the veneration of 




An examination of literary scholarship on foolishness has much to offer since 
literature tends both to absorb and shape ideas derived from the national religious 
culture. Given the literary inspiration that lies behind much modern filmmaking, it is 
important to unpick such treatment. In this section I follow a chronological principle 
of organization and reflect on the various approaches to the holy fool as fictional 
character. It becomes clear that not only does the holy fool feature widely across 
European national cultures, but also that holy fools figures are varied, the most 
peculiar being those that feature in Russian literature. It is worth noticing that, 
beyond the particularities of each type, determined by the context they emerge from, 
literary critics have put forward theories that reach a sufficient degree of generality 
to be useful in the analysis of cinematic fools. 
Among European national cultures it is perhaps in Russian literature that the 
holy fool has extended the deepest roots. This is reflected in the literary scholarship 
on the subject. The prolific Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin paid particular 
attention to the function the holy fool type has had in literature, both popular and 
cultured, and his remarks are helpful when applied to film. In his The Dialogic 
Imagination (1975) Bakhtin analyses the importance for the later development of the 
novel of three types present in the folkloric satires and parodies – the fool, the rogue 
and the clown. A few characteristics stand out from the Bakhtinian text. First, the 
fool has a metaphorical significance. Both the fool and the clown, he argues, 
represent a metamorphosis of the Tsar and god.18 Second their existence is a 
reflection of some other mode of being: they externalize the private life of the other 
and make it public. Third they have the right to be “other” and from this perspective 
they can see the pretence in each situation. In novels (and arguably cinematic works), 
the author can use just their image in the struggle against convention and for 
authenticity. The next step is their transformation into a major protagonist. In both 
cases the figures are likely to be the bearers of the authorial point of view. Bakhtin’s 
theory of the carnavalesque was elaborated in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
                                                
18 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four essays, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1981), p. 161 
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(1929) and Rabelais and His World (1965), in which he offers the appropriate 
background for the figure since the fool is the primary performer in the relativization 
and reversal of the official seriousness brought about by the carnival. Thus a 
marginal figure such as the fool has the ability to undermine the stability of the 
dominant social structure and the predominant, ‘dogmatic’ worldview.  
A. Panchenko’s article ‘Laughter as spectacle’, a classic of Russian literary 
criticism, is part of the monograph Laughter in Old Rus (1984). The framework here 
is informed by Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque, so it is not surprising that it 
reflects this influence. In the author’s opinion the holy fool occupies an intermediate 
position between the comic world and church culture, begetting a third world. Holy 
foolishness has a passive side, turned inwardly, manifested in ascetic self-abasement, 
faked madness and mortification of the flesh, and an active one expressed as 
contempt of the world, peaceful existence, denouncing of the vices, and flaunting 
public decency. The latter can be seen as social criticism or protest and has a marked 
theatrical quality. In his/her passion play the holy fool is both actor and director. 
His/her ‘art’ seeks personal salvation but is in the service of the public as well. 
Aesthetically, the life of the holy fool is a refutation of the conventional ideal of 
beauty, a reversal of it, due to the absorption of the aesthetic element into the ethical 
one.19 By contrast to the cultural and theological approaches Panchenko looks at the 
phenomenology of holy foolishness from a performative perspective, relating the 
holy fool to his/her audience. 
Ewa M. Thompson’s Understanding Russia: The Holy Fool in Russian 
Culture (1987) is illustrative of a kind of literary criticism which uses the holy fool 
trope as a tool to interpret Russian culture. The study marks an important step in 
providing a theory for how hagiograpical holy fools relate to their literary 
counterparts. The book is also known for expressing the ‘heretical’ view about the 
shamanistic roots of Russian holy foolishness but engaging with that idea is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. A Slavist, Thompson is interested in the posterity of the 
historical holy fool in literature. She points out two stages: until the October 
Revolution (1917) the common literary holy fool had an appearance very similar to 
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the historical or hagiographical figures. The last decades of the Empire gave way to a 
‘stylized’ holy fool, who ‘adopted himself to the mode of behaviour prevalent among 
the educated Russians of his time’20. He enacts the holy fool attitude without being a 
real one. However, he retains the function of the real one by casting aspersions on 
the ‘bourgeois’ characters, travelling from one place to the other and experiencing 
personal epiphanies or illuminations. Moreover, the five binary oppositions that form 
the ‘holy fool code’ remain unchanged: wisdom/foolishness, purity/impurity, 
tradition/rootlessness, meekness/aggression, veneration/derision.  
If we want to ask how holy foolishness can engage with society in other ways 
than the strictly religious, Harriet Murav’s Holy Foolishness: Dostoevsky’s novels 
and the Poetics of Cultural Critique (1992) provides a good answer. Dostoevsky’s 
animosity towards the increased over-rationalization of life is well known. Murav is 
looking at the way he was critiquing his culture’s appropriation of natural science 
and its claims to certainty through the trope of holy foolishness. In The Idiot, for 
example, he presents conflicting interpretations of Prince Myshkin’s epilepsy as a 
‘higher state’ or as a pathology, continuously undermining a strictly medical 
interpretation.21  
Vicki K Janik puts together a composite collection of historical and fictional 
fools in her monograph Fools and Jesters in Literature, Art and History (1998). In 
spite of their variety, she proposes two criteria of classification: first, the fool’s 
perception and acknowledgement of his own weaknesses and desires, and second, 
the fool’s perception and acknowledgement of the weaknesses and desires of those 
around him. This results in four categories: the wise fool who perceives and 
acknowledge both his own weaknesses and that of others; the dupe or victim who 
perceives and acknowledge his own desires but not those of the others; the trickster 
or evildoer who does not perceive his own weaknesses but he does when it comes to 
others; and the innocent or holy fool who fails to perceive either his/her weaknesses 
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or those of the others. In Janik’s classification, the holy fool practically corresponds 
to the idiot figure and has no aura of mystery or holiness.22 
 Only three decades after Zijderveld was wondering whether the holy fool 
could persist, we can therefore see that the study of holy foolishness has begun to 
proliferate in modern scholarship. What could be the explanation? In a recent article 
entitled ‘Modern Tragicomedy and the Fool’ (2007) Faye Ran unravels the 
surprising modernity of the fool. She sees the ubiquitous presence of the fools in 
tragicomedy as a consequence of ‘our modern penchant for dialectic subversiveness 
and multifaceted indeterminacy.’23 In 20th-century drama, literature and film the fool 
is emblematic of rebelliousness, protean passion and problematic perceptions. In 
spite of his apparent modernity the fool draws on an archetypal configuration which 
comprises five aspects: an idiosyncratic appearance and behaviour, maladaptation, 
his/her function as a target and source of humour and laughter, marginality, duality 
(dovetails opposite attributes). The contradictoriness of the fool reflects the 
ambivalent self-constructs of the modern individual and his/problematic interaction 
with society. 
Tihana Maravic’s doctoral thesis Il folle in Christo comme performer. 
Teatralta e performativita nel fenomeno della sacra follia a Bisanzio (secc. IV-XIV) 
e in Russia (secc. XI-XVII), (2008), is, to the best of my knowledge, unique due to its 
theatrological approach. Maravic’s original contribution lies in further developing A. 
M. Panchenko’s comments on holy foolishness as a form of theatricality and 
connecting it to the art of the actor and the theatre of Grotowski. She investigates the 
performative character of holy foolishness as religious practice both in Byzantium 
and Russia. In her opinion the holy fool operates in the popular imagination on two 
levels: action (gesture and word), which is outwardly directed towards an audience, 
and image, which expresses an inward work, self-directed, in imitation of Christ’s 
passion.24 The result is an ‘iconic theatre’ with cathartic effects in which the holy 
fool represents the foolish love of an incarnate and suffering God. Maravic’s findings 
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have implications for cinema as the viewer comes in direct visual contact with the 
image of the holy fool as suffering body (Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of Arc is perhaps 
the most famous example). 
 
The cinematic perspective 
While the theatrical and performative elements of the holy fool have been 
recognized in theological and literary scholarship, these insights have not yet been 
satisfactorily applied in studies of film. This is surprising and unfortunate given the 
pervasive nature of the figure in European cinema. In the absence of a definition of 
the cinematic holy fool figure put forward in film scholarship, this thesis challenges 
the existing literature on film and offers a new model for understanding the figure 
and its critical function. 
The classical study of madness in cinema, Michael Fleming and Roger 
Manvell’s Images of Madness: Portrayal of Insanity in the Feature Film25 seems to 
be innocent of the significance of holy foolishness in European film. The chapter on 
sanity as madness and madness as sanity discusses Frank Capra’s You Can’t Take It 
with You (1938) and Philippe de Broca’s King of Hearts (1966) only in conjunction 
with contemporary psychiatric theories. Only a brief reference to Christ the Fool is 
made to account for the foolish behaviour of the protagonist of the former. A few 
years later the authors return with another article on the same subject, ‘Through a 
Lens, Darkly’26. Even if Fleming and Manvell don’t explicitly state that they are 
going to ignore European cinema, it is rarely present and they focus almost wholly 
on Hollywood productions. They use three alternative concepts of madness: as 
human nature gone awry, as response to social injustice, and as enlightenment. Holy 
foolishness could have featured under the last heading but is ignored. Still, when 
they write about madness as enlightenment the selection of films they use makes it 
clear that what they have in mind is not a transcendent source of illumination. The 
failure to establish a connection between the holy and the divine and to develop 
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discussion around the way in which modernity challenges the theological model, 
leaves us without the interpretative tools necessary to understand the flourishing of 
the character type in contemporary cinema.  
One of the great difficulties with the literature of film and religion 
scholarship is that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no explicit working 
definition for the holy fool. Lloyd Baugh labels them merely as ‘extreme Christ 
figures’27. In Imagining the Divine: Jesus and Christ-Figures in Film (1997) he 
makes an inventory of what he calls ‘essential dimensions and typical guises of the 
Christ-figures’ in cinema, all united by a number of characteristics they share: a 
mysterious origin, reflecting the wholly Other; spiritual fatherhood, commitment to 
justice, miracle-working, conflict with authorities, sacrificial victim, God’s intimate, 
the suffering servant, the shedding of blood, the via crucis, metaphorical 
representation of the resurrection. Out of all the Christ-figures he considers - the 
woman, the child, the priest, the saints, and the outlaw, and what he calls ‘extreme 
Christ-like figures’ – it is the fool, the madman, and the clown which seem the most 
inexplicable. Yet in many ways, these three extreme figures are capable of 
replicating each other as a result of operating within a transcendental category: holy 
foolishness. 
One of the more perspicacious studies is that of Theresa Sanders. In her book 
Celluloid Saints Sanders addresses the problems that arise from the encounter of  
psychoanalysis with different ascetical or mystical practices. The aim of her chapter 
Saint or Psychotic? is to explore ‘the complex and murky territory that lies at the 
juncture between mental illness and spiritual greatness’28. Sanders’s position doesn’t 
rule out the possibility of the coexistence of mental illness and mystical experience, 
but the latter cannot be accounted for in terms of the former. Instead, she considers 
mysticism as consisting in ‘psychological distinct experiences that manifest clearly 
and intensely a grace that is available to all of us’. This moves the focus of attention 
from the subject to the divine manifestation, thus rendering irrelevant the question 
about the clinical sanity of the person involved. What needs assessing in this case is 
whether a certain situation reflects the grace of God. The criteria she proposes are 
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those of charity, virtue and good works.29 Sanders further exposes the fallacy behind 
the supposed conflict between science and religion, and the reductive assumptions 
that some films present to the viewer. Often a character may be either genuinely 
divinely inspired or simply mentally deranged, without any other option in between. 
‘What neither of these films seem to understand is that one might be both blessed 
and psychologically disturbed, both holy and insane’.30 Without explicitly discussing 
the holy fool, Sanders has recognized the important bridging characteristics that the 
figure can possess.  
More recently, some film scholars have acknowledged the existence of the 
holy fool as an important cinematic device, but discussion has been limited to its 
relation with modernity. Paul Coates in Cinema, Religion and the Romantic Legacy 
identifies two reasons for the contemporary interest by film directors in the holy fool, 
as is obvious from Lars von Trier’s ‘Goodheart trilogy’. First, as a ‘relative of the 
mystic and a form of the free-speaking (unheard) conscience of Christendom’ he 
suggests the holy fool can be used as an emblem of a spirituality opposed to the 
establishment, an idea palatable to an increasingly individualistic society, confronted 
with a crisis of the religious institutions. The second argument starts from the holy 
fool’s spiritual elevation as reflected in his daily disenfranchisement. The paradox he 
offers: utter abjection on the one hand and divine election on the other makes him a 
good voice to ask ‘what compensation the order of things – be it social and cosmic – 
may offer the various disabled’.31  
In Images of Idiocy. The Idiot Figure in Modern Fiction and Film the 
literature scholar Martin Halliwell identifies another reason for the cultural 
representations of the holy fool figure in the modern era: it has been deemed suitable 
to provide modernist explorations into alternative modes of subjectivity and to 
satisfy the postmodern interest in fractured discourses.32 In his opinion, the idiot 
upsets the conventional logic by remaining outside organized language. This remark 
explains how madness and idiocy may be part of a common strategy since both are 
ways of transgressing rationally organised systems, be they social, religious, 
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political, or linguistic. While Halliwell and Coates helpfully identify the use of folly 
to expose problems with modernity, neither uncovers the radical critical function of 
the holy fool in a way that satisfactorily explains its pervasive nature in film. It is the 
critical nature of the holy fool, capable of adapting itself to many cultures, that I am 
arguing most plausibly explains its broad reach in European film making. 
In spite of the appearance of the cinematic fool across many nations, limited 
attention has been paid by scholars to the different cultural contexts in which the 
figure has been used. One exception is provided by the literary scholar Dana Heller 
in a published dialogue with Elena Volkova, The holy fool in Russian and American 
culture: a dialogue (2003), in which the hagiographic and the fictional models of the 
holy fool are compared as well as the Russian and the American versions. 
Unfortunately, the treatment of the cinematic aspects of each culture in this dialogue 
is cursory, but Heller does illustrate the importance of paying attention to national 
context. Analyzing the presence of holy fools in American fiction and 
cinematography Dana Heller notices their spiritual significance as a national longing 
for redemption. The forms they take are influenced by the specific American secular 
context, in which, in spite of a sense of the important role that the religious ideas 
play in the foundation of morality and democracy, the state deliberately avoids siding 
with any religious orientation. This has come to regulate the American mind and 
accounts for the holy fools being detached from any particular religion.33 More 
specifically, they become open to association with different agendas in which their 
basic spiritual meaning is mixed with specifically American concerns, like race and 
racism. Heller’s approach is useful since it demonstrates the benefits of grounding 
analysis of the figure of the holy fool in a particular religious, political and cultural 
context and of looking at their interaction. The context will provide a specific shape 
for the embodiment of the idea of holy foolishness in cinema. The context itself then 
has to be seen as the result of a historical evolution. In this case tracing back the 
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ancestry of a figure reveals all the layers of signification and explains its present 
potency as a literary or cinematic trope.34 
This literature review has revealed that within the field of film and religion 
scholarship only very limited attention has been given to discourse on holy 
foolishness, and the powerful critical function of the holy fool figure remains 
neglected. This thesis will for the first time unpick the strategies employed that have 
translated a religiously charged concept – holy foolishness – to a modern audience 
through cinematic means. The above review of the current state of scholarship on the 
holy fool points to a number of important themes that will inform this study. First, 
they show the need to identify variations in the figure; secondly, the need to trace the 
ancestry of ideas within a more localized approach; the importance of explaining the 
figure within particular social, political and cultural contexts; and fourthly, to look at 
problems that can arise with the reception of the holy fool figure. 
 
Methodological considerations 
As reflected by the literature review, whilst folly in its various manifestations 
has received significant attention in sociological and literary scholarship, the figure 
of the holy fool has been treated in a much less consistent manner. Most studies of 
the figure focus only on holy fools in the hagiographic writings from Byzantium and 
medieval Russia. Yet, as will be argued in the following chapter, the holy fool has 
held an enduring presence throughout European Christianity, even in Latin or 
Western Christian culture where the figure has been shaped differently, around an 
ideal of the holy ‘idiot’. The roots of holy folly in both cases, I will show, are derived 
from the Pauline texts of the New Testament, and particularly from St Paul’s ‘foolish 
wisdom’ as developed in his First Epistle to the Corinthians. Before I explore these 
roots in more detail, I will first offer a methodological explanation of the approach 
taken in this thesis. In particular, it will be important to address the question of how 
the cinematic holy fool can be identified. The technique I use will make recourse to 
both the Pauline figure in the Scriptures as well as a series of other figures – 
hagiographical and literary - that constitute the successors to this figure, and who 
                                                
34 Heller, ‘Holy Fools, Secular Saints, and Illiterate Saviors in American Literature and Popular 
Culture’, Comparative Literature and Culture: A WWWeb Journal, 5.3 (2003) 
<http://clcwebjournal.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb03-3/heller03.html> 
33 
will be introduced in my study of the history of holy foolishness in the following 
chapter.  
In order to interpret the figure of the holy fool in the context of the past 
hundred years of the cinematic age, I will be using a number of hermeneutical 
techniques familiar to those working in the field of film and religion. Particularly 
influential have been the scholars Robert K. Johnston, Larry Joseph Kreitzer, Robert 
Jevett and George Aichele who have worked in recent decades at the interface of 
film and biblical studies to develop a hermeneutical method for reading religious 
motifs in film. They approach the relation between film and scriptural texts from 
different starting points, but ultimately their endeavours could be described as falling 
under the banner of intertextuality.  Intertextuality is taken here not as a single 
strategy but as a method of covering a range of readings, some similar to the 
traditional models of source and redaction criticism, and others more influenced by 
postmodern theories. What these theologians propose is that we must look back at 
the biblical text not through the more or less authoritative eyes of particular 
commentators, but rather through the lenses of the literary or cinematic products they 
inspire. In other words, meaning is supplied less through theological commentary, 
which is often in the background, and more through cultural interpretations.  Each in 
their own way attempts to make sense of the cultural expression of a biblical event, 
theme or character, seeing them in conversation with a particular culture and trying 
to privilege neither. 
The attempt not to give pre-eminence to either expression does not 
necessarily mean putting them on a par: an approach only Aichele takes with a clear 
postmodern standpoint on the texts under analysis.  Robert K. Johnston states the 
customary position of the theologian who embraces film from a position of faith. He 
places at the centre of the theological process the authoritative biblical text, and 
continues by identifying four sources of meaning: the worshipping community, 
historical Christian thought and practices, the relevant culture and the personal 
experiences of the reader.  As a component of culture, film can therefore be said to 
be a source of theological meaning.35 In concrete terms what he proposes in 
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approaching film is a cultural hermeneutics: he starts from a cultural narrative 
outside Scripture and uses it as a lens to examine a specific biblical text.36 He 
describes his method as a reversal of the typical hermeneutical flow, borrowing the 
expression from Larry Kreitzer. Kreitzer resists selecting only a single narrative 
through which to examine Scripture but prefers a series of literary fictions and their 
cinematic adaptations, in which biblical ideas, themes and motifs are used and 
reworked. 37 Johnston’s purpose is ultimately the same, to achieve an understanding 
of the ‘diversity of meaning inherent in biblical text’.38  
In his introduction to Kreitzer’s Gospel images in fiction and film: on 
reversing the hermeneutical flow, George Aichele is the first to define this kind of 
approach as intertextual, in the sense that meaning is formed in the space created at 
the intersection of one text with another. While expressing a similar view to 
Kreitzer’s when he asserts that the biblical texts are recycled in the various cultural 
forms and media available in each age, he subtly points towards a different agenda 
his conclusions supporting the ‘arbitrary and artificial character of every reading’.39 
In the Introduction to Scripture: Intertextual Connections between Scripture and 
Film Aichele elaborates together with Richard G. Walsh on this approach: Scripture 
is seen as the precursor of later texts which rewrite biblical characters, themes, 
situations for a different culture. Each of these rewritings functions as an 
interpretation of the original text.40 The role of the reader who makes all these 
connections between the texts is highlighted, in a change of emphasis from the text 
itself to the reader as creator of meaning. 
While these approaches start with the cinematic text in order to provoke a 
fresh understanding of Scripture, my method in studying holy fools in film relies on 
a two-way hermeneutic. This possibility was opened by Robert Jewett whose Saint 
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Paul at the Movies projects an ‘interpretative arch’ with one end anchored in the 
ancient world and the other in the contemporary cultural situation. He seeks not new 
understandings of Scripture but analogies between the two terms of comparison 
which will then illuminate certain aspects of contemporary culture. Jewett attempts a 
‘culturally contextual interpretation’ from which he has delved into the historical and 
cultural contexts at each end of this dialogue across the centuries.41 Jewett’s 
methodology diverges, however, from the three scholars mentioned above since it 
proceeds towards interpretation from the opposite direction: using the past to 
illuminate the present rather than vice-versa. The two-way approach towards 
intertextuality has since been developed by Larry Kreitzer, who, placing himself 
within an interpretive circle, sometimes chooses to reverse the hermeneutical flow 
and consider the fresh perspective that each side can bring to the other. While 
Kreitzer’s focus is on the literary reworking of themes and their cinematic 
adaptations, the nature of my investigation means that I must begin by examining the 
cultural history of the conceptual and performative interpretations of the Pauline text. 
Establishing this will allow me to identify the hagiographical and literary traditions 
that help to identify the cinematic holy fool, and to justify the legitimacy of what I 
argue are their present manifestations. Once this has been outlined, I will reverse the 
hermenutical flow, revisiting the Pauline text in the remaining chapters using the 
lenses offered by the cinematic perspective. 
How do tradition and intertextuality work together in my thesis, given that 
the latter seems to bypass a linear view of thematic development? Both aspects are 
necessary to understanding the critical power of the modern cinematic holy fools. 
Tradition designates a set of observances, values, and doctrines which together 
develop a way of being in the world and interpreting reality. Traditions originate in 
the past and come to shape the present, to various extents. In this thesis I am dealing 
not only with different religious and cultural traditions but also geographical spaces 
in which tradition functions in a number of ways. Despite the truism that modernity 
has been eroding the grip of tradition, the situation is not so simple. Recently, for 
example, Russian culture has been in the grip of a reinvigorated Orthodox tradition, 
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as part of the post-Soviet search for a national identity. As a result, the past two 
decades have seen increased production of overtly religious films, many of which 
have received the approval of the Orthodox Church hierarchy42. On the contrary, in 
Western Europe, where the cultural space has become more pluralist, Christian 
religious traditions are diminishing in the public space and the cultural arena. In 
addition, religious and cultural traditions in Western Europe, which up until the 
Reformation followed a similar path, are increasingly being rediscovered and 
breaking down Catholic-Protestant divisions. In order to set the correct context, 
therefore, for my discussions of the holy fool in various national cinemas, I begin 
each chapter by presenting the presence of the holy fool in the dominant religious 
tradition, before evaluating the extent to which the cinematic representations enter 
into a dialogue with each respective tradition. This will allow for an understanding of 
how the critical function of the holy fool is being applied across different national 
contexts.  
The methodology of intertextuality helps to overcome some of the problems 
associated with trying to trace influence. In the later twentieth century, ‘influence’ as 
a critical term seemed outdated as a result of its connection with ideas such as 
tradition and agency, which fell under critical scrutiny at the same time.43  
Intertextuality carries a note of impersonality, since the reader appears to be 
confronted with crossing a field of texts from which human agency has been 
expelled.44 My approach could be described as intertextual, since I consider the holy 
fools in the selected films in relation to their possible precursors. However, my task 
is more complicated as a result of the lack of scholarly consensus over whether we 
can speak of a phenomenology of holy foolishness in Western Christianity. In order 
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to clarify this question I begin the study by reconstructing a history of holy 
foolishness across the European Christian World in its Eastern and Western 
dimensions. First, I delineate a portrait of holy foolishness as derived from what is 
considered to be its foundational text in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. I follow 
this by looking at the traditions that issue from the Pauline text. Only after 
establishing that the Western holy idiot is as legitimate an expression of holy 
foolishness as the yurodivyi in Eastern Christianity do I move to analysis of the films 
in their own context of origin. In doing so I follow John Fiske’s suggestion that: 
‘Studying a text’s intertextual relations can provide us with valuable clues to the 
readings that a particular culture or subculture is likely to produce from it.’45 I 
appropriate for my own purposes what he calls ‘horizontal intertextuality’, by which 
he understands the more or less explicit relations between primary texts are usually 
linked along the axes of genre, character or content.46 Even if Fiske articulates his 
theory in the context of media studies, particularly television, I apply it to my own 
investigation, which is driven by theme and character. The fact that this study 
includes a historical dimension allows for transfer or accumulation of meaning over 
historical time.  
The cinematic investigation in this thesis is devoted to three national 
cinematic outputs, chosen for their interest as bearing contrasting European cultures. 
The concept of national cinema is currently a matter for debate, motivated by 
questions over the nature of national identity, and a sense that nations are more 
fragmentary and de-centered than usually imagined.47 The usefulness of the nation as 
a heuristic tool for framing cultural specificity has also been contested, since the 
model of cultural unity and homogeneity it implies is challenged on the one hand by 
the complexities of the international film industries, the transnational movements of 
financial capital, and cultural globalization, and on the other by the diverse identities 
that can coexist within the boundaries of a state. One view is that it is more accurate 
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to speak of local and transnational communities that film imagines.48 While it may be 
granted that this approach has some merits when considering the rapid move towards 
multicultural societies in certain nations, it is also true that the concepts of nation and 
national culture, even if constructed, still provide a mode of consciousness in which 
film functions as both a reflector and a mobilizer of the national ethos. 49 In Europe it 
is also the case that national film industries have long been shaped by the state, for 
both financial and linguistic reasons. And as will be identified in the three national 
film cultures I have chosen to study, directors and producers are often very explicitly 
thinking of national issues and identity when framing their subjects and 
characterization. 
The selection of films chosen for this study is shaped to an important degree 
by the idea of national culture because it provides a salient category for examining 
difference. In the European context, cinematic difference is defined not only by 
opposition to American Hollywood cinema, which is an international Goliath in 
relation to the relatively small national cinematic industries of Europe, but also by 
emphasizing the cultural specificity of one country in relation to others. Therefore, 
national cinema in Europe connects national individuality with particular cultural 
heritages, of which religion forms an important part. Religious traditions remain a 
significant form of cultural difference, even if the ideal of a single consensual 
tradition has waned recently, especially in Western Europe. It can be either overtly 
represented in its external manifestation or merely detected in less conspicuous 
forms.  Out of the seven typologies Susan Hayward considers relevant for the 
enunciation of the ‘national’, two seem to me suitable for the transmission of 
religious traditions to the screen: the narrative, as culture’s way to make sense of 
itself, and secondly ‘cinema as the mobilizer of the nation’s myths’.50  
                                                
48 Andrew Higson, ‘The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema’ in Cinema and Nation, ed. by 
Mette Hjort, Scott MacKenzie (Routledge: London, New York, 2000), p. 64 
49 For the relevance of the category of the national cinema with regard to the cinematographic 
productions of Russia, France and Denmark see the arguments developed in ‘Russia Cinema – 
National Cinema. Three Views’ in  Russia on reels: the Russian idea in post-Soviet cinema, ed. by 
Birgit Beumers (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), Susan Hayward, ‘Defining the ‘national’ of 
a country’s cinematographic production, in French National Cinema (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 
and Tytti Soila, Astrid Söderbergh-Widding, Gunnar Iversen, ‘Film production as a national 
project’ in Nordic National Cinemas, ed. by Tytti Soila, Astrid Söderbergh-Widding, Gunnar 
Iversen (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 
50 Hayward, p. 9 
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The three national cinemas that this study examines - Russian, French and 
Danish – have been chosen for the purposes of comparison. The selection enables a 
discussion of religious themes in European cinema across three key divisions in 
Christianity: Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant. The assumption here is that religion 
is part of the fabric of national specificity, seen both synchronically and historically, 
even if today it has limited capability of actively shaping policy or has been 
marginalized in the public sphere. In the three selected national cinemas religion is 
bound with nationality in somewhat different ways, which has implications at the 
level of representation. In Russia Orthodoxy is the dominant religion, presently 
attempting a position of partnership vis-à-vis the state and thereby acquiring an 
important degree of visibility in the public life as a social actor. Moreover, it is seen 
as an important component of national identity, emphasized by the long alliance 
between the state and the Church before 1917. While this has been revived followed 
the introduction of glasnost in the second half of 1980s, one should not ignore the 
aftermath of the 1917 Revolution when the Russian Church was confronted not only 
with marginalization but also persecution, which changed the function of Christianity 
and made it a rare source of inspiration. In contrast with the status the Orthodox 
Church is currently enjoying in Russia, in France and Denmark the situation is 
significantly different. Danish Lutheranism and the Catholic Church in France are 
being relegated in the public sphere and are reliant on their heritage to sustain their 
identities. In Denmark, however, which has been much less subject to the periodic 
outbursts of secularism France has experienced since the 1789 Revolution, 
Lutheranism has remained a state religion, and more than 80% of Danes claim to be 
members of the national Church.51 In France, by contrast, the republic has defined 
itself around secularism and the concept of laïcité, epitomised by the law on the 
separation of the churches and the state passed in 1905. In spite of this, a majority of 
French continue to consider themselves culturally Catholic, even if they are not 
regular worshippers.52 Furthermore, in both countries the two forms of Christianity 
                                                
51 Kirkeministeriet < http://www.km.dk/folkekirken/statistik-og-oekonomi/kirkestatistik/folkekirkens-
medlemstal.html> [accessed May 2011] 
52 Kay Chadwick, ‘Catholicism and Protestantism’ in Encyclopedia of contemporary French culture, 
ed. by Alex Hughes and Keith Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 92 
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constitute important cultural traditions stretching back centuries, forming modes of 
identity that continue to appear in cinematic representations of religiosity.  
This comparative model, based on the use of national cinemas, can provide 
important insights into the way religious themes are treated across the European 
cultural space. In this thesis, this provides an opportunity to examine how holy 
foolishness has developed in different contexts out of its Pauline roots. At the same 
time, it is also important to delineate the limitations of this approach. I acknowledge 
that directors may work within more than one national context. Two figures 
prominent in my thesis, Andrei Tarkovsky and Theodore Dreyer, directed at various 
times outside their own country, independently of their national cinematographic 
industry. However, I argue that we should not overlook these respective films as 
alien to the director’s national cinema. The reason for not doing so lies in the fact 
that I give prevalence to the personality of the director as auteur and as the product of 
a certain cultural environment over the means of production. In some cases, 
nonetheless, the changing location of filming can be said to affect the director’s 
treatment of his native culture. For instance, I note that this translation from one 
cultural space into the other coincides with a stylistic change in Dreyer, which brings 
him closer to the Catholic iconographic conventions in The Trial of Joan of Arc, 
while Tarkovsky’s last holy fool in Sacrifice transgresses the traditional Russian 
canons of representation. 
In terms of the analysis of the films and figures under consideration, this 
thesis supports those theology and film scholars who have drawn attention to the fact 
that film has its own specificity as an art.53 Narration is important but the image and 
the sound also contribute to the process of meaning-making, sometimes to a 
significant degree. My analysis of each film will therefore be driven by theme and 
character. Equally important will be the relation between theme, narrative form and 
stylistic technique. The literature review above has already identified the paradoxical 
aspects of folly, including its transgressive, inversed aesthetics and its adversity 
towards discursive reasoning. How is this reflected at the level of narration and 
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stylistic technique? In order to answer this question I will employ terms and concepts 
taken from Bordwell’s theory of narration. Particularly useful will be his 
considerations with regard to art-cinema and parametric narrations. If in art-cinema 
narration the relation between fabula (story) and syuzhet (plot) is characterized by an 
increased loss of causality, in parametric narration things are complicated further by 
the introduction of the concept of style. Style ‘creates patterns different from the 
demands of the syuzhet system. Film style may be organized and emphasized to a 
degree that makes it at least equal in importance to syuzhet patterns’.54 More 
importantly, style creates its own logic. However, unlike those neoformalist critics 
for whom thematic implications are irrelevant, I will be using these concepts to 
investigate how the theme can imprint its ‘foolishness’ at the formal level. 
In what follows, therefore, I will be using a number of techniques to locate the 
critical functions of the holy fool in European cinema. Drawing from recent 
scholarship in the fields of film and religion, the thesis will use a model of 
intertextuality to compare the cinematic functions of the holy fool with the 
development of the figure in the Pauline texts and later Christian writings. This will 
be coupled with a strongly contextual approach, using the comparison of national 
cinemas to open a new view of how the holy fool functions across different 
confessional traditions in Europe. Analysis of the films will be based on a model of 
directoral autonomy, such that I pay particular attention to the way in which each 
director creates meaning through his characters. These approaches will provide a 
framework for evaluating the continuities and discontinuities between the cinematic 
holy fools and their predecessors, opening a new insight into the characters’ 
durability and relation to modernity. Such an emphasis will allow an enriched 
understanding of the critical functions of the holy fool, even where these have been 
embedded in particular cinematic techniques and shaped by national cultures. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Pauline Holy Fool and its successors 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the holy fool in European culture is its 
ubiquity: the figure appears in various guises across many nationalities and 
traditions. This is made possible because of the protean nature of the figure, for holy 
foolishness is a concept that can hold different emphases depending on the particular 
cultural background. Rather like a medieval palimpsest, new meanings are frequently 
grafted onto older forms. It is no surprise, therefore, that many of these variegated 
forms of holy foolishness have percolated into the modern cinematic medium. If, 
however, we are to account for the functions and attractions of the figure across such 
a wide cultural space we need to understand its origin and development. By 
unpicking the cultural and religious roots of the figure, it will be possible to 
understand how contemporary forms have sprouted out of older traditions, 
accommodating and adapting to particular national and cultural contexts. This is 
particularly true when interpreting the modern critical functions of holy foolishness, 
which, I argue, need to be read through their common origin in a shared religious 
tradition.  Before we can begin to analyse its impact in modern cinema, we therefore 
first need to explain the roots of the concept. This chapter will map the theme from 
its earliest appearance, through its development in various European contexts, in 
order to explain its entry into the twentieth-century cinematic world.  
To understand the roots of holy foolishness in the European cultural space, 
we need to return to the very earliest expressions of Christian belief. The theological 
context of the idea stems from the concept of foolishness for Christ, expressed in the 
Epistles of St Paul, which justified the flouting of social and intellectual conventions 
for religious ends. For the early Christian communities, this became a powerful and 
practical theme, first in the context of widespread persecution, and later through the 
development of monastic and ascetic practices. With the spread of Christianity across 
Europe, the concept of divine folly percolated widely into different cultural spaces, 
developing distinct forms in Eastern and Western Christian traditions. This chapter 
will unpick these developments, beginning with an analysis of the theological roots 
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of the concept, as offered in the opening four chapters from The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians. This Epistle is a frequent reference in later hagiographic accounts 
featuring holy fools and I will pay particular attention to the way in which St Paul 
endowed holy foolishness with a critical function. With this outlined, I will move to 
explain the theoretical and practical interpretations of holy foolishness as developed 
by Christian communities in both Western and Eastern Europe. The chapter will 
conclude by looking at the reconfiguration of these religious traditions for a modern 
age in the writings of the nineteenth-century thinkers Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and 
Nietzsche. These writers, I maintain, updated the holy fool’s critical function in 
profound ways that were to shape the profile of the cinematic holy fool in the 
twentieth century and beyond.   
 
The First Epistle to the Corinthians as foundational text for holy foolishness 
 
Although there are striking examples of unconventional asceticism by the 
Jewish prophets, it is in the New Testament, and specifically in The First Epistle to 
the Corinthians, that the idea of holy foolishness is explicitly explained. In the Old 
Testament the themes of wisdom and folly can be frequently encountered in 
prophetic and sapiential literature but wisdom is always identified as God’s attribute, 
while foolishness is only ascribed to His people.1 Apart from the basic meaning, 
rooted in the classical Greek, of deficiency in understanding and judgment, in the 
Old Testament the term acquires contextual meanings that range from a lack of true 
knowledge of God, to rebellion against Him and blasphemy.2 Much of the New 
Testament follows in the same tradition, until we reach the Pauline Epistles. 
Remarkably, The First Epistle to the Corinthians stands out as the only text in the 
                                                
1 In spite of the negative connotations that foolishness bears in the Old Testament, there are known 
instances when the prophets adopted its appearance in order to drive home different aspects of their 
preaching: Isaiah walked naked, Zedekiah donned horns of iron, Jeremiah wore a yoke (Isaiah 20:2-
4; 1 Kings 22:11, Jer. 27:2) This was nevertheless an occasional practice and not a celebration of 
folly; it did not lead to a reconsideration of foolishness unlike the daring argument of St Paul.  
However, such instances of unconventional behaviour are noted as a possible source of inspiration 
for the practice of holy foolishness by scholars such as Segei A. Ivanov and Svitlana Kobets. 
2 Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Abridged in one volume, ed. by Gerhard Kittel and 
Gerhard Friedrich; trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Exeter: 
Paternoster, 1985), p. 620; The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, vol. 3, 
ed. by Colin Brown (Carlisle: Paternoster Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), p. 1025 
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whole of Scripture that speaks, through a radical redefinition of the term moria, 
about the ‘foolishness of God’ as manifested in Christ crucified.3 Moreover, ‘foolish’ 
and ‘fool’ (moros) are turned on their head to designate the authentic mode of 
Christian existence. The Epistle also contains an explicit injunction that came to 
form a reference for the practice of holy foolishness first recorded in the 5th century 
in Byzantium: ‘If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him 
become a fool, that he may be wise.’ (3:18). St Paul’s exhortation, denoting more 
than a taste for paradoxical verbal constructions, was predicated on the message of 
the Gospels. On this account he fashions himself as a ‘fool for Christ’. 4  How can we 
explain Paul’s radical redefinition of foolishness in the Epistle? 
A first look at the context behind the composition of the Pauline Epistles 
illuminates the reasons for such a strategy. They are linked to the apostolic 
proclamation as both form, content and practical consequence. The ‘preaching of the 
cross’ lies at the heart of the kerygma of the early church and is tellingly 
encapsulated in the Pauline letters and particularly in his First Epistle to the 
Corinthians (1:18). Why would the apostle provide such a reminder to a community 
already familiar with the narrative of the Gospel? While the message of the crucified 
Saviour was the driving force of the apostolic proclamation, it had the potential to be 
offensive to a culturally alien audience. As a result, there arose the risk of the 
message losing its centrality in church life. This is exactly what happened in Corinth, 
where a composite Christian community made up of Jews and Gentiles, mainly of 
rather low wealth but also belonging to the social and political elite, was embracing a 
‘self-sufficient, self-congratulatory culture … coupled with an obsession about peer-
group prestige, success in competition, their devaluing of tradition and universals, 
and near contempt for those standing in some chosen value system’.5 This infiltration 
of the secular ethos had affected the very core of the apostolic proclamation. As a 
                                                
3 ‘Foolishness of God’ is the translation of to moron tou Theou where the definite article with the 
neuter single of the adjective moros means ‘the foolish thing’, which indicates that rather than 
denoting an attribute of God it points to ‘God’s free dealings with the world’, cf. Hans Conzelmann, 
1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1975), p. 46 
4 St Paul appropriates the persona of the fool again in 2 Corinthians 11. Here he uses the device as part 
of a rhetorical strategy allowing him to ‘boast’ of his numerous afflictions and thereby assert his 
moral superiority over the ‘false apostles’. 
5 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: a Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand 
Rapids Mich: W B Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), p. 17 
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result St Paul means his letter to challenge his opponents in Corinth, who are 
attempting to water down the offence caused by the cross.6 He also seizes the chance 
to sum up he various attitudes that rejected the message of the cross, spelling out 
their serious soteriological implications.  
The first four chapters of the Epistle reveal St Paul preoccupied with 
explaining his own understanding of true wisdom (sophia), which in his view takes 
the form of the folly (moria) of the cross. At the heart of this distinction is a critical 
attitude towards the conventions of the world. The overriding theme of the Epistle is 
the reaffirmation of the entirely different system of values and the new spiritual 
realities brought about by the cross and the resurrection.7 Directly subordinate to this 
is the issue of the lack of communion amongst the members of the church in Corinth. 
The apostle is also, however, aware there is some opposition to himself: for this 
reason the first four chapters acquire a justificatory tone, with Paul finding himself in 
a position from which he needs to defend his own missionary activity.  
The apostle starts by assessing the reasons for the state of conflict that has 
arisen in the community between the various factions aligned to different preachers. 
In Paul’s view, those listening to his vision of a kerygma centered on the folly of the 
cross can be divided into believers and non-believers. First St Paul reminds the 
Corinthians of two categories of audience that have a negative response to the 
message of the cross and points to the nature of their objections. For those of Jewish 
origin, who are trained to look for signs of divine intervention, Christ crucified is ‘a 
stumbling block’, contradicting their messianic expectations. For those of Greek 
culture, who value wisdom, the cross can only be foolish, lacking conforming with 
the standard criteria for wisdom, be they formal or substantial. The Corinthians 
belong to none of these two categories since they are those who ‘are sanctified in 
Christ Jesus, called to be saints with all who in every place call on the name of Jesus 
Christ’ (1:2).  
                                                
6 Martin Hengel, Crucifixion in the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross 
(Philadelphia PA: Fortress Press, 1977), p. 89 
7 The unity of the epistle has been contested but for the purpose of this chapter I rely on Anthony C. 
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Corinthians in The First Epistle to the Corinthians, and The unity of the Corinthian correspondence 
(London: T. & T. Clark International, 2003) 
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Yet there were doctrinal tensions between the rival factions destroying the 
unity of the church in Corinth, apparently rooted in a conflict about social status 
between the cultured elite and their subordinates.8 St Paul seems to allude to this 
when he writes that ‘not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not 
many noble are called’ (1:26). His assertion demarcates two opposing groups in 
terms of wisdom and power. As a consequence, his discourse is meant to deflate the 
arrogance of the cultured and powerful elite by exposing their claims to wisdom and 
honour as matters alien to a spirituality centred on the cross. Hence the apostle 
begins his argumentation by announcing that God made foolish the wisdom of the 
world (1:20). Since human wisdom could not lead to salvation it pleased God to 
achieve this through the foolishness of the message preached (1:21), which he further 
clarifies as having at its core ‘Christ crucified’ (1:23). This foolishness of the cross 
conceals the true divine wisdom, which is wiser than that of humankind (1:25). 
Therefore God has chosen the foolish and the weak things of the world in order tot 
put to shame the wise and the mighty (1:27). Divine wisdom takes on a mysterious 
quality, being ‘the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the ages for our glory’ 
(2:7). The Corinthians might seem wise, but in order to be truly wise they need to 
become ‘fools’ (3:18).  
Biblical scholars have mainly tended to read this passage either in terms of 
the ideological variances expressed or the socio-political allegiances of different 
parties. As a result, the scholarship on 1 Cor 1-4 has witnessed an ongoing debate 
about the meaning ascribed to ‘wisdom’ (sophia) by the community of Corinth, 
seeing it as vital for understanding the Pauline argumentation about the foolishness 
of the cross. The main approaches have interpreted sophia variously as: Greco-
Roman rhetoric or sophistry (Witherington, Pogoloff), Gnostic wisdom (Bultmann, 
Schmithals, Wilckens, Winter, Barett), Jewish wisdom tradition (Windisch, Dupont, 
Conzelmann, Feuillet) or Hellenistic Jewish wisdom in the tradition of Philo of 
Alexandria (Horsley, Pearson, Davis).9 Other scholars have favoured a political and 
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social interpretation, with the result that the Corinthian conflict is read less in terms 
of knowledge and more in terms of power. On this scheme the divisions inside 
community were not primordially theological but rather socially determined.10 
Subscribing to Raymond F. Collins’s assertion that ‘the search for a particular kind 
of wisdom’ is ‘a search that does not admit of resolution’, I have adopted an 
inclusive position which sees the ideological and the social aspects behind Paul’s 
message as interrelated. This will reflect a set of concepts that work in tandem: first, 
wisdom and power, and secondly foolishness and weakness: each entering a parallel 
relationship. However, these two alliances are ultimately upset by an inversion 
strategy which reveals the foolishness of God as His wisdom and His weakness as 
power.  
Given the competing interpretations of ‘worldly wisdom’ in modern 
scholarship, it is worth reconsidering what Paul wanted to convey to his first-century 
audience. Is ‘the foolishness of the cross’ dependent on an accurate grasping of the 
meaning of ‘wisdom’ as practiced in Corinth, with which ‘the folly of the cross’ then 
enters into a dialectic relationship? In fact in his argumentation Paul consistently 
takes as a point of reference divine wisdom (or by the same token divine folly) 
against which all comparisons are made. Even if the full meanings ascribed by the 
Corinthians to the word ‘wisdom’ were identified, this would not explain what divine 
wisdom is, but rather would delimit it from what Paul thinks it is not. In other words, 
placing wisdom and foolishness in a dialectic relationship does not render the folly 
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of the cross dependent on worldly wisdom for sense-making purposes. On the 
contrary, it is the folly of the cross, which St Paul takes as divine wisdom, that 
remains constant, while worldly wisdom is variable and unsecured. Scholarly 
disagreement over the precise historical meaning of worldly wisdom does not 
therefore preclude an understanding of divine folly. The lack of any precise 
qualification for worldly wisdom in Paul’s text has the singular advantage that it can 
be ascribed a variety of contents, without ever rendering the opposition void: from 
the perspective of the cross, with all its existential implications for the Christian 
mode of being in the world, all human intellectual or moral achievements are found 
to be lacking.  
Read in such a way, the critical nature of Paul’s treatment of folly becomes 
apparent. The ‘message of the cross’ is used critically to expose worldly wisdom and 
worldly power, both of which are aligned with social status, and therefore 
detrimental to unity and devoid of salvific qualities. In order to make this argument 
Paul places the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of God in an antithetical 
relationship. This is emphasised by a paradox: the wisdom of God is foolishness 
from the point of view of the human wisdom, just as worldly wisdom is foolishness 
from the point of view of divine wisdom. Paul repeatedly insists that God has 
inverted all human values: the cross has shown worldly wisdom to be foolish and 
rendered conventional weakness powerful. Weakness is given a positive value 
because it is through the cross, a symbol of weakness and shame, that God has 
disclosed his wisdom.11 The cross is the culmination of Christ’s kenosis whereby He 
temporarily gave up his divine power (Phil 2:7). The force of this argument, and its 
effect on his readers, must have been electric. Paul’s rhetorical display is from 
beginning to end of continuous offense to his audience: from highlighting Christ’s 
shameful death on the cross to disparaging what the Corinthians held dear: wisdom, 
power, and honour. The reversal of conventional values is presented as an act of 
divine irony: frustrating all expectations, it pleased God to save mankind through the 
foolishness of the cross. He has chosen the foolish, weak and base things to shame 
the wise, so that ‘no flesh should glory in his presence’ (1:29). This strategy of 
                                                
11 Raymond Pickett, The Cross in Corinth: the Social Significance of the Death of Jesus (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), p. 71 
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reversal ensures lofty things are concealed in the low in a discrepancy that would 
become important for the kind of challenge that foolish wisdom poses. In a deeper 
sense the reassignment of new meanings to old concepts by reversal expresses the 
liminal condition in which one finds oneself between the temporal world and the 
coming kingdom of God.12 St Paul’s critique of the world is achieved through the 
‘foolishness of God’ manifested in the cross both in an epistemic sense: the cross 
defining the reality, and in a salvific sense, determining human fates.13  
Once Paul has established these new Christian values, he urges the 
Corinthians to practice them. He/she who wants to be wise has to become foolish, 
challenging the conventions of the day. The apostles are presented as models since 
they are indeed ‘fools for Christ’s sake’ (4:10). If so far the argument in the Epistle 
has been fashioned in rather abstract terms and with paradoxical meanings, St Paul 
now moves to explain in very concrete terms the low social status of such a ‘fool’ as 
himself. With irony and sarcasm, he places the apostles in stark contrast to the 
privileges enjoyed by the Corinthians who are held in honour for their wisdom and 
social position. If they are ironically called ‘kings’ (4:8), the apostles are instead 
placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy, as people to be deprived of everything, 
even of their own life: ‘For I think that God has displayed us, the apostles, last, as 
men condemned to death’ (4:9). While the Corinthians are called wise, strong and 
distinguished, the apostles are, in stark contrast, foolish, weak and dishonoured 
(4:10). In addition they share in a state of total deprivation and abjection: they suffer 
from hunger and thirst, are poorly dressed, beaten, homeless, earning their own 
living by work, reviled and persecuted (4:11-12). In conclusion, from the point of 
view of the worldly wisdom they are worthless and disposable as filth (4:13). St Paul 
enumerates in his description all the foolish, weak, and base things that he previously 
stated that God used to put to shame the wise and the mighty (1:27-28). In fact, by 
the same strategy of inversion he has applied earlier, utter abjection comes to 
designate high status in the divine order. Through the ‘catalogue of afflictions’ that 
beset the apostles, St Paul outlines the portrait of a new kind of fool, the ‘fool for 
Christ’.   
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The critical functions that the ‘fool for Christ’ possesses are often 
overlooked. The customary image is one in which the apostles enjoy a position of 
centrality and authority within the church, being the focal point from which spiritual 
life overflows. Yet by adopting the guise of a holy fool, Paul introduces a position of 
marginality that gives force to the countercultural thrust of his argument against the 
church in Corinth.14 The Corinthians form a church that has become well-established 
in their religious beliefs and practice, even if the apostle considers them as still 
‘babes in Christ’ (3:1). If we uphold the thesis that the conflict created in Corinth is 
not exclusively doctrinal but relates to the pursuit of social status, what St Paul 
means by ‘worldly wisdom’ is therefore a set of cultural assumptions that regulate 
life in the community. Such worldly viewpoints do not originate in a cruciform 
vision of the Christian life. In other words, they are the product of a religious belief 
adulterated with secular notions of self-interest and self-promotion. Consequently he 
rejects all such worldly values that have been accommodated in the church as alien to 
a cross-centered spirituality. 
In adopting the critical pose of the fool, Paul also endows the figure with a 
performative dimension that was to have important consequences for its later 
development in European culture. The social situation of the apostles described by St 
Paul is very similar to that of the marginalised and the outcasts in Greco-Roman 
society. The term moros that St Paul uses is the same that designated the emblematic 
figure impersonated by mimics in antiquity.15 The use of theatrical imagery: ‘for we 
have been made a spectacle to the world, both to angels and to men’, can suggest that 
the apostle had in mind these professional fools that entertained the crowds in the 
ancient world. Indeed, L. L.Welborn argues persuasively that this is the apostle’s 
strategy: according to him St Paul makes recourse to theatrical language in order to 
place himself inside a well-established tradition of jest and mime.16 By adopting such 
a low social status and dishonourable persona, Welborn argues, he responds to some 
                                                
14 Paul Hertig, ‘Fool’s Gold: Paul’s Inverted Approach to Church Hierarchy (1 Corinthians 4), with 
Emerging Church implications’, Missiology: An International Review, 35 (2007); Also E. A. Judge, 
Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays, ed. by David Scholer, 
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15 Ruth Webb, Demons and dancers: performance in late antiquity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p. 96 
16 L. L. Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, A Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4 in the Comic-Philosophic 
Tradition (London: T & T Clark International, 2005) 
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members of the church in Corinth, who first called him a ‘fool’ – moros, in 
comparison with the eloquent and cultivated preacher Apollo. The dilemma he faced 
initially was that, by not responding to the insult, he would have implicitly accepted 
relegation to a social category which had no voice in Greco-Roman society except as 
an object of ridicule in mime shows.17 Yet rejecting the charge and calling himself a 
wise man – sophos, would have meant accepting the values and criteria of the rich 
and learned in Corinth. What he does instead is admit to being a fool while 
redefining the term through a strategy of inversion whereby it acquires a new 
paradoxical sense predicated on Christ’s cross and doing justice to his mission as an 
apostle. He thus puts forward ‘a personal form of the concept (μωρός) as the truth of 
his life, now understood in a deeper, paradoxical sense.18 However, his 
argumentation has more than personal implications, foolishness becoming a 
characteristic of authentic Christian life.19 
The traditional concept of the moros in the Greco-Roman world draws on 
different traditions, yet cumulates in a number of important features which will 
resurface throughout this thesis. First, Paul’s readers would have been alive to the 
way in which the term reflected a counter-cultural position from which to criticise 
authority. The philosophic, literary and dramatic traditions of the classical world 
endowed the concept of moros with ‘a grotesque perspective’20. The mimic, often an 
individual stigmatised by physical deformity and whose obscenity flaunted 
conventional decorum, was authorised by his low status to speak truth to the people 
in authority without the repercussions that a high status figure would have incurred. 
His punishment instead is administered on the spot in the form of slapsticks. He had 
a critical function, giving voice to popular thinking that contained elements of 
resistance to the elites in power.21 Moreover the mimic was the inheritor of an earlier 
tradition in which a grotesque outsider could act as a critic of authority.22 In the same 
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manner, adopting the guise of a despised ‘fool’ St Paul could challenge the 
conventional wisdom of those in authority in Corinth.23  
A second dimension is related to the way moros is endowed by Paul to 
provide a new standard for truth-telling. There is a philosophical precedent here, 
notably through Socrates who, as a wise fool, cultivated the paradoxical in 
appearance, behaviour and argument.24 As Welborn suggests, Paul can be said to 
have followed a Socratic precedent in making himself and his manner of speaking an 
object of parody, and by adopting a divine perspective as result of his experiences.25 
In this ‘comic-philosophic tradition’, Welborn contends, one can encounter the three 
specific elements of St Paul’s argument: divine initiative in the reversal of 
conventional wisdom and foolishness, the recognition that this reversal is revealed to 
some while hidden from others, and the acceptance of irony as the authentic mode of 
relationship to a world unaware of the divine reversal. Where Paul transforms this 
concept of foolish truth-telling, I would like to suggest, is in the way he identifies it 
squarely with the Godhead. The concept of the foolishness of Christ crucified 
implies a new critical function and standard of truth-telling. The example of Christ’s 
ill-treatment and humble status are used to give the holy fool a religious context 
which mutates his/her significance into something more profound. The holy fool’s 
mission is now not simply to utter common-sense truths, or even to stand up for 
doctrinal and moral truths (which are ultimately forms of truth rationalized by the 
human mind), but for any deviation from the crucified Truth. This embodied Truth, 
made real by Christ, renders relative all the other forms of truth that arise in the 
human mind, so that the presence of the holy fool is always challenging and 
subversive.    
These critical and performative dimensions are important because they can 
explain some of the trajectories of the development of the holy fool in European 
culture. In the development of ascetic holy foolishness in the Christian world, the 
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phenomenon bears obvious similarities with the ancient mimes.26 If St Paul’s 
appropriation of a foolish persona is chiefly a matter of rhetoric, it remained for these 
early Christian ascetics to turn it into practice. In many cases, Paul’s view that 
understanding Christian Truth also presupposes sharing in the humiliation and 
suffering to which Christ was subjected, are brought to the fore in the figure of the 
holy fool. It is to the development of this practice that I now will turn.   
 
Holy foolishness in the patristic tradition 
How did Paul’s explanation of divine folly in The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians develop into such a pervasive theme in the Christian world? We have 
seen how Paul’s use of folly was indebted to a classical, performative tradition, but 
in his theological argument was turned into a powerful critical tool through which he 
could attack the conflicts that were dividing the church of Corinth. The key issue 
here is not the motivation behind the conflict but the meaning that St Paul ascribes to 
wisdom and why he criticised the kind of wisdom that prevailed in the church of 
Corinth as detrimental to the spiritual life of the community. In what follows I will 
explore interpretations of the Epistle relevant to how the concept of holy foolishness 
developed in the traditions of the early Church. Once established, I will also point 
out how these traditions began to diverge in Latin and Orthodox Christianity, and 
lent a different critical edge to the holy fool in Eastern and Western Europe. 
How pervasive in the early Church was Paul’s refashioning of the ideas of 
wisdom and folly? It is apparent the early Greek commentators inherited from the 
New Testament at least two meanings for ‘wisdom’. One designated the natural 
wisdom of the universe which had preoccupied the pagan philosophers; the other was 
grounded on an identification of Christ with the wisdom of God. Most theologians 
wanted to reconcile the two and argue that Christ was the fulfilment of ancient 
philosophy.27 For example, Theodoret of Cyrus (393 – c. 457) drops any sense of 
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opposition between different kinds of wisdom, and instead in a commentary on The 
First Epistle to the Corinthians argues that they are complementary: 
(Paul) speaks of two wisdoms or even of three … one wisdom is the one 
given to men, which makes us to be reasonable beings and to discern the 
moral quality of our actions; it also allows us to discover crafts and 
sciences and to know God; the second wisdom is contemplated in 
creation…; the third is manifested to us by our Saviour, and is called 
‘folly’ by the unbelievers.28  
It was deep within the monastic tradition that Paul’s view of the tension between 
worldly wisdom and God’s wisdom was kept very much alive. For example, in a 
commentary on the same Epistle, the monk and scholar St John of Damascus (676-
749) identifies the ‘wise according to the flesh’ (1:26) with those who were 
considered wise according to ‘appearance, to the present life and to pagan education’ 
and opposed to them the uneducated, considering God’s victory evident in the way 
he had conquered the world through them.29 It is interesting to note that St John of 
Damascus is more interested in showing the apostles to be uneducated rather than 
foolish. However, a more complicated picture began to take shape as early as St John 
Chrysostom (347-407) took this interpretation in a different direction with profound 
implications for the Byzantine and Orthodox traditions of Christianity. Commenting 
on 1:18-21 he writes that: 
 … the cross is beyond reason ... and it has an indescribable power. 
For since, in the wisdom of God, Paul says, the world did not know 
God through wisdom, the cross appeared … He made the things that can be 
seen so that by reasoning from them we might worship their maker (Rom 
1.20)…since the world did not wish to know God through this wisdom, he 
persuaded men through the apparent foolishness of the gospel, not through a 
process of reasoning but through faith. 
… And in fact the apostles went forth not in wisdom but in faith and 
they proved wiser and loftier than the pagan wise men, inasmuch as 
receiving the things of God is greater than mounting arguments. This gift 
transcends human understanding.30 
In Chrysostom’s discussion, he indicates that the human mind is incapable of 
grasping the meaning of the cross. Reason was potentially able to make correct 
judgments about natural law but in spite of this rationality alone could not form the 
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right relationship with the divine Creator. As a consequence, God sidelined reason 
when he decided to persuade mankind of redemption through the (apparent) 
foolishness of the cross. The apostles did not make use of pagan wisdom but 
ultimately proved wiser than the pagans as a result of their faith. Christ’s cross 
becomes the province of faith alone. When interpreted through human reason, 
Chrysostom is saying, the cross is foolishness; but it ceases to appear so from the 
standpoint of faith. I will show later that Kierkegaard reached very similar 
conclusions. As a result, it is important to dissect the meaning St John Chrysostom 
ascribes to the fools for Christ:  
Now he becomes a fool unto the world, who slights the wisdom from 
without, and is persuaded that it contributes nothing towards his 
comprehension of faith. As then that poverty which is according to God is 
the cause of wealth, and lowliness, of exaltation, and to despise glory is 
the cause of glory. So also the becoming a fool maketh a man wiser than 
all. For all, with us, goes by contraries.31 
Chrysostom points out how Christian existence is caught in a network of 
paradoxes. The way to achieve something, he suggests, is to do or to be the very 
opposite of our rational instincts. The kingdom of heaven is revealed to be the 
reverse of this world. The more one distances oneself from this world the more 
he/she becomes empowered in the other world. One’s knowledge of God increases 
while one’s worldly knowledge decreases. In this sense the fool for Christ becomes 
equivalent with the unlettered person of faith:  ‘But the Cross wrought persuasion by 
means of unlearned men; yea it persuaded even the whole world. (….) And of all 
men it made philosophers: the very rustics, the utterly unlearned.’32 This 
interpretation was later to find resonance in the Western anti-scholastic trend during 
the Middle Ages.  
In Latin Christianity Tertullian was one of the most fervent defenders of the 
tension between the two wisdoms, but his was not a popular position. According to 
André Deville, the patristic traditions in the Latin world saw interpretations of 1 Cor. 
1-4 develop along two axes: firstly, the folly of destitution, weakness and 
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humiliation, in defiance of a proud wisdom, and secondly, a folly of the cross 
inviting suffering and opprobrium in response to the foolish love of Christ the 
Saviour.33 The latter did not exhibit a voluntary renunciation of one’s mind as under 
the guise of a madman or an idiot. It is rather an affective mysticism in which the 
emphasis is on overflowing love for the suffering humanity of Christ expressed as a 
participation in his passions. This kind of affective mysticism is little known in the 
Eastern tradition, where mysticism took the form of apophaticism or negative 
theology. 
The Western patristic commentaries on the first four chapters of The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians do not elaborate on the issue of the foolishness of God in 
relation to the cross, preferring rather to reduce the discussion to two terms: human 
wisdom in opposition to God’s wisdom. The scandal and the excessiveness of the 
cross are left in the background.34 Based on 1 Cor 1:30, Christ becomes the master of 
all true wisdom and philosophy. Returning to the classic Old Testament dichotomy, 
the fools are those who follow the false wisdom of the world, whereas the wise are 
those who follow Christ to the point of the martyrdom. Derville notes that most 
patristic commentators in the West fashion the discussion in a pedagogical manner, 
ensuring there is a smooth transition from the best of human wisdom to the wisdom 
of Christ, which attenuates the rupture between the two.35 In this way the Pauline 
radical opposition between the two wisdoms became less polarised, taming the 
critical function that the fool held in the Pauline text. These different patristic 
interpretations ensured that the development of the holy fool in European 
Christianity took different trajectories, with a much stronger emphasis on the 
performative aspect in the Byzantine and Orthodox worlds.  
Holy fools in Orthodox Christianity: the Byzantine and Russian traditions 
For Origen all Christians were fools in virtue of their faith: ‘We who believe 
are foolish in the sight of the world.’36 Appreciation of the counter-cultural nature of 
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Pauline folly was no doubt strong for those living under the pre-Constantinian era of 
persecution, especially for one such as Origin whose father was martyred for his 
faith. Yet the performative aspect of holy foolishness reached its maturity in a later 
era of Christian culture when professing Christianity was a social norm not a 
deviance. The experiential nature of holy foolishness, in which the fool participates 
in Christ’s suffering, was most vividly realized under Orthodox Christianity, where 
there emerged a special category of saints: the fools for Christ’s sake. The term can 
also be applied to ordinary monastics and lay people who practice salia or yurodsvo 
– the Byzantine and Russian terms most commonly used to designate folly for 
Christ’s sake.37 Generally the Byzantine holy fool, and to a lesser extent the Russian 
holy fool, exhibit an outlandish quality as a result of reinterpreting the Pauline 
injunction to become fools in a totally idiosyncratic way. It is intriguing that this 
Byzantine interpretation was novel, and marked a departure from earlier patristic 
commentaries on 1 Cor 1:4, where the term moros is taken in a purely metaphorical 
way, with no reference to an actual performance similar to the professional fool in 
the Graeco-Roman world. Yet in the Byzantine hagiographies 1 Cor 3:18 is indicated 
as the biblical source of inspiration for divine folly.38  
A closer look at 1 Cor. 4 demonstrates that the Byzantine interpretation of 
holy foolishness actually relies on a very concrete, literal interpretation of St Paul’s 
injunction to become a fool.  ‘We have been made a spectacle (theatron) to the 
world’ was an observation which would have evoked to contemporaries the Graeco-
Roman theatres and the dramatic representations and games that took place there. 
For the Byzantine holy fool in particular, though slightly less so for its Russian 
counterpart, the theatrical element is very important. The life of the holy fool has an 
increased public exposure when compared with the hermits of the desert or the 
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monks and nuns living as recluses in the monasteries. From this point of view he/she 
is very similar to the professional fool for whom the public space was vital. One of 
the most important hagiographic conventions is that the fool’s madness was feigned. 
The holy fool would put on a mask, which in this case was not an object detached 
from his own exterior appearance. The mask enabled a play with appearances, a play 
between concealed sanctity and manifest depravation. It was the human aspect of the 
paradox manifested in the Pauline idea of foolish wisdom: from a human perspective 
the saint appeared sinful and foolish but from God’s perspective his performance was 
an act of sharing in Christ’s sufferings and humiliations.  
The marginal nature of the holy fool was also emphasized, drawing on the 
Pauline text: ‘We are weak…we are dishonoured. To the present hour we both 
hunger and thirst, and we are poorly clothed, and beaten, and homeless’ (1 Cor 4:10-
11).  In order for divine foolishness to be credible its practitioner needed to be a 
stranger, always on the way, and unknown to the community in which he/she was 
performing his/her antics. Never well integrated in the social structure of the 
community he/she was destined to a position of marginality, therefore being deprived 
of any power. In terms of dishonour Dargon argues convincingly that the hidden 
sanctity of the Byzantine fool was a reaction against the ostentatious holiness of the 
monastic who was transformed into an honourable person by his recognisable 
virtue.39 Symeon of Emesa (6th century), for instance, not only behaves like a 
madman but, while keeping on his monastic garment, he was seen in the company of 
prostitutes and witnessed eating sausages on Maundy Thursday. His secret feats of 
self-abnegation, including the fact that he had attained a state of complete dispassion 
or that he had not eaten anything for the whole of Lent, remained unknown. Here is 
reworked to its full effect the common hagiographic motive of the secret servant 
whose sole raison d’être was to humble the religious by revealing the existence of 
laymen worthier than themselves.40 If we examine the list of tribulations that St Paul 
offers as criteria for the life of the fools for Christ, it is obvious that all the physical 
depravations enumerated there were applicable to the salos and yurodivyi, who by 
their vagrant and provocative lifestyle made themselves vulnerable to both 
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deprivation and ill-treatment.41 Some of them even went beyond these criteria, 
wearing few clothes or going naked to expose themselves to the elements. Since 
humiliation of the self, suffering and derision were accepted as a form of asceticism, 
they were not only welcomed but provoked through scandalous behaviour. As Paul 
noted, ‘Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed we 
entreat’ (1 Cor 4:12-13). Sanctity was only to be discovered at the end of their lives 
or, if revealed before, they would flee to another place.  
The oldest Byzantine hagiographical writing that features a holy person 
feigning madness is Palladius of Galatia’s anthology of the lives of the desert 
ascetics, the Lausiac History, written around 420.42 The fool was living in a convent 
at Tabennisi, never speaking and spending her time in the kitchen in the contempt of 
the entire community, only to disappear immediately after her holiness is revealed. 
Her role seems to have been to teach both the nuns and the great ascetic who had 
discovered her a lesson in humility. The word sale, used for the first time to indicate 
this type of foolishness, was different from moros so often used by St Paul in his 
First Epistle to the Corinthians. It is significant though that the episode from the 
Lausiac History was to be later entitled ‘The one who simulated folly (morian)’, 
using the Pauline term, which emphasized their synonymy. It was salos though that 
was to become the technical term to designate the fool for Christ in the Byzantium 
and which later was going to expand its semantic field towards madness. It is worth 
emphasising that the initial semantic overlap between madness and idiocy is in 
accord with the general view held by law and medicine until the 6th century, where 
no clear distinction was drawn between cognitive disability and mental illness.43 
They were united by virtue of a common denominator: a lack of understanding. This 
proto-holy fool comes very close to ‘the blessed idiot’ or blazhenny from the Russian 
culture, which manifests itself as intellectual and physical simplicity and lowliness.44 
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However, the term generally used to designate a holy fool is iurodivyi which, if not 
in its original meaning, in its later form moves towards the semantic field of 
madness. Significantly, this reconceptualization is very similar to Justin Martyr’s 
understanding of moria as mania. In his Apologia, with reference to The First Epistle 
to the Corinthians, he described the offense caused by the cross as madness (mania) 
rather than foolishness (moria).45 And indeed the excessively provocative behaviour 
of the later fools permits the same semantic slippage of foolishness into madness – 
for Christ’s sake.46  
In the sixth century accounts of the lives of the holy fools began to 
proliferate: Evagrius’s Life of Symeon (of Emesa), Leontius’s of Neapolis Life of 
Symeon (arguably a different one), John of Ephesus’s account of Theophilus and 
Maria, and The Life of Daniel of Skete. These accounts introduced two new elements: 
the performance moves to the cities and open spaces, while the feigned madness is 
accompanied by a feigned immorality. For instance, Theophilus and Maria, children 
of an eminent man of Antioch, assumed the role of a mime actor and a prostitute 
respectively, performing drolleries and buffooneries and making fun of the priests in 
the city of Amida.47 The most scandalous of all were found in Leontius of Neapolis’ 
Life of Symeon, which recounted episodes offering plenty of instances of behaviour 
that verged on obscenity.48 In contrast to Palladius’s sale who lived in complete self-
effacement, this kind of salos was, through his antics, a constant source of annoyance 
and offence for their contemporaries, being the best illustration for the ‘scandalous 
prankster’ type49. We can see a more aggressive strategy adopted by the holy fool. 
However, their outrageous behaviour was a form of self-humiliation and ascetic 
endeavour since it was supposed to attract all kinds of physical punishments. This 
paradoxical, promiscuous quality of holiness has been seen as specifically Eastern.50 
                                                
45 St. Justin Martyr, The First and Second Apologies, trans. by Leslie William Barnard (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1997), Apology 1, 13, p. 31 
46 Ivanov notes that the element of aggression that was added to the apostolic ‘foolishness’ (moria) 
necessitated the use of a different technical term – salia, p. 31 
47 John Saward, Perfect Fools: Folly for Christ's Sake in Catholic and Orthodox Spirituality, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 1980, p. 18 
48 ‘A Translation of The Life of Symeon the Holy Fool by Leontius of Neapolis’ in Krueger, Symeon 
the Holy Fool, pp. 131-172  
49 Bouteneff, p. 339 
50 Paul Magdalino, referring to the opinions of the Bollandists and Peter Brown, ‘What we heard in the 
Lives of the saints we have seen with our own eyes’ in The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the 
61 
How did this tradition come to influence Russian Christianity? Nikephoros’s 
10th century Life of St Andrew the Fool seems particularly important in spite of being 
a literary construct.51 First it records Andrew’s vision of the Protecting Veil of the 
Mother of God in 911, which was to inaugurate a special feast day in Constantinople, 
and secondly it seems to be the first life of a saint that reaches Russia and was most 
probably taken as a model for its successors.52 Many of the details of his life became 
commonplace in the accounts of Russian holy fools: he was considered incurably 
mad, walked naked, slept in the open, behaved like a half-wit, but at the same time 
he was endowed with the gifts of discernment and prophecy. Through his awe-
inspiring spiritual gifts and bodily mortification he became the prototype for ‘the 
terrifying ascetic’53 The first Russian holy fool – iurodstvo - is considered to be St 
Isaak Zatvornik in the eleventh century, a hermit of the Monastery of the Caves at 
Kiev, but the era when the phenomenon reached a climax was the sixteenth century. 
It was a time when the church hierarchy turned a blind eye to abuses and injustice 
and the critical function of holy fool became incredibly powerful, used as a device 
for the oppressed to protest against autocratic power.54 The most venerated fool of 
this period was St Basil the Blessed. He was believed to have appeared to Tsar Ivan 
the Terrible nearly twenty years after his death in order to admonish him. A 
comparison with the lives of Byzantine fools reveals that two important emphases 
had been added to the initial paradigm once translated to Russia: clairvoyance and 
political criticism.55 As the obscene elements and concealment subsided, we see 
miracles and instances of prophecy increase to preserve the uncanniness of the 
figure. Since political absolutism was on the rise in the 16th century Russia the holy 
fool acquired a political function as well. 56  He became an authorised voice that 
could admonish the Tsar by virtue of his special spiritual status.  
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The controversial, even outlandish, behaviour of the hagiographic holy fool 
in Orthodox Christian culture demands some clarification. In the previous section I 
showed that, far from having a different source of inspiration, such holy fools were 
practicing the themes of 1 Cor 1-4 in a very literal manner. Paradoxically, such a 
literal interpretation of Paul’s arguments transported them into a symbolic realm. 
Theologically, the extraordinary behaviour of the holy fools came to be seen as a 
symbol and intimation of Christ’s Kingdom to come. This eschatological dimension 
gave the fool added critical power, providing a basis from which one could not only 
attack the current social order but also point to the radically different world to come. 
A Kingdom in which the foolish, the weak and the base things are held in high 
regard appears to human reason as something absurd. John Caputo writes of ‘a para-
logic poetics of the kingdom’57 which designates this state that is not immediately 
accessible to the rational faculty. But as St Paul argued, Christ’s cross showed the 
wisdom of God to be foolish from the standpoint of reason. As a result the Kingdom 
is governed by the logic of foolish wisdom, a logic which Dionysius pseudo-
Areopagite described as ‘irrational and mindless’- the ‘Cause of all mind and reason, 
and all wisdom and understanding’.58 It is interesting that it is Dionysius, the father 
of negative theology, who picks up St Paul’s suggestion in a way that associates 
paradoxically foolishness with wisdom instead of simply substituting foolishness for 
wisdom.59 I suggest that this was the sense Fedotov used when he wote that: ‘Salia 
always remains irrational – a disinterested impetus to madness which claims a 
religious motivation.60 It is irrational because symbolically it has been lent something 
of the impenetrable quality of God’s wisdom.61 The holy fool does not behave in the 
conventional manner in which holiness is popularly conceived, which then frustrates 
our understanding. 
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The Kingdom comes across as a radical change, for which reason it appears 
in opposition to the conventions of the world. The holy fool, by performing the 
inversion of values that St Paul explains at length in his Epistle, represents this 
counter-world. He/she therefore develops an eschatological function62, and the 
kingdom he/she reveals is a realm of the paradox and of ‘the possibility of the 
impossible’.63 This explains the holy fool’s paradoxical appearance: he/she is to be 
found in the most abject postures because these are, in a reversed order, invested 
with power – the power of the cross (1Cor 1:18). In order not to be viewed as absurd 
this Kingdom entails a new understanding. In the Orthodox world, therefore, holy 
foolishness came to be understood as the renunciation of the fallen mind in order to 
reach a new perspective similar to that of St Paul, a phenomenon described by 
Orthodox theologians as metanoia, the change of mind. This newly acquired 
perspective affirmed the primacy of the age to come64. From this perspective 
everything worldly is relative while the Kingdom is absolute, which sets the two 
worlds in a radical opposition. It is in this sense that the maximalism of the holy fool 
in the Orthodox world has to be understood. 65 Within Russian Christian culture, in 
particular, the holy fool became no supporter of a respectable middle or happy 
medium. The critical function of the fool therefore resided in its antagonistic power 
rather than any sense of compromise.  
 
Holy fools in the Christian West: the Latin tradition 
The vast majority of the theological studies dedicated to holy fools take for 
granted the idea that the Byzantine and Russian cultural worlds held a monopoly 
over the paradigm. The reason can be found in the fact that only the Eastern Church 
sanctified this kind of spiritual endeavour. As a consequence all other forms have 
been measured against the models offered by the Byzantine salos and the Russian 
iurodsvo. It is suggestive that even those studies that raise the question of the 
existence of holy fools in the Western Church adopt this stance. For instance, John 
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Saward’s Perfect Fools strives to demonstrate the existence of an equivalent Western 
phenomenon to the Eastern model, similarly devotional in nature. The evidence that 
Saward provides cannot always perfectly match the Eastern phenomenon, although 
points of similarity can be traced with religious figures such as the Irish ascetics, St 
Francis of Assisi (1181-1226), Philip Neri (1515-1595) or Jean-Joseph Surin (1600-
1665), who all exhibited behaviour in common with the follies of the Orthodox holy 
fools, but are hard to reconcile in a single category. What seems to have prevented 
such follies developing as signs of holiness in the West was a certain sense of self-
respectability and gravity, which can be clearly inferred from St Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s interpretation of holy foolishness as ‘a joyous game, decent, grave, and 
admirable’66. The idea of a ‘joyous game’ points to a different emphasis in Western 
Christianity. Whereas in the Orthodox world the holy foolishness came to stand for 
counter-cultural madness, in Catholic Christianity the holy fool was correlated with 
simplicity and childlikeness. The literature of early monasticism furnishes us with 
numerous examples of these distinct, though closely related, kinds of ‘holy 
unwisdom’: namely, holy idiocy and folly for Christ’s sake.’67 Using Saward’s 
terminology, the first of these - folly for Christ’s sake - involves a renunciation of 
conventional rationality and exhibiting a form of madness, while the second - holy 
idiocy – is a state of mind below rationality, involving a simple experience of faith 
and the created world.68. On this scheme of understanding, the holy idiot and the fool 
for Christ become different modalities of exploring holy foolishness as, respectively, 
a spiritual experience on a personal level and spiritual strategy on the social level. 69  
In so much as the Western Christian tradition saw in the holy idiot a more 
acceptable form of the fool for Christ, this was in line with the evacuation of the 
notion of brazen foolishness from theological discourse. We find this in the way that 
simplicity of thought and manner are preferred in Catholic spiritual writings as an 
example of divine folly, and how this becomes associated with the concept of the 
folly of love. Raymond Jourdain wrote around 1400 a book called Contemplationes 
de amore divino which circulated under the pseudonym ‘Idiota’. At the time idiota 
                                                
66 The Letters of St Bernard of Clairvaux (London: Burns Oates, 1953) in Saward, p. 58 
67 Saward, p. 12 
68 Neither ‘idiot’ nor ‘madman’ is taken here in the clinical sense. 
69 Saward, p. 68 
65 
did not have its present pejorative meaning. In the fourteenth century it was still very 
close to the Greek meaning: a simple, private person, who did not hold a public 
office, like the peasantry and most women in Jourdain’s world.70 As time passed, in 
the Romance languages it acquired a stronger meaning, designating someone poor in 
spirit, the equivalent of the Latin imbecillis.71 This meaning developed into the idea 
of learned ignorance, or the eschewing of intellectual pride in favour of a meek 
idiocy. 
 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), an anti-scholastic humanist, relied on the 
motif of learned ignorance in two of his writings. In On Learned Ignorance he 
argued that the intellect can never precisely grasp the truth that resided in the divine 
mind due to the incommensurability between the human and divine minds.72 In De 
Idiota (The Dialogue of the Layman) there are three main interlocutors – the layman 
(or unlettered man), the orator (the humanist scholar) and the philosopher (the 
university-trained dialectician). The layman proves wiser than his interlocutors. Cusa 
puts in his mouth a direct reference to Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, which 
makes it clear that he intends the idiot to be the representative of learned ignorance: 
‘the knowledge of this world, wherein thou thinkst thou excellest all other is a 
certaine foolishnesse before God, and thereupon puffs men up, whereas true 
knowledge humbles them.’73 Cusa was writing from within a mystical tradition in 
which intellectual pride was to be eschewed in search for a contemplation of the 
Creator. This percolated across Western Christendom and survived the Reformation. 
In the English 1650 edition, for instance, Everard translates idiota directly as ‘idiot’. 
Tim Stainton finds the detail significant because by 1650 the English term was used 
to denote a person unable to manage his affairs, and was used more generally as a 
somewhat interchangeable term for “natural fool’.74 Jean-Joseph Surin (1600-1665) 
published in 1630 a letter in which he describes an encounter with a young man 
completely unlettered who ‘had never been instructed by anyone but God in the 
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spiritual life, and yet he spoke to me about it with such sublimity and solidity that all 
I have read or heard is nothing compared to what he told me’.75  
In Western Christendom, therefore, religious culture tended to read holy folly 
as a personal spiritual exercise, designed to improve the imitation of Christ’s love. 
This had important critical consequences: the figure of the holy fool in the West 
became a mode for self-reflection and spiritual criticism rather than predominantly a 
political and social critic in the Orthodox sense. The emphasis on the folly of love as 
seen in the writings of the French monk Guillaume de Saint-Thierry (1075-1148), 
who developed the theme of the folly of the revelation and the need for inner 
conformity with the suffering humanity of Christ. On St-Thierry’s scheme the 
wisdom of philosophy has to be surpassed in order to reach true theology, without 
which it is void and foolish. In direct connection with this the theme of the folly of 
love appears: it is foolish love that leads to wisdom.76 The disciple who wants to 
attain wisdom has to follow Christ in his passion. The interpretation was reinforced 
by St Francis of Assisi and the order which followed him: St Francis being well 
known both as one whose mission is to bring ‘new folly’ into the world and as the 
first bearer of stigmata. The foolishness of the cross, no longer defined in the context 
of wisdom, becomes the human response to the foolish love of Christ.77 Attuned to 
the same interpretation but with a less inflammatory tone, there followed in the Latin 
West Thomas à Kempis (1380-1471) with his Imitation of Christ, Ignatius of Loyola 
(1491-1556), and John of the Cross (1542-1591). Similar lines to these medieval 
interpretations were followed in the centuries to come. After, the Reformation, 
however, the Pauline tradition made an important comeback through Jansenist 
theologians such as Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), who wrote in his Pensées that ‘The 
grandeur of wisdom that comes from above is invisible to the sensual, and to the 
merely intellectual’.78 Notwithstanding this rediscovery of foolish wisdom, the 
dominant trend in Catholic mysticism has always inclined in favour of an 
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interpretation emphasising a folly of love,79 culminating in the 20th century with St 
Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897): ‘Now I have no desire left, unless it be to love Jesus 
even unto folly!’80  
 
The hagiographic holy fool as a critic  
These different ways of interpreting the holy fool reveal to us how versatile a 
critical tool the figure became in pre-modern European Christian culture. The fool, 
especially in the Byzantine tradition, by virtue of the fact that his/her behaviour 
contradicts what it is assumed to be, is obviously an ironist, not a moralist. The 
figure plays with the discrepancy between appearance and essence in the same way 
the ironist does, so that when the holy fool dies and his/her holiness is finally 
revealed, he/she has the final laugh. It was the fool’s audience that was being fooled 
all along. The perfomative aspects here are strong: first the fool enacts the 
discrepancy between wisdom and folly in his/her own being. Secondly, he/she 
proves the same discrepancy to be present in his audience. For instance, Symeon of 
Emesa enjoyed sticking his foot in front of people running in order to trip them. The 
gesture is symbolic: the person that falls loses his/hers dignified composure and 
looks ridiculous – for a moment the incongruity between what one is and how one 
wants to appear is exposed and the person is reduced to what he/she is essentially: a 
fallen creature. Thirdly, all these discrepancies reveal a yet greater division: a radical 
contradiction between Christian truth and both the common and moral senses of the 
human world.81 Ultimately, it is this divine irony that the fool enacts, manifested in 
the foolish, in which weak and base things have found favour with God as reflected 
Simeon’s words: ‘I am going to mock the world’.82 
If the fools appear to transgress the laws of nature, they do so even more with 
the laws of human culture. This is the case in the varieties of holy foolishness 
developed in both Eastern and Western Christianity. Inner freedom is achieved by 
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avoiding any natural and social determination.83 In virtue of their marginality, they 
stand outside any cultural, social, or political organization. This allows them to 
deconstruct all that comes clothed in wisdom, revealing often nothing of the kind at 
its core.84 To take an example, holy fools are usually alien to the notion of honour 
because this does not fit their axiological system, and cannot be seen as a Christian 
virtue. In exchange they provide insight into holiness while challenging any 
confusion with the idea of honour. Holiness here does not coincide with morality. 
Holiness is associated with the sphere of the religious, whereas moralists are 
grounded in the human world. Through their scandalous behaviour or puzzling 
miracles we often find holy fools warring against ‘the danger of identifying virtue 
and holiness with conventional social decorum and egocentric moral rectitude’85 
They are not led by laws but by the inner voice of personal conscience86. Spidlik 
observes that when written laws prevailed in the state and ecclesiastical structures, 
the fools stand instead for the importance of freedom and individual conscience87.  
It becomes obvious that in whichever culture the holy fools appear they are 
counter-cultural. They undermine all certainties, demolish the idols of the mind, 
point out inconsistencies, and deconstruct the social order. Their presence is 
subversive, although not in the same way as the reformer or the revolutionary. By 
virtue of their marginality they extend solidarity to those at the very periphery of 
society. They are in permanent conflict with conventions and the authorities in power 
because these are taken to be irreconcilable with the freedom of the divine Kingdom. 
Therefore, the holy fool will not advocate the replacement of something bad with 
something better, but instead calls for a fundamental spiritual paradigm shift. They 
expose all power that is derived from the world and lacking in spiritual foundation, 
while their invisible holiness is a contrast to the corruption concealed underneath the 
sanctimonious lustre of the consecrated.88 Obedience to any authority on earth is not 
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a prominent feature in the life of the fool in Christ.89 Their opposition to all forms of 
power places them at the base of he social pyramid. It is from there that they can 
establish, by virtue of their spiritual status, a privileged relation with those invested 
with authority.90 As will be seen in future chapters, this critical aspect is present 
across the European cultural world, but in certain nations, particularly Russia, holy 
foolishness has developed into a very powerful language of religious and political 
dissent. For example, in the 17th century archpriest Avvakum, leader of the Old 
Believers, wrote a letter to the Tzar Alexei Mikhailovich in which he adopted a 
rhetoric similar to holy foolishness.91  
The counter-cultural critical function of the holy fool, I suggest, is one of the 
reasons that the figure has survived as an important artistic device in the modern 
world. Respected in its various guises as a means of revealing truth to power in 
Christian culture, whether as part of a personal spiritual journey, or for attacking 
social and political norms, the holy fool has been able to retain a critical versatility 
that religious institutions have not. As European nation states have evolved into post-
confessional, secular cultural spaces, the figure of the holy fool has provided a means 
of questioning norms and modernity from a radically independent perspective. This 
has often made the figures seem dangerously threatening to political authority, 
particularly in Eastern Europe where holy fools have traditionally been invested with 
socially subversive functions. During the Soviet Union, for example, those identified 
as holy fools were kept out of the sight of the authorities who were determined to 
send them to psychiatric asylums.92 The independence of the holy fool as a critical 
figure has ensured that it can challenge authoritarianism of all stripes. As Kallistos 
Ware has commented on role of the holy fool in contemporary societies: ‘Modern 
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The modernity of the holy fool 
To understand how the figure of the holy fool made the cultural transition 
from Christian asceticism to modernity it is helpful to unpick the various ways in 
which holy foolishness was refashioned in the nineteenth century. It was during this 
period that holy foolishness was lifted out of its hagiographic context and used as a 
device with which to confront modernity. European philosophers and writers 
interested by the forces shaping modern society came to pay particular attention to 
folly and madness as a way of exploring contemporary norms. In so doing, they 
provided powerful cultural models that were to percolate into the cinematic art of the 
twentieth century. To explain these developments I will focus on three great 19th-
century thinkers – Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche – from across the 
continent, who were to pay particular attention to these issues. In different ways, 
their foolish figures would have a profound impact on the cinematic holy fool.  
These three figures have often been heralded as the precursors of 
existentialism and prophets of a new age. With their writings they dramatised the fate 
of faith in the 19th century, but were also heralding the beginning of an era in which 
the established foundations of society were going to be challenged more strongly. In 
their writings, I would like to identify three different ways in which they refashioned 
the figure of the holy fool for a new age: Dostoevsky’s idiot, Kierkegaard’s knight of 
faith, and Nietzsche’s madman. Even if these thinkers found the boundary between 
literature and philosophy to be permeable, the figures they devised to represent 
foolishness are not situated in the same plane. A distinction made by Deleuze and 
Guattari is useful: ‘The difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures 
consists first of all in this: the former are the power of concepts, and the latter are the 
powers of affects and percepts. The former take effect on a plane of immanence that 
is an image of Thought-Being (nomenon), and the latter take effect on a plane of 
composition as image of a Universe (phenomenon).94 Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, 
and Nietzsche’s madman are conceptual characters whereas Dostoevsky’s idiot is an 
aesthetic figure. The idiot is a reworking of the Russian Orthodox iurodivyi tradition 
whereas the knight and the madman are reflections on the European idea of 
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religiously-inspired madness. Each of them, in their own specific way, I will 
demonstrate, had an impact on the way the idea of foolishness was to be constructed 
as an artistic form in the following century.  
 
Kierkegaard’s knight of faith 
The first of the modern reconfigurations of the holy fool I wish to identify 
originated with the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. The significance of 
Kierkegaard for this study is that he reintroduced holy foolishness into modern 
theological discourse through his revised concept of madness. The ‘heavenly sent 
madness’ motif is Socratic but Kierkegaard reinterprets it from two biblical sources: 
Genesis 22:1-25 – the story of Abraham and Isaac, and the first two chapters of The 
First Epistle to the Corinthians.95 To understand its cultural impact I will here offer a 
brief explanation of the Kierkegaardian reconstruction of the fool as a ‘knight of 
faith’, as well as some other Kierkegaardian concepts I will apply in the following 
chapters. 
Kierkegaard appears as the modern thinker whose religious categories were 
most influenced by The First Epistle to the Corinthians, and particularly by its 
opening two chapters. At least three concepts fundamental for Kierkegaard’s 
thinking are derived from St Paul’s Epistle: madness, offence, and paradox. In trying 
to explain the place of faith when confronted with a modern, secular worldview, 
Kierkegaard found these concepts particularly useful. Interestingly, he believed that 
the reaction of the modern world to Christ’s second coming would be very similar to 
that picture offered by St Paul: 
 It is frequently said that if Christ came to the world now he would once again 
be crucified. This is not entirely true. The world has changed; it is now 
immersed in ‘understanding.’ Therefore Christ would be ridiculed, treated as 
a mad man, but a mad man at whom one laughs. . . . I now understand better 
and better the original and profound relationship I have with the comic, and 
this will be useful to me in illuminating Christianity.96 
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In relation to the established order and to human reason Christ therefore reappears as 
a fool. For this reason Christianity should be primarily defined as madness. Madness 
represents the very essence of faith. It is in the First Epistle to the Corinthians that 
the notion of offence – Christ being the stumbling block for understanding - comes 
into force. Human understanding is offended twice: first at the idea of eternity 
descending into temporality (the incarnation), and secondly at the idea of the 
crucified God. This paradoxical statement is absurd but this is a condition for faith. 
In this respect Kierkegaard builds on Tertullian: ‘Mortuus est Dei filius; credible est 
quia ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit; certum est quia impossibile est [the Son of 
God has died: this is believable because it is silly; buried he has risen again; this is 
certain because it is impossible]’97. The absurd is turned into a category, the 
‘negative category of the divine and of the relation to the divine’.98 The absurd and 
the paradox are related categories that he uses interchangeably in relation to 
Christian faith. However, as in the case of St Paul, it is just a question of point of 
view: it is only from a position outside faith that the Christian tenets seem absurd, 
but for the believer this contradiction is overcome. 
  Kierkegaard borrows the term ‘divine madness’ from Plato’s Phaedrus in 
order to use it in relation to Abraham, his knight of faith from Fear and Trembling 
(1843).99 The understanding of the term is Pauline though: ‘Abraham was greater 
than everybody – great by that power whose strength is powerlessness, great by that 
wisdom whose secret is folly, great by that hope whose form is madness…’.100 The 
knight of faith is someone who is ready to give everything up but, by virtue of the 
absurd, expects to receive everything back – he/she believes that all things are 
possible. The context is illuminating for what Kierkegaard means. Abraham is 
ordered by God to sacrifice his son, which he is ready to do, but at the same time has 
faith that his son will be given back to him. To human reason, this sounds absurd but 
it is the absurd and madness implied by faith: ‘Faith therefore hopes for this life but, 
be it noted, by virtue of the absurd, not by virtue of human understanding… Faith is 
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therefore what the Greeks called the divine madness’.101 The story can be easily put 
into the service of the divine command theory in ethics but this has the danger of 
justifying any kind of crime executed on religious grounds or in the name of 
exceptionality. Instead, a better interpretation would be to consider Kierkegaard’s 
retelling as a parable about ‘how all individuals should act: that is, with the 
seriousness, earnestness, anguish and hope of an Abraham’.102 The knight of faith is 
willing to be ridiculed by human society because he is aware of what is at stake, and 
how radically offensive this is to human rationality. In the modern world, therefore, 
Kierkegaard offers us a holy fool capable of illuminating the dichotomy between the 
spiritual and the secular. 
 
Dostoevsky’s idiot 
 If Kierkegaard’s understanding of foolishness was derived from his desire to 
unpick the paradox of private faith in modern society, Dostoevsky, working within 
an Orthodox cultural tradition, was more acutely aware of the holy fool figure as a 
critic of contemporary social norms. Faced with a rapidly modernizing urban society, 
Doestoevsky found himself asking whether the holy fool could survive the transition 
to a secular age. Dosteovesky’s exploration of this question was to lead him to 
develop the character of Prince Myshkin in the Idiot (1869): a character that Ewa 
Thompson considered a ‘stylized holy fool’. Myshkin is, in other words, a fool who 
has broken free of the canons of the Christian hagiographical writings with their 
well-established motifs. Nonethless, the character’s main function remains that of a 
critic, laying bare what Dostoevsky saw as the unpleasant truths hidden beneath the 
lustre of nineteenth-century St Petersburg society. But, while Myshkin proves to be a 
challenge for society, society is no less a challenge for him. The questions that 
Doestoevsky tries to answer are both internal and external: how is the holy fool 
perceived in a society where traditional modes of thinking no longer hold sway, and 
in what way does this modern society affect the holy fool, more precisely the 
iurodivyi?   
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 Doestoevsky’s notes are an invaluable source of information for documenting 
the evolution of his Prince Myshkin. The character underwent a series of 
refashionings in the process of creation but reached a breakthrough when two related 
ideas triumphed. In his notes Doestoevsky emphatically scribbled: ’He is a Prince. 
Idiot. Prince Yurodivi’ and ‘The idea is – to portray a perfectly beautiful man.’103 
Still, in the novel iurodivyi is used only once during the first encounter with 
Rogozhin. Afterwards the word ‘idiot’ comes to the fore, used as a pejorative term 
from the Swiss asylum where Myshkin resided, in spite of the obvious innocence and 
naivety of the prince. At the time the word would still have sounded relatively new to 
the ears of its Slavic users.104 By highlighting the term Doestovesky draws attention 
to the way in which modern medical science was interfering with one of the 
traditional figures of the Russian culture. His intention is to challenge the hegemony 
of the medical science through Myshkin, in whom infinite goodness and mental 
derangement manage to coexist. However, the novel marks an important moment, 
marking the way in which it has become difficult for the holy fool to escape the 
scrutiny of modern medical science. The slippage of holy fool into the medical 
terminology of an idiot is a sign that the world has lost its religious perception.  
However, in the process, mental disturbance is valorised as an insight into the divine. 
Before the onset of an epileptic fit the prince would experience: ‘the acme of 
harmony and beauty…a feeling, unknown and undivined till then, of completeness, 
of proportion, of reconciliation, and of ecstatic devotional merging in the highest 
synthesis of life.’105 
Dostoevsky appeared to be aware, however, that when confronting modernity 
the holy fool seems to lose his/her redemptive power. The return of Myshkin to the 
asylum indicates powerlessness in the face of the spiritual wasteland that Dostoevsky 
saw emerging. The observation was important because Dostoevsky realized that the 
holy fool was no longer functioning in its traditional setting, faced with the loss of 
faith in the contemporary world. The spiritual atmosphere is metaphorically 
suggested by a copy of Holbein’s painting The Deposition which turns up in chapter 
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4, part 2, where Prince Myshkin, who has seen it abroad in Basel, remarks: ‘Why, 
that picture might make some people lose their faith’. Børtnes writes that: ‘the dead 
body in Holbein’s painting has become an empty signifier, its very emptiness 
signifying that the sacrifice of Christ has lost its meaning, thereby depriving the 
whole of Christian culture of its meaning, too’.106 The holy fool doesn’t remain 
unaffected either. If the hagiographic writings tended towards a divinization of the 
holy fool, the stylized holy fool is markedly humanized. In this way, the fool became 
more readily divorced from its hagiographical origins.  
 
Nietzsche’s madman 
Whereas Dostoevsky transformed the fool into a counter-cultural character 
for a new age, Nietzsche took one step further by emphasizing the thoroughly 
disorientating process that secular modernity has upon the concepts of wisdom and 
folly. The fool’s relationship to secularization is characterized by Nietzsche’s 
madman who heralds the ‘death of God’ in section 108 of The Gay Science (1882): ‘I 
seek God. Whither is God? I will tell you. We have killed him, you and I.’ The 
passage is ambiguous as the madman declared himself to be a God-seeker but at the 
same time a God-murderer like all his fellow citizens. One line of interpretation 
holds that the fool presents himself as a God-seeker to indicate that the origin of the 
death of God and nihilism are rooted in a Christian interpretation of the world that is 
now redundant. As truth was searched for in a transcendent God, so the loss of truth 
in culture has resulted in the death of God.107 Nietzsche therefore challenges the fool 
with the prospect of a world that has lost its meaning, in which his function is to 
confront society with this reality. 
After breaking the ‘tremendous’ news of the end of God the fool in 
Nietzsche’s parable ponders the consequences of such an event: ‘Whither are we 
moving?.. Backwards, sideways, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up and 
down?’. The ‘death of God’ removes the old frame of reference such that there are 
no means of orientation left. Still, human society does not realise this yet since it has 
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internalised a way of thinking that depends on supernatural presuppositions.108  For 
Nietzsche the ‘death of God’ does not mean a personal confession of atheism but 
rather a historical and cultural event: the belief in the Christian God has become 
unbelievable.109 This is the meaning of the madman’s rhetorical question: ‘What are 
these churches, if not the tombs and monuments of God?’. Still, what is implied is a 
collapse of the system of beliefs and values of traditional European civilization. This 
is not necessarily a descent into nihilism, and it is possible to argue that Nietzsche’s 
madman heralds the beginning of a new approach to the divine. Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche, for example, identifies the ‘death of God’ with the death 
of the historical institutions of Christianity, the ‘secular-political phenomenon of the 
Church and its claim to power within the formation of Western humanity and its 
modern culture’; not with the Christian life before the writing of the Gospels.110 
Heidegger opens up the possibility of a search for a true and living God in 
Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics.111 In spite of his opposition to traditional 
Christian culture, Nietzche’s madman can therefore be seen taking on some of the 
dimensions of holy foolishness, providing a vantage point from which the spiritual 
void of modern society can be critiqued. 
In this chapter I have developed an understanding of the holy fool as a 
multifaceted cultural phenomenon in Europe, with representatives both in the real 
world and in the world of the imagination. The versatility of the Pauline holy fool 
has ensured that the development of the figure has been reinterpreted in relation to 
historical period and the surrounding culture. In the Christian world these 
developments resulted in a divergence between treatments in the Latin West and 
Orthodox East, while the development of a more secularized, modern society in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enabled thinkers to rediscover the critical 
versatility of the holy fool. The catalogue of figures described above is testament to 
the way in which its treatment has varied widely: they have ranged from 
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hagiographical figures, to literary characters and conceptual personae. For this 
reason, the semantic field of the holy fool had, by the twentieth century, extended 
almost beyond the possibility of a clear-cut definition, rooted instead in prototypes 
provided by thinkers including Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. Nonetheless, I have 
argued that the practice of holy foolishness has remained in many ways faithful to St 
Paul’s Epistle both in letter and spirit. As a consequence, regardless of the contexts 
in which they appear, holy fools almost always bear a countercultural connotation, 
laying bare the radical contradiction between the values of the present world and the 
transcendental values for which they stand. This countercultural critical function 
survived the transition to modernity, providing, as we shall now encounter, a 




Speaking Truth to Power:   
The Holy Fool in Soviet and Russian Cinema 
 
The image in the Soviet director Eisenstein’s film Ivan the Terrible of a 
bearded, long-haired man carrying thick chains across his naked body and 
admonishing an anointed ruler with harsh words would make for a striking 
appearance of folly in any historical film. To a Russian audience, however, it is 
much less clear that such iconography would be considered extraordinary. In Russian 
culture the holy fool inhabits a paradoxical situation: while traditionally defined by 
marginality, the yurodivyi – the Russian holy fool, has also entered the discourse of 
mainstream culture, following a move from the realm of the Church into the secular 
arts and cultural theory. The pre-modern figure of the holy fool has been 
rediscovered in modern Russia as a versatile tool, not only to pinpoint the nation’s 
historical idiosyncrasies, but also as a means to aid definition of its contemporary 
culture.1 I am beginning my comparative study of holy foolishness in European 
cinema with Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, because it is here that the concept is most 
clearly rooted and defined within the boundaries of a national religious tradition. 
 This tradition has endowed the holy fool with powerful critical functions. In 
the analysis that follows I will suggest that the appearance of the holy fool in Soviet 
and Russian cinema is part of a subversive visual discourse that repositions the holy 
fool as a powerful critic of the existing order. In order to explain this development I 
will begin by considering the aesthetic and ethical aspects of holy foolishness in the 
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Russian Orthodox tradition, and their relation to the critical function of the holy fool. 
I will then turn to the political function of the holy fool as expressed in the ‘Russian 
Idea’: an historical, socio-political and religious canvas on which the critical practice 
of holy foolishness can be understood. Russian culture presents us with an unusually 
complex situation, since holy foolishness designates not only a theological category 
but also a popular cultural phenomenon. As the figure of the holy fool is translated 
outside the strictly religious sphere, cultural re-interpretations result in stylized 
versions of the holy fool. For this reason the chapter will split discussion of the 
figure in Soviet/Russian cinema into two sections. First, I will examine portrayals of 
holy fools that were directly inspired by hagiographic models. These figures emerge 
in the films of the Soviet directors Sergei Eisenstein, Sergei Bondachuk, Elem 
Klimov, and also more recently in the work of the Russian director Pavel Lungin. 
The second section will examine stylized portrayals of the holy fool figure, as 
prominent in the Soviet and post-Soviet films of the directors Pyotr Todorovsky, 
Tengiz Abuladze, Alexander Kaidanovsky, Andrei Konchalovsky and Konstantin 
Lopushansky. One notable absentee here is the director Andrei Tarkovsky, who will 
be considered separately in the next chapter on account of the pioneering and 
sophisticated way in which the idea appears in his work. I argue that, in spite of the 
many different forms that stylized holy fools take when compared to their 
hagiographical-inspired counterparts, the figure still retains, implicitly or explicitly, 
the same subversive critical function.  
  
The aesthetic and ethical functions of holy foolishness in Russian Orthodoxy 
Before we move to examine holy foolishness in Russian film it is worth 
considering some aesthetic aspects which surface in the cinematic portrayal of holy 
fools. This is necessary because there are a number of aesthetic features of holy 
foolishness that appear in Russian culture to a degree unmatched elsewhere. These 
features were derived from the canonical representations of holy fools in Byzantium 
and for this reason are applicable to all those holy fools inspired by a hagiographical 
tradition. These considerations will help explain how the simple presence of a holy 
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fool can be such a powerful critical device, holding a mirror to contemporary 
assumptions and forcing reconsideration of existing political and social structures. 
In different settings we find distinct aspects of Holy Foolishness accentuated. 
Sergei Ivanov observes that: ‘The culture which gives birth and semantic form to the 
concept of holy foolery notes and endows with meaning only these features of insane 
behaviour which are conceptually relevant to it, while ignoring the rest.’2 In Russian 
culture two prominent features of the holy fool model are public humiliation and 
degradation, which can take the form of the ugly, the repulsive and the grotesque. 
Often holy fools walk around in rags or almost naked while their deeds can be 
annoying or even terrifying, and their words simple gibberish. Through his/her 
behaviour and appearance the holy fool contravenes conventional forms of decency 
in order to express sheer abjection. This has aesthetical as well as ethical 
implications, by confounding the distinctions between beauty and ugliness, cleanness 
and uncleanness, and purity and impurity.3 In what follows I will uncover the 
significance embedded in their modus vivendi.  
After the Second World War, the philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin developed a 
powerful theory of the grotesque which was to influence the cultural studies inside 
and outside Russia. In his writings the fool appears as a literary figure, in which he 
includes the Orthodox yurodivyi, and the figure is interconnected with the more 
general categories of the carnavalesque and the grotesque. In his Rabelais and his 
World (1965) Bakhtin argues that in conjunction with the religious festivals of 
official ‘high’ culture, and in opposition to their seriousness and loftiness, joyful and 
popular celebrations such as the Feast of Fools, the Feast of the Ass, and the Carnival 
took place. The fools were a familiar figure in these celebrations, having a role of 
enacting a reversal of the social hierarchy.4 As a consequence of this symbolic 
reversal, not only are the lowest strata of society elevated, but also everything that 
has to do with the lower parts of the body and its biological functions. Grotesque 
realism is the expression of ‘man’s vivid awareness of his materiality, [and] of his 
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bodily nature, closely related to the life of the earth’.5 What carnivalization achieves 
is a ‘joyful relativity’ opposed to the dogmatism of the official culture which seeks to 
preserve a given social order.6 Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque captures the spirit of 
the medieval ceremonial fools but its valorization of the corporeal does not offer a 
definitive explanation of the Russian yurodstvo. 
Building on Bakhtin’s theoretical premises, A. M. Panchenko sees the 
phenomenon of yurodstvo as occupying an intermediary position between the 
popular culture of laughter and the official church culture. It gives rise to a world 
turned upside-down; a counter-world which subverts the logic of the dominant 
culture.7 Here not only do we find questioning of what the world holds as virtue, but 
also an undermining of aesthetic values. For this reason, Panchenko argues, 
yurodstvo is also a rejection of the ideal of the beautiful and an elevation of the ugly 
to an aesthetical principle, with the aesthetical element being absorbed into the 
ethical.8 He identifies two precursors: the Cynical school of philosophy and a strand 
in Christianity itself which he traces back to the customary connection established 
between carnal beauty and the devil, and also to the tradition represented by Justin, 
Origen, Clemens of Alexandria and Tertullian, which reflected on the ugliness of 
Christ: a trait which in the Old Testament was regarded as messianic.9  
Yurodstvo, I would like to argue, as an imitatio Christi practice, is actually a 
continuation of this old theological tradition. In this respect its sources are both 
biblical and patristic. The passage from Isaiah referring to the ‘suffering servant’ or 
the ‘man of sorrows’ has been interpreted in Orthodox Christian literature as a 
reference to the Messiah, and more specifically to the moment of His passion: ‘he 
had no form or comeliness that we should look at him, and no beauty that we should 
desire him. He was despised and rejected by men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted 
with grief’ (Is. 53: 2-3). The chapters from Paul’s The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, which are credited in the hagiographical text as the origin of the 
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practice of holy foolishness, indirectly reinforce this Old Testament imagery in a 
way that ‘revolutionizes ancient perception and philosophy’.10 By directing his 
rhetorical skills against the spiritualizing tendencies in the Corinthian community the 
apostle Paul returns his attention to the weak, the foolish and the low in society. In 
his preaching the whole hierarchy of ancient values has been turned upside down by 
the cross, for which reason the Greeks consider it foolishness. After the fourth 
century the emphasis started to fall more on the cross as a symbol of Christ’s triumph 
rather than of His torture, especially as a result of the Emperor Constantine’s victory 
over his enemies under this sign. Early church writers such as Clemens of 
Alexandria, Origen, Irenaeus and Tertullian write about the ‘ugly’ appearance of 
Christ on the basis of Isaiah 53 and also justify it as an effective mode of preaching, 
which does not distract attention from Christ’s words.11  
The iconoclastic drive of the Byzantine and Russian holy fools can be 
therefore interpreted as following in the steps of this ‘cult of the ugly’ present in the 
early Church which stands in stark contrast to the ideal of Greek classical beauty. 
The art of representation of the canonical holy fool in grotesque naturalism is called 
‘paradoxical’ by Jostein Børtnes, as it is ‘grounded in the principle of contrast, 
reducing the points of similarity between the “earthy” and the “upperworldly”, the 
visible and the invisible, to a minimum’.12 For this reason the holy fool, more than 
any other kind of saint, is an incognito servant of God.13 This ‘inverted symbolism’ 
whereby the most base and despised things designate the most elevated reality has an 
ethical dimension. When in a hagiographic, literary or cinematic work the 
debasement of the holy fool appears in a context, it develops a critical function, 
involuntary or not. The holy fool does not have to pass explicit judgment because the 
visual force of the representation itself can challenge contemporary norms.   
Given these aesthetical and ethical characteristics of traditional holy 
foolishness, how are they valorized in subsequent literary and cinematic works? A 
useful concept is ostranenie – defamiliarization, proposed by Viktor Shklovsky 
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(1893-1984), a key figure of the Russian Formalist School.  Ostranenie is the means 
whereby something is made strange so that habitual perceptions are imbued with a 
refreshed vision.14 First, it can be applied to art in general, as a way in which it can 
be distinguished from ordinary experience; second it is an artistic device which 
creates unusual perspectives. The fool brings with him/her a worldview that is 
deviant in rapport with the ethos of society, and as a result it is perceived as foolish 
or scandalous. By throwing in this provocation yurodstvo achieves this 
defamiliarization necessary to look at society’s values anew.15 While 
defamiliarization is conceived as an artistic device within the practice of the 
formalist school, in the case of holy foolishness the defamiliarization achieved by 
scandal expands into the realm of the ethical, social and political. As Antoci 
observes: ‘Scandal gives these marginal deeds the valence necessary to engage 
mainstream persons and institutions.16 The fool, by eschewing the assumptions of the 
dominant culture, becomes a stranger to that culture and, from the position of the 
outsider, confronts society about its own clichés.17 The function of the fool in 
connection to society is replicated by the function of the parable as interpreted by the 
New Testament scholar J. D. Crossan. While the role of the myth is to establish 
worldviews, the function of the parable is to ‘create contradiction within a given 
situation of complacent security…to challenge the fundamental principle of 
security’.18 Having touched here on the aesthetic and ethical functions of the holy 
fools I will now turn to the political power that they have been invested with, best 
captured in the context of the politico-religious narrative known under the name of 
the ‘Russian idea’.  
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The political function of the holy fool within the ‘Russian Idea’  
In 1996 as part of the commemoration of the Century of Cinema the British 
Film Institute released the documentary The Russian Idea, directed by Sergey 
Selyanov and scripted by Oleg Kovalov. Here the ‘Russian idea’, understood as the 
mission of bringing about of the Kingdom of God on earth, is paradoxically shown to 
be the shaping force behind post-revolutionary cinema. This tradition was shaped by 
the 1920s avant-garde directors Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Dovzhenko, and reached a 
climax with the final scene of Tarkovsky’s Stalker. The argument is reliant of 
Nikolai Berdyaev’s version of the ‘Russian idea’ as a messianic mission of a nation 
characterized by opposed characteristics and suspended between two opposed 
kingdoms: the here and now versus the eternal everlasting. The essentially religious 
idea is applied to interpret the very reality that denied it: communism becomes on 
this scheme the manifestation of religious utopia, the dream of the heaven on earth. 
The way to achieve this is through the self-sacrifice of the hero for the sake of the 
radiant future. Individual salvation is impossible, for the hero accepts the sacrifice 
for the salvation of all. Ultimately, Selyanov and Kovalov claim, the ‘Russian idea’ 
also refers to the unresolved opposition between the state, with the Tsar as its 
representative, and the ‘kingdom’, represented by the holy fool. The documentary is 
by no means extensive but conveys a number of important elements that make up the 
historically sedimented meanings of the ‘Russian Idea’. 
Essentially a religious narrative, the ‘Russian idea’ mobilizes both social and 
political elements. Its pivotal significance for the understanding of the Russian 
identity and culture resides in the explanation it offers to the messianic mission of the 
Russian people, which accounts for both its particularism and universalism. From 
this messianic understanding of the historical role of the Russian nation and the 
terms in which it has been fashioned stem a series of ideas relevant to the context of 
our discussion. They shape the public arena debates to such an extent that artistic 
artifacts such as films come to be categorized according to criteria that take into 
account the engagement with these ideas. For example, George Faraday proposes 
four opposing positions available to the Russian directors: messianic elitism, amoral 
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elitism, messianic populism and amoral populism, which are formed at the 
intersection of two axes: the ideological message and the targeted public.19  
The ‘Russian Idea’ is intimately linked to the national identity because its 
three institutional pillars are the Orthodox Church, the Tsarist state and the peasant 
commune, the three of them having been perceived as constitutive of the Russian 
identity. I will not attempt a review of the shapes that the idea has taken in the socio-
political theories of different thinkers, but I will rather try to pinpoint the dynamic 
between the forces at play which accounts for the genesis and evolution of the 
practice of holy foolishness. Coined by Dostoevsky at about 1860, the ‘Russian Idea’ 
was first discussed in a systematic way by Vladimir Solovyev in a talk given in Paris 
in 1889 and published in French and Russian in 1889 and 1909 respectively. 20 In his 
moral philosophy the ‘Russian Idea’ acquires universalistic tones – Russia in the 
service of all the other nations.  It then only reached a similar theoretical acuity in the 
work of Nicolas Berdyaev, especially in his The Russian Idea (1946) as a historical 
elaboration of a religious conception with social and political ramifications that 
harked back to the 15th century and rose into the national consciousness in the 19th-
century debates between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, when it is conceived 
in opposition to what was seen as Western European individualism and rationalism.  
Paramount for the inception of the idea was a historical event which caused 
the Russian kingdom to be formed on the messianic idea of Moscow as the Third 
Rome21. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire under the Turks in 1453, the Russian 
people was the only one left with the mission to preserve and perpetuate the 
Orthodox faith. The rationalization of the idea was due to a monk from Pskov, 
Philoteus, who, in a letter to Basil III in 1511, argued that the Russian church had 
been invested with a divine mission as protector of Orthodoxy, which required of the 
then rulers special moral responsibilities with regard to preserving the purity of faith. 
Two forces were envisioned as Christ-bearers: the people (the Church) and the ruler, 
which were to work together in a harmonious relationship for the realization of the 
divine mission. 
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As the monk advanced it, the religious idea of the Third Rome was 
inextricably dependent on the political establishment for its realization. But soon this 
ideal form of government was to degenerate into autocracy under the reign of Ivan 
the Terrible (1530-1584). Berdyaev notes this inherent tension beneath attempts to 
put the ideal vision into practice: 
The doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome became the basic 
idea on which the Muscovite state was formed. The kingdom was 
consolidated and shaped under the symbol of a messianic idea. The 
search for true, ideal kingship was characteristic of the Russian people 
throughout history. …. But the religious idea of the kingdom took 
shape in the powerful state in which the Church was to play a 
subservient part. The Moscow Orthodox kingdom was a totalitarian 
state.22  
The notorious theoretician of Russian autocracy was Ivan the Terrible.  
Interestingly, in opposition to his political vision, a new concept arose: that of ‘Holy 
Russia’. Michael Cherniavsky interprets it as an ‘antitsarist, antistate slogan’, 
expressing a popular ideology that existed outside the political establishment.23 The 
stage was set for the future confrontations, all striving to rescue individual liberty 
and equality at the expense of centralised power, be it political or ecclesiastical.  The 
framework was religious, offered by a messianic vision of the national destiny. This 
has given rise to apocalyptic feelings and interpretations whenever an obstacle 
seemed to come in the way of the realization of the ideal, so that messianism and 
apocalypticism in this context are closely related.24 This is important to note because 
it helps us interpret the apocalyptic atmosphere that dominated Lopushansky’s and 
Tarkovsky’s films and the latter’s mindset during his twilight years.    
How does the holy fool tie in with this account? Nancy Condee makes the 
suggestion that the figure of the holy fool is a means to give expression to the 
paradoxes and contradictions embedded in the ‘Russian idea’25. I would go further. 
The holy fool figure’s principle of construction, paradoxically uniting the sublime 
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with the abject, makes it an excellent means to voice the tension created between 
institutionalized power and the ideal of a commune. On a symbolic level it becomes 
an ideal to represent tensions on two levels: between the kenotic, humiliated Christ 
and the glorified Christ, and also between the historical and the eschatological 
realities. His/her life is a celebration of the virtue of humility, the very virtue that is 
the foundation of the Russian spirituality.26  
The holy fool’s logic of construction (if textualized), or action (if practiced in 
reality), is based on inversion, since the destitution and suffering in this world are 
taken as indicative of high status in the next. This often takes the form of a political 
function. If the hagiographies do not ascribe directly a political function to the holy 
fool, it is clear that it is implied in the numerous episodes in which the holy fool is 
pitted against the secular power.27 John Saward notices that the holy fools are most 
common at a time of political tranquility, when the Church is absorbed by the 
political status quo28. When applied to the Russian context such ‘tranquility’ is not to 
be understood as an induced state of spiritual torpor. As G. P. Fedotov explains, the 
sixteenth century was a peculiarly fruitful time for holy foolishness due to these 
special historical circumstances. The forms of autocratic Tsardom and the 
subservient role of the church were in need of a corrective.  Similar to the Old 
Testament prophets on whose archetype the figure was fashioned, the holy fool stood 
up against the rulers’ abuse of power and their betrayal of what was seen as the 
Christian mission.29 
 In a strange way, the holy fool comes to threaten the tendencies towards 
absolutism manifested by the state or by the Church not necessarily through his/her 
                                                
26 Nadejda Gorodetzky, The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1939), p. 9 
27 The political connotations of the practice of holy foolishness were apparent to foreigners, who were 
more sensitive to these issues and less reluctant to talk about them. Thus Giles Fletcher wrote in 
1588 about the holy fools he encountered during his visit to Russia: ‘They have certeyn eremites 
[whom they call holy men]… This maketh the people to like well of them, because they are as 
Pasquils, to note their great mans faults that no man els dare speake of. Yet it falleth out sometime, 
that for this rude libertie which they take upon them, after a counterfeite manner, by imitation of 
prophets, they are made away with in secret; as was one or two of them in the last emperours time, 
for beying over bold in speaking against government.’, ‘Of the Russe Common Wealth’ in, Russia 
at the Close of the Sixteenth Century, ed. by E. A. Bond (London, 1856), p. 119, in G. P. Fedotov, 
The Russian Mind, p. 340 
28 Saward, p. 28 
29 Svitlana Kobets, ‘The Paradigm of the Hebrew Prophet and the Russian Tradition of Iurodstvo’, 
Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, 50 (2008), 1-16 
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words but primarily by the values he/she stands for; in this case, the values embraced 
by ‘Holy Russia’. First, an ideal social model like ‘Holy Russia’ is complemented by 
a spiritual one: a community conceived as ‘opposed to law, abstract associations, 
formal organization, and mutual interest’ is instead supported by a vision in which 
the human being is governed not through external prescriptions but by the voice of 
the conscience – the voice of God.30 This vision undermines any worldly authority 
regulated by either laws or autocratic will since it raises to the status of ultimate 
authority the voice of God embodied in the community that people form.31 Second, 
the holy fool’s extreme humility as a form of asceticism and his/her subsequent 
humiliation as form of sharing in the passions of Christ, as well as his/her non-
resistance to evil and lack of any socio-political ambitions, stand in stark contrast not 
only to the state’s political ideology, but also to the Church’s practices when she 
embraces a worldly mentality and structures. As John Saward remarks the holy 
fool’s political power is ‘dependent upon his being an unstable and strange element’ 
in a closely knit society.32 
There is still one more important reason why the holy fool integrates so well 
in the Russian Idea narrative and which also illuminates the religious grounds for the 
political singularity of Russia in the history of European civilization. What 
relinquishing one’s mind suggests intuitively in terms of the holy fool’s attitude 
towards reason is spelt out by one of the theorists of the Russian Idea, the founder of 
the Slavophilic movement Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856). In his view the spiritual 
divide between East and West is the latter’s rationalist spirit and individualism. 
European culture has lost its inner wholeness and become fragmented by its 
deviation into abstract rationalism.33 This reflects not only in religion but in the 
whole Western civilization. We could say that the holy fool figure is precisely a 
bastion of this rationalism, as a champion of the logic of the heart over the logic of 
reason. This intermingling between the religious and the political accounts for the 
holy fool’s participation in a debate that is both spiritual and political. Having shown 
                                                
30 Tim McDaniel, p. 45 
31 Given Russia’s totalitarian past these assertions might sound contradictory. The ideology of the 
ruler as God’s appointee and guarantor of Orthodoxy kept in check the egalitarian impulses. 
32 Saward, p. 28 
33 P. E. Boyko, ‘Stages in the Evolution of the Russian Idea in Our Fatherland’s Historiosophical 
Thought’, Russian Studies in Philosophy, 45 (2006), 34-50 (p. 38) 
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the many-faceted significance of the holy fools we can now turn to their 
representation in the cinematic tradition of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. 
 
Cinematic representations of the hagiographic holy fool  
One of the earliest depictions of the iconography of the holy fool in Russian 
film was from a seminal founding figure in Soviet cinema: Sergei Eisenstein. This 
might at first appear surprising given how his artistic talents were often in the service 
of Marxist ideology. Even more surprising perhaps, is that the holy fool should 
emerge in a film in which Josef Stalin took a very keen interest. Sergey Eisenstein’s 
Ivan the Terrible (1944) was commissioned by the Soviet leader as part of a 
campaign meant to legitimize, by means of recourse to an idealized past, both the 
centralization of power in his own hands and the terror that he had spread to subdue 
his own people.34 The ruthless actions of the sixteenth-century despot, a figure 
reclaimed as an heroic predecessor to Stalin, were to be justified as the pursuit of a 
higher national purpose. Whether Eisenstein endeavoured to fulfill this vision 
remains highly questionable, since the Soviet authorities had serious reservations 
regarding the second part of the film, (released as a result as late as 1958), and 
obstructed the realization of a third part. It is not difficult to notice that the narrative 
line, while in keeping with the official historical version, seems to be constantly 
undermined by the visual discourse.  
Before providing an overview of the hagiographic holy fool’s occurrences in 
the Russian cinema, I want to dwell a little further on the significance of what is 
possibly his first appearance upon the Soviet stage in Eisenstein’s film. Eisenstein is 
well known for his ambivalent relationship with religion.35 While there is evidence 
that he was drawn towards mysticism, his attitude was nevertheless anti-clerical and 
his films often reflect a negative image of the Orthodox Church.36 In spite of this, 
however, and especially in Ivan the Terrible, we can see an emphasis on 
ecclesiastical ceremonies and insignia. In Ivan’s portrayal religious imagery is often 
                                                
34 Joan Neuberg, Ivan the Terrible (London, New York: I.B. Tauris), 2003, p. 28 
35 Al Lavalley, Albert J. LaValley, Barry P. Scherr, Eisenstein at 100: A Reconsideration (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2001), p. 71 
36 Jolyon Mitchell, ‘Russia’ in Eric Mazur, Encyclopedia of Religion and Film (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 
ABC-CLIO, 2011), p. 377 
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employed as a subtle commentary, subversive of any prima facie meaning. The 
appearance of a holy fool then becomes less of a surprise in Eisenstein’s recreation 
of the past. Even if it is difficult to establish the historical authenticity of the holy 
fool that challenged Tsar Ivan IV (1547-1584) 37, it is easy to notice the critical role 
that the holy fools play in relation to official power, and indeed this is the function 
from which Eisenstein draws. The cultural historian Sergey Ivanov identifies this as 
one of the elements that enriched the holy fool paradigm when it was translated to 
the medieval Russia from the Byzantine Empire: “Wherever he may be, the holy fool 
exposes the artifices of the worldly structures which serve as guarantors of the divine 
order. In Byzantium this means, primarily, the Church; in Rus the Tsar.”38 Pitted 
against a centralised authority represented by the tsar, the fool establishes himself as 
his spiritual double and as an alternative pole of power and authority. Priscilla Hunt 
gives us an insight in how the transgressive spirituality of the holy fool functioned as 
a language expressing the tension between the official hierarchical structures of 
power and the egalitarian aspirations of the community, which the holy fool attempts 
to bring into balance.39 During the totalitarian Soviet period of Russian history in the 
20th century holy foolishness therefore offered a subtle but recognisable language of 
dissent.40  
Given the privileged relation with power that the holy fool held in Russian 
culture, it is not difficult to see how the employment of the holy fool related to 
Eisenstein’s intentions. In a situation where everybody is submitting to Ivan’s will, 
the holy fool is the only figure capable of resisting his manipulation. Eisenstein 
manipulates the symbolism of the holy fool’s paraphernalia, traditionally interpreted 
as either ascetic practice or having a prophetic significance. In his enraged 
remonstrance, Eisenstein’s holy fool casts malevolent looks, and makes accusations 
of witchcraft and cold-blooded murder, all the while pulling the chains worn across 
                                                
37 The historian G. P. Fedotov opines that Basil the Blessed, who is usually reputed with challenging 
Ivan and obtaining an end to the executions, could not have been an witness of the terror unlashed 
by Ivan’s henchmen since he died in 1550 (The Russian Religious Mind, p. 338). Sergey A. Ivanov 
writes about a different holy fool, Nikola Salos, reputed with the same feats (Holy Fools in 
Byzantium and Beyond, pp. 296-297). 
38 Ivanov, p. 401 
39 Priscilla Hunt, ‘Avvakum’s “Fith Petition” to the tsar and the Ritual process’, The Slavic and East 
European Journal, 46 (2002), 483-510 
40 Lauren Elaine Bennet, The Synthesis of Holy Fool and Artist in Post-Revolutionary Russian 
Literature, doctoral dissertation (University of Virginia, 2000) 
91 
his naked body in a gesture evoking a proletarian protest as much as a divine 
mission. It is clear that his revolt cannot be appeased as straightforwardly as if it 
were the mutiny of a mob. If intended and read as the embodiment or the survival of 
the revolutionary spirit, the holy fool levels a particularly powerful critique of 
Stalin’s autocratic tendencies. While drawing on established hagiographic 
iconography and the traditional understanding of the holy fool as a spiritual pole of 
power in opposition to the secular power, Eisenstein manipulates these features to 
serve his own artistic and political ends. In order to do so he also diverges from the 
historical chronicles, according to which Ivan held holy fools in high regard and even 
feared them.  
Although Eisenstein developed a political critique through his use of the holy 
fool, any higher spiritual significance is drained out of the figure. This appropriation 
leaves us with both an observation and a question that will prove of consequence in 
the development of my argument. The observation is that the figure of the holy fool 
is capable of retaining a power and hold over the popular imagination, even in a 
supposedly materialist Soviet climate. This is in keeping with a more general trend in 
Russian criticism which sees holy foolishness not only as a religious phenomenon 
but also as a tool of cultural interpretation. We are left therefore with a question 
about how well the ‘canonical’ iconography of the holy fool serves the critical 
function of holy foolishness in cinema? The responses to this question will be linked 
to an inquiry into how holy foolishness has been culturally reworked, and I will 
return to both these issues at various points during this chapter. 
Eisenstein was far from the only director to use the hagiographic tradition to 
portray on film the holy fool figure. In the same line stands Sergey Bondarchuk’s 
rendition of the relation between another holy fool, possibly Ivan nicknamed “Big 
Cap”, and Boris Godunov (1598-1605), who was crowned Tsar within a few years of 
the death of Ivan the Terrible. Bondarchuk’s 1986 film Boris Godunov is a grand 
adaptation of Pushkin’s eponymous play. On this reading Boris had not only usurped 
the legitimate claimant, contriving the death of Ivan’s son, but was also responsible 
for persecutions triggered by the apparition of a pretender, a monk assuming the 
identity of the murdered Tsar. Bondarchuk, following folk and literary traditions, has 
the guilt-ridden Tsar confronted by a holy fool Nikolka. He wanders the streets in 
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winter dressed in rags, barefoot, wearing a broken metal helmet on his head and a big 
cross hanging in a thick chain around his neck. He acts as Godunov’s conscience, 
reminding the tsar that his request to kill the children who have mocked him and 
stolen his kopek is very similar to what he himself did to the Tsarevich. The 
yurodivyi not only utters the inconvenient truth to the surprise of the crowds, but also 
refuses to grant Godunov’s request by replying he will not pray for ‘Tsar Herod’, 
which functions as an ominous sign.  
A holy fool conceived in the same mould, but this time as a fictional figure 
rather than a historical one, appears in Elem Klimov’s Agony (1975). Here we 
remain in the same iconographic canon with the difference that historical references 
are less certain, even if the two protagonists of the film are two important historical 
figures: Rasputin and Tsar Nicholas II. The film was controversial and only released 
ten years after production. Against a range of films developing a Russian 
nationalistic tendency during the 1970s and early 1980s, Agony struck a discordant 
note because of the balanced, almost positive, treatment of a Tsar struggling against 
his weak nature to rule the country and counter the negative influence of Rasputin at 
the imperial court. The presence of the holy fool is restricted to one episode. His 
character is again constructed in opposition to a malefic center of power: a neat and 
tidy Rasputin, but one all too ready to indulge in debaucheries, is briefly juxtaposed 
with a filthy, hunchbacked holy fool, wearing heavy metal religious artifacts. The 
latter’s transgressive spirituality is pitted as a critical device against transgressive 
immorality. The use of the holy fool here reinforces the enduring power that the 
iconography of the holy fool held through the Soviet era, yet the scene is given an 
ambiguity such that the fool’s critical function is not wholly positive. 
 
The Island (2006) 
It is not at all surprising that the post-Soviet era has witnessed a return to the 
cultural model of the holy fool in all its spiritual significance. The rediscovery of 
pre-Soviet national identities after 1991 has included a strong appreciation of the 
Orthodox aspects of that heritage. As a result the religious and hagiographic 
component of holy foolishness has recently not only been made explicit by Russian 
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directors but often vigorously affirmed. Such films include Pavel Lungin’s 
Ostrov/The Island which is, to the best of my knowledge, the first feature film to 
elaborate on the spiritual model of the holy fool such that it is the central concern of 
the film. To apply Mikhail Bakhtin’s literary distinction to the cinematic field, a 
transition is made from a primary level, in which the author utilizes the image of the 
fool, to a level in which the fool becomes the major protagonist.41 Lungin’s film was 
conceived as a response to a new stage in post-Soviet Russia’s ongoing search for 
identity. At the opening of an interview with the director Lungin, Andrey Plakhov 
comments on the symbolic value that the film has for today’s Russia: ‘Nowadays, 
more than likely it is considered more important to resolve inner problems – 
symbolically within the individual, as within the country’.42 The director’s 
acknowledged ambition is to ‘open up new genres in film, in this case the genre of 
the lives of the saints’43. Hence the whole film is intended as an alternative to a 
mainstream cultural and political discourse that overlooks religious hagiography in 
favour of secular references. The narrative form of Ostrov is similar to the pictorial 
representations of the vitae of the saints called klejma – a series of images framing 
the icon and depicting episodes from the life of a saint.44 Partially independent 
episodes are welded together to create the multifarious image of a clairvoyant, 
penitent, prankster, pedagogue, and exorcist, all these characteristics contributing to 
the portrayal of a complex holy fool figure: Father Anatoly. 
Although the story is set in Soviet times – the 1970s - for most of its length, 
Lungin utilizes the national emblem of the holy fool in such a fashion that he 
projects the image of a new spiritual guide for the post-Soviet era. Father Anatoly, 
the stoker of a monastery situated on an island, is paradoxically both a prankster and 
a clairvoyant, only loosely resembling the saints that the script writer Dmitry 
Sobolev used as prototypes: St Theophilus of Fool-for-Christ of the Kiev Caves 
                                                
41 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotrope in the Novel’ in The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1981), p. 163  
42 The press kit for Around the World in 14 Films – The Berlin Independent Film Festival at Babylon, 
2006 <www.berlinbabylon14.de/ger/presse/pr_russland.pdf> [accessed 1 Oct. 2008] 
43 Ibid. 
44 Per-Arne Bodin, ‘The holy fool as a TV hero: about Pavel Lungin's film The Island and the problem 
of authenticity’, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, 3 (2011) 
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(1788-1853) and St Sebastian of Karaganda (1884-1966).45 Anatoly is depicted 
interacting with two groups: the lay people who revere him and in whose company 
he is often seen drinking tea at his small stoker’s shed, and the monastic community 
into which he never completely integrates and which he teases permanently. In spite 
of his spiritual gifts, he bears the secret burden of a murder that he thinks he 
committed during the Second World War, an assumption which is only disproved at 
the very end of the film. 
The critical functions of Anatoly are in keeping with that of the 
hagiographical fools. Through his theatricalized behaviour and metaphorical gestures 
Anatoly acts out the conflicts smouldering within people’s own consciences and 
present in their relations with their neighbours. Anatoly assumes the status of an 
outsider: he has the lowest position in relation to the monastery because he has 
refused to take the habit and is in charge of the dirtiest place there as a simple stoker. 
He enjoys being marginalized for his theatrical and irreverent behaviour towards the 
other monks and the religious services. Yet his centrality is of a spiritual order: on a 
symbolical level he keeps alight the spiritual fire for the whole monastery. He is 
endowed with divine awareness and discernment of spirits, acting as a reflector and 
revealer of the monks’ inner conflicts. His behaviour is metaphorical – his cleverly 
designed practical jokes are meant to redirect people’s scrutiny towards themselves 
and point out their warring spiritual attitudes in an attempt to ease their troubled 
consciousness and unify their torn interiority.   
 Anatoly’s unconventional behaviour and his profound penitential religiosity 
place him in stark contrast not only to the state’s materialistic ideology but also to 
the formalism often practiced in the monastery. This positioning heightens his 
critical function against the norms of society and the Church. In this sense we 
witness a “folly within folly”: an uncompromising immoderation within, as it were, 
what John Saward calls the monastic “counterculture”.46 A few episodes stand out as 
particularly revealing. Having heard of the healing powers of Anatoly a mother 
brings her lame son to the island, as a last hope after the doctors have given up. She 
                                                
45 Elena Jakovleva, ‘“Ostrov” vezenija: Avtor scenarija fil'ma “Ostrov” Dmitrij Sobolev o 
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is a white collar worker and very fond of her designer work, probably in a factory. 
Anatoly cures her son but advises her to allow the child to receive communion the 
following day.  She is extremely fearful and tearful that she is going to lose her job  
if she does not return to work the next day and so she decides not to wait. Anatoly 
has to snatch the boy from the returning boat and dismisses her anxiety using his 
clairvoyant abilities to assure her that all will be well.  The critical suggestion is that 
fear causes people become enslaved to social systems and willingly to give up their 
freedom. The word ‘cannot’ is recurrent in the mother’s speech: she cannot be absent 
from work, and she is convinced that her boy cannot walk after Anatoly prays for 
him, even if she arrived with the hope that he would. Even the boy, after taking a 
first few steps by himself, returns fearful to his crutches and needs to be reassured 
that he no longer needs them. The woman and the boy cannot envisage a situation 
which contravenes the experiences of their material world. If there is no explicit 
criticism of the recent Soviet regime, Lungin points to a mode of being in the world 
which becomes automatically subversive to any totalitarian system, this happening 
when people retain an independence of mind and preserve their own freedom of 
action at any cost. Control is often not achieved in a violent manner, Lungin 
suggests, but insidiously through uncritical acceptance of norms and conventions that 
come to regulate the mind.  
In another, darkly humorous, episode in Ostrov, Lungin deliberately creates a 
situation where the abbot, Filaret, realises he is completely unprepared for death. 
Filaret’s comfortable boots are burned and his favorite blanket is thrown into a lake, 
exposing the inconsistency between such self-indulging practices and his former 
ascetic ideals. Moreover, the fact that the boots were a gift from a bishop alludes to 
the spiritual slackness of the Church at a time when it was assuming a subservient 
position towards the Soviet state. In another series of episodes Job, the treasurer of 
the monastery, is constantly reminded of his envious nature especially as regards 
Anatoly’s charismatic gifts and of his hostile attitude by reference to the killing of 
Abel. The implication is that, frustrated in his search for vainglory, Job’s envy and 
anger is a sort of killing, in intention if not in deed. Anatoly benignly makes fun of 
Job’s obsession with cleanliness in order to show it for what it is: an attempt to hide 
the passions that have come to rule him and also disrupt the brotherly concord 
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supposed to exist in the monastery. At the same time there is a subtext with broader 
implications. What appears to be Job’s bad inclinations: his obsession with 
cleanliness and his spying and informing on Anatoly, each allude to practices that 
characterized the paranoid Soviet society at large. In the process of purging society 
from elements inimical or not conforming to the Soviet ethos, the informants, 
recruited from all strata of society, played an important role.  
Besides those elements Lungin uses to ensure that his audience identifies 
Anatoly as a holy fool - the use of antics to deliver his prophesies and uncover the 
inner truth of his fellow beings, as well as his feigned madness - the story has a 
strong psychological ingredient. Due to this psychological emphasis, Ostrov presents 
a turn from the previous narrative usage of the holy fool. If in previous Russian films 
the holy fool ran the risk of becoming a symbol frozen in traditional patterns, used 
episodically to create a relation between two opposed poles of authority, in Ostrov 
the holy fool is no longer subordinate to the narrative but is explored as a protagonist 
in his own right. In parallel with playful episodes the camera takes the viewer into 
the private moments of man’s daily torment whereby he (falsely) believes that he 
cowardly took the life of his commander in World War II. In the most idiosyncratic 
Russian tradition the holy fool model is conflated with the sinner-turned-into-saint 
motif.  
By doing so, Pavel Lungin achieves something that the traditional model of 
the hagiographic holy fool never attempted: he opens the door to an understanding of 
holy foolishness as a potentially viable alternative for everyone. In his rendition the 
radical quality that holy foolishness has acquired in Russian hagiography is ‘tamed’ 
by the director’s attempt to illustrate some of the most cherished Orthodox spiritual 
and penitential practices. The element of scandal and controversy that usually 
accompanies the life of the holy fool is underplayed. This is because the viewer can 
recognize the protagonist as a holy fool as well as gaining insights into his inner life 
of prayer and penitence at an early stage in the story: the fool’s eccentricities are then 
interpreted in this key. Moreover, Father Anatoly is at times invested with the role of 
a staretz or spiritual father which diminishes that otherworldly quality of the holy 
fool normally achieved through his/her loneliness and mysteriousness. As a 
consequence the challenge posed to the viewer is also diminished; rather than 
97 
overturning common religious assumptions there is a sense in which the viewer’s 
expectations are met, particularly in a Russian context where Orthodox culture is 
dominant. 
 
Iurodstvovanie or playing the holy fool 
Practicing holy foolishness in its customary understanding presupposes an 
element of acting, at least in the Byzantine-Russian tradition where foolishness is 
understood as a mask meant to conceal the sanctity of its practitioner. In this context, 
the real holy fool is saved from the accusation of imposture by the authenticity of 
his/her existential commitment to the role. However, this was not always the case. In 
order to account for cases of appropriation of foolish behaviour in Russian film for 
different purposes the term at hand is iurodstvovanie. To the best of my knowledge 
this idea is indicated by a special term only in Russian culture, where it has been 
recognized as a distinct behavioural pattern having formal qualities of holy 
foolishness but lacking its substance.  
Pavel Lungin offers an ample analysis of the practice in his The Tsar (2009), 
where it is combined with Ivan’s the Terrible personal mythology of kingship. Here 
the figure of the historical fool who castigates Ivan the Terrible is suppressed while 
the Tsar himself is conceived as a sort of holy fool in reverse, an alleged latter-day 
saint figure disguised in imperial clothes. He is shown adopting for himself 
something of the awesome character of some Russian holy fools whose mysterious 
behavior and acts – sometimes apparently cruel - were deemed to be beyond human 
understanding or at least having a hidden significance at odds with the prima facie 
interpretation of facts. It is the coincidence of oppositional elements that underlies 
the construction of the holy fool which makes the figure easily susceptible to 
appropriation in contexts that lack a positive spiritual significance. In the political 
plane the appropriation of the holy fool’s behaviour can become the basis for 
despotism, sanctioning any action of the sovereign.47  
The film opens in the year 1565 and the oprichnina, Ivan’s political police, 
were killing people and devastating villages. One girl escapes and is saved from 
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freezing by the abbot Fillip. On seeing the abbot Ivan asks him to become the new 
patriarch. Fillip’s nephew, Kolychev, leaves to fight in the Livonian war. He returns 
defeated and Ivan considers him a traitor and orders him arrested. Kolychev flees to 
Fillip who hides him, and naturally falls under suspicion himself. Eventually, Ivan 
finds Kolychev and orders Filip to judge him and his fellows. The Metropolitan 
refuses to condemn them in spite of the fact that they recognize their guilt, 
suspecting that confessions were made under torture. Ivan sends the accused to fight 
a bear, whereby Kolychev is miraculously saved by the same orphaned girl who 
featured earlier. Unfortunately, such salvation is only temporary as Kolychev will be 
cruelly tortured in the public square under the eyes of his uncle. For his refusal to 
condemn his nephew, the Metropolitan is dismissed by the Tsar and imprisoned. 
However, rumors of the Metropolitan’s sanctity and miracle-working capacity are 
spread and so the film ends with a vengeful Ivan having him killed.  
Lungin shows the feeling of an impending apocalypse to be the motivation 
for Ivan’s irrational behaviour. His acts are justified to himself and to his subjects by 
the perceived imminence of the second coming. Ivan’s religious mania can be 
explained by exactly this kind of transformation of general expectations in his own 
mission.48 He assumes this mission which - very conveniently otherwise - serves his 
own political interests and ambitions. Ivan conceives himself as the apocalyptic 
forerunner of Christ. Two episodes in particular stand out. In the first he explains to a 
girl taken from Metropolitan Filip and placed under his protection that he had built 
his palace Alexandrovskaia Sloboda as a New Jerusalem with the coming of Christ 
in mind. In the second, Lungin shows a religious cleansing ceremony in which the 
royal cart is pulled by virgins dressed in white, in a reenactment of Matthew 25:1-13. 
In Ivan’s mind it is his mission to purge everything before the second coming, 
administering the justice of God as His earthly representative. The Tsar’s 
predilection for the orphaned girl whose parents had been killed by his own men is 
another way of distancing himself from the sinners and associating himself with the 
unblemished.  
It can be observed that Lungin’s approach to the historical subject is 
peculiarly modern. In contrast with 16th century ideology which promoted the figures 
                                                
 
99 
of the holy fool and the Tsar as beyond good and evil, Lungin deliberately presents 
Ivan as a fool without sanctity or charisma. The classic holy fool is missing, his place 
having been taken by a travesty of a fool: Ivan. Lungin is playing with the difference 
between appearance and essence that is characteristic of the fool. The model of the 
holy fool was meant to convey the idea that under the mask of madness sanctity 
could be concealed. In the same way Ivan projects an image of himself as a bloody 
tyrant in appearance while in secret he is an ascetic.49 In the privacy of his residence 
at Alexandrovskaia Sloboda, he is shown in his cell in monastic garments, praying in 
front of his icons or publicly performing a ritual of repentance in front of the altar 
together with his personal guard, the oprichniki. By casting Pyotr Mamonov, who 
played the holy fool in Ostrov, in the role of Ivan, Lungin inspiringly uses the 
ascetical face of this actor to make a point to the audience. In his twisted way Ivan 
expiates for the sins of his people and expects the unconditional support of his 
subjects. He reads historical events as a response to his own piety and his people’s 
piety, a defeat or a victory in the military field being decided by the moral conduct 
and religious devotion of him and his people. A defeat would be, under this 
interpretation, a kind of divinely inflicted punitive suffering. Following from this 
conception, the suffering he inflicts on his own people has a redemptive character, 
the ultimate aim being to attract God’s benevolence for his military campaigns and 
create the conditions for the second coming of Christ. Inflicting suffering becomes 
perfectly justifiable: it is the result of the sins of his people but is also intended as a 
means of purification. In an inversion of the traditional hagiographic fool, religion 
and politics here reinforce each other to create the mythology of Ivan the Terrible as 
defender of the faith. 
I have previously suggested that there is a risk that proliferation of a certain 
phenomenon in a culture can cause it to lose its freshness and unpredictability. As 
Juri Lotman observes, through repetition and imitation even an extraordinary act can 
fall from the sphere of ‘explosion’, that is creativity, into the sphere of the habitual.50 
In this section I have showed how the traditional hagiographic fool, now undergoing 
a revival of interest in Russian culture, can be appropriated and made to serve 
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purposes that contravene its very raison d’être. In so doing, the familiarity of the 
holy fool can cause it to lose much of its critical function: a problem which is more 
acute in Russian culture today than under the Soviet period where the figure, though 
stripped of much of its Christian content, retained a powerful critical force. It is to 
the use of these stylized holy fools in Soviet cinema that I now shall turn. 
   
Stylized Holy Fools 
Under the Soviet Union, it was often difficult to express overtly religious 
content in film, and so directors often used the iurodiviy in a stylized form. In many 
ways, these stylized fools retained pointers that linked them with the functions of the 
traditional holy fool in Russian culture, most importantly their critical function. As 
with the holy fools that use explicitly hagiographic models, these derivatives have 
also led to some conceptual reworking of the holy fool paradigm, and have survived 
as important models in post-Soviet Russian cinema. While their depiction departs 
from the ‘canonical’ iconography the identification of these stylized figures as holy 
fools is reliant on literary precedents in Russian culture and similarity of function. I 
have found useful Peter C. Bouteneff’s proposal to break down the figure of the holy 
fool into three types: the “scandalous prankster”, the “terrifying ascetic” and the 
“blessed idiot”.51 In cinema, I would argue, this has branched off into two directions: 
an exploration of the potentialities of the blessed idiot figure and of the holy madman 
figure, into which the other two categories are collapsed. In the first case the holy 
fool would mostly be referred to in Russian by the word “blazhenny” (blessed, 
innocent) and his/her foolishness would manifest itself as “an intellectual and 
physical simplicity and lowliness”52. These reworkings of the hagiographic paradigm 
have been facilitated by the fact that holy foolishness has functioned in Russia not 
only as a theological category, but also as a mode of popular religiosity.53 Probably 
the first such explorations into the spirituality of the holy fool are Dostoevsky’s 
Prince Mishkin in The Idiot (1868) or Elizaveta in The Brothers Karamazov (1880), 
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to which many of the cinematic fools are indebted. Thereafter the door was open to a 
gallery of cultural interpretations, which Ewa Thompson calls ‘stylized holy fools’ in 
order to differentiate them from the strictly hagiographic counterpart.54   
Wartime Romance (1983) 
The development of stylized holy fools was particularly marked in the 1980s 
as the Soviet system began to be questioned from within. One of the most notable 
instances of a stylized holy fool features in Pyotr Todorovsky’s Wartime Romance. 
In the first part Alexander is a World War II soldier platonically attracted by Liuba, 
the mistress of a major who is killed in action. When they meet again after ten years, 
Alexander is a film projectionist studying to become a history teacher and already 
married. Liuba, a worn-out street vendor has a daughter. He does everything in his 
power to help her, including selling her doughnuts for her and babysitting her 
daughter. Still, Alexander’s love for Liuba has a nonphysical dimension.  His self-
debasement and the danger of losing his wife, friends, social position, is a way of 
sharing in her misfortune. His mission is to help Liuba rediscover herself as a 
valuable and beautiful human being troubled by unfortunate circumstances. In one 
suggestive scene, he is projecting a Chaplin film in the cinema. The hint is apparent: 
Alexander has now become the Tramp, the character that Chaplin himself came to be 
identified with. On a symbolic level, it reinforces Alexander’s depiction as a holy 
fool, in spite of the lack of references to religion.55 The social behavioral model is 
rooted not in the ethos of the new Soviet man but in the pre-revolutionary ‘kenotic’ 
model of the Slavophils, who cherished the ideals of humility, self-limitation, 
suffering and poverty.56 At the time when Wartime Romance was filmed the ideas of 
humility and willingly sharing in the suffering of others could not have been  more at 
odds with the official Socialist aesthetic whose three supporting pillars were 
‘ideological commitment’, ‘Party-mindedness’ and ‘national/popular spirit’. This 
meant that films were supposed to contribute militantly to uncovering the communist 
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‘idea’ and oppose cosmopolitanism and bourgeois nationalism.57 Neither was 
Wartime Romance in line with the heroic male paradigm of the Soviet mythology.58 
Under such circumstances, a subtle approach had to be used if one was to challenge 
these state-sponsored ideals. Todorowksy demonstrated that an alternative model of 
man could be promoted in disguised form through the fool figure, masking his 
subversive criticism through the means of an unpretentious comedy. 
Repentance (1984) 
With filmmakers restricted to state sponsorship during the Soviet era, and 
suffering under a regime of strict censorship, it was unlikely that any overt criticism 
of the regime could be expressed in cinema. The advent of glasnost in the 1980s saw 
a mild relaxation of censorship that encouraged a critical spirit. It was in this 
atmosphere that a film which questioned the Soviet past and authoritarianism 
emerged (thought it is true it emerged at the periphery of the Soviet Union, far from 
the central bureaucracy). Director Tengiz Abuladze produced Repentance for 
Georgian television in 1984 and received political support from the local Party 
Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze, though the controversial nature of the film 
prevented broadcast until 1986.59 It was seen by Gorbachev in the same year, who, 
very much impressed, personally made it possible for it to be widely distributed and 
to  enter public debate.60 Repentance became a cult film of the 1980s as the first to 
address directly the terror of the Stalinist regime and, in the words of a Russian 
critic, ‘satisfy our tremendous thirst for truth and our urge to reevaluate the mistakes 
of the recent past’.61 
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The whole of Soviet society recognized its own traumatic past in Abuladze’s 
political parable, and even its surrealism was deemed perfectly suited to describe 
accurately the show trials and mentality of the Great Stalinist Terror.62 At the same 
time the Georgians saw it as specifically promoting their own national cause and 
customs.63 However, the film was designed to have universal value. It is set in an 
imaginary time and space – contemporary at first sight but with anachronistic 
elements such as police forces dressed in medieval outfits and horse carriages, meant 
to undermine the viewer’s effort to establish a timeframe.64 The figure around which 
the narrative is woven is not a specific historical individual but the universal dictator 
– a composite caricature of Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Beria and Chaplin’s ‘great 
dictator’.65 In addition, his histrionic side brings him close to Caligula and Nero. It 
was in this mix that Abuladze made use of the holy fool figure to maximum critical 
effect. 
Repentance exhibits an intricate construction en abîme, with two framing 
narratives, one real and circular, and the other imaginary, with its own fantasies and 
flashbacks. The story is narrated from the point of view of Ketevan Barateli, a cake 
decorator now in her forties who, in the first sequence, is seen finding out from the 
newspaper that the mayor Varlam Aravidze has died. This sets in motion her 
daydream, and all that follows happens in her subjective time with the exception of 
the final sequence. In her reverie Ketevan imagines herself as the defiant woman 
who digs out the body of Aravidze, is caught and brought to court where she gives 
her own version of the real character of the much-esteemed mayor. The flashbacks to 
her childhood years offer a complex portrayal of Adavidze as father, unscrupulous 
lover, corrupted leader, dilettante patron of arts, and capricious dictator. Most of all 
he is shown in relation to her own family, as a persecutor of her parents, the painter 
Sandro and his wife Nino. They stand up for the old values of art and spirituality 
which the materialist Aravidze wants to destroy while keeping up the appearances of 
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an enlightened leader. They are ultimately eliminated from the absurd world that 
Aravidze turns his town into, where ‘four out of three persons are enemies’. Ketevan 
has thus a personal reason for digging him out because ‘to bury him means to forgive 
him’. Her unexpected ally is his own grandson, Tornike, who cannot bear the lies 
and hypocrisy of his father and grandfather. Only Tornike’s suicide makes his father 
Abel determined to dig out and throw Varlam’s corpse into the sea. 
It is in his characterization of Aravidze that Abuladze utilizes the trope of 
iurodsvovanie to great effect.66 Each different angle from which he is shown 
uncovers not a facet of his personality but rather a new mask since Aravidze doesn’t 
appear to have a stable identity. On his first encounter with the Baratelis his costume 
suggests the ambiguity of his character: he wears a white gown over a black uniform. 
On the one hand he seems to be sympathetic to Sandro, his art and his desire to save 
the town church from destruction, and is full of admiration for Nino’s beauty, while 
on the other hand his antics are meant to intimidate and have a symbolic subtext. 
When he visits the Baratelis his gift for Ketevan is a caged bird: an ominous sign of 
the future imprisonments. His recital of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 66 offered on the same 
occasion about the desecration of faith, honour and virtue, and ‘art made tongue-tied 
by authority’, is actually used as a riddle to foretell the ordeals Sandro and his family 
will soon be subjected to. In the end the mask falls, revealing that the benevolent 
patron of the artists and art is nothing of the sort, all consumed instead by the desire 
to protect society from what he deems to be corrupting principles. 
While Valaam proves to be the unholy fool, Ketevan emerges as the true holy 
fool. This is not a case of cultural appropriation. In Georgia, as in Russia, the 
practice of holy foolishness came to be known quite early – already in 11th century 
the life of Andrew the Fool circulated in Georgian translation.67 Abuladze utilizes 
two topoi of holy foolishness: the sacrilegious behaviour and the symbolic gestures. 
Apparently Ketevan’s digging up a corpse is a sacrilegious gesture, a personal 
vendetta. As the procurator points out it would be a case of believing that one can 
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achieve a moral good through immoral behaviour. While her acts are objectionable 
on moral grounds there is still a higher reason that takes precedence over moral 
prescriptions ‘for Aravidze is not dead. As long as you defend him, he lives on and 
corrupts society’. Varlam is not dead because he lives in the collective memory as a 
great man, the benefactor of his town. Ketevan’s gesture is symbolic because the 
town has to confront its demons and call them by their own name. Abel’s attitude is 
revealing of the refusal to pass any judgment on his father and on the past because 
‘those were complicated times’. But the danger is that by not incriminating the 
perpetrator for his crimes, the past continues to live on insidiously through the living 
and repeats itself in their attitudes. This is true in Abel who is a Varlam with a 
human face. While his father was demonic and obliterated his enemies he just lacks 
moral criteria and prefers, like in the case of Ketevan, to send his enemies to the 
mental asylum. Ketevan’s pronounced madness is saner than the unreasonability that 
passes as normality but the system has now found milder forms of dealing with the 
inconvenient truth, more suitable for the post-Stalinist generation. 
In fact, what is left for the holy fool once old values have been obliterated 
and the people have been given new consciences? Abuladze suggests that the 
function of the fool is to keep alive the memory of the past, particularly a past that 
has been rewritten. Churches can be demolished but their memory should be kept 
alive, Ketevan seems to tell us through each cake she symbolically decorates with a 
church. This had profound meaning for a society finding itself at a turning point in 
the 1980s. In this context the last line of the film must have sounded even more 
relevant to its Soviet audience: ‘What good is [a street] if it doesn’t lead to a 
church?’. For Soviet cinema it marked symbolically a moment of liberation from the 
censorship that had previously been imposed on religion. 
Kerosene Seller’s Wife (1989) 
Alexander Kaidanovsky’s Kerosene Seller’s Wife raises similar issues to 
Abuladze’s film. Set in Kaliningrad in 1953, Kerosene Seller’s Wife is another 
glasnost films designed to revisit and critique the Stalinist past. The narrative line, 
punctuated with Christian symbolism and grotesque allegory verging on the surreal, 
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features a Cain-and-Abel case in which a corrupted high rank Communist official, 
Sergey, deliberately provokes the death of a patient, for which his twin brother Pavel, 
took the blame. As a result Pavel, once a prestigious surgeon, has been demoted and 
constrained to become a kerosene seller. He rises to the stature of a holy fool by 
assuming the injustices of social exclusion and destitution, which brings him closer 
to the outcasts of the community. His self-abnegation is meant to rack Sergey’s 
conscience, which never happens as he prefers to drown himself rather than renege 
on his Stalinist principles. The truth is brought to light by an investigation into the 
accusations of bribery-taking which a priest and his community bring against Sergey, 
while Pavel tries unsuccessfully to take upon himself the blame for his brother’s 
criminal activities for a second time.  
That the director fashions Pavel as a holy fool is not only suggested by his 
having previously played the role of another fool in Tarkovsky’s film Stalker, but is 
clearly indicated by his wife in the film who explicitly calls him a yurodivyi. 
Kaidanovsky’s purpose is to contrast Sergey’s ascension up the political hierarchy 
with his brother’s utter degradation. Even the film’s title undermines Pavel’s status 
by bringing his relatively unimportant wife to the fore. Under Kaidanovsky’s 
direction the behavior of holy folly is employed to extreme effects, with grotesque 
images of Pavel in his repugnant fur coat crawling like a beast on the ice and 
mumbling indistinctively as a kind of mortification or atonement for his brother’s 
deeds. As the priest’s defeatist motto says, echoed by the police investigator himself, 
‘Victory is the refuge of the villain’, which seems to be embraced by Pavel as well. 
Kaidanovsky’s naturalistic use of the aesthetics of holy foolishness offers a sharp 
social criticism rather than moments of transcendence. The truth the investigator 
discovers doesn’t bring any relief to the victim since evil is endemic to society. In 
contrast, the truth Pavel is after is shown to lie not in the external circumstances of 
‘who did it’, but in the miraculous personal conversion of the criminal. ‘I’m 
convinced that without the hope of a miracle life would lose its reality’, Pavel tells 
the investigator. The miracle of Sergey’s repentance and salvation never takes place 
since he has irremediably lost his soul in exchange for the honours granted to him by 
the Soviet regime. Only the police investigator is touched by fleeting visions of 
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transcendence inspired by the presence of the priest and members of his community, 
but nevertheless he still decides to cover up the facts.  
In keeping with his marginalized status, Pavel speaks very little all through 
the film with one exception, when the investigator is writing his final report at the 
police station. Like a prophet of doom, Pavel, in a trace-like state, launches a last 
diatribe against a society where spiritual death reigns supreme and the present, ever 
keeping the phantoms of the past alive by embodying them in monumental art, is 
condemned by divine judgment. As he continues his monologue the camera zooms in 
while his face changes dramatically to express the horror of this spiritual death of 
which society is unaware. Cutting to a blank red frame, the face of Sergey then 
bursts into the sequence to engage Pavel into a dialogue about the meaning of 
immortality. For Sergey immortality means being present through propagandist art as 
a repository of collective memory. Pavel replies by criticizing the way moral 
conscience and personal memory are erased to stifle any attempts to redeem the 
present. He asks: ‘Who is guiltier than he who turns aside when he is told the truth or 
forgets crimes he himself has committed?’ The present cannot be changed as long as 
it is populated by the dead and there is no acceptance of moral responsibility. In the 
film Pavel refers to the post-Stalinist present but the question of the quality of 
personal and collective memory that he raises is as relevant for the period of 
transition that glasnost represented. The same issue of personal and collective 
repentance that is central to Abuladze’s film is raised in a different form here.  
At the conclusion of his film, Kaidanovsky enhances Pavel’s isolation on the 
fringes of society by placing him in a mental asylum as leader of the inmates. It is 
unclear whether this is the result of successful brainwashing or Pavel’s realization 
that greater humanity is to be found within the asylum’s walls than outside. Pavel 
ends by pounding exploding caps with a brick while church bells are heard in the 
distance: a measure through which Kaidanovsky enhances his protagonist’s 
destitution. In a culture where holy foolishness was still alive in collective memory 
one could not fail to make associations. Pavel is resonant of the historical holy fool 
Ivan Iakovlevich Koreisha (1780-1861) who spent much time in the mental 
institution to which he had been committed. Also, it is a direct allusion to the 
communist practice of institutionalizing the ‘enemies’ of the regime on grounds of 
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insanity. It is significant that from the 1950s the number of the asylums in the Soviet 
Union increased from 40 to over 400.68 This was in line with a more general 
interpretation of madness seen ‘in relation of opposition to social and political 
institutions regulating the human mind, which become internalized as prevailing 
cultural assumptions.’69 Through his use of Pavel as a stylized holy fool in an mental 
hospital, Kaidanovsky questioned the norms and fundamentals of a society that 
required the depersonalization of the human being in order to function. The critical 
force of his character enabled a trenchant distinction to be offered between self-
denial as the last defence of humanity and the depersonalization practiced in 
totalitarian regimes. 
Russian Symphony (1994) 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, stylized holy fools could begin to be 
explored in a specifically religious way in Russian cinema. One of the most striking 
examples is Konstantin Lopushansky’s grim picture of a man who, realizing his own 
ungodliness, takes up holy foolishness as penitence. Lopushansky inherited from 
Tarkovsky the feeling of an impending apocalypse, a theme that became his main 
focus in four films: Russian Symphony (1994), Letters from a Dead Man (1986), 
Visitor to a Museum (1989), The Black Swans (2006). Of these four, only in Russian 
Symphony is the apocalyptic vision specifically religious. The viewer is introduced 
into this atmosphere from the first lines of the protagonist’s monologue which 
ruminates on the idea of God’s judgment of history and on the last invisible battle 
between the forces of the light and the forces of the dark that is underway.  Its 
protagonist Masarin is, by his own definition, ‘a Russian intellectual’, an ‘heir of 
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky’, given to continuous introspection, who is drawn to action 
by the gravity of the events. He makes it his mission to rescue the children in an 
orphanage that is going to be engulfed by floodwaters. Soon he realizes that the 
authorities are not going to help him as the Soviet empire is collapsing and they are 
preoccupied with saving themselves. The signs of the last days become manifest as 
the dead emerge out of their graves. The only person he can find that is sympathetic 
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to his intentions is a writer who calls him a ‘Myshkin’ in reference to Dostoevsky’s 
fool. But the writer proves to be only interested in the children’s story as a subject 
for a good novel and Masarin is no real Myshkin. He realises that he can actually feel 
no compassion for the children and that it is only his mind that tells him that the 
children must be saved. In a discussion with the writer he explains his conception of 
life as a continuous role-play. Some play better than others but one player will be an 
impostor - the Antichrist. As the film develops the faithful brace up for the last battle 
and travel to Kulikovo, the site of an historical battle between the Russians and the 
Tartars. While they are waiting for the enemy a dwarfish holy fool puts his ear to the 
ground to hear his coming. The false Myshkin appears totally changed into a stiff 
self-important politician and tries to reassure the people that the children need 
nothing; they just should learn how to swim and save themselves. As he ends a storm 
breaks out, which brings chaos. 
In many ways Russian Symphony finishes its representation of holy 
foolishness where Lungin’s The Island begins. Its last part follows the process of the 
protagonist becoming a holy fool. He admits to himself that his logically thought out 
solution for the plight of the orphans makes him a murderer. He dreams of himself 
being dead and of an angel who cannot find clean shirts for him because his soul in 
not clean. He realizes that the only important question in life regards God. The last 
sequence is a long shot of him plodding on his knees in the snow, dressed in rugs, 
with a big cross hanging in a thick chain around his neck and asking God for 
forgiveness. More than any other holy fool explored so far Lopushanky’s has a 
critical function to expose the inner problems of the soul. Empires can fall but this 
split in human psychology between the mind and the heart can endure with fatal 
consequences.  
The understanding of this dramatic change in the character hinges on a 
specific anthropological view of the human person which experiences a kind of 
dualism between the mind and the heart. Masarin’s recurring statements that he is an 
‘intellectual’, his permanent introspection, are relevant for the subsequent 
development of events. The eschatological preoccupation in a religious sense played 
a significant role in shaping the thinking of the intellectuals of a Slavophile bent in 
the 19th century and thereafter. Lopushansky draws his inspiration from this religious 
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and philosophic tradition and shows the way is should be embodied. He makes clear 
that the idea about the eschatological sense of history and the type of action it entails 
should be rooted in a kind of spirituality able to bring the two in an organic unity. As 
Berdyaev summarises an age old tenet of Orthodox spirituality: ‘It is the mysticism 
of the heart which is at the centre of life. Therefore the mind must be united to the 
heart if there is to be any spiritual unity within.’70 Otherwise the non-coincidence 
between the two is perceived internally as role-playing. The film enters into dialogue 
with Berdyaev’s conception of personality as both a persona, a mask which ascribes 
a social role, and as capacity for communion.71 It is the latter aspect that is deficient 
in Masarin, his heart not having the capacity to feel and bond with the children in 
need.  Holy foolishness is employed here as a means to humble the mind and bring it 
under the control of the heart.  
 
The House of Fools (2002) 
Andrei Konchalovsky’s Dom Durakov/The House of Fools (2002) offers yet 
another cultural transfiguration of the holy fool in the flourishing cinematic revival 
of the post-Soviet era. Its director co-scripted Andrei Rublev with Tarkovsky and his 
reworking of the theme of holy foolishness is therefore of great interest. He even 
establishes an arch in time between the two female characters, alluding to Andrei 
Rublev’s durochka through the use of the same insignia that come to be temporarily 
associated with both: the white outfit and horse. Anticipating my analysis of 
Tarkovsky in the next chapter I note here that both depict holy fools in conflicts 
where they seem to position themselves on the wrong side as a result of an apparent 
error or lack of judgment. 
The House of Fools is a personal approach towards the contemporary armed 
conflict in Chechnya, for whose impartiality the director was criticized in Russia.72 
Konchalovsky had the diplomatic objective of making a film that attempts to 
alleviate the war wounds on both sides of the conflict - Russian and Chechen – 
                                                
70 Nicolas Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), p. 254 
71 Richard Polt, ‘Person’ in Dictionary of existentialism, ed. by Ḥayim Gordon (London: Fitzroy 
Dearborn, 1999), p. 345 
72 Galina Stolyarova, ‘The Love and madness of War’, The St Petersburg Times, 18 October 2002 
<http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=8373> [accessed 45 August 2008] 
111 
inspired by his pacifist spirit. Foolishness informs the vision of this film which is 
mostly set in a mental institution on the Russian border state of Ingushetia, and 
becomes an extended metaphor that inquires into the rationale for the war. But in 
spite of its poetical quality and the luminous figure of Janna, the film’s holy fool, the 
view of the war is gloomy. What is it that puts the machine of war into action in The 
House of Fools? The personal justification for it loses any relevance and the only 
answers the film seems to offer are those relating to irrationality. The question is 
posed by a Russian soldier citing Tolstoy: ‘Why is a man happy when he kills 
another?’ The problem is answered by one of his compatriots, a resident of the 
psychiatric asylum: ‘War and stupidity will feed this generation of junkies and trash.’ 
Otherwise the treatment of both the Russian and the Chechen soldiers reveals a 
human nature that is not altogether corrupted and unredeemable. A trace of human 
solidarity can be spotted in an episode in which the Russian soldiers want to 
exchange ammunition and the body of a Chechen for drugs and money. A possibility 
of bonding is affirmed between the two enemy captains when the Russian one 
discovers that the Chechen saved him in the Afghanistan war, a potential bond 
thereafter eliminated by the accidental shooting of the Chechen by a drugged Russian 
soldier. 
The film has a number of different agendas, revealing the shapes that modern 
warfare can take. The metaphor of holy foolishness is used both to unmask political 
and institutionalized repression and to question the boundaries between madness and 
sanity. The film allows two contrasts: first, between the institutionalised world of 
madness and the outside world, in order to expose the radical opposition between the 
humane madness of the incarcerated and the inhuman one of the free people; and 
second between different types of foolishness. Most of these have a rather benign 
form, rather like idiosyncrasies that contribute to the individualization of each 
patient. This picturesque world poses a challenge to what normality is and to what is 
generally deemed as reasonable. It reunites a gallery of odd figures, whose political 
views deviate from the generally held ones or whose peculiarities contradict normal 
social conduct.  
The film would have been reduced to two political targets - pleading for the 
right to be different and the unmasking of institutional repression - if it were not for 
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the remarkable character of Janna, who stands out through her deep humanity and 
non-violent nature. No clear reason is presented for her institutionalization in the 
asylum except perhaps for her romantic fantasies in which Brian Adams plays the 
role of her fiancé. For Janna the hospital is not a repressive space but a place where 
she can place herself in the service of the others. Her freedom is no longer coerced 
by conventionally restricted spaces. On a symbolical level she is fashioned in the 
mould of a modern holy fool. She remains faithful to her fantasy fiancé, in a manner 
similar to that of mystical love. In the middle of a mad world the melodic sound of 
her accordion playing gives us hints of an alternative world, while reminding that 
‘We are alive because someone loves us’. She also encounters an extraordinary 
mysterious presence: an aged patient who thinks himself to be God. Handed an apple 
he imagines it to be the planet and he refuses to consume it in spite of the people 
hopelessly ‘loving and destroying each other for generations and dying’.  
Janna’s resemblance to the traditional holy fool is reinforced by 
Konchalovsky’s use of the common topos of the fool as an object of ridicule. Janna 
puts herself up for ridicule when accepting the mock proposal of marriage from a 
Chechen soldier, Ahmed. Her clownish make-up and her clumsy dancing underline 
the disparity between her and the world. It is her innocent trust in the inherent 
goodness of human nature that ultimately convinces Ahmed to admit the insanity of 
his own world and the need for cure and salvation: ‘I’m sick. I need to be treated." 
Through her apparent folly she provides a more compelling argument for peace to 
Ahmed than could have been achieved through a lifetime of reasoning.  
Ward no 6 (2009) 
The revival of the trope of holy foolishness continues to flourish in Russian 
filmmaking. Russia’s 2010 entry for the American Academy Awards’ Best Foreign 
Film was Karen Shakhnazarov’s and Aleksandr Gornovsky’s Ward no 6, an 
adaptation of Gogol’s classic story. The formal qualities of the film contribute to the 
modern appearance of this screen adaptation of a Russian literary classic and suggest 
a renewed preoccupation with 19th century issues, chiefly with the theme of madness-
foolishness as a form of higher perception. The film highlights foolishness in a 
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pseudo-documentary style using fixed frames, a hand-held camera and silent home 
video recording, which contribute, together with the use of real inmates for the 
extras, to the blurring of the line between fiction and reality.73 Gogol’s short story on 
which the film is based was interpreted at the time of its publishing (1892) as a 
political allegory about the state’s repressive structures, equating the madhouse, 
incidentally a former monastery, with a prison and ultimately with Russia itself.74  
The tone of the story is that of polemic, prompted by the ideological 
confrontation between the psychiatrist Ragin, and his patient Gromov, 
personifications of passivism and activism on the one hand and of atheism and faith 
on the other. The film is faithful to Gogol’s work but, relocating the action to the 
present day, makes it explicit from the outset that Ragin believes the mentally 
deranged Gromov to be a prophet and shows his growing intellectual attraction 
towards him in spite of the patients questioning the purpose and methods of the 
establishment and its agents. Ragin supports a fatalistic acceptance of one’s fate as 
dictated by the system, devoid of any logic and morality, and even if he accepts that 
progress can be made theoretically, he claims the human condition will essentially 
remain tragic. Gromov foresees an era in which justice will prevail, his optimistic 
view being predicated on the premise of the existence of God and mankind’s 
immortality. Humanity’s progress, however envisioned, cannot solve the tragic 
condition of human mortality – this is a point on which the two agree.  
Before long Gromov gains a position of ascendancy over his custodian, 
grounded in his capacity for suffering which is coupled with a remarkable capacity to 
scan the personality of the doctor, revealing the human weaknesses behind his 
philosophical stance. This is disturbing for the doctor: the sudden reevaluation of his 
principles impact his life in a way that does not pass unnoticed by his colleagues and 
he ends up locked in the same Ward no 6 through their ‘well-intentioned’ 
intervention. Apart from the political, social and existential issues that it raises, the 
film, as much as its literary source, is revealing about Russian society’s ambivalent 
relationship towards madness. We see the tension between confinement as deviation 
                                                
73 Interestingly, Andrei Konchalovsky’s film House of Fools, which has for its setting a madhouse, 
was Russia’s choice for submission for the same Awards in 2003. 
74 James N. Loehlin, The Cambridge Introduction to Chekhov (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 86 
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from the norms of reason on the one hand, and its compensatory exaltation as a form 
of clairvoyance and wisdom on the other. Holy foolishness recuperating here 
rediscovers its metaphysical forcefulness. 
The above analysis of the holy fool in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian cinema 
has revealed the versatility of the figure as a critical device for filmmakers. Two key 
models are used. The first, and rarer, representation is the holy fool cast in the 
traditional hagiographical mould. In the Soviet era such representations were limited 
to historically located films, but in the post-Soviet era when it has been permissible 
to use overtly religious representation, the figure has been revived, most notably in 
the portrayal of Fr Anatoly in Pavel Lungin’s Ostrov. The critical function which 
would occupy most of the space of a hagiography goes here hand in hand with the 
role of spiritual guide, with the result that a call to reform our inner life becomes the 
main focus. This spiritual project is shown to be at odds not only with both the 
contemporary religious practice and the state ideology. In contrast with the 
hagiography-based figures, the stylised cinematic re-interpretations of the holy fool 
in Russian cinema have proved more powerful in their critical message and 
imaginative in both form and content. As expected, in the Soviet cinema the 
representations are few and do not bear explicit spiritual meaning and their critical 
force is limited. As more favorable conditions arrived with the glasnost era, the 
representations of holy foolishness increased and began to manifest historic 
awareness. They were used as vehicle of criticism, particularly in connection to the 
Stalinist period, but due to their metaphorical language had the potential to open 
towards generalization. The post-Soviet cinema, entirely freed from the political 
censorship, has voiced concerns with the present social and political situation of the 
country. Thus the holy fool figure has been employed as a means of exploring 
eschatological ideas and express concerns about state supported repression, and war. 
There was one director, however, who more than any other transcended the 
traditional boundaries of holy foolishness in the Russian context, and it is to him I 





Holy Fools in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky 
 
 Among all those directors working within the Russian cultural tradition 
Andrei Tarkovsky deserves a special place. This is not only because the character of 
the holy fool assumes such an important place in his films, but also due to his 
outstanding contribution towards the modernization of the figure. In Tarkovsky’s 
films the fool’s critical power, while derived from Russian tradition, is lifted above 
this context and becomes a universal figure, capable of providing a radical critique of 
modern society. In one of the most striking illustrations of this move, Tarkovsky 
depicted the critical power of the fool not in Moscow but in Rome, as part of his 
1983 film Nostalghia. In a major scene, Tarkovsky has the camera pan across the 
Piazza del Campidoglio on the Capitoline Hill, disclosing a gallery of misfits 
loitering between the imposing columns. Their faces look impassive at the voice that 
is heard speaking, while their bodies express total disconnection with the 
surroundings and with each other. We are shown the man that is speaking before the 
view zooms slowly out to reveal that he is standing on the equestrian statue of 
Marcus Aurelius. The man, whom the viewers recognize as the recluse Domenico, 
ends his castigatory speech with: ‘What kind of world is this if a madman has to tell 
you to be ashamed of yourselves?’ How has this Russian-like fool traveled to the 
symbolical heart of the Roman Empire and the spiritual center of Western Europe? 
 In order to unpick the importance that holy foolishness acquired in Andrei 
Tarkovsky’s cinema, I will begin by examining those characters that are typically 
labeled as ‘holy fools’ by the critics, with the aim of outlining the development of the 
theme in Tarkovsky’s cinematic imagination. While doing so I will give particular 
attention to the elements that contribute to the identification of these characters as 
‘holy fools’. The remaining part of the chapter will deal with the critical force and 
modernity that the holy fool acquires under Tarkovsky’s directorial treatment. Part of 
this ‘modernization’, I argue, is due to a move towards a vision which, while still 
remaining rooted in one local tradition, aspires to universality, mixing traditions and 
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featuring holy fools on a mission to save humanity. It was also designed to a move 
towards an existentialist conception of the holy fool, which added a fresh critical 
edge to the figure. In order to support this interpretation I will outline the affinities 
between Tarkovsky’s ideas and Christian existentialism, in particular the theology of 
Søren Kierkegaard. Reading Tarkovsky through a Kierkegaardian lens will 
illuminate the former’s critique of rationality in the modern age. With this 
established, we can better appreciate the dynamic transformation of the holy fool in 
Tarkovsky’s cinema.   
 
The function of Holy Fools in Tarkovsky’s filmography 
Holy foolishness is a recurring theme in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky 
(1932-1986) and I therefore consider his work in some detail through this chapter. 
What distinguishes him from the Russian directors I have discussed in the previous 
chapter is the fact that he developed through his career a personal conception of holy 
foolishness that could be called ‘Tarkovskian’.1 It is framed by a particular 
existential philosophy of life, which, towards the end of his career, aspired towards a 
universal expression. Under this philosophy, the holy fool is developed as a unique 
figure capable of criticising contemporary society and modernity. The genesis of this 
idea can be traced quite early in Tarkovsky’s filmography. His preoccupation started 
with his second feature film Andrei Rublev (1969), was continued through Stalker 
(1979), matured in Nostalgia (1983), and reached an apex in his final film The 
Sacrifice (1986). It might be significant to note, without overrating it, that the only 
opera he directed, Boris Godunov, happened to coincide with the period when his 
preoccupation with the idea of holy foolishness was at its most intense in the early 
1980s.  When Tarkovsky directed Mussorgsky's opera for the Royal Opera House, 
Covent Garden in 1984, Tarkovsky portrayed his second traditional holy fool, after 
the durochka (the female holy fool) in Andrei Rublev. The portrayal of this holy fool 
is striking: Tarkovsky added to fool’s traditional iron chains a hood reminiscent of 
                                                
1 Tarkovsky doesn’t use the term ‘holy foolishness’ to refer to his authorial conceptions. But, as I will 
show, the picture that is recreated based on his writings, interviews and his own films corresponds 
to what is designated by the association of the two terms. 
117 
those condemned to death, an idea developed in his last two films.2 Moreover, one of 
his unrealized projects was an adaptation of Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, considered by 
many literary scholars to be a reworking of the hagiographical model of the holy 
fool, and to which he refers several times in his book Sculpting in Time.3 
What was it that made Tarkovsky see the figure of the holy fool as a potent 
vehicle for his ideas? He drew on an Orthodox tradition that valorized the mad and 
madness to the highest degree by making them stand for the divine wisdom that 
surpasses all understanding. Therefore the holy fool represents a spiritual sphere in 
his films and offers a transcendental perspective of human affairs. In this sense, the 
irrational truth and “amorality” of the fool appear on a plane higher than rational 
truth and the lay morality which he believed would ultimately lead to catastrophe and 
the destruction of human civilization. The holy fool, as we will see, was for 
Tarkovsky the last bastion of faith: a representation of ‘what lacks in the world: the 
inner freedom and the faith, which don’t know the impossible.’4 In order to 
understand Tarkovsky’s development of this theme, I will begin here by offering an 
overview of his relevant filmography while tracing the development and the way in 
which Tarkovsky’s idea of holy foolishness materialized into a critical device. 
Andrei Rublev (1966) 
The first film of Tarkovsky’s to offer a powerful characterization of holy 
foolishness was Andrei Rublev, his second feature film released in 1966. The film, 
based loosely on the life of the eponymous fifteenth-century Russian icon painter, 
already presents us with a complex situation. Tarkovsky centred the film on the 
spiritual and artistic becoming of Andrei Rublev in a world which put his ideals to 
test in myriad ways. From the very beginning Rublev is confronted with what is only 
the first tension in a series: between the world of laughter and freedom of the lower 
classes, represented by the skomorokh  – the traditional Russian street performer - 
and the oppressive attitude of the authorities towards this kind of entertainment. The 
                                                
2 Irina Brown, ‘Tarkovsky on London: The production of Boris Godunov’ in Tarkovsky, ed. by Nathan 
Dunne (London Black Dog Publishing, 2008), p. 367 
3 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema (London: Bodley Head, 1986), pp. 
42, 188, 193, and 213 
4 Balint Andras Kovacs and Akos Szilagyi, Les Mondes d’Andrei Tarkovsky (Lausanne: L’age 
d’homme, 1987), p. 157 
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scenario is then replicated by the authorities’ suppression of the pagan beliefs of 
some villagers, and by the betrayals and discord of the rulers, in stark contrast to the 
faithfulness and brotherly love of the people.  
It is on this troubled background that Andrei’s personal drama is developing: 
his talent is first envied by his fellow-monks Daniil and Kirill, with the latter 
especially wanting to discredit him in the eyes of the renowned master Theophanes 
the Greek. His plot is not successful but as the film progresses we become aware of 
the different position that Andrei and Theophanes take to iconography, Andrei being 
inclined to see the good in people rather than the evil side. His artistic crisis 
prompted by his revolt against the prevailing fear-inducing type of iconography that 
is promoted officially coincides with the appearance of the durochka, a female holy 
fool. His ideas are further tested during the Tartars’ pillage of the city of Vladimir, 
when he kills a soldier in order to defend the holy fool. As a penance he takes a vow 
of silence and non-violence, which makes him incapable of saving the durochka, 
who naively consents to leave with a Tartar in a later episode. Andrei’s silence and 
refusal to paint come to an end after he witnesses the strenuous endeavour of a boy to 
cast a bell guided by his artistic intuition rather than based on craftsmanship. The 
first chiming of the bell finds all the strafing parties reconciled in an act of devotion 
and celebration, including the holy fool. One of the concluding shots shows Andrei 
Rublev’s frescos. 
Holy foolishness underpins the whole directorial vision – narrative and 
imagery. Tarkovsky merged this with the concept of artistic creativity: a 
characteristic that will constantly reappear in the works to follow. The conflation is 
not unnatural. Drawing on Victor Turner’s theories, Lilia Avrutin argued that the 
artist shares with the holy fool the same anti-structuralist position which, in 
totalitarian societies, predestines him/her to suffering and social silence.5 For 
Tarkovsky, who was acutely conscious that his moral mission was at odds with 
Soviet ideology, this conflation offered both the advantages and disadvantages of 
marginality; that is, a weakness that could be turned into moral strength. As I will 
                                                
5 Lilia Avrutin, ‘Shostakovich on Screen: Film as Metatext and Myth’, Russian Review, 56 (1997), 
402-424 (p. 403) 
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show later in the chapter it is precisely such weakness that is reconfigured as a 
spiritual force in his major works. 
Features of holy foolishness are spread among a few characters in Andrei 
Rublev. The most traditional forms of the fool are to be encountered in the character 
of the skomorokh – the street performer, and of the durochka – a term used by 
Tarkovsky in his screenplay to refer to unnamed female figure of the holy fool in 
Andrei Rublev. Durochka would fall into the blazhenny category – the blessed idiot 
type that I mentioned in the previous chapters. She is mute, a phenomenon that, as 
Alexander Panchenko has shown, points to the way in which silence and kenoticism 
are the features of the passive holy fool.6 Moreover, social silence, as a conscious 
choice, can be a ‘sacred silence’, ‘a channel for communication with superior 
powers’.7 The holy fool plays a very important role in Rublev’s spiritual becoming as 
she forces him into action. Defending her from a Tartar Rublev commits a murder, 
which provokes a further critical scrutiny of his values against the background of 
cruelty and violence. As an act of penitence he decides to share in her silence, his 
gesture acquiring overtones of holy folly. At the other extreme, the skomorokh would 
be very close in his external manifestation to the prankster type of the holy fool. If it 
hadn’t been for the episode in which he tries to get revenge on Kirill, his obscene 
provocations could be taken as those of a holy fool who derides the vices of society. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that his profession exposes him to the persecutions of 
official authorities, the skomorokh has similarities with the holy fool’s voluntary 
submission to public humiliation and ridicule. In this sense, it is worth noting that 
Tarkovsky has him spread his arms in a crucifixion pose. Through the performance 
of the skomorokh a transition is made towards more sophisticated artistic endeavors 
and forms of criticism. 
An interesting instance of expressing the idea of holy foolishness is 
associated with the other great iconographer in the film, Theophanes the Greek, a 
character constructed on a series of polarisations characteristic of the yurodivyi, the 
hagiographic holy fool: wisdom and foolishness, aggression and meekness, 
                                                
6 Robert Otto Efird, Life beneath Surface: Narration in the Early Films of Andrei Tarkovsky, doctoral 
thesis (University of Virginia, 2007), p. 224 
7 Avrutin, p. 404  
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veneration and sacrilege.8 In his first conversation with Rublev he is shown in the 
forest, resting his feet on an ants’ nest, probably as a means of mortifying the flesh, 
thereby evoking the ascetic feats of the holy fools. In a previous conversation with 
Kirill he confesses he used an icon to press cabbage. In the previous sequence, 
Tarkovsky has Theophanes glimpse the world as an image turned upside down. This 
can be interpreted as a visual metaphor for the message that fools are trying to get 
across: ‘in the kingdom of God reigns a complete inversion of our earthly values’9. 
On the contrary, it is our world which is upside down in comparison to the divinely 
appointed order. Jostein Børtnes translates it into aesthetic terms, which helps to 
explain how images of abjection may be used in an ‘inverted symbolism where life 
on earth in its most humble and despised forms serves as the visible analogue of an 
invisible glory transcending the world of senses’.10 This inversion of conventional 
patterns – ethic or aesthetic - is later replicated by Rublev, in both his rejection of the 
traditional fear-inducing way of representing the Last Judgement, and in his 
declaration that the durochka is not a sinner for having failed to follow St Paul’s 
injunction to cover her head. Even if Andrei Rublev is not considered to meet 
enough of the attributes of holy foolishness to qualify as such figure, the vow of 
silence he makes after killing on the spur of the moment the Tartar that has captured 
the durochka can be read as a kind of protest specific to the behavioural model 
exhibited by the passive holy fool.    
Last but not least, there is one further instance of holy foolishness residing 
not in the what but in the how of the story. This is conveyed by the narrator who ‘by 
emphasizing the disparity between the physical and the spiritual through both 
grotesque and sublime images, as well as an often baffling syuzhet [plot, the order 
and logic of events] arrangement, indulges in a kind of paradoxical holy foolishness 
performance throughout the film’.11 Thus, when the narrator breaches social 
conventions by showing scenes of nudity, desecration, and violence in relation to the 
monk artist that achieved one of the most composed expression of Russian religious 
                                                
8 Efird, p. 206 
9 Fedotov, p. 322 
10 Jostein Børtnes, Visions of Glory: Studies in Early Russian Hagiography (New Jersey: Humanities 
Press International, 1988, p. 31 
11 Efird, p. 188 
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art, he appropriates the iconoclastic behavior of the holy fool who ‘mocks all the 
forms of legalism that turn Christianity into a code of rules’.12 This is in keeping with 
what Tarkovsky himself reveals about his art: ‘I am drawn to the man who is ready 
to serve a higher cause, unwilling – or even unable – to subscribe to the generally 
accepted tenets of a “worldly” morality’.13 This moral vision is supported by a 
paradoxical art, not unlike the contrarian nature of the holy fool, which juxtaposes 
images of sacrilegious devastation and ugliness with images of mysterious beauty, 
witnessed in the scene showing the desecration of the Vladimir cathedral which is 
concluded with a starkly beautiful view of snow falling inside the walls. As 
Tarkovsky explains: ‘Hideousness and beauty are contained within each other. This 
prodigious paradox, in all its absurdity, leavens life itself, and in art makes that 
wholeness in which harmony and tension are unified’.14 In terms of the cinematic 
style Tarkovsky’s iconoclastic approach is as unconventional. The fabula is 
undermined by numerous ellipses which can leave the viewer uncertain as to the 
development of events, as seen in the case of Rublev’s encounter with the ‘pagan’ 
young woman, or the unexplained appearance of the abducted durochka. All these 
are meant to ‘decentre and destabilize the viewer’s sovereign point of view’, thus 
creating the conditions for new meanings to emerge.15 
Tarkovsky was intensely aware of the critical function of the holy fool, and in 
Andrei Rublev he masterfully uses the figure to demonstrate how far authority falls 
short of the moral precepts of love and humanity. As we saw in the case of 
Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, the implied criticism of Soviet authority is masked by 
historical setting of the film. In the case of Andrei Rublev, holy foolishness exposes 
the moral failings of church authority first and foremost. Tarkovsky depicts Rublev’s 
agony over his commission to paint the Last Judgment, knowing he cannot in all 
conscience depict it according to the iconographical canon approved by the Church 
authorities. The conflict with the authority of the Church is implied, a Church keen 
on promoting a religious artistic vision automatically consolidating its worldly power 
as well. 
                                                
12 Kallistos Ware, The Inner Kingdom, (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000), p. 169 
13 Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 209 
14 Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 38 
15 Robert Bird, Andrei Rublev (London: British Film Institute, 2004), p. 76 
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 The Orthodox Church is depicted in Andrei Rublev as in a subordinate 
relation to the state power but at the same time using the state’s power to consolidate 
its own in a mutually profitable symbiosis. In one of the first episodes after Andrei 
leaves Andronikov monastery he encounters a group of peasants on St John’s Day, 
which coincides with the summer solstice, an occasion for celebration in the pre-
Christian cultures. Following the old pagan traditions, the peasants perform rituals of 
fertility. It was a form of Christian beliefs (as proved by one of the peasant’s making 
the sign of the cross) mixed with pagan rituals that coexisted with the official 
religion in the newly Christianized territories for centuries. The men of the Grand 
Duke, representatives of the state authority, are shown while trying to catch and 
punish them. Andrei witnesses this alliance between the state and the Church 
suppressing any form of religiosity that departed form the official ideology. Later on, 
the presence of the holy fool reinforces the gap between the official powers – be they 
lay or ecclesiastical – and the communal principle.  
 The holy fool here stands for ‘Holy Russia’ and for an ideal of community 
that is opposed to any autocratic tendencies. The tension between the ‘communal 
principle’ represented by the Russian people and the autocratic ambitions of various 
political leaders corresponds to the ‘panslavic’ historical thinking as embedded in the 
‘Russian Idea’. According to it, the people is the bearer of a unifying principle’, its 
fundamental values are purity of heart, spiritual life and communal traditions.16 
Political power, when devoid of these principles, turns destructive, as Tarkovsky is 
keen to show. The most prominent conflict in Andrei Rublev is the political one, 
between the Grand Duke and his brother. The Duke’s brother allies with the Tartar 
army in order to attack the city of Vladimir, betraying both his brother and his 
people. Confronted with the cruelties of the massacre that follows and the 
desecration of the Cathedral, he is filled with remorse. In two flashbacks he recalls 
the oath of allegiance and concord he and his brother were forced to swear in the 
Cathedral, and how he was made to kiss the cross before the Metropolitan. This 
makes it even more obvious that his present betrayal breaks the bonds of brotherly 
love as well as divine law. Ultimately it is a betrayal of the people who embody the 
two, as shown in the passion play performed by the peasants that Rublev imagines 
                                                
16 Kovacs and Szilagyi, p. 89  
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during his talk with Theophanes the Greek. Rublev’s appreciation for the unlearned 
peasants is reinforced by images which show them as the only ones interested in the 
divine drama. The play is mute as the durochka. Her silence points to a surplus of 
meaning that cannot be contained by the human word, as in the apophatic theology to 
which the holy fool bears resemblance. If for Tarkovsky the Trinity epitomizes ‘the 
ideal of brotherhood, love, and quiet sanctity’, the Russian people is the very 
embodiment of this ideal.17 Tarkovsky’s use of the same actor to play both parts 
suggests not only this terrible tearing apart of the common nature that all human 
beings share but also the inner fragmentation and drama that a human being can 
experience when he/she entirely gives in to his evil inclinations. Even Rublev sins by 
taking a life while trying to defend the durochka, failing to follow the principle he 
would like to live by. Rublev too decides to follows in her path by taking a vow of 
silence and non-violence. Ultimately, Rublev’s vow of silence as a form of penitence 
is ‘his most exasperated act of resistance. He withdraws from participation in human 
communication as a willful act of opposition to the sociality in which he is 
implicated’.18 
 This communal principal should be extended beyond the national entity, 
Tarkovsky seems to suggest in another interesting episodes related to the fool. When 
the durochka encounters again the vicious Tartars, she is the only person capable of 
establishing a bridge with what seems to be the untouchable and dehumanized other. 
In one fleeting moment the Tartar who is making fun of her simplicity scrutinizes her 
eyes and is fascinated: it is a moment of communication beyond the realm of words, 
of peering into the depths of the other person and encountering something there: in 
her all-encompassing charity and total vulnerability, the image of the Other. Is there 
maybe a possibility of redemption even for those who embody the evil? Her 
abduction by a Tartar leads to her recovery in her integrity, beauty and purity, as the 
casting of the bell scene lets us see. In the person of the holy fool God’s love can be 
extended to the fiercest enemy.  
                                                
17 Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 34  
18 Paul Johnson, ‘Subjectivity and Sociality in the Films of Andrei Tarkovsky’ in Through the mirror: 
reflections on the films of Andrei Tarkovsky, Gunnlaugur A. Jónsson and Thorkell Á. Óttarsson 
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As an historical film, Andrei Rublev might seem anchored in the realities of the 
century it presents, but as its creators confessed it was considered relevant for the 
epoch when it was made:  
We wanted to show that Andrei Rublev's art was a protest against the 
order that reigned at that time, against the blood, the betrayal, the 
oppression. Living at a terrifying time, he eventually arrives at the 
necessity of creating and carries through all of his life the idea of 
brotherhood, love for peace, a radiant worldview, and the idea of Rus's 
unification in the face of the Tatar yoke. We found it extremely 
important, both from the historical and the contemporary viewpoints, to 
express these thoughts.19 
 
‘The Tartar yoke’, like the Soviet regime, and like any other historical instantiation 
of power, is again seen in opposition to the communal values of the people, a people 
whose protest finds its ‘voice’ in the (ironically) mute durochka.  
We can conclude that holy foolishness, from its first manifestations in Andrei 
Rublev, is creatively employed by Tarkovsky in order to reveal what it traditionally 
stands for: ‘the radical contradiction between the Christian truth and both the 
common sense and the moral sense of the world’.20 While the director draws here on 
the traditional model of the holy foolishness, its features are spread among a number 
of characters. Tarkovsky returned to the idea of holy foolishness in his last three 
films  – Stalker, Nostalgia, The Sacrifice, in surprising but less traditional ways. The 
most unlikely literary texts were serving as sources of inspiration for Tarkovsky by 
the 1980s. He found in the science-fiction genre an ideal medium to express his ideas 
in a way that could deflect the suspicion of the censors of Goskino, the central 
directory body of Soviet cinematography. Tarkovsky’s increasing disillusionment 
with the Soviet powers caused him to use imaginative ways of criticizing the 
authoritarian political and social system that it represented. The metaphysical 
substratum of his scripts can hardly be missed. Both his first film based on a science-
fiction story Solaris (1972) and the later Stalker can be read as parables disclosing 
the existence of another reality beneath the cruel surface of the contemporary 
material world.  
                                                
19 Andrei Tarkovsky, ‘The Passion According to Andrei’, interview by Aleksandr Lipkov,  
<http://people.ucalgary.ca/~tstronds/nostalghia.com/TheTopics/PassionacctoAndrei.html> 
[accessed on 20 Jan. 2009]  
20 Fedotov, p. 322 
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Stalker (1979) 
By the later 1970s Tarkovsky was suffering something of a crisis in his 
personal and professional life. He was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the 
Soviet authorities, who were strongly critical of his 1971 film Solaris and placed 
restrictions on its distribution. Meanwhile, his next project, an adaptation of the 
Strugatsky brothers’ novel Roadside Picnic, which was to become the film Stalker, 
met with serious delays, compounded by the heart attack that Tarkovsky suffered in 
early 1978. During this time, Tarkovsky’s disenchantment with the material world 
increased, and his late films show a powerful interest in the spiritual life. The 
religious undertones of Stalker are made explicit by Tarkovsky late in the film when 
we hear in voice-over the passage from the Book of Revelation (6:12-17) about the 
sixth seal. This is followed shortly by a recitation of the first verses describing Jesus’ 
appearance on the road to Emmaus (Lk. 24:13-18) from which the topographic and 
onomastic references are omitted. Who are the three on the road and what is this 
Emmaus that are they after? Three characters set off on a journey through the Zone, 
in search for the Room, where one’s desires are to be fulfilled. The Zone itself is a 
mysterious land, supposedly created by an alien civilization, governed by its own 
natural laws, which the authorities are striving to keep off limits. Only the ‘stalkers’ 
can guide someone there and back unharmed, since the partly apocalyptic, partly 
paradisiacal landscape is allegedly rife with dangerous traps. Proof that the meaning 
is allegorical is found the names of the three protagonists, each being indicative of 
their worldviews and mission: the Scientist, the Writer, and the Stalker.  
 The Stalker is fashioned by Tarkovsky in the mould of the traditional holy 
fool, by way of an emphasis on his humility and simplicity. A look at the screenplay, 
based on the Strugatsky brothers’ novella, A Roadside Picnic, and published in 
Science-Fiction Anthology No 25 (Moscow, 1981), confirms this, revealing the 
numerous changes the text underwent under Tarkovsky’s pen. The affirmation of the 
wife of the Stalker: ‘You know, my mother was dead against it. He was a real tough, 
the whole street was terrified of him. He was handsome, and sure of himself…’ 
becomes: ‘You know, my mother was dead against it. You’ve probably realized how 
he’s like. One of God’s holy fools… The whole street used to snigger at him. He was 
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so pathetic, such a mess.’21 Even the film’s text contains explicitly a reference to the 
the Stalker as a yurodivyi: after explaining his purely altruistic reasons for being a 
guide into the Zone for the desperate people, the Writer concludes: ‘You are just a 
God’s fool’. 
Tarkovsky directs the camera to scrutinize the Stalker’s appearance in order 
to reveal the characteristics of a marginalized fool: his head is shaven, his face is 
marked by the hardship of his life, and his clothes are worn out. He looks vulnerable 
and ineffective, in keeping with his creed that ‘weakness is a great thing and strength 
is nothing’: a clear reversal of worldly values. Tarkovsky himself confessed a 
particular attraction towards human weakness which discloses a different kind of 
strength, different from the affirmation of the self at the expense of others, and 
revealed in ‘the capacity of a human being to make a stand against the forces which 
drove his fellows into the rat race, into the rut of practicalities’.22 This was a moral 
idea he followed unconsciously throughout his work, as he confessed in one of 
interviews.23 This explains why he found in the archetype of the holy fool and the 
paradoxes that underlie it an ideal vehicle to express his criticisms of contemporary 
society. In 1979 when the film was released this celebration of human weakness 
could not be more at odds with the Soviet aesthetics and ideology. The twist that 
comes towards the end of the film is that this broken man, an outcast with no social 
ambitions and with spiritual aspirations at odds with the official materialistic 
ideology, is discovered in one shot to be an intellectual. As the Stalker lies down on 
the floor deploring the Scientist’s and the Writer’s lack of faith the camera zooms out 
just to reveal the books that cover an entire wall of the decrepit house. This type of 
intellectual could not be more different than the ‘self-assured, integrated and 
infallible’ hero promoted in socialist realism.24 
 
                                                
21 Maya Turovskaya, Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry (London; Boston: Faber and Faber), 1989, p. 108 
22 Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 209 
23 Andrei Tarkovsky, ‘Tarkovsky at the Mirror’, interview by Tonino Guerra, Panorama, 676 (1979), 
pp 160-170,   
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24 Rufus W. Mathewson, ‘The Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage’, American Slavic and East 
European Review, 12 (1953), pp. 506-523 (p. 508) 
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Nostalghia (1983) 
In Tarkovsky’s final two films, his critique of contemporary society reached a 
new level, and it is here that he transformed the role of the holy fool into a universal 
opponent of modernity. It is no mere coincidence that these final films were 
completed in Western Europe, or that in 1982 Tarkovsky made the decision never to 
return to the Soviet Union, since these elements ensured that the critical dimensions 
of his films had a wider applicability. In Nostalghia a new idea, that of the human 
sacrifice, comes to the fore, working in a tandem with holy foolishness. The 
protagonist, the Russian poet Andrei Gorchakov, visits Italy in the company of a 
translator, Eugenia. His proposal is to research the life of an eighteenth-century 
peasant musician, Pavel Sosnovsky, a Russian serf sent to study in Italy but who 
preferred to return home, where he committed suicide. As his subject of 
investigation, Andrei suffers from the nostalgia of his country, and also his wife and 
son. But with Tarkovsky things are never what they seem at first sight. What appears 
to be the natural result of a geographical dislocation, a nostalgic longing for home, 
acquires a higher significance when he meets a native recluse, Domenico, whom 
everybody thinks mad for his apocalyptic views: so extreme that he has shut his 
family in his house for seven years waiting for the end of the world. But I would 
suggest, it is this madman that is the key figure for the interpreting the critical power 
of the film. In an telling interview, Tarkovsky outlined his vision of the character:  
Domenico also stands for the constant search for the meaning of life, a 
meaning to the concepts of freedom and insanity. On the other hand, 
he is in possession of the receptiveness of a child and the extraordinary 
sensitivity often found in children. … the somewhat mad Italian is 
simple, no beating around the bush, and convinced that he in his own 
enlightened outsidedness has found a solution to the general problem. 
… He is ‘the fool’ who accuses ‘the normal’ of being too lazy, and 
sacrifices himself so as to shake up his surroundings, thus underlining 
his own warning. This is his sacrifice and it is all he can do. His 
intention is to force us to act, to change the ‘now’.25 
It is self-evident that Tarkovsky ascribes to Domenico’s madness a spiritual 
significance. At the same time we see expressed in just a few sentences a directorial 
                                                
25Andrei Tarkovsky, ‘To Journey Within’, interview by Gideon Bachmann, 
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vision that subscribes to the main characteristics of the holy fools: inner freedom, 
irrationality, child-likeness, marginality, imitatio Christi, and provocation. The last 
sentence reveals the role that Tarkovsky ascribes to his holy fools: to provoke us into 
action, to shake off the complacency of the viewers.  
Tarkovsky writes in Sculpting in Time that nostalgia overcomes Gorchakov 
because he remains unable ‘to find a balance between reality and the harmony for 
which he longs, in a state of nostalgia provoked not only by his remoteness from his 
country but also by a global yearning for the wholeness of existence’26. This 
‘wholeness of existence’ manifests in Gorchakov’s inner struggle to ‘abolish 
borders’, in an attempt to unify three levels of existence: moral - the dream-like 
memories of Russia and his wife, belonging to the past; aesthetical – the Italian 
ancient cultural heritage and Eugenia (his Italian translator); and spiritual, manifested 
in Domenico’s world27. Only Andrei doubts that Domenico is mad or anyway argues 
the mad are closer to the truth. And indeed, Domenico’s mysterious 1+1=1 
demonstration is the mathematical formulation for what Andrei is experiencing and 
the solution for his existential crisis. In this respect, Domenico seems to manifest the 
clairvoyant powers of the Russian holy fools and the enigmatic language in which 
they hid their prophecies. When Andrei visits Domenico he is exercising on a 
stationary bicycle, possibly a metaphor for the futility of seeking resolutions outside 
the self when the real problem lies inside the human soul. For Andrei the unity he 
has longed for in life is achieved only by his death, by absorbing his aesthetic and 
moral values into the spiritual one. It is the accomplishment of the act of faith 
Domenico has asked for that achieves the stasis of the last shot. Andrei is shown 
sitting on the grass with Domenico’s dog on his left-hand side and a Russian dacha 
(house) and trees in the background. As the camera tracks back the whole landscape 
is revealed surrounded by the walls of a ruined Italian cathedral.  
Domenico’s mission is not, however, restricted to single individuals. As he 
confesses to Andrei, he was wrong when he sequestered his family for seven years in 
a desperate attempt to save them: ‘My motives were egotistical when I tried to save 
my family. You should save everyone’. Still, if he entrusts Andrei with the mission 
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to cross St Catherine’s pool with a lit candle, he reserves for himself a much more 
difficult task. As he puts it in the speech to the audience on the Capitoline Hill ‘It 
must be sunny at night and snowy in August’, which means a reversal of the human 
values if not even more, a total transformation of the world as we know it. In order to 
call the world’s attention to his message he proceeds with an act of self-immolation. 
The solution is irrational in its radicalism. And yet, it is not so abhorrent and alien in 
a Russian context. Under the reign of Peter the Great the most zealous of the Old 
Believers, a dissenting movement in the Orthodox Church opposed to Peter’s new 
reforms, chose to go ‘into the forests and burned themselves, preferring a baptism of 
fire to life under the yoke of Anti-Christ’.28 For his protest against society’s 
indifference to spiritual matters, Domenico chooses Rome’s Capitoline hill. 
Ironically, his diatribe, ending with: ‘What kind of world is this? If those who are 
mad call out to you – be ashamed!’, is uttered very close to the heart of religious 
world. In spite of its very serious tone, the scene has something grotesque: as with 
Alexander in The Sacrifice, whose matches seem to fail him at first, the Ode to Joy 
that was supposed to serve as a musical background for Domenico’s self-immolation, 
come to a halt while he is still writhing on the pavement, shrieking in pain. As Slavoj 
Zizek notices: ‘What elevates Tarkovsky above cheap religious obscurantism is the 
fact that he deprives this sacrificial act of any pathetic and solemn "greatness", 
rendering it as a bungled, ridiculous act…. Rather, Tarkovsky follows here the long 
Russian tradition whose exemplary case is Dostoevsky's "idiot" from the novel of the 
same name.’29 The observation points to Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin, arguably the 
most important literary influence on the conception of the Tarkovskian holy fools, 
but is also in keeping with the grotesque aesthetic underlying the paradoxical 
construction of the holy fools, which I have analysed in the previous chapter. The 
holy fool is here a bundle of opposites, oscillating between the extraordinary and 
banal; the sublime and grotesque; and the transcendent and abject. 
 
 
                                                
28 Sergei Nikolaevich Bulgakov, The Orthodox Church (Crestwood: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
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29 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Thing from Inner Space - On Tarkovsky’, Angelaki: journal of the theoretical 
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The Sacrifice (1986) 
In Tarkovsky’s final feature film, The Sacrifice, Domenico’s supreme 
offering is matched by that of the character Alexander, who renounces everything he 
possesses, including his family, so that the world is spared from a nuclear disaster. 
Following a general characteristic of the Tarkovskian signature, the film oscillates 
between everyday reality and dream-like sequences. Alexander, a professor of 
aesthetics and a writer, lives with his family – his wife, son and step daughter - in a 
remote place, the only ‘intruders’ into this closed space being his friend Victor, a 
doctor and a rationalist, and the postman Otto, a collector of strange stories. The 
news of a nuclear disaster disrupts the apparent peace of the family and Alexander 
pledges to renounce everything if the world is saved. At the same time he turns to 
their servant Maria for help, urged by Otto who thinks that she has miraculous 
powers and the tragic end of the world will be avoided if Alexander is intimate with 
her. Although it remains unclear which of Alexander’s acts has worked, the next day 
returns to normality, as if nothing has happened. 
 Alexander is an intellectual whose moral aspirations have been stifled by the 
lack of spirituality around him. When the occasion presents itself, he not only lives 
up to it, but welcomes it: ‘I have waited my whole life for this’. A former actor, 
whose most successful roles were impersonating two extremes: Prince Myshkin, the 
personification of goodness, and Richard III, the embodiment of evil, Alexander 
strives for an authenticity and sense of life he can only find in sacrificing himself for 
the salvation of the others. The burning of the dacha, the Russian house that is a 
recurrent image in Tarkovsky’s films, is a symbolic act. It can be used 
metaphorically to represent the human body, in which case Alexander’s final act can 
be interpreted not only as a renunciation of the materialistic concerns but also as a 
denial of his self.30 In this interpretation his descent into madness is just the result of 
this total surrender into God’s hands and marks the beginning of his spiritual 
regeneration. In other words it is a passage from the sphere of the aesthetic into the 
sphere of the religious. 
                                                
30 Vida T. Johnson and Graham Petrie, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky: A Visual Fugue (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 225 
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This last film gives the highest artistic expression to Tarkovsky’s thinking 
and it has been rightly considered as a summation of his work and his spiritual 
testament.31 It opens with a parable from The Sayings of the Fathers, a collection of 
stories about the desert hermits of the first centuries. In the original context it is 
meant to illustrate ‘the fruits of obedience’: at the request of his spiritual father, a 
disciple waters daily a withered branch which, at the end of the third year, sprouts. I 
would like to suggest that Tarkovsky employs it here to point to the possibility of the 
impossible, which can only be stated from a position of faith. It explains the 
radicalism and incomprehensibility that the gestures of both Domenico and 
Alexander imply, which presuppose a Kierkegaardian “leap of faith”. I will return to 
this motif shortly. 
In both Nostalghia and The Sacrifice holy foolishness abstracts the hero from 
the usual order of things and offers him in position from where he can launch a 
critique of the fundamentals of this modern world. Both Domenico and Alexander, 
existentialist characters who take upon themselves the responsibility for the entire 
world, want to save humanity from the domination of materialism, spiritual 
bankruptcy, and ultimately disaster. Both have a sense of the imminence of the end 
of this world, which Tarkovsky also shared.32 The eschatological aspect is one of the 
elements that make up the holy fool paradigm. As Sergey Ivanov observes the task of 
the holy fool is “to serve as a reminder of Christianity’s eschatological core. The 
holy fool wants to shake up the world because it is ‘lukewarm, and neither cold nor 
hot’ (Rev. 3:16)”33 The holy fool does not destabilize this world in order to return it 
to the previous status quo as part of a cycle of eternal return. For him/her the idea of 
time is eschatologically oriented and every human creation falls short of perfection 
and is therefore in need of restoration.  
This eschatological dimension is incorporated by Tarkovsky into his fools 
through the idea of salvation. He conflates the image of the holy fool with that of the 
saviour. The Stalker believes that he can save people from the despair and 
unhappiness that have become their second nature. Domenico thinks he is called not 
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only to save his own family from spiritual death but the whole humanity. The fate of 
the whole world seems to be dependant on Alexander’s actions. For Tarkovsky the 
individualistic principle is not in contradiction with the communal one. As he noted 
in his diaries: ‘The time has come for individual prowess. The banquet during the 
plague. You can only save everyone else by saving yourself: in a spiritual sense, of 
course.’34 What makes the holy fool suitable for this mission is not only their 
assumed marginal status but also a kind of implied androgyny. In other words, they 
unify in themselves the two genders, so that they can redeem both.35  For instance the 
Stalker is masculine but has feminine characteristics: he is well built but at the same 
time ‘neurotic’; Alexander is wearing a woman’s shawl in the night of the disaster 
and a gown with the Yin and Yang symbols the next day.  
 The primary issue Tarkovsky is concerned with is spirituality and its absence. 
In his last three films the spiritual void is taken for granted. Engulfed by materialism, 
the modern society, Tarkovsky seems to imply, lacks spiritual guidelines, in 
whatever corrupted form. Mankind already lives in a spiritual wasteland. The images 
of this wasteland abound. In Stalker, with the exception of the vegetation in the Zone 
everything else is dominated by neutral industrial landscapes. Even in the Zone the 
landscape bears the marks of a catastrophic event, possibly a nuclear war. In the 
protagonist’s apocalyptic dream, a fragment of Ghent Altarpiece (1432) representing 
John the Baptist is shown beneath the water, partially covered in detritus. In 
Nostalgia the pool of St Catherine is shown either full of steamy water whose 
curative properties are sought by people preoccupied only with their physical 
immortality as Domenico puts it, or emptied, with cleaners scouring for junk. In The 
Sacrifice life is threaten by the imminence of a nuclear war. Images of the terrible 
event haunt Alexander’s visions. In a more profound sense the nuclear war is used as 
‘an equivalent or embodiment of desacralization on a global scale’.36 It is this loss of 
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the spiritual values that Tarkovsky thinks is at the root of the bankruptcy of our 
civilization.37 
 There are other issues that undermine the fabric of society. Both Domenico 
and Alexander are critical of the irresponsible use of rationality to promote a 
technological progress that encourages a culture of domination and ecological crisis. 
In Stalker the camera shows images of desolate industrial landscapes outside the 
Zone, as well as what looks like a nuclear disaster inside the Zone. Domenico’s ‘We 
must go back to the main foundations of life, without dirtying the water’ can be taken 
literally to refer to the water of the St. Catherine’s pool, seen full of debris in a 
previous sequence, or in a metaphorical way as referring to the primary water over 
which the Spirit of God was hovering. Alexander points out the fact that the 
technological progress has been made to serve humanity’s instinct of domination and 
has often been used for violent purposes. The accusation of reliance on ‘power, fear 
and dependence’ to rule might be seen to be directed towards Soviet totalitarianism, 
but it could also be extended further. This situation is due, in his view, to a 
disharmony between the material and spiritual development of humanity, in which 
spiritual progress has failed to match technological advance. 
 By placing these ideas in the mouths of his holy fools Tarkovsky has no 
intention of undermining them. On the contrary, these are arguably very close to his 
own opinions. It is not difficult to see an intentional identification of the director 
with his protagonist Andrei: a connection borne through both having the same name 
and finding themselves in a similar situation in Italy. It is plausible that the director 
also saw himself in Domenico. It is through Domenico’s last words on the Capitoline 
Hill that Tarkovsky pays homage to his mother to whom the film is dedicated: ‘O 
mother! The air is that light thing that moves around your head and becomes clearer 
when you laugh.’ Nostalgia and the Sacrifice were filmed during the director’s self-
exile in the West. Coming from a totalitarian regime, he was disappointed with the 
state of affairs in the West and deplored both situations: 
 …the Soviet Union is already beyond redemption; and even in Western 
Europe people seem to take a delight in surrendering their own 
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personalities in the belief that something will be gained by creating a so-
called `new society.38  
 The holy fool’s agency matches Tarkovsky’s artistic creed, in which he 
attributed a prophetic quality to his art, able to awake in mankind that conscience 
“which keeps watch and forbids a man to grab what he wants from life and then lie 
back, fat and contented”.39 It would not be an exaggeration to understand 
Tarkovsky’s artistic mission as conceived in terms of the cultural model of holy 
foolishness. This would not however render him less modern. The use of the figure 
of the fool for the purpose of self-portraiture is a familiar trait of modernism, by 
which the author aspires to make a statement about the human condition.40 The figure 
of a holy fool can only add a spiritual dimension to the director’s critical look. 
 In Tarkovsky’s view, the only answer to this ‘terrible disharmony’ that 
humanity is experiencing is an act of self-sacrifice. At this critical point in 
humankind’s history holy foolishness only is left to play a redemptive role. We come 
full circle to the question of self-sacrifice: in the Tarkovskian world the holy fool is 
not only a critic, but a saviour as well. This is not, however, a saviour in the 
traditional mould. To explain Tarkovsky’s use of the fool, we need to explore in a 
little more detail his ‘mission’ which, while indebted to the specificities of Russian 
Orthodox religious culture, moves beyond it, opening the figure to universal 
application while addressing the problems of modernity.  
 
The holy fool meets modernity 
My aim in the remainder of this chapter is to offer an explanation for the ways in 
which Tarkovsky transformed the holy fool as a vehicle for critiquing society. The 
director’s transformation of the figure requires study of two related aspects: the move 
towards towards universalisation, in which the figure, while remaining faithful to a 
Russian mindset, is abstracted from a direct Russian context; and secondly a 
progression toward a conception of the holy fool as a critic of modernity.  In order to 
ground the legitimacy of this interpretation I will outline how Tarkovsky held close 
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affinities with Christian existentialism. In particular, I will argue that viewing 
Tarkovsky’s last films through a Kierkegaardian lens provides fresh insights into his 
treatment of the figure. This is not to say that Tarkovsky was retreating into his own 
theological world. On the contrary, this grafting enabled Tarkovsky to voice his 
critique of modernity in a way that was far more palatable and germane to the 
Western viewer.  
I would like to emphasize that Tarkovsky’s conception of holy foolishness, in 
spite of the sinuous evolution that I will describe, retains its defining characteristic: 
that of being a radical manifestation of Christian kenoticism.41 All the Tarkovskian 
characters that I have discussed share a philosophy of life that is encapsulated in the 
way the director describes Alexander: ‘This is a man who has understood that, to 
redeem himself, it has become indispensable to efface himself’.42 Compared to the 
original hagiographical model, the ascetic component of the fool is here in marked 
decline, no longer featuring as one of the primary concerns. However the kenotic 
idea itself implies, as Kobets argues, a series of features such as meekness, self-
abasement, voluntary poverty, humility, obedience, ‘non-resistance’ acceptance of 
suffering and death, all being characteristic of ascetical endeavour.43 But where these 
features are present in the cinematic characters, they are not part of an intended 
ascetic practice or, with the exception of Andrei Rublev, set in a monastic 
environment. This innovation did not originate with cinema, but first manifested 
itself in literature. The clearest example is Doestoevsky’s Prince Myshkin in Idiot, a 
figure of intense interest for Tarkovsky. Using the model illustrated in the previous 
chapter, very few of the Tarkovskian holy fools are cast in the traditional 
hagiographic mould; most are actually what we might call ‘stylized holy fools’, akin 
to Myshkin.  
A second reason for the eclipse of the ascetic feature in Tarkovsky’s fools has to 
do with a state of mind that accompanied the director during the shooting of his last 
three films. It is usually termed as ‘the apocalyptic mood’ and it is a recurrent state 
of mind in Russian culture, to the extent that it could be considered endemic. Not 
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only have communities of people manifested it during Russia’s troubled history – 
religious dissenters in particular - but also generations of intellectuals, especially in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.44 This ‘led to the expectation of a violent end 
to the existing world and a radical transformation in the situation of the apocalyptic 
believers’.45 Tarkovsky became increasingly enticed by this mood, even delivering a 
speech on the Apocalypse of St. John in London in 1984 in response to an invitation 
from the Piccadilly Festival, an annual celebration of on film, theatre, music and 
poetry.46 This feeling of an impending end to the conventions of modern society 
shaped the Tarkovskian holy fools to a great extent and it explains why their 
foolishness is not ascetical but a response to these very special circumstances, 
requiring a radical act of self-sacrifice. Indicative of his mood, on 5 March 1982 
Tarkovsky wrote in his diary this prophecy of a desert father about the people of the 
last days, as recorded in The Lives of the Fathers: ‘They will not lead the monastic 
life at all; but disasters will overcome them, and they, the victims of disasters and 
temptations, will turn out to be greater than us and greater than our fathers’.47 His 
latter-day holy fools are the result of this sort of apocalyptic anticipation. The 
sacrifice by fire is an idea that originates in the Book of Revelation, in which St John 
talks about ‘gold purified by fire’ (Rev. 3:18). Stylistically, the installation of this 
state of mind is reflected in the ascetical cinematic style where there is a restraint 
from indulging in the sensuous, a kind of minimalist tendency that began to settle in 
with Stalker.48   
 In this sense, Tarkovsky’s fools can be understood at the same time as in a 
renewed connection with the Pauline text (I Cor. 1-4) as lived tradition. Tarkovsky 
reconnects to the very source of spirituality that first conceived the tradition of holy 
foolishness, and this is the reason why, when compared with other Russian directors, 
he does not engage with an instrumental usage of tradition. In this respect it would 
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not be entirely correct to talk about the way he reworked an existing cultural model. 
Tarkovsky is not only participating in a conversation with a literary tradition (in 
which Dostoevsky plays the main role) that has passed on to him a certain literary 
canon, but he is also engaging with a lived spiritual tradition in which holy 
foolishness is not purely a means to provoke but an existential standpoint. The latter 
connects him directly to the Pauline text in I Cor. 1-4. In this way, I would like to 
argue, in his final films he goes beyond the boundaries of his own culture in an 
attempt to reach out to a world in an advanced state of desacralization and lacking in 
faith. His characters are not pious ascetics who have left their isolation in order to 
challenge the world and suffer humiliations, as in many of the hagiographical 
writings, but rather people that live an ordinary life in a secularised world  (with the 
notable exception of Andrei Rublev). This is how Tarkovsky conceived of Alexander 
in The Sacrifice: 
He represents my idea of a certain type of individual. His inner world is 
that of a man who hasn’t gone to church in a long time, who perhaps 
was educated by a Christian family, but who no longer believes in any 
traditional way, and perhaps no longer believes at all. I can envision 
him, for example, impassioned by Rudolf Steiner, with questions of 
anthroposophy… I can also imagine him as someone who is aware that 
the material world is not all there is, that there’s a transcendent world 
waiting to be discovered. … And when misfortune arrives, when the 
horror of a terrible catastrophe is imminent, he turns to God in a manner 
befitting his character, to the only hope which remains for him.49 
And indeed Tarkovsky included these ideas into his script in the exchange between 
Alexander and the eccentric Otto: 
‘And what is your relationship with God?’ 
‘I haven’t one, I’m afraid.’ 
‘Don’t be too upset by it, and don’t fret. And don’t expect anything’ 
‘Whoever gave you the idea that I was expecting something?’ 
The question is, however, followed shortly by his recognition that: ‘I’ve been 
waiting for this all my life’. 
 I would like to suggest that with Tarkovsky we have a conscious move 
towards a translation of ‘things Russian’ into a universal language: one that would be 
palatable to a Western audience as well. In my opinion, this is how the criticism 
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offered by Tarkovsky’s former collaborator Andrei Konchalovsky needs to be 
understood, when he complained that Tarkovsky ‘moved from Orthodoxy to 
Catholicism, Protestantism even’50 and that ‘in his final films Tarkovsky tried too 
hard to be like the later Bergman in incorporating complex philosophical concepts 
into his work; lacking Bergman’s literary skills and his profound psychological 
understanding of his characters, he succeeded only in undermining his own major 
talent as a visual poet’51. It is true that Tarkovsky had great admiration for the 
Swedish director Ingmar Bergman’s art, but his move seems to me rather prompted 
by the particular circumstances in his life once he decided to continue his artistic 
career in the West. Tarkovsky’s last two films, Nostalghia and The Sacrifice, are the 
product of this period of self-exile. Some of his previous films had already 
participated and been rewarded at prestigious international festivals, but the problem 
of cultural translation came into focus at this time, prompted by the necessity of 
making himself understood by a primarily non-Russian audience. As evidence of his 
preoccupation with the idea, one of the important issues in Nostalghia is the 
(im)possibility of cultural translation. As he tells one of his interviewers: ‘Art is 
culture, culture is the soul and memory of the people. There must be the possibility 
to transmit, to communicate culture: because only through this communication, this 
exchange, can man arrive at his entirety.’52 
 I would like to describe the last part of Tarkovsky’s artistic career therefore 
as an evolution towards a conception in which holy foolishness takes on a universal, 
less traditional form in Nostalghia and The Sacrifice, with the former film trying to 
reconcile the East and West, while still giving a nod to the Russian utopia. For this 
purpose, the cultural model of the holy fool, with its non-dogmatic, anti-structural 
component was an ideal form of expression. Domenico is not a Russian, in spite of 
embodying much of the maximalism and irrationality of the Russian spirit; neither is 
Alexander, but he appreciates the art of both Leonardo and the Orthodox 
iconographers. We witness a progress towards a religiosity which exists 
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(paradoxically) within and without the boundaries of national ideology, and the 
transformation of the Russian Idea into a universalism stripped of national 
connotations in The Sacrifice. In this Tarkovsky was not far from one of the premises 
of existentialism that ‘all authority has been destroyed and individuals are radically 
isolated in their quest for truth’.53  
 
The influence of Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard on Tarkovsky 
 A second thread in Tarkovsky’s use of the holy fool as a critic of modernity 
was the way he used his characters to question conventional rationality. At the root 
of Tarkovsky’s move towards developing a new conception of the holy fool was his 
interest in existentialism, which emerged as both a modern movement and a critique 
of modernism.54 This lent to Tarkovsky’s thinking a modern language and a critical 
edge; one that was more accessible, or in any case more palatable, to a Western 
audience. What is at stake though is more than a problem of reception since, as I will 
show, Christian existentialism, and particularly Kierkegaard’s philosophy (pitted 
against Hegel and rationalism) helps us better discern Tarkovsky’s critique of 
modern rationality. In this context it is not without significance that Kierkegaard 
fashioned himself as a holy fool in his critique of the ‘spirit of the age’.55 Meanwhile 
Tarkovsky saw himself as developing and completing in many ways the self-
sacrificing fools depicted in Dostoevsky’s novels. Understanding the significance of 
self-sacrifice and faith in his characters is essential because Tarkovsky’s critique of 
the modern world lies in what is expressed through the lines of his characters as 
much as in their action. If their action were to be relegated to an obscurantist, 
reactionary directorial attitude, the critique itself would suffer. In other words, it is 
important to establish that the critique is not flawed from the very beginning but is 
existentially assumed, with the ensuing directorial risks.  
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 Tarkovsky is, like many Russian religious thinkers, greatly indebted to the 
proto-existentialist Dostoevsky not only for the conception of his characters but also, 
in more general terms, for the problem of faith, which the Russian novelist acutely 
posed in his writings.56 He arguably considered himself a continuator and developer 
of Dostoevsky’s ideas which, he thought, had been left incomplete.57 It was in his 
approach to the spiritual crisis and his critique of materialism that Tarkovsky found 
the spiritual foundation for his films.58 Significantly, he also inherited from 
Dostoevsky the concern with the problem of inner freedom and free will, and the 
distrust of reason, which both feature high on the existentialist agenda. Almost all the 
existentialist range of themes and concerns are to be found in Tarkovsky’s written 
and cinematic work: freedom, consciousness of existence, free will and 
responsibility, alienation and despair, as well as the rejection of instrumental reason.  
 In order to explain the relevance of Christian existentialism to the cultural 
model of holy foolishness, particularly in the form professed by Kierkegaard, we 
need to identify their points of contact: both are a in a tense relation with human 
rationality. As Fedotov points out: ‘Salia always remains irrational – a disinterested 
impetus to madness which claims a religious motivation. This motivation is free 
from all practical and moral consideration’59. Christian existentialism and holy folly 
also emphasize the importance of conscience and subjectivity – as Kallistos Ware 
underlines: ‘the fool is guided not by objectivized “laws”, but by the voice of God 
speaking directly in the heart. … He bears witness to the preeminent value of 
persons rather than rules.60. Furthermore, for both the holy fools and Christian 
existentialists freedom is paramount –as has been observed: ‘The wonderful inner 
freedom which animates them is the result of their total renouncement of the worldly 
things, their family life and even their psychic balance or the mental health.’61 
Finally, both are characterized by a sense of religious individualism. B. P. Fedotov 
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even identifies ‘absolute individualism’ as the main feature of holy foolishness.62 The 
last assertion needs qualification in the sense that albeit an individual enterprise it is 
done in the name of communal principles: it is not the individual good that is 
pursued but the common good, which is valid for the Christian existentialism as well. 
For these reasons holy foolishness can easily find in Christian existentialism a 
philosophical ally.  
 Given these inherent affinities, it becomes more obvious how it was possible 
for Jaroslav Pelikan to make a case for Kierkegaard as a modern holy fool, one 
whose ‘madness permitted him to see, more clearly than most, the blasphemy of 
identifying the Holy and the True, as he was able to face up to it with a consistency 
and a rigor that only the mad and the half-mad can afford’.63 His argument is based 
on Kierkegaard’s attack on intellectualism on the grounds that it stultified morality, it 
bred an arrogant dogmatism and there were other ways through which truth could 
come. Most importantly, his critique of intellectualism was launched from the 
standpoint of faith. 64 There are two important claims that render Kierkegaard very 
close to what the holy fool purports to stand for: that a person’s knowledge of God is 
a personal communion and truth is subjective in the sense that all objective 
knowledge fails confronted with the Holy, because the Holy is beyond mind’s 
capability of understanding.65 Therefore, from a Kierkagaardian standpoint, the 
fool’s practice of renouncing his/her mind in order to attain enlightenment would be 
a justifiable one. Moreover, the way the Danish philosopher and the holy fool think 
of their mission is similar: both envisage themselves as bringing a corrective to a 
faith that has derailed from its right course.66 
 It is possible to argue that Christian existentialism was, for Tarkovsky, the 
last stronghold from where he could launch his critique of modernity. Tarkovsky was 
clearly familiar with Kierkegaard the thinker. His diaries mention a Kierkegaard 
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biopic as a possible future project. There is also a long interpretative tradition in 
Russia, initiated by another religious existentialist, Shestov, who claims that 
Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard are kindred spirits and that they basically say the same 
things.67 That Dostoevsky had a great influence of Tarkovsky cannot be disputed, 
and he acknowledged it himself.68 In the absence of more detailed evidence, I 
identify the key relation between Tarkovsky and Kierkegaard as their understanding 
of madness, sacrifice, and the absurd, concepts which highlight the problems with 
modern rationality. Clarifying the issue of rationality and the absurd is crucial the 
understanding of the Tarkovskian holy fool and his criticism of the world, and helps 
us understand the full power of the holy fool as critic. 
 
The problem of the absurd: the critique of rationality 
 The treatment of irrationality in Tarkovsky’s last three films is crucial if we 
are to explain why Tarkovsky makes recourse to such extreme figures as his holy 
fools. Turning the fools into critics of rationality was an important development for 
Tarkovsky. As Maria Turovskaya pointed out his last three films form a trilogy in 
which he continues to explore the same idea, taking it to its logical conclusions: ‘The 
subject matter, from the point of view of normal logic, is of course absurd, but it 
seems so natural an extension of Stalker and Nostalghia that we are surely justified 
in regarding these three films as a trilogy, even within the context of the one long 
‘work’ upon which Tarkovsky was engaged throughout his life.’69 The problem of 
the absurd is always linked in Tarkovsky with the problem of madness: in each of the 
cases of the Stalker, Domenico and Alexander, their madness is predicated on what 
appears to be their ‘absurd’ self-sacrifice.   
 When questioned about his meanings, Tarkovsky never denied that he could 
see the absurd side of the sacrifice, but he pointed out that the other side of the coin 
is its salvific quality:  
‘But this faith [Alexander’s] seems in a certain sense to border upon the 
absurd…That’s only natural! For myself I think if someone is prepared to 
sacrifice himself, he can be called a believer. Of course, it’s strange… 
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Alexander sacrifices himself and at the same time demands that everyone 
else sacrifice themselves… it’s a bit absurd. But what can one do? 
Without a doubt, in everyone’s eyes he’s lost; but that which is absolutely 
clear, is that he is saved.’70  
 
 The idea of sacrifice is therefore directly linked to the question of faith, 
which was a constant preoccupation of Tarkovsky throughout his life. As he 
explains, the absurd is the result of a material perspective only, not of the spiritual:  
My protagonist can no longer go on living as he has done before and he 
commits an act that may have been born out of despair but which 
demonstrates to him that he is still free. Any such act is likely to appear 
absurd on the material plane, but on the spiritual plane they are 
magnificent as they create the possibility of a rebirth.71 
 
 This is similar in spirit with the advocatory position Johannes de Silentio 
adopts in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling (1843). He makes a case for faith as a 
virtue of the absurd using the biblical episode of the killing of Isaac by Abraham. 
While Tarkovsky explains the absurd as emerging from a perspective from the 
‘material plane’, Kierkegaard looks at it from the perspective of universal moral law: 
[Abraham] acts by virtue of the absurd, for it is precisely absurd that he 
as the particular is higher than the universal. This paradox cannot be 
mediated; for as soon as he begins to do this he has to admit that he was 
in temptation (Anfechtung), and if such were the case, he never gets to the 
point of sacrificing Isaac, or, if he has sacrificed Isaac, he must turn back 
repentantly to the universal. By virtue of the absurd, he gets Isaac again. 
Abraham is therefore at no instant a tragic here but something quite 
different, either a murderer or a believer.72  
 
 This stark observation about the absurdity of true faith was recollected by 
Tarkovsky. In The Sacrifice, the parable of the withered tree that John Kologa 
watered daily as instructed by elder Pavva frames the action of the film. The 
unabridged version that Tarkovsky takes down in his Diaries contains a moral 
imperative too: ‘By the end of the third year the tree sprouted and brought forth fruit. 
The elder took the fruit and brought it to church to the community and said to them: 
“Come, taste the fruit of obedience”’73. Apparently the parable is about obedience 
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but in a more profound sense, one that Tarkovsky perceived, it is about faith. The 
first meaning Tarkovsky ascribes to the parable is related to the power of the ritual: 
‘But a method, a system has its own virtues.’ In this sense it is similar to 
Gorchakov’s carrying of the candle across St Catherine’s pool for repeated times. 
But afterwards Gorchakov discovers the power of the singular act that can lead to 
salvation. This is predicated on a faith in the possibility of the impossible. In less 
dramatic terms, the parable serves the same purpose as the biblical episode of 
Abraham and Isaac in Kierkegaard’s interpretation: it is faith, by virtue of the absurd, 
that calls into question the very rationality that derides it.  
 The importance of Abraham and Isaac for Tarkovsky has not been unnoticed 
by critics. Kovacs and Szilagyi observed of Tarkovsky’s final characters that: ‘From 
an ethical point of view Domenico is a murderer and a madman (as Abraham is a 
killer); from a religious point of view he is a just person, a believer like Abraham.’74 
On the other hand Peter C. Christensen writes that ‘acting on the basis of faith may 
appear to be either sin or madness. An outside observer can never know definitely’.75 
This ‘suspension of the ethical’ happens in the case of what Kierkegaard calls ‘the 
knight of faith’, which he identifies with Abraham.76 What does Kierkegaard mean 
by the ‘suspension of the ethical’? He distinguishes between three different spheres: 
aesthetic, ethic and religious. Within the religious sphere, he claims, the laws of the 
ethics are suspended for a higher purpose, which renders the act of faith 
unaccountable to the ethical: 
…within the rationalistic view of ethics, there is no question of a 
teleological suspension of the ethical. If there is such a teleological 
suspension of the ethical, then it means that the case is outside the 
ethical view o life. What Jahannes means by a teleological suspension 
of the ethical is that the ethical sphere as a whole is suspended for the 
interests of a higher telos outside the ethical sphere. The person who 
is involved in this teleological suspension of the ethical sphere by 
accepting a telos outside the ethical is also outside the ethical sphere 
by the act of faith.77 
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 With religion we are in the sphere of supreme subjectivity, where ‘madness 
and truth become in the last analysis indistinguishable.’78 It is of course a subjective 
truth, born out of complete dependency on God and in relationship with Him.  But it 
reinforces the position of the holy fool as representative of the divine wisdom and 
implicitly, legitimizes all the judgments he or she makes with regard to the ways of 
the world. By choosing to make his madmen the embodiment of the highest values, 
Tarkovsky defies the rationalism that has entered all spheres of modern life, from 
religion to technology. He sees it as a root of all evils: it first perverts the human 
souls before corrupting all that humankind creates. It moves the focus from God to 
man through a blind faith in the power of human faculties to find the answer to all 
questions. Or, as Tarkovsky emphasized ‘Before claiming to contribute to the 
development of humanity, he [man] must realise that he is dependent on God.’79 
 Tarkovsky illustrates the flaws of modern rationality by using his holy fools 
to expose its limitations. The cold, destructive rationality of the scientist in the 
Stalker is subordinate to the reformed, converted mind of Domenico in Tarkovsky’s 
subsequent film, who has undergone a process of metanoia (literally ‘a change of 
mind’, term used technically with spiritual implications). The Scientist wants to put 
technology in the service of destruction, planning to blow up the Room of Desires, 
which the Stalker believes to be the last chance of happiness for man. To his mind, it 
is better to eliminate from people’s lives that which cannot be understood and 
controlled. In stark contrast, Domenico is a mathematician who has reached the 
conclusion that it is possible for 1+1 to make 1. According to scientific laws this is 
absurd, impossible, but he demonstrates experimentally to Andrei that it works for 
oil drops. Domenico uses it in the spiritual sphere and turns it into a formula for 
unity. His apparent irrational, absurd sacrifice is performed in the name of the same 
unity. Technology is used for the same constructive purposes: haphazardly or not the 
tape that plays the Ode for Joy at the time of the immolation ‘happens to break on the 
word “Brüder” (German for brothers), encapsulating the dying man’s hope for 
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universal brotherhood that will transcend pervasive apathy’.80 As a counterpart to the 
Scientist, Domenico asks who is the real fool in this upside-down world: ‘What kind 
of world is this? If those who are mad call out to you – be ashamed!’ This is copied 
by Alexander in The Sacrifice, asking what kind of world this is in which religiosity 
is considered madness and the mad are institutionalized, as he is seized by doctors 
and taken in an ambulance. It is noteworthy that Tarkovsky came from a country 
where the numbers of mental institutions had risen dramatically, from 40 to 400, 
only in 1950s and 1960s.81 They were designed not only to incarcerate the dissenters, 
but there were also laboratories where the ‘new Soviet man’ was created, if not by 
his/her own initiative, by sheer force. By contrast, Alexander lives in a free world. In 
this context Tarkovsky’s criticism acquires caustic tones. 
 Where then does the authority of Tarkovsky’s modern holy fool originate? 
What is it that distinguishes him from his courtly counterpart, the wise fool? 
Tarkovsky believed that true spiritual authority was derived from self-sacrifice, 
without which it was merely an exercise of worldly power. He saw the rescue of 
freedom and moral autonomy from materialism as a pre-condition for the 
rediscovery of self-sacrifice in the human soul: 
The sole means of returning to a normal relationship with life is to restore 
one's independence vis-a-vis the material things of life and consequently 
reaffirm one's spiritual essence. In this film I deal with one of the aspects 
of this struggle for anyone living in society: the Christian concept of self-
sacrifice…..if one acquires a moral autonomy, one may discover within 
oneself a capacity for self-sacrifice.82 
For Tarkovsky, therefore, the holy fool’s ultimate power to challenge society lay not 
merely in words but to an even greater extent in his action. This action, in order to be 
effective, needed to take the form of a self-sacrifice that baffles the mind and forces 
the complacent into action.83  It is from this assumed position of self-sacrifice, 
verging on the absurd, that the Tarkovskian holy fool launches his criticism.  
 If in the previous chapter I offered a picture of the holy fools as critics of 
Russian society, and engaged in a dialogue over national concerns, in this chapter I 
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have suggested that the Tarkovskian holy fools are committed to a universal mission, 
illustrated most forcefully in the director’s last films, Nostalgia and The Sacrifice. It 
is clear that Tarkovsky relied on the traditional paradigm of holy foolishness for 
some of his characters in Andrei Rublev, although even in this relatively early 
context the holy fool coalesced with the artist in an attempt to transcend the 
limitations imposed by concrete reality. In the 1970s we find Tarkovsky attempting 
to escape national boundaries, so that The Stalker, with its screenplay based on a 
science fiction work, marked a transition towards a conception of the holy fool less 
anchored in a specifically Russian context. The move becomes obvious in Nostalgia 
and The Sacrifice, both made during Tarkovsky’s self-exiled last years. Here the holy 
fool is no longer satisfied with a life sacrificed daily on the altar of spiritual 
guidance, but wants to save the world though an act of radical self-offering. The 
radicalism of the solution is best understood in the light of Kierkegaard’s concepts of 
subjectivity and faith in virtue of the absurd. For Tarkovsky the absurd functions 
similarly as a way of critiquing modern rationality which, he believes, is opposed to 
that total commitment to faith unveiled in the act of sacrifice. From this fundamental 
criticism of the modern world a cluster of others grow: the alienation of the human 
being, the loss of communion with fellow beings and God, and the ecological 
damage and potential for domination that accompanied technological progress. In 
this apocalyptic atmosphere Tarkovsky revised the figure of the holy fool, adapting 
its functions to launch a damning critique of modern society and rationality. His holy 
fools do not cry for the end of human civilization, but instead plead that we must 




The Suffering Fool in French Cinema 
If in Russian cinema holy fools are represented as opponents of corruption 
and seekers of humiliation, in French cinema their portrayal reflects a rather different 
tradition. Encased within a Latin Christian understanding of folly, holy foolishness, 
when it is depicted, is marked by an emphasis on suffering, which, whether caused 
by others or self-inflicted, helps to shape the critical power that these fools are given. 
In order to explore the representation of the holy fool in French cinema it will first be 
necessary to examine the context for religious depictions of madness and folly. The 
dominant cultural models for holy fools in France, I will argue, originate in Roman 
Catholic discourse, and particularly the concepts outlined by Blaise Pascal (1623-
1662). My second task will be to unveil how this is reflected in the French cinematic 
tradition, a study which will focus particularly in the films of Robert Bresson, who 
used the fool figure to an extent arguably unmatched by other French directors. 
These Bressonian religious figures, who lend themselves to an interpretation as holy 
fools, will be explored as part of an argument that his holy fools gradually evolved 
from Catholic models towards non-traditional forms. Finally, after pulling together 
the various theological and cultural strands that underpin the French cinematic holy 
fool, I will examine, based on the evidence provided by the films analysed, the 
critical dimension of the fool figure. The dominant note of holy foolishness in French 
cinema, it will be revealed, is to be found in the notions of suffering and sacrifice, 
either inflicted by others or self-inflicted. 
 
Catholicism, Pascal and the French cinematic holy fool 
 
Unlike the Orthodox half of the Christian world, the Catholic Church has 
shown little interest in promoting a clear-cut hagiographical model for the practice of 
holy foolishness as a distinct form of religious behaviour. Only relatively recently 
have Catholic theologians such as John Saward and Hans Urs von Balthasar 
considered holy fools as an important theological or literary category in their own 
right. To illustrate this point, it is worth noting that Hans Urs von Balthasar dedicates 
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a chapter to folly and holy fools in his The Glory of the Lord in Theological 
Aesthetics (1991). For the purposes of this thesis it is important that he makes his 
remarks with application to the hagiography-based as well as the literary or fictional 
holy fool. He proposes an initial definition according to which the holy fool is ‘the 
unprotected man, essentially transcendent, open to what is above him’.1 Balthasar 
continues by adding a few more characteristics of the fool, distinguishing him as 
‘never quite “in his right mind”, lacking the ponderousness that would tie him down 
to earth’ and neither ascetic nor ‘in any danger from purism or exclusiveness’. He 
then concedes in the general sense that even the saints who followed in the footsteps 
of Jesus could be regarded as fools.  
Embarking on a quest for examples of holy folly in Western fiction, Balthasar 
dedicates different sections of his discussion to a very wide range of European 
literary figures, from Grimmelshausen’s Simplizissimus and Cervantes’s Don 
Quixote to Dostoevsky’s The Idiot. Ultimately, the impression that remains is that 
each of these protagonists offers different avenues of inquiry in holy foolishness and 
its possibilities of expression. His discussion of Wolfram of Eschenbach’s Parzival, 
written between 1200-1207, contains a few remarks pertinent to the present analysis.  
He writes about Parzival’s transformation from a natural fool into the King of the 
Grail using the idea of a transcendent folly which, having been first deficient, passes 
through full measure before becoming exaggerated, introducing the idea of excess.2 
Significantly, he finds that the notion underpinning Parzival’s foolishness is that of 
simplicity, defined as the ‘heart’s capacity manfully to withstand the world’s 
contradictions’.3 It is worth noting that most of the portrayals of cinematic holy fools 
in French film exhibit this characteristic. Similar to my suggestion in the second 
chapter that the illuminated idiot is a variant of the holy fool in the West, von 
Balthasar goes on to contend that folly can take different forms and identifies a 
genealogy from the Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite’s docta ignorantia to Nicolas 
of Cusa’s learned idiota and the tradition of the illiterati in Wolfram’s time. 
However, Balthasar argues, this kind of folly, closer to the mind rather than to the 
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Metaphysics in the Modern Age (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1991), p. 143 
2 von Balthasar, The Glory, p. 154 
3 von Balthasar, The Glory, p. 156 
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heart, has to imitate Christ in order to be the ‘folly of the cross’ that St Paul 
discusses.4 
Casting his investigation across European culture, von Balthasar’s 
considerations have a degree of generality. Assuming that there is a degree of 
variation between expressions of Catholicism in different countries, where does this 
leave our search for a French model of holy foolishness? I would like to suggest that 
the French concept of holy foolishness is also shaped by a cultural model that 
became popularised in the West through medieval drama and Pascal’s theology. A 
frequent theme in medieval drama represents Jesus as a fool in front of Herod. For 
example, in the 15th century Passion d’Arras Herod orders that Jesus is dressed in 
the fool’s white robe. Hence the fools come to represent ‘ideal human beings in a 
religious sphere’.5 What the image does symbolically is to associate a few ideas - 
faith, folly, and suffering - with the last of these implying not only physical torments 
but also moral – humiliation and ridicule. As faith is the starting point I will graft 
onto this medieval image a modern element: Pascal’s wager. By so doing, I 
acknowledge the importance of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) for at least some of the 
cinematic works of religious tendency I will be dealing with in this chapter. 
My two working propositions are illustrated by two films of Eric Rohmer 
(1920-2010): Perceval (1978) and Ma nuit chez Maud (My Night at Maud’s) (1968). 
Rohmer’s work is underpinned by a moral vision originating in his Catholicism. He 
was also a reputable film theorist and Perceval was the applied result of his theory of 
enunciation, more precisely an illustration of the indirect discourse to which he was 
suggesting that cinematic art should return. The indirect discourse is similar to that 
used in literature where the author expresses himself without putting his words in the 
mouth of the characters.6 Therefore in Perceval he follows Chretien de Troyes’s 12th 
century romance of innocence, and brings on the screen one of the archetypal myths 
of Western civilization. It is primarily a spiritual quest in which human love is 
subordinate to divine love and through which the foolish and naïve hero preserves 
                                                
4 von Balthasar, The Glory, p.157 
5 Judith McCrary, The Fool in French Medieval Drama, doctoral thesis, Columbia: University of 
Missouri, 1976, p. 102 
6 Jean-Michel Frodon, L'âge moderne du cinéma français: de la Nouvelle Vague à nos jours (Paris: 
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his innocence.7 Rohmer was faithful not only to the text but to the epoch as well. The 
film has a striking visual resemblance with the iconographical conventions of the 
time, with stylized props and wooden castles. There is even a chorus of medieval 
singers commenting on the action in the passion play that ends the film. 
As something approaching a reproduction of Chretien de Troyes’s romance 
this film offers very few surprises besides the unconventional style. One of them is 
though particularly revelatory for the director’s vision. What was in de Troyes a 
simple sentence: ‘Thus Perceval learned how God was crucified and died on a 
Friday, and on Easter Day he received the communion’ is extravagantly turned into a 
passion play.8 Perceval reenacts Jesus’ life from his appearance in front of Pilate to 
the crucifixion. The summit of Perceval’s spiritual initiation is thus impersonating 
the Divine Fool; and sharing in His passions. This is a very important addition to the 
text pointing to the fact that neither Perceval’s childish foolishness and innocence, 
nor the later initiation in chivalric practices, could replace the required self-sacrifice. 
This is significant as it points to two recurrent motifs in the films I analyse: self-
sacrifice and suffering. 
My Night at Maud’s belongs to the cycle of six Moral Tales (Contes moraux) 
directed between 1962-1972. They are variations on the theme of the man caught in a 
love triangle and faced with a moral decision. The tales are not moral in the strict 
sense of traditional Christian morality but present us with the workings of an ethical 
consciousness. My Night at Maud’s is a meditation on Pascal’s wager and its 
implications. Jean-Luis is an introverted bourgeois Catholic who is introduced by his 
Marxist friend Vidal to a beautiful divorcee, Maud. They discuss Pascal over dinner 
in Maud’s flat. He is a believer, a Catholic, of which he seems very proud, but he 
can’t understand why he would give up a thing that he enjoys, like the Chanturge 
wine they are drinking: ‘Why give it up? In the name of what? No, what I don’t like 
in the wager is the idea of giving in exchange, of buying a ticket like a lottery’. He 
then explains the nature of his faith, that what counts are not the deeds as much but 
the purity of the heart. Vidal leaves and by morning Jean-Luis gets very close to 
                                                
7 Michel Serceau, Eric Rohmer: les jeux de l’amour, du hazard et du discourse (Paris: Cerf, 2000), p. 
100 
8 Andrew Sarris, ‘Rohmer Resurgent’, The Village Voice, 33 (1988), p. 66 
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becoming unfaithful with Maud to his ideal mate, a Catholic girl that he had only 
recently met at church.  
The film introduces a discussion about what is at stake in Pascal’s wager. 
Simply stated, since reason is incapable of definitively uncovering whether there is 
God or not, the best we can do is to weigh the loss and the gain from wagering that 
God exists. If we gain, we gain all, if we lose, we lose nothing. Kierkegaard comes to 
a similar idea over what concerns the impossibility of demonstrating God’s existence 
and of the choice one has to make. The important difference is that Pascal wants to 
minimize all risks through choice, whereas for Kierkegaard the choice itself implies 
a risk. But what is of interest here is the idea of choice and what it implies. The 
wager refers stricto sensu to admitting the existence of God, but not necessarily to 
faith. That’s why Pascal considered it necessary that the wager should be followed 
by a control of our passions so that grace is attracted.9 In other words the intellectual 
assent should be doubled by an existential commitment. What actually leads to faith 
doesn’t have to do with its reasonable side but the foolishness implied in the Cross: 
  Our religion is wise and foolish: wise, because it is the most learned 
and most strongly based on miracles, prophecies, etc., foolish, because 
it is not all this which makes people belong to it. This is a good enough 
reason for condemning those who do not belong, but not for making 
those who do belong believe. What makes them believe is the Cross. 
Lest the Cross of Christ should be made of none effect.10  
Returning to Rohmer’s Jean-Louis we realize that behind his continuous 
introspections and rationalizations lies the rejection of the Cross: ‘Take me: with all 
my mediocrity, my careful middle-of-the-roadism, my lukewarmism – all of which 
God despises, I know – I can still attain a kind of…fulfillment’. It is difficult to 
imagine that Rohmer could have obtained a better definition of the precise opposite 
of what a holy fool stands for. 
For a theoretical formulation of the argument I will turn to Gilles Deleuze. In 
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983) Deleuze dedicates a section to the relation 
between philosophy and cinema by tracing a line of inspiration from Kierkegaard to 
Dreyer and Pascal to Bresson in what he terms as the ‘consciousness of choice as 
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steadfast spiritual determination’ and the mode of existence it triggers11. This is 
important because Deleuse’s insights into the nature of the spiritual choice can also 
illuminate the spiritual commitment of the holy fool. This is because the holy fool 
can be seen as an intensified expression of the person of faith who chooses to serve 
God, and by doing so understands that resurrection and the crucifixion are 
existentially interrelated in religious life. Even if it is not stated clearly here, it can be 
easily inferred that he also assumes a line of inspiration that can be traced from 
Pascal to Kierkegaard. In spite of the two centuries that separate them and their 
different philosophical and theological backgrounds, affinities between the two 
thinkers can be established at different levels. These range from the general – both 
fought against the ‘spirit of the age’ and what they saw as the perversion of 
Christianity - to the particular - the concrete way in which they conceived of 
Christian existence.12 However, Deleuse is only interested in showing what is at 
stake in Pascal’s wager and Kierkegaard’s leap of faith. He interprets the wager not 
as a choice between terms but as a choice between modes of existence:  
This is all that Pascal’s wager says: the alternation of terms is indeed the 
affirmation of the existence of God, its negation, and its suspension 
(doubt, uncertainty); but the spiritual alternative is elsewhere: it is between 
the mode of existence of him who ‘wagers’ that God exists and the mode 
of existence of him who wagers for non-existence or who does not want to 
wager.13   
Pascal’s formulation is useful in encouraging us to think more deeply about character 
types, and how they affect understandings of divine folly. Four types are suggested: 
the devout character, a man of virtue and a guardian of order for whom there is no 
question of choosing; the skeptic, the person of uncertainty who doesn’t know how 
or what to choose; the creatures of evil who by choosing the evil lose their freedom 
of choice; and finally the person of faith who makes an authentic choice or has the 
consciousness of choice (embodied as I will show in Bresson’s Joan of Arc and the 
country priest). The character of true choice is discovered, most importantly, through 
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a form of sacrifice.14 Suffering and sacrifice will run like a red thread through the 
cinematic narratives that I will now embark upon. 
 
The Bressonian holy fool 
Of all French directors, Robert Bresson (1901-1999) perhaps paid greatest 
attention to the spiritual dimension of folly. It is, nonetheless, very difficult to draw a 
psychological profile of the Bressonian holy fool. Bresson deliberately preserves the 
mystery of the human being by eluding psychological explanations: ‘No psychology 
(of the kind which discovers only what it can explain)’.15 For this reason Bresson 
avoids using actors but prefers persons totally untrained in the art of acting whom he 
calls models (with the exception of his first three films). What he demands from 
them is not acting but a kind of automatism. What we capture from these portrayals 
is what André Bazin calls their ‘physiology of existence’.16  René Predal defines 
Bresson’s characters as either ‘madman of God’ – the religious protagonists - or 
‘tormented rebels’, referring to the others.17 While his assertion should not be 
generalized to all characters, it is a very useful tool to describe a marked tendency in 
the Bressonian portrait gallery, capturing an essential feature most of them share: 
passion. They are presented from the very beginning as being possessed by their 
passions. This brings to mind the way Dostoevsky despised ‘lukewarm’ characters 
(following their condemnation in Rev. 3:16) who, in his work, tend to belong to an 
unredeemable category, incapable of spiritual regeneration, precisely because of their 
half-heartedness. All the other features derive from this motivation: intransigence 
and will are necessary in order to pursue their passions.18 However, this is not 
sufficient, and in Bresson’s early films at least, human passion is met halfway by 
divine grace. Thus attaining one’s own vocation is a combination of three factors: 
will, freedom and grace.19 
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If we turn to the particular category of the ‘madmen of God’, what Bresson’s 
viewer can access is ‘the forms of their spiritual action’.20 Their reasons are not 
disclosed by Bresson and are not subject to psychological laws. In fact, such 
characters defy common sense. Joan of Arc is governed by the voices she hears, and 
she refuses to save herself, while Bresson’s country priest has moments of 
clairvoyance which are beyond our comprehension, and it would be impossible to 
find a character more opaque than the donkey Balthasar. Their peculiarity triggers 
their solitude and pits them against the commonality of society. They challenge 
involuntarily, as a result of their very existence, and in spite of their apparent 
weakness. Weakness is for Bresson, as it is for Tarkovsky, an important 
characteristic. It alludes to the “power of weakness” expounded in the New 
Testament.21 At the same time these characters are depicted as suffering innocents, 
imitating Christ in His passion. Their suffering comes through less through the mind, 
and more via the body – a body which is imprisoned, beaten, and consumed by 
illness. Their passion as religious fervor is therefore translated into the concrete 
terms of passion as suffering. In order to explain Bresson’s representation of the holy 
fool, it will now be necessary to examine his depiction of them in his filmography. 
Diary of a Country Priest (1951) 
It is telling that Bresson paid a great deal of attention to religious figures 
throughout his directing career. Bresson’s third feature film, the Diary of a Country 
Priest (1951) is a faithful adaptation of the homonymous novel of Georges Bernanos, 
a Catholic writer whom Hans Urs von Balthasar considered to be a spiritual 
‘descendant of Pascal and Kierkegaard’.22 It is here that we encounter the first of 
Bresson’s recognizably holy foolish figures. The diary format of the novel is 
transposed onto the screen through the actual presence of a hand writing in the diary 
and also a voice-over – representing the consciousness of the priest – which act as an 
organizing principle and a commentary for both the writing and the action. In the 
first sequence of the film the voiceover announces the intention to jot down ‘the very 
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simple trivial secrets of a very ordinary kind of life’. By the end of the film we 
realize that such a comment cannot do justice to the human life recorded by the diary 
even if the voice spoke in total honesty, so deep is the humility of its owner. What 
we gain access to is not the psychology of the character, but the life of the spirit in 
the presence of grace. It is for this reason that Bazin credits Bresson with the creation 
of a new dramatic form that is specifically theological: a phenomenology of salvation 
and grace.23 
The priest is immediately introduced after the opening diary sequence. A sign 
for a place called Ambricourt fades to leave in full close-up the tired and sad face of 
the curé as he is wiping his forehead. A medium shot taken from behind a forged 
steel gate informs the viewer he is taking a rest next to his bike in front of his new 
parish church. It is followed by a cut to a close-up of a man and a woman embracing 
in the garden on the other side of the fence; they notice the priest and turn their backs 
towards him, heading for the mansion in the distance. The priest is left alone: there is 
nobody else to welcome him. This scene is revelatory for his drama which will 
unfold in the solitude of his conscience. Shortly afterwards, he meets another priest 
from Torcy, his spiritual mentor, with whom he will have a few other encounters in 
future. We see the priest feeding himself on bread and wine, the only nourishment he 
can have as a result of what appears to be a stomach condition. As the action moves 
to his ministry, he is shown after the catechism class, where he wishes to reward the 
student Seraphita for her diligence, only to be told what lovely eyes he has while the 
other girls are giggling behind the door. Seraphita continues her defiance in future 
episodes. Meanwhile at night he is tortured by stomach pains and the feeling that 
God has deserted him; he can hardly pray. Chantal, the count’s daughter, visits him 
to denounce the governess’s affair with her father and the priest, in a moment of 
clairvoyance, asks her for what we suspect is a suicide note.  
The most dramatic episode of the film follows, in which he meets the 
countess who has stopped to take any interest in the world since the death of her 
infant boy. Her relation with her husband and daughter has been transformed into 
one of indifference. The priest wrestles for her soul and she manages to find peace. 
The next morning the priest hears the news of her death. Chantal who has overheard 
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the conversation cast doubts over his involvement. His health deteriorates even more 
but he tenaciously attends to his daily duties. One night he falls in the mud while 
walking in the forest, though not before having visions of the Virgin and the holy 
Infant. When he comes over Seraphita is attending to him. The next day he decides 
to leave and see a doctor. Chantal’s cousin, Oliver, an officer the foreign legion, 
gives him a ride on his motorbike to the station, which for him turns into an 
exhilarating experience. On the same day he finds out he suffers from stomach 
cancer and decides to visit a friend from the seminary, Louis Dufrety, who has 
renounced his priesthood. He dies, but not before trying to make him reconsider his 
decision. From the letter Dufrety sends to the priest from Torcy we find out his last 
words were ‘all is grace’.      
Bazin compares the film to a medieval Passion Play or the Way of the Cross, 
each sequence being a station along the road.24 The comparison is not only invited by 
the cross that fills the screen in the last sequence, but is clearly suggested by the 
priest’s realization that his place in Christ’s drama is in the garden of olives: ‘The 
truth is that my place for all time has been the garden of olives. Suddenly our Lord 
has granted me the grace of letting me know, through the words of my old 
teacher…that I was the prisoner of the Holy Passion’. Through his physical and 
emotional suffering in the service of his parishioners he participates into Christ’s 
Passion. Hans Urs von Balthasar makes an observation about Bernanos’s protagonist 
which is as valid for Bresson’s: 
It is obvious that these two kinds of anguish cannot be distinguished in the 
experience itself. For, who would venture to pinpoint the place where 
personal human suffering passes over into universal human suffering 
conditioned by original sin, where the latter then passes over into the 
universally vicarious suffering of the Cross, and finally where this all-
encompassing suffering of Christ is communicated to the individual 
“member” of Christ as personally experienced anguished, to the precise 
degree pleasing to grace?25 
As a result, even if what he experiences are events strictly related to his daily 
life, they parallel the biblical narrative of the Passion in a mysterious way, reminding 
us of Pascal’s maxim ‘Everything happens through mystery’ that appeared in 
Bresson’s first feature film Angels of Sin (1943). The bread and wine that his diet is 
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reduced to are signs of his sacramental existence – his whole life becomes a 
communion with Christ. He not only celebrates the mass in a church as a function of 
his ordination, but on a private level he offers his entire being as oblation. In 
retrospect the ‘trivial’ events in his ‘ordinary’ life are transfigured into something far 
higher. He is indeed subject to an invisible trial by the community and condemned 
with undeserved and unexplainable hostility as a useless creature and a drunkard. 
Mentally and physically exhausted, he falls in the mud like Christ under the weight 
of the cross. The cloth that Seraphita uses to wipe his face resembles the veil of 
Veronica. He experiences God’s desertion and is left struggling even to pray. His 
vomiting of blood cause by his illness offers another point of resemblance, this time 
to Christ’s bleeding on the cross. Finally, the priest shares in the divine drama even 
to the point that he is made to appear like a fool in the eyes of his parishioners. The 
motive of foolishness and ridicule is recurrent: he is treated with impertinence by 
Seraphita which provokes the laughter of the other girls; the count calls him a fool 
for trying to warn him about his daughter’s sadness; he is criticized by the curé of 
Torcy for his ridiculous appearance; and he suspects people might have put 
something in his drink just to laugh at him. If the curé of Torcy represents the 
‘devout voice of common sense’, or the embodiment of respectability, the curé of 
Ambricourt stands for the foolishness of sacrifice.26 
The curé of Ambricourt reunites in himself most of the characteristics 
associated with holy fools: marginality, mortification of the body, child-likeness, a 
combination of weakness and strength, and the gift of clairvoyance. His 
marginalization is caused by a threefold alienation: first, from his body, triggered by 
sickness and unconscious mortification of the body through scarce nourishment and 
lack of rest; second, from society – he is considered useless and inept due to his lack 
of social skills; and thirdly, from sin – he leads un unsuspected life of religious 
devotion27. This privation is compensated in the spiritual order of things by the gift of 
clairvoyance and visions. His child-like purity is guessed by the countess who 
mentions it in the letter addressed to him and Oliver recognizes in his apparent 
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weakness the tenacity of a legionnaire: ‘You could have been one of us’, he exclaims 
coldly. And indeed his determination to carry on all his priestly duties in spite of the 
continuous deterioration of his health testifies to this point. The same tenacity and 
dedication to the life of the spirit was developed with even greater rigour in the next 
religious figure Bresson depicted as a protagonist: Joan of Arc. 
 
Trial of Joan of Arc (1962) 
In spite of the typical confiscation of Joan of Arc by political and 
nationalistic discourses, Bresson manages, like Carl Theodore Dreyer whose Joan we 
shall examine in a later chapter, to elude all these aspects and concentrate on her 
spiritual life, giving the film a meditative quality.28 Still, in other ways, Bresson’s 
Trial of Joan of Arc (1962) couldn’t be more different from Dreyer’s Passion. 
Bresson deliberately avoided the ecstatic view of eyes cast to heaven and the close-
ups so beloved by Dreyer. His look is detached and the film’s authenticity is 
provided not through a historical reconstruction, documentary-like, but through a 
spiritual reconstruction based on the transcripts of her interrogations. In the absence 
of any other historical evidence, Joan comes to life through her own words, as the 
viewer is advised in the opening of the film: ‘there is no tomb, no portrait, but we 
have better than her portrait, her words before the judges at Rouen’. Joan’s role as a 
holy fool is used to arraign the clerical establishment. Bresson is very particular in 
showing at the end of the film that Joan’s persecutors took any possible measures to 
erase all her material traces. But this assists Bresson’s endeavor to capture a ‘non-
historical truth’, since what is left, her words, are the carriers of a reality that comes 
from beyond her, from eternity.29 
Trial of Joan of Arc presents five successive interrogations of Joan in which 
the bishop in charge of her trial, Cauchon, is trying to force her to admit the 
delusional character of her ‘voices’, or at least trap her with questions that would 
discredit her and any claim to the reality of her visions.30 Her poised answers, never 
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theologically erroneous, are puzzling, contradicting her lack of education. Still, given 
that they correspond to the transcripts, they betray the fact that Joan’s source of 
inspiration is not of this world. Perhaps even more than with the country priest, Joan 
gives the impression that she is a ‘possessed being’ whose body shelters ‘an 
extraordinary force coming from the supernatural’.31  This ‘automaton of grace’ as 
Susan Sontag call her, comes very close to what Bresson demands from his ‘models’ 
(his actors): that they be vehicles rather than performers.32 
This is not equivalent to saying that Joan is deprived of her own will, though 
she is the perfect illustration of Deleuse’s theory of choice. Asked: ‘How did you 
know that it was [Saint] Michael?’ she replies ‘I soon believed it. I had the will to 
believe it…’. Grace cannot force itself onto human will. The person of faith is aware 
of the freedom to choose whether to believe or not. Joan chooses to believe 
passionately in the reality of her voices. While it is true that the essence of the film is 
the opposition between Joan and the bishop Cauchon, it develops into a tension 
between her and the ecclesiastical structure33. Asked: ‘Do you believe you are subject 
to the church on earth?’ she replies: ‘Our Lord is to be served first’. The answer 
cannot be contested, but it is nevertheless a challenge for the institution which 
Cauchon represents. For this reason he is more interested in silencing her, in making 
her admit that she was wrong about her voices. Signing the recantation is therefore 
more important than the burning at the stake, and as a result he will not ultimately 
deny her Holy Communion even if she is considered a heretic. 
Like the country priest Joan’s solitude is total, apart from her voices and the 
occasional gestures of sympathy coming from Isambert, a Dominican brother. 
Visually, she is abstracted from the normal order of things by the fact that she never 
appears in the same shot with anybody else, least of all with Cauchon, not even when 
the interrogation moves to the confines of her own small cell. Besides her voices, 
what sets her apart is her virginity, which is emphatically asserted, contested, 
acknowledged and threatened.  Her virginity not only crosses the gender barrier but 
points to an androgyny professed only in the monastic asceticism. This becomes the 
only material ‘proof’ that could legitimate her spiritual experience.  
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As in the country priest’s case, Joan’s passion for her voices turns into a 
‘holy passion’. She recants under the threat of the stake but quickly realizes that it 
would be a sin to betray her voices that she has been obstinately defending during the 
trial. Bresson here doesn’t make use of the biblical parallels that were favoured in the 
Diary, but, as with Christ, her own party has deserted her and she is faced only with 
her judges and the hostile crowd. To make her an object of ridicule an anonymous 
leg from the crowd attempts to trip her on her way to the stake. The last images that 
Bresson shows are the cross that she has asked to see, followed by the stake, empty, 
with no trace of her body, as if she has already passed both her body and soul into 
the other world.     
 
Bressonian pessimism 
If Joan of Arc and the curé of Ambricourt are rather conventional 
representations of the Latin idea of holy foolishness, in his subsequent films Bresson 
develops the figure in darker and more modern ways. This reached a climax in his 
portayal of Charles in The Devil, Probably (1977). The moral profile of this holy fool 
should be read against the spiritual coordinates that the director sets and the role he is 
invested with understood within the logic of the director’s peculiar apocalyptic 
vision. If this logic is not accepted Charles becomes just another of Bresson’s 
suicidal characters. In what follows I will discuss Bresson’s pessimism, how it 
evolves and deepens during his career, as well as two attendant and interdependent 
themes: imprisonment as human condition and death as the solution to this situation. 
The latter includes the issue of suicide and I will highlight the particularities of 
Bresson’s thinking on this matter. I will show that, in his artistic vision, suicide takes 
the form of a final protest against the world and constitutes the only solution left to 
assert the possibility of transcendence. It is the ultimate form of redemptive 
suffering. Moreover, I would like to suggest that in this respect Bresson’s vision 
comes very close to Tarkovsky’s in his last two films, Nostalgia and The Sacrifice. 
Bresson’s pessimism is a recurrent theme in his later works that has received 
much comment from critics. Whatever the nature of the protagonists’ tribulations in 
his earlier works – to be more precise the first six films discounting the 25 minute 
comedy short Public Affairs (1934) – a salvation of some kind is achieved in this life 
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through the synergy of divine grace and human will, even if sometimes deferred till 
the physical death. Gradually Bresson moved towards a vision in which grace is 
absent from this world creating a spiritual void which can become unbearable to the 
point of despair and suicide. I will sketch this evolution. Bresson’s vision of the 
human condition turns bleaker after Au hasard Balthasar (1966). This is achieved by 
a double movement which comes to define almost all of his following works: on the 
one hand, evil is engulfing the world in forms that are increasingly impersonal and 
autonomous (this contrasts with a more clearly defined vision of human agency in 
the first films); on the other hand, as René Predal observes, ‘it becomes harder and 
harder for grace to impose itself in the end…the transcendence is not apparent, the 
void becomes quite terrifying, and the neutrality of director’s gaze icier and icier’.34 
This new gaze also brought into focus new solutions that, taken literally, pose a 
challenge to Christian theology.   
Bresson’s next film, Mouchette (1967) raises the problematic issue of suicide 
in his work. His young heroine Mouchette suffers not only the social injustices of the 
poverty into which she was born, but also inexplicable cruelties inflicted on her by 
family and community. Her innocence remains untainted in spite of her expectations 
being failed from all sides. Still, Bresson chooses to end his film in a way open to 
interpretation. The final scene shows her playing with death: in her white muslin 
dress she rolls down the hill towards the water three times. First she stops short of 
the water, gets up and waves at a man on his tractor who ignores her. Then she 
continues her game by rolling into a bush. On the third attempt her body rolls down 
the hill out of the frame and disappears in the water with a splash. The camera only 
shows the rippling rings of water fading away while Monteverdi’s Magnificat from 
Vespers for the Blessed Virgin delivers the aural commentary, via praise for the God 
who ‘has put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted the lowly’ (Lk 1:52). 
And indeed, for the heroine, abused by all who have found themselves in a position 
of power over her – and that meant practically the whole village – God is the only 
hope that remained. Bresson’s technique of substituting image by sound is due to his 
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belief that ‘the ear is much more creative than the eye’35. The Magnificat is evocative 
of a spiritual presence in a way in which image by itself could not invoke.36 His 
careful use of image and sound contributes to the suspense of moral judgment 
usually passed on incidents of this sort. Her death is suggested in the manner of a 
serene passing away into another world, a ‘form of redemption and rebirth’, 
postulated as the ‘only way, it seems, to find peace’.37   
What distinguishes Mouchette from Bresson’s previous films is the way in 
which he envisions the possibility of salvation: in present life or through death. Two 
out of his five major films before 1967 stand out as particularly bright in terms of the 
possibility of spiritual regeneration and salvation within the confines of this world. 
These two notable exceptions feature the French resistance prisoner Fontain in A 
Man Escaped – The Wind Bloweth Where It Listeth (1956) and Michael in 
Pickpocket (1959). The former plods his way out of prison by perseverance and 
chance, or grace. It is a form of deliverance which is religious in as much as it is 
underlain by an unwavering determination to succeed, met halfway by the 
benevolent hand of providence. The latter, whose moral portrait is loosely inspired 
by Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, follows an ascendant 
trajectory which leads him both to repentance and love, and ultimately redemption.  
The other three films of the same period: Journal of a Country Priest, Trial of Joan 
of Arc, Au hasard Balthasar all end with the death of the protagonist. Salvation is 
acquired through death, and is experienced no longer as liberation within this life, but 
from this life altogether.  
Intertwined with this is Bresson’s artistic vision of life as an incarcerating 
universe. Paul Schrader argues that the director is actually the inheritor of a line of 
thought that is linked to the body/soul dichotomy in Plato and the Scriptures, as well 
St Paul’s conception of body as prison.38 While it is true that Bresson tends to see 
death as a liberation from the body in earlier films such as the Diary of a Country 
Priest, A Man Escaped, and Trial of Joan of Arc, because it is through the body that 
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most of the suffering is inflicted, from Au hasard, Balthasar onwards the sense that 
the world offers no escape intensifies. This translates into a second circle of walls 
around the soul, ushering in ‘the image of the prison world, of man as captive 
being’39. It is likely that Bresson owes this image to Pascal in whose work the 
‘cachot’ (the prison) is the central metaphor used as a means of situating humankind 
in relation to infinity and to express its present fallen condition. However, Bresson 
proceeds to complicate the picture further with the creation of an inner prison 
brought into being by knowingly collaborating with evil. 
This is a universe in which grace is not obstructed by external space, but it 
can transform it by indicating the workings of providence, as in Fontaine’s case. It is 
a universe infused by grace in all forms: ‘All is grace’ are the concluding words of 
the country priest. For the person of grace, it works from within, which creates a 
tension with the reality outside. It renders the priest of Ambricourt as a perpetual 
‘prisoner of the Holy Agony’ and Joan as a perpetual prisoner of her own 
martyrdom. Grace introduces a fundamental disparity between modes of existence 
which, for Bresson, translates in terms of oppression and persecution. Joan’s ‘voices’ 
turn her into a political enemy to the English and inconvenient prophetess to the 
church authorities. The priest’s total dedication to his vocation brings him in 
contradiction to the ways of the world and the turns the world into a cause for his 
suffering. The same grace manifests as providence for Fontaine’s physical salvation 
and Michel’s moral regeneration. For Joan and the priest the world is the prison; for 
Fontaine and Michal the world is instrumental to their liberation. 
In Mouchette Bresson takes a step further since there is no external factor that 
directly causes the death of the heroine. Still, the narrative does not offer a way out 
of Mouchette’s predicament and for her, once she has experienced the worst, life 
cannot be but a repetition of abuses and rejection. Following this logic, the only way 
to put an end to evil is by withdrawal from life, to escape from the prison of this 
world. The suggestion is disturbing and leads to an uneasy theological situation. 
Such pessimism can only be predicated on the premise of a world which is 
irredeemably evil or whose possibilities of spiritual awakening are indeed very 
limited and restricted to certain individuals. Given the French context, Jansenism 
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comes naturally in discussion as responsible for such a view. Its main theological 
emphases are the fall, the wretched condition of the post-lapsarian humankind, the 
primacy of grace over free will, the dynamic nature of conversion and an austere 
lifestyle.40 Jansenism has typically been used to account for the asceticism of 
Bresson’s style and elucidate the rapport between will and predestination in his 
works, with the director himself admitting to such an influence.41 However, as I have 
suggested, there exists the possibility of an even deeper influence of Jansenism on 
Bresson, through Pascal.  This suggestion requires qualification, however, since 
although the premises may be similar, Bresson develops them into a direction alien 
to Pascal’s thinking. In addition, in the later films one essential part of the Jansenist 
universe is lost: the working of grace. 
Mouchette is just a transition though to an even darker strain of pessimism in 
A Gentle Creature (1969). Paradoxically, this shift coincides with Bresson’s first 
colour film. It is the story of an unhappy marriage in which the solely materialist 
concerns of the husband drive the wife towards despair and suicide. The film 
contains a paradigmatic gesture: the husband, a pawnbroker, snatches an ivory Christ 
from the gold crucifix that his future wife presents to him as her last possession. He 
weighs the cross in the scales, estimates its value and tells her to keep the Christ. She 
refuses and takes the money offered in exchange. This is not an isolated case, but 
indicates the spiritual collapse which is endemic to this world. In Lancelot of the 
Lake (1974), contrary to the classical idealised versions, we witness the spiritual 
failure of the quest of the Grail. This uncompromising look back on one of the most 
important symbols of medieval religiosity ‘prefigures the dissolution of Western 
values in The Devil, Probably and the la ronde-like study of the nefarious effects of 
capitalism in L’Argent’.42 Given that one of Bresson’s unfulfilled projects was a film 
called Genesis, we can see him working towards a grander design and towards a 
universal vision that incorporates the whole spiritual history of humanity, which 
under the direction of this ‘new Saint John’ takes the form of a ‘transcript of a trial 
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without possibility of appeal of an itinerary to perdition’.43 Bresson’s critics typically 
refer back to Jansenism in order to explain his theology but his modern side is 
overlooked. It is significant to mention in this respect that, as if anticipating 
Bresson’s categorical account of Western civilization, the French-born Protestant 
theologian Gabriel Vahanian wrote his The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-
Christian Era (1961) less than a decade earlier, reaching similar conclusions. 
This waning of Christianity in the Bressonian universe is taken as an 
opportunity to express his ideas and the presence of God without the props of 
theology as a doctrinal system. Susan Sontag was already noticing this tendency in 
1964: ‘Bresson’s Catholicism is a language for rendering a certain vision of human 
action, rather than a “position” that is stated…The proof is that Bresson is able to say 
the same thing without Catholicism in his three other films’ (by which she meant at 
the time Ladies of the Bois de Boulogne, A Man Escaped, and Pickpocket).44 
Schrader sees this move in his later creation as a shift from ‘saintliness in a world 
without God’ to ‘saintliness in a world without theology’ but the picture Bresson 
creates is of a post-Christian world, fashioned this way by its own will, in which if 
there is anything left to humans that is God. What he rejects is in fact what he calls 
the religious ‘ideology’, in an impulse that seems very similar to Kierkegaard’s 
search for authenticity: ‘Ideology is the moral. I don’t want to be ideological. I want 
to be true.’45 His attitude is provoked by disillusionment, later in life, with the 
Catholic Church, which he sees as touched by the generalized materialistic trend: 
‘…when people become so materialistic, religion is not possible, because every 
religion is poverty and poverty is the way of having contact with mystery and with 
God. When Catholicism wants to be materialistic, God is not there’46 Deleuse points 
out his intellectual affinities: “This extreme moralism which is opposed to morality, 
this faith which is opposed to religion,…had much in common with Pascal and 
Kierkegaard, with Jansenism and Reformism.’47 The Devil, Probably gives the 
highest expression to his thinking in Bresson’s late oeuvre, and the best example of 
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the way in which Bresson transformed the holy fool from its conventional 
characterization. 
 
The Devil, Probably (1977) 
The Devil, Probably is Bresson’s most uncompromising indictment of 
modern society. That the title evokes Dostoevsky’s The Devils (1872) and a 
discussion between Ivan and his father in The Brothers Karamazov (1880) is not 
mere coincidence. Bresson had not only adapted two of Doestoevsky’s works for A 
Gentle Creature and Four Nights of a Dreamer (1972) and drew inspiration from 
him in Pickpocket, but also considered him the only novelist he could agree with.48 
Apart form this, there are other relations that can be established between The Devil, 
Probably and The Devils. Both are intended to be an insight into the political and 
religious state that existed in their corresponding society and time. In both works, the 
trigger that sets the action in motion is a murder. It is also significant that one source 
of inspiration for The Devils was a huge project called ‘Atheism’ which was 
supposed to tell the story of a character who, losing faith, was to undergo intense 
spiritual suffering and conduct an investigation of all religious faiths, in a manner 
similar to the inquiry conducted by Bresson’s protagonist into the available religious, 
pseudo-religious or non-religious beliefs that he saw flourishing during the 1970s. 
The historical moment that Bresson chooses to portray captures what is 
referred to as ‘the failure of the sixties’. In as much as May ‘68 was a political 
failure, The Devil, Probaby, can be considered a film of ‘political despair’.49 The 
affirmation should be qualified though: in his elliptic manner, Bresson is not 
interested in analysing in any detail the ideologies and institutions he wishes to 
expose, which indeed can create the impression of an ‘apolitical pessimism’.50 He 
makes an inventory of the nihilist tendencies and the ecological apocalypticism in the 
aftermath of May ’68, which themselves could lead to political pessimism, but as I 
will suggest later he seems to rather point to the possibility – at least theoretical – of 
an apolitical hope.  
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The film begins with a close-up of a newspaper headline referring to a suicide 
in Père Lachaise cemetery, immediately contradicted by another headline that fades 
in and suggests it was actually a murder. The rest of it is a flashback that leaves the 
reader to ponder over the reasons and significance of Charles’s act. In one of the first 
scenes a group of friends discuss the best way to walk. Then they go to a political 
meeting where a voice nihilistically proclaims destruction, an attitude dismissed by 
Charles, who seems to be the leader of the group. In the following sequence we see 
Michel from the group and some student fellows watching footage of terrible 
environmental pollution. We later find out that Michel is also an author whose book 
on ecological issues does not enjoy much success, and that he is deeply in love with 
Alberte. Charles is a highly intelligent person, but also a drop out from university, 
uninterested in pecuniary matters. Both Alberte and her friend Edwige are in love 
with him. A second attempt at finding something meaningful is pointed to by their 
attendance of a religious meeting, but they leave in disappointment. Charles moves 
with another friend, Edwige, and they pick up from the street Valentin, a drug addict 
of whom they take care, and whom Charles convinces to accompany him to Notre 
Dame at night. They listen to Monteverdi’s Ego Dormio but towards morning 
Valentin breaks open the offertory boxes and steals the money. The police arrive and 
take Charles in for questioning, which leaves him depressed. Worried, his friends 
persuade him to go to a psychoanalyst. Here he confesses that he cannot kill himself 
because he cannot stand not being able to see and hear, and that he hates both life 
and death. He acknowledges God’s existence and incomprehensibility. At the end of 
the session the psychoanalyst unwittingly mentions that in Roman antiquity the 
nobles had the friends or servants kill them. Charles asks Valentin to kill him in 
exchange for money, which the latter does, indifferently, in Père Lachaise cemetery, 
without allowing his friend to finish his last sentence.          
Bresson writes in Notes on the Cinematographer: ‘Hide the ideas, but so that 
people find them. The most important will be the most hidden.’51 Still, The Devil, 
Probably shouts its discontent with politics, religion, psychoanalysis and ecological 
catastrophes and apparently leaves nothing hidden. It is a cacophony of voices and 
discourses which is best summarized by the meeting in St Eustache church in which 
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each participant utters one sentence without really entering into dialogue, while the 
organ punctuates their discussion with discordant sounds intermingled with the 
ludicrous noise of a vacuum cleaner in the background. The only moment of 
harmony is experienced in Notre Dame, at night, when Charles listens to 
Monterverdi’s Ego Dormio played on a portable record-player, while lying on the 
floor in a sleeping-bag. The lyrics are from the Song of Songs, an Old Testament 
epithalamium or nuptial song which is allegorically interpreted in the Judeo-
Christian tradition as representing the love relationship between God and his church 
or between God and the human soul. The first line: ‘Ego dormio et cor meum vigilat’ 
(I slept but my heart was awake) came to be interpreted in the mystical tradition as 
symbolic of the state of contemplation in which the senses are shut down so that the 
attention remains fixed in contemplation.52 Charles is shown lying still on the floor, 
listening attentively, dead to the world and its tumult in a prefiguration of his later 
death. It is the only time during his numerous attempts to find something meaningful 
that he doesn’t walk away from his attempted encounter. The next morning he will 
be taken away by the police – and thus the world denies him even a fleeting moment 
of transcendence.   
This scene offers the key for the interpretation of Charles who, as the film 
shows, is the last searcher, the last man who is willing to listen to God. He is the one 
who returns to the cathedral at night, after the daily clamor finishes. The creed he 
professes, a citation from Victor Hugo, is one to which the director himself would 
subscribe: ‘When you come in a church, or a cathedral, God is there, but if a priest 
happens to come, God is not there anymore’. This refers back to the moment the 
group attends the religious meeting at St Eustache when someone suggests that the 
Christianity of the future will be without religion. In other words, God is evacuated 
from Christianity which continues its existence as a cultural artifact. Bresson views it 
as a spiritual void, and makes Charles highly aware of this void, which in his case 
cannot be filled by dedicating himself to either a cause or the love of a woman. Even 
if young people of similar age are seen engaged in support for different causes, he 
fails to rally under any, sensing the vanity of doing that. The episode in the bus, from 
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which the title of the film is derived, presents this aspect in a different light. While 
Charles and Michel are in a bus a discussion starts and one of the travellers asks: 
‘Who, then, is maneuvering us on the sly?’ to which another one answers: ‘The devil 
probably’. Immediately after the noise of a collision puts an end to the verbal 
exchange. 
  Analyzing the characteristics of Bresson’s style, and highlighting the 
differences between Bresson’s cinematography and that of the mainstream, Adams 
Sitney concludes that: ‘The viewer of ‘le cinématographe’ is invited to read images 
figuratively, to escape from the nightmarish blindness of the commercial “cinema’s” 
literalness’53. By the same token, Bresson’s films should not be taken literally and 
caution should be exercised before assessing them theologically as factual.54 In 
particular, Charles in The Devil, Probably should not be judged by measures 
different from those applied, for example, to Tarkovsky’s Domenico. Interestingly, 
because the latter is typically interpreted through a nationalistic lens as a holy fool à 
la russe, such questions have never arisen. That Bresson endows his hero with the 
same significance may not only be inferred form the narration of the film itself, but is 
clearly stated in the interviews Bresson gave.  
Bresson states in one of his last interviews that he made The Devil, Probably 
as a protest against indifference and reminds that at the time some people were 
burning themselves alive for the same reason.55 The practice immediately brings to 
mind Tarkovsky’s holy fool Domenico in Nostalgia, who sets himself on fire on the 
Capitolium. The act is raised to the realm of the symbolic – not a taking of life, but 
giving it for a higher purpose, in order to protest against the spiritual desert that the 
world has become.  For Bresson ‘there is something which makes suicide possible - 
not even possible but absolutely necessary: it is the vision of void, the feeling of void 
which is impossible to bear.’56 Charles hates dying but feels compelled to do it. He 
has rehearsed the moment of death in his mind, imagining the ‘sublime thoughts’ he 
will have which means that he has attached significance to his gesture. The Devil, 
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Probably continues the theme of life as prison, but the director is careful in hinting 
the mission with which he has invested his protagonist, which goes against an 
interpretation of the end as an ‘unequivocal triumph of Thanatos’57 Bresson chooses 
to have Charles killed rather than committing suicide, so that he can divert attention 
away from questions over the ethics and psychology of suicide, while he invests 
death as a carrier of meaning.  
It is important to notice the various parallels invited by the final expression of 
the holy foolishness depicted by Bresson and Tarkovsky.  This can be due to the 
impending sense that both directors share a view that the world cannot continue in its 
present state; that a global catastrophe is underway. In both directors these latter-day 
holy fools lose the insignia of their particular religious traditions. Their profile is 
actually shaped by the lack of spirituality around them and the inefficiency of each 
director’s respective religious traditions to fight it. As a consequence, characters 
arise that take it upon themselves to draw attention to this situation and to reaffirm 
the possibility of salvation. They deserve the attribute of ‘holy’ not because they 
necessarily lead a saintly life but because in a world engulfed by a godless spirit they 
are the last to keep the flame of transcendence alight.  
 
 
Beyond Bresson: three French portrayals of folly 
In the wake of Bresson’s The Devil, Probably, French cinema in the 1980s 
underwent a renaissance in the number of films with religious themes. Many of these 
focused on the ideal of a suffering figure, foolish and saintly, standing at odds with 
the world. A cursory list of examples include Jean-Luc Godard’s Hail Mary  (1985), 
a modernist controversial version of the biblical story of Mary and Joseph, Alain 
Cavalier’s Thérèse (1986), Maurice Pialat’s Under the sun of Satan (1987), Jean 
Delannoy’s Bernadette (1988) and the sequence Bernadette’s Passion (1989) about 
the Catholic visionary of Lourdes. Thérèse and Under the Sun of Satan offer two 
contrasting portrayals of folly: a luminous one, belonging to a nun who was shortly 
canonized after her death, and a dark one, of a priest of controversial sanctity. As if 
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to offer a more comprehensive picture, more recently, in 2008, the figure of a lay 
woman, an epitome of forbearance and long-suffering, saw the light of the screen in 
Marion Laine’s A Simple Heart. An analysis of these films demonstrates the 
continuing significance of suffering folly as a key theme in the French cinematic 
world after Bresson. 
Thérèse (1986) 
St Thérèse de Lisieux is known for advocating the ‘little way’ - the daily, 
laborious, apparently unheroic way of serving God in humility and love. Cavalier’s 
film fits her spiritual method by showing that great passion can be expressed in a 
very simple way, with a minimal story and a minimalist décor. The director focuses 
mainly on two moments in her life: the passionate attempts to enter the Carmelite 
convent – being underage she has to go as far as approaching the Pope to ask for a 
dispensation - and the harrowing last months of her life, afflicted with tuberculosis.  
According to the director the liturgical ceremonies are deliberately avoided, so 
that instead the simplicity and the poverty of the Carmelite lifestyle come to the 
fore.58 There is still an important ceremonial that he presents for its symbolical 
power. When Thérèse enters the convent she is wearing a white wedding dress as a 
symbol of her becoming the bride of Christ. Then, in the convent, the nuns 
repeatedly recite the Song of Songs as an expression of their love for Christ, their 
bridegroom. Thérèse is a champion of this impetuous love, describing her relation 
with Christ in concrete human terms and advising one of the sisters to ‘Fondle him. 
That’s how I snared him.’ Though we are not given a great deal of access to the 
routine of the spiritual life in the convent, except for the penitential practices, we are 
nevertheless given a window into the daily menial task of the nuns. Their inner life 
goes on unseen, hidden under the ordinariness of the visible corporeal reality. 
The film is far from being an exaltation of suffering but remains faithful to 
the biography of its protagonist. Her physical sufferings, most of the time self-
inflicted, are recorded with a neutral tone. When she is still at home she prays 
intensely for a convict awaiting his execution, and abstains from drinking water as a 
sacrificial offering for him, only to find the next day that he has repented. In the 
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convent she sleeps without a mattress or blanket and occasionally the camera 
discreetly captures traces of the austerities imposed on her body: bandaged hands, 
drops of blood on her lips. When she is dying she gathers all her strength to rise from 
bed and limp around her room as an offering on behalf of one of the sisters who was 
escaping from the monastery. This ‘sacrificial asceticism’, as Theresa Sanders calls 
it, is replaced in the last months of her life by the suffering caused by her 
tuberculosis, which she accepts with joy as a form of sharing in Christ’s passion.59 
As one of her sisters remarks: ‘Suffering is the key’, though she embraces it as a 
form of loving rather than penance. 
The foolishness of such a life of renunciation and privation is assumed by 
Cavalier. When Thérèse’s father loses his mind as a result of her entering the 
convent, Céline, the only sister out of four who hasn’t (yet) become a nun, accuses 
the others of selfishness and folly. While her sisters are quick to deny this charge, 
Thérèse simply admits: ‘Yes, we are foolish’. The extreme ascetical practices to 
which Thérèse submits may be said to ‘border on madness’ but can be better 
understood as an act of love in the light of this holy foolishness.60 The wise 
bridesmaids from Christ’s parable, with whom the Carmelite sisters identify, are, 
paradoxically, foolish.   
 
Under the Sun of Satan (1987) 
By contrast, Maurice Pialat’s Under the sun of Satan gives expression to a 
very different vision in spite of sharing the same practices of sacrificial asceticism. 
The film is based on the homonymous novel of George Bernanos (1888-1948). 
Donnisan is a young priest who appears awkward and lacking in manners, which 
disconcerts the parishioners of Campagne. He seems to have doubts about living up 
to his vocation and attempts to compensate for this by excessive mortifications of the 
flesh. This end is met by wearing a coarse hair shirt under his cassock, self-
flagellation or walking for miles instead of making use of available transport. Later 
in the film we discover that he offers his bodily sufferings as a way to save souls 
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possessed by sin: ‘So many souls possessed by sin. That enraged me. To save them, I 
offered all I had. My life, first; it’s not much. My salvation, if God wants it’. Still, 
this is driving him to despair, especially when he begins to believe that the world is 
under the Devil’s sway, in spite of his fervent faith and preoccupation with the 
salvation of the others. 
He comes to this conclusion by precipitating the suicide of Mouchette, a 
young woman of easy virtue who has murdered one of her lovers and whose deed 
and inner torments are revealed to the priest by some sort of supernatural 
intervention. In his attempt to save her he confronts her with the worthlessness of her 
vicious life, the unoriginality of her sin, and the loss of freedom that comes with it: a 
discovery which has a shattering rather than a redemptive effect. The origins of his 
spiritual gifts remain ambiguous as they follow what appears to be a personal 
encounter with Satan, who promises never to give Donissan peace. Satan appears in 
various guises, such as a horse dealer tempting Donissan by offering him self-
knowledge beyond his powers of introspection. In spite of avoiding this temptation 
Donissan is promised the gift to ‘see others as you saw himself’. Pialat suggest the 
possibility that the encounter was just a play of Donnisan’s imagination as result of 
his physical exhaustion. Nonetheless the encounter is taken as real by the priest. 
When his attempt to save Mouchette’s soul fails, his priestly abilities come into 
question and he is sent to a Trappist monastery for a time before being left in charge 
of a smaller parish.  
Even if at the end of the film we are given the hint that Donissan may really 
be a saint, the ambiguity cultivated by Pialat leaves the viewer divided over his true 
spiritual merit. Given his reputation as a miracle worker, he is called to heal a boy 
from a neighbouring parish hit by meningitis. After he arrives too late, Donissan, 
moved by the anguish of the mother and at the urging of the parish priest, tries to 
resurrect the boy. Lifting the boy in his arms he calls upon God to show who is more 
powerful. The boy opens briefly his eyes, only to throw the priest into more 
repentance at the thought of having doubted God’s power. His foolishness was to be 
a zealous soldier of God even if believing that God has lost the battle in a world 
totally engulfed by evil. Troubled, he returns to his church, only to be found dead in 
the confessional by his superior, Menou-Segrais. His serene face is lit by a sunbeam, 
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indicating that he is at last at peace. Whether the mortifying of his body or working 
miracles are signs of sanctity is left unclear but his serene face suggests he has won 
the final battle with the evil, a battle carried out mainly through the torture of the 
body. While Mouchette demonstrates the body as an instrument of perdition, for 
Donissan it is one of redemption.61  
Pialat explores the idea of foolishness in a world where ‘people are looking 
only for the agreeable and the useful’ and where ‘there is nothing for the saint, who 
is derided as a madman’, as Menou-Segrais says. In spite of his unorthodox theology 
and troubled soul, Donissan is animated by an unquenched desire to serve God and 
his fellow humans, even if he doubts God’s omnipotence and believes, along 
Jansenist lines, that evil has overcome people to the extent that they are no longer 
accountable for their deeds.62 This suspension between two worlds is rendered 
visually by the alternation of light and darkness, suggestive of divine illumination 
and evil’s insidious presence, such as in the scene that follows the miracle.63 Here, 
overwhelmed by repentance, Donissan is walking in the light, falls on his knees and 
enters a spot of shadow before returning into the light again. Rather than appearing 
condemned for his dealings with the world of shadows Donissan is marked for an 
exceptional and unusual destiny. One sequence is revelatory for the way Pialat sets 
him apart. In a dolly shot we see him plodding along the road in the rain to the 
neighbouring parish of Etaples where his mentor has sent for him, while farm 
wagons pulled by horses pass him by. Then the camera cuts to the next shot in which 
he is seen walking towards and then following a narrow path off the road. The next 
sequence of shots show him trudging up and down the hills in total solitude – an 
image of the loneliness and singularity of his life journey in a world that follows the 
broad road.  
 
A Simple Heart (2008) 
If Thérèse and Donissant are confident that they can ‘trade’ their suffering for 
the salvation of their fellow beings, Marion Laine’s protagonist in her free adaptation 
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of Flaubert’s homonymous short story is found at the opposite pole. A devoted maid 
in the house of the widow Madame Aubain, the rather simple-minded Félicité is a 
picture of love and humbleness, unaware of her professional and human qualities. 
Her relation with God is rather instinctual, and never rationalized. She lacks any 
education that would allow her to formulate clear ideas about God and her utter 
humility deters her from presuming that she has any merits at all. ‘Poor’ Félicité, as 
her mistress calls her with reference to her feeble mind, is not even aware whether 
she was ever baptized. For this reason she cannot participate in the sacramental life 
of the church in a formal way but she emphatically transposes herself in the place of 
her mistress’ daughter when she receives her first communion. Her faith, like all her 
actions, is not filtered by the mind but springs directly form the heart, in a way that 
comes very close to Pascal’s description of faith in his pensée 277: ‘The heart has 
reasons of which the reason knows nothing. It is the heart which perceives God and 
not the reason. That’s what faith is: God perceived by the heart, not by reason.’64   
Madame Aubain offers a counterpoint to Félicité. A wealthy and educated 
lady, she is calculated and restrained in her affections towards her two children, 
Clémence and Paul. While Aubain is a cerebral woman, Félicité is quite the opposite, 
pouring her affection first on Clémence and, after the latter leaves home for a 
boarding school, on her nephew Victor. She does not hesitate to put her life in danger 
to protect her mistress and her children from an enraged bull, an event that leaves her 
lame, but fails to attract any gratitude or compassion. When she hears that Clémence 
is seriously ill at the boarding school she clings onto the back of a carriage only to 
get there whipped and frozen. While showing inner fortitude, on the outside Félicité 
is content with a state of indistinctiveness, most of the time wearing an old dress the 
colour of red soil. The exceptions are when she changes her usual outfit for black 
mourning clothes, following the deaths of Clémence and Victor, and later when she 
clothes herself in white. 
Her dressing in white coincides with her descent into folly, after she 
repeatedly suffers great losses: first, the people she cared for, followed by her parrot 
that reminded her of her nephew, her hearing, and finally her mistress. Two 
significant episodes draw the film to a close and propose that she is not only a long-
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suffering servant but a paradoxical figure of sanctity. One day when Madame Aubain 
returns home she finds an aged Félicité wearing a white dress and saying she will 
take part in the procession of the virgins for confirmation. Her employer reminds her 
she no longer has the age or the moral purity to join the procession. After the death 
of Madame Aubain, a final episode shows an agonising Félicité suffering from 
pneumonia in the attic of the house where she has spent most of her life. She is lying 
in bed, wearing a white dress and a wreath of withered flowers on her head. The 
procession of the virgins going for confirmation is passing under her window and the 
woman visiting her remarks that it was a funny idea for her to participate in the 
procession. Still, her folly reveals the actual truth: both her mind and body have been 
preserved unblemished, in spite of a short-lived relationship with a man in her youth. 
Her life has been dedicated entirely to serving and loving others while totally 
disregarding herself, which renders her most deserving of being one of the virgin 
brides of Christ.  
Departing from Flaubert’s text which is more ambiguous, Marion Laine 
projects her as a so called ‘idiot’ who proves to be a visionary in providing a lesson 
in humanity.65 While the Flaubertian ‘perroquet gigantesque’ appears as the last 
image of the film and is presumably the first image Félicité sees in the moment of 
her death, it is no longer a sign of her incapacity to picture the new world. Referring 
back to an episode in which the priest tells the story of St Francis of Assissi and his 
birds taking prayers to heaven, the parrot is transformed into a psychopomp 
apparition, coming to take her ascending soul. 
 
The suffering fool and French culture 
In the majority of the films investigated in this chapter the visual level 
complements the narrative level in order to accentuate the foolish figure’s physical 
suffering. I would like to suggest that French cinema, particularly in films where 
religious themes have been depicted, has been, like other fields of culture, influenced 
by a historical discourse about sacrifice. Sometimes this has supported and at others 
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opposed the virtues of a sacrificial vision promoted in religious literature, but this is 
a debate which has preoccupied French culture at large, cinema being no exception.  
At the core of this discourse have been key elements of Roman Catholic 
theology. Sacrifice, whether of Christ or his followers, has been the cornerstone of 
the Christian proclamation from the very beginning but it acquired a specific 
importance in French modern history, arguably unparalleled in other European 
Catholic countries. Ivan Strenski points out that in France sacrifice has been 
understood by both theologians and religious folk as an ideal opposed to the prudent 
and calculated ‘giving’ of the bourgeois morality as ‘a total annihilating surrender of 
the self, a complete “giving up” of oneself’ serving to achieve expiation for sin.66  He 
identifies four historical phases, each putting forward its own reinterpretation of the 
sacrificial ideal.  The ‘baroque’ phase was a period of reaction to the disruptive 
effects of the Reformation in the early seventeenth century. It was provoked by the 
Protestant denial of Eucharist as sacrifice to which L'école française de spiritualité 
led by Pierre Berulle (1575-1629) offered a robust criticism, reaffirming sacrifice as 
a total annihilation of a victim and an expiation for sin. In the ‘rococo’ phase that 
followed the sacrificial spirituality was exemplified by the Jesuit devotion to the 
Sacred Heart. The ‘restoration’ spirituality after the French Revolution was 
dominated by the radical thought of Joseph de Maistre (1755-1821), especially in the 
politicised character of his meditations on sacrifice and nation. The 
intransigent/integrist period from the first third of the nineteenth century to the early 
twentieth century, Strenski argues, was characterized by a dogmatism reaffirming the 
teachings of the Council of Trent, with the political right adopting de Maistre’s ideas 
in their fight against liberalism.67 
Joseph de Maistre’s depiction of suffering has proved immensely influential 
in French culture. He reinterpreted the traditional doctrine of redemptive suffering 
for the French historical context. To start with the Christian has the obligation to 
sacrifice himself or herself, even physically if necessary, thus participating in 
Christ’s suffering on the cross. Derived form this was the doctrine of vicarious 
suffering. Its origin was in St Paul’s Epistle to the Colossians (1:24): ‘…now I 
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rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I complete what is lacking in 
Christ's afflictions for the sake of his body, that is, the church’. Therefore, by 
suffering, the Christian not only participates in but also completes Christ’s suffering 
on the cross.68 In de Maistre the doctrine is a direct answer to the contemporary 
historical turmoil the nation was going through. The executions of anointed 
monarchs, aristocrats, clerics and other royalist supporters that followed the French 
Revolution became in de Maistre’s language ‘martyrdoms’ which renewed Christ’s 
sacrifice on the cross and had the potential to save the entire French nation.69 This 
politicisation of an originally religious idea opened the door for future 
reinterpretations, not necessarily religious, in which the individual could be 
sacrificed for the benefit of the collectivity. One might add that the recurrent images 
of blood that appear in modern French literature and cinema, can be associated with 
the influence of  de Maistre’s idea of ‘salvation through blood’ in which personal 
sacrifice, including the shedding of blood, combines with sacramental presence of 
Christ’s body and blood in the eucharist.70  
This discourse on sacrifice has influenced generations of Catholic as well as 
non-Catholic French writers in different forms and to different extent. One such 
writer is Bernanos on whose works three of the films that analysed in this chapter are 
based: Diary of a Country Priest, Mouchette and Under the Sun of Satan. The need 
for suffering to achieve redemption in an uncaring world is emphasized. In Bresson’s 
Diary of a Country Priest the idea of vicarious suffering is subtly implied in the 
protagonist’s stoic acceptance of his illness and of his parishioners’ cruelty. In Under 
the Sun of Satan it is forcefully revealed through Donissan’s bodily mortifications. 
Mouchette, rather than being the innocent victim that atones for the sins of her 
community, finds personal liberation in suffering, as does Joan of Arc.71 Cavalier in 
his Thérèse, though not a believer himself, cannot avoid picturing the way suffering 
becomes meaningful in the experience of the saint he portrays. Marion Laine, by 
freely adapting Flaubert, accentuates what he plays down – the physical pains that 
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Félicité accepts without complaint.  In the films analysed here the idea of suffering 
emerges as the key attribute that helps to combine the sense of the divine and the 
problem of foolishness: a context which in Bresson became overridden by a 
pessimistic view of the human condition. It is therefore justifiable to affirm that, in 
terms of emphases, the notion that underpins holy foolishness in French cinema is 
that of suffering. 
The critical power of this representation of the holy fool is striking. In most 
of the cinematic accounts the holy fool appears as a sufferer sacrificed on the altar of 
his love for the Other or for others; love here being taken not only in the sense of 
affection but also of the will to act in the interest of one’s neighbour. His/her 
function as a critic is manifest principally in the religious sphere and it is from this 
perspective that the world appears deficient and lacking moral virtue. In the same 
way that the coming of light into the world condemns a society where darkness is 
preferred (Jn. 3:19), the suffering of the holy fool is an indirect criticism of a society 
which has lost faith and a mode of being predicated on Christian self-sacrifice. This 
is manifested in two directions: first suffering highlights and critiques the hostility, 
insensitivity and lack of understanding in relation to the person of faith; for this 
reason the perpetrator – an individual or a community - is condemned. Secondly, 
suffering is assumed, if not invited, as an offering by the person of faith for the 
salvation of those who have lost themselves spiritually or otherwise. It is in the latter 
form that Christ is taken as a model of forbearance and suffering for the salvation of 
humankind.  
These critical elements have been well illustrated in the French films under 
review. In Bresson’s Diary of a Country Priest the hostility that meets the curé of 
Ambricourt stems from the loss of sacrificial love towards each other. The 
parishioners are cold and hostile to the curé’s simplicity, as pointed out by the 
count’s uncle: ‘People don’t hate your simplicity – they shield themselves from it. 
It’s like a flame that burns them’. Likewise, the countess in the film is enclosed in 
her pain for the loss of a child and fails to provide the wifely and motherly love 
while the other members of the family falter in their love towards her. The very 
presence of the priest as innocent victim reveals the evils of this community which 
has lost the sense of communion and whose members are turned against each other. 
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As the priest points out in the conversation with Olivier, the parishioners’ world is 
different from his because ‘it lacks love’. Moreover, the curé’s world differs from the 
sacrificial ethos of the legionnaires because it stands for ‘a justice without honour’, 
of the kind disclosed in Isaiah’s ‘suffering servant’. From this justice any tendency 
towards forced domination of the other, spiritual or otherwise, is excised. Bresson 
upholds here a worldview based on the supremacy of those spiritual values that claim 
the sacrifice of the ego and are unlikely to bring social recognition, quite the reverse 
of what the world deems as admirable. 
 In Joan of Arc Bresson used the character to demonstrate the way in which 
the simple fool exposes truth in a corrupt world. The contemporary applicability of 
the character is indicated by Bresson description of her as a ‘modern young girl’.72 
Joan stands for any innocent victim martyred for their truth, a truth that is rather a 
question of individual conscience and choice. Joan enters in conflict with the very 
institution that regulates truth – the Church, and the institution for which truth can be 
politically inconvenient – the state. Both institutions connive to bring the offender to 
a sham trial, with the outcome decided in advance. As some of the churchmen called 
to judge her object while leaving the court: ‘None of us here is free to say his 
opinion. We cannot judge under constraint’. This tension between the individual and 
the institution appointed to keep the established order is repeated by Bresson, and 
Joan’s suffering critiques the complicity of the world in evil. Joan herself spells out 
Cauchon’s real motif for persecuting her: ‘God chose a simple girl as an 
intermediary’: such a character was an offence and scandal for the learned and 
powerful.  
With The Devil, Probably Bresson helped to create a new critical function for 
the holy fool, abstracted from its religious context. By creating a picture of a world 
corrupted by mercantilism where God is dead, Bresson allows his foolish protagonist 
to express his pessimism about human society. In such a world where the alternatives 
are nihilism or religion as a mere cultural relic, both are found wanting by Charles. 
This spiritual death of the world is accompanied by an ecological crisis which spells 
out a physical extinction. For such a world to continue, Bresson, through his 
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representation of the folly of Charles, can envisage either a spiritual solution or none. 
This use of a suffering holy fool to reveal the corruption and uncaring nature of the 
modern world was continued by other directors. Pialat’s Under the Sun of Satan 
depicts a world seen by Donnisan as enchained by sin and beyond salvation were it 
not for the redeeming intervention of those who take on suffering but are seen by the 
world as fools. Similarly, in Laine’s A Simple Heart Felicité is the perfect vehicle for 
critiquing a society incapable of understanding pure goodness and which takes 
advantage of the vulnerability of the meek and self-sacrificing.  
As Tarkovsky achieved with the Russian holy fool, so Bresson managed to 
update his representation of the Catholic holy idiot so that it unveiled and critiqued 
those problems the director saw inherent in modern society. Both directors came to 
use the fool rather less as an opponent of the power structures of the day, and more to 
oppose what they saw as the overriding problem of indifference and spiritual apathy 
in the modern world. Nonetheless, as the above analysis has demonstrated, the 
suffering associated with holy foolishness in the French cinematic tradition has 
incurred a degree of pessimism and ambiguity over the modern fool’s salvific power. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the holy fool in French cinema rarely escapes a 
religious context, a reflection of the legacy of the ideas of Pascal that the holy fool is 
a person of absolute dedication and faith. Such qualities are necessary to enable the 
fools to endure the suffering that makes possible their function as critics of society: 
suffering gladly in order that they can expose injustice and inhumanity in an 









Whereas holy foolishness in the Orthodox and Catholic cultural spaces has 
developed as a result of clear hagiographical models from which artists can draw, 
this is much less the case in the Protestant Christian world. How, therefore has this 
affected the representation of the holy fool and its critical function in European 
nations where Protestant traditions are dominant? I have chosen to explore this 
aspect in European film by investigating Danish cinema, which enjoys one of the 
richest and more cohesive national cinematic traditions in Northern Europe, thereby 
forming a useful counterpoint to the previous studies of Russian and French cinema. 
In this chapter I will focus on the representation of holy foolishness in Danish 
cinema, first by providing the context for understanding holy fools and their 
representation within Danish culture.1 In order to do this I step outside the world of 
film, to consider three related theological approaches, commonly referenced within 
accounts of Danish religion. To understand holy foolishness in Danish film it is 
useful to reflect briefly on the work of Luther, the Pietist Movement and 
Kierkegaard, and in particular how they wrestle with the limitations of human 
reason. What is perceived as impossible by these authors is also represented as 
beyond the bounds of possibility by several Danish film-makers. We shall see how in 
several films it is only through holy foolishness that the impossible is made possible.  
I will then move to examine the cinematic context, in which special attention will be 
given to the directors Carl Theodor Dreyer and Lars von Trier, whose work is 
particularly marked by indirect representations of holy foolishness. The religious 
context for holy foolishness is often brought to the fore in Danish cinema, but 
recently the idea of folly has received a broader and more modern treatment through 
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the Dogme 95 movement, a development that I will explore in the following chapter. 
With this exploration undertaken, I will demonstrate that in the Protestant and 
Scandinavian context of Danish cinema, holy foolishness acquires two critical 
functions: first, it is used as a means to deconstruct the established order and, second, 
it is a way of signaling the presence of another kingdom to come, rooted in a 
radically different order that may appear at first sight to be impossible to realise.  
 
 
Holy foolishness in Danish Christianity 
The theme of foolishness emerges in Danish cinema in a somewhat oblique 
manner. One of the key motors for understanding holy foolishness in Danish 
religious culture has been the central and ongoing debate in Danish philosophical life 
over the position of reason in connection with faith. I will work towards an 
understanding of the category of the ‘impossible’ which, as I will show, becomes a 
recurrent motif in the films I have selected for investigation. I will reveal how the 
‘impossible’ participates in the semantic field of the ‘foolish’, shaping the treatment 
of the figure in cinema. In the last part of this section I will look at the significance 
of a key fictional figure in Protestant culture – Gerhard Hauptmann’s Emanuel Quint 
- who, to the best of my knowledge, represents the only significant literary 
elaboration of a fictional character along the lines of holy foolishness in a Lutheran 
pietistic mould.  
Unlike the situation in Russian culture, Danish culture has not fashioned a 
model of the holy fool rooted in a hagiographical tradition. The transition of the 
country from Roman-Catholicism to Lutheranism, formally initiated by the Danish 
Crown in 1536, was however the beginning of an ongoing questioning of the powers 
of reason from the position of faith, whose manifestations can be found in the 
established Orthodoxy of the 16th and 17th centuries and in the subsequent pietistic 
revivals. If the theology of Luther was striving to strike a balance between faith, 
reason and works, the antagonistic tendencies that followed can be read as reactions 
against slippages in one direction or another. In a schematic historical picture, these 
tendencies, while coexisting, alternately gained the upper hand in Danish theological 
life. While, for much of the 17th century, the Lutheran church was dominated by a 
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scholastic orthodoxy that emphasized the primacy of faith, or right doctrine, in which 
belief was often diminished to assenting the doctrinal content of the Formula of 
Concord drafted in 1580, the later 17th and early 18th centuries saw the advent of 
various pietistic movements, which placed a much greater emphasis on devotional 
practices.2 These brought to the foreground the importance of faith manifested as 
good works, both in the state-sponsored form – such as the Halle pietism - as well as 
in the more radical grass-roots pietistic vision of the Herrnhutism (Moravian 
pietism). Lutheranism became infused with the pietistic ethos of repentance and 
conversion by the introduction in the Danish Church, at the intervention of King 
Christian VI, of Truth for Piety (1738): a catechism authored by Halle pietist Erick 
Pontoppidan.3 The happy marriage of the two tendencies did not last for long: in 
1794 the use of the aforementioned textbook was dropped. By the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, however, heavily influenced by the Enlightenment, the established 
Church promoted a form of religion reduced to ethics: a movement that was fiercely 
resisted by early-and-mid 19th-century pietistic awakenings.4   
What was the status of reason and folly in these different theological 
accounts? It is well known that Luther had opposing views about the powers of 
reason as applied within the temporal sphere and in relation to God.5 He treated the 
latter case with diffidence. Upholding an account of human nature perverted by sin, 
Luther distinguished between ‘right reason’ or ‘reason of faith’, a mode of thought 
informed by the word of the Gospel, and ‘natural’ or ‘human reason’, the latter 
designating ‘the intellect as an expression of the flesh and a passionate (offended) 
enemy of the Gospel’6. For Luther the message of the Gospel is contradictory to 
human reason, which, finding it ‘absurd’, ‘foolish’, ‘impossible’ and a ‘paradox’, is 
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thereby ‘offended’.7 For Luther, the biblical figure who best exemplified the tension 
between faith and reason in an exemplary way is Abraham. He believed through faith 
that Sarah’s barren body would conceive, which to reason appears as ‘absurd, 
foolish, improbable, yea, impossible’.8 This conception of faith led him to the same 
conclusion that St Paul adopted in his First Epistle to the Corinthians about the 
Christian as a foolish person. 9 
Ultimately faith remained a matter of the ‘heart’.10 It was to be reiterated in 
different forms in the following centuries, animating the pietistic movements that 
acquired, besides the turn towards subjectivism (with an emphasis on individual 
conversion) and anti-institutionalism, a strong element of anti-intellectualism, which 
opposed faith to mere intellectual assent. In this respect Lutheranism was 
recuperating a medieval strand of Catholic mysticism which was deemed to have 
been exemplarily embodied in the life and writings of the German theologian 
Johannes Tauler (c1300-1361). Luther was not alone in finding a spiritual master in 
Tauler, for he also had great influence on the pietists.11 Significantly, from 1498 
onward Tauler’s sermons included a later interpolation entitled ‘The Friend of God 
from the Oberland’. The episode, supposed to have happened around 1345, narrates 
the encounter of the spiritual ‘master’ with the ‘friend of God’, a layman who claims 
to have been taught directly by God and who challenges Tauler to renounce his 
proud reason acquired through scholasticism.12 This unlearned but divinely 
illuminated character is in all probability a construct but he marks in symbolic way, 
as de Certeau argues, ‘the baseline of modern spirituality’.13 This refutation of 
scholasticism, which also involved a refutation of the role of reason in the sphere of 
faith, came to be one of the pinnacles of Danish pietism. 
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 The Herrnhutism, which was to be the most enduring form of Danish 
pietism, was based on the teachings of the German count Nicholaus Ludwig von 
Zinzendorf, who, continuing the theological tradition mentioned, placed religious 
experience outside the scope of intellectual inquiry.14 Allowed officially in 1739 to 
form societies for spiritual development, the movement was also to offer the seedbed 
for neo-pietistic awakenings in the 19th century, especially in the region of Jutland, 
where the family of one of the fiercest enemies of rationalism, Søren Kierkegaard, 
had their roots. His father, Michael Pedersen, maintained his rustic lay religiosity 
learned in Jultland even after he had moved to Copenhagen as a result of his 
affiliation with the Herrnhut Congregation of Brothers. This saw itself as the main 
stronghold against the rational Enlightenment values prevailing in the official State 
Church; at the same time the family would attend services presided over by the anti-
rationalist preacher J.P. Mynster at the official state Church of Our Lady in 
Copenhagen.15 Kierkegaard built on the legacy of both Luther and the Pietists with 
their distrust of human reason.  
Kierkegaard challenges reason in two possible understandings: as a human 
faculty and as the assumption that it is embodied in the established order.16 In terms 
of the former, he raises two kinds of objections. The first, philosophical in nature, 
concerns the finiteness of human reason, which renders it incapable of grasping the 
paradoxes of faith. The second, theological, objection rehearses the argument put 
forward by Luther in connection to the sinfulness and corruption of human nature 
and by extension human reason. When included in historicity this understanding of 
reason as finite and sinful enables him to carry out a form of critique of ideology.17 
Reason would represent in this case ‘ideology’, a product of historical circumstance, 
which ultimately renders ‘the concept of Christ as madman and the concept of the 
established order integrally related’18.   
When reason comes under attack the ‘impossible’ offers the ammunition 
since it causes reason to acknowledge its limitations. In turn, the ‘impossible’ is very 
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intimately connected to the idea of the absurd.19 The relation between the two is 
illuminated in connection with Abraham, whom both Luther and Kierkegaard take to 
exemplify the tension between faith and reason in an exemplary way. Johannes de 
Silentio, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym in Fear and Trembling, presents Abraham as 
greater than every other man because he expected the impossible: that the sacrificed 
Isaac would be returned to him. This kind of faith can only be held ‘in virtue of the 
absurd, by virtue of the fact that for God everything is possible’, even the 
impossible.20 As Alastair Hannay remarks, ‘in virtue of the absurd’ means not 
‘logically impossible’ but ‘humanly impossible’ or ‘in any intelligible way 
impossible’.21 In this case, for Kierkegaard the impossible is ‘that which exceeds 
speculative and objective comprehension and circumscription’22. It is on the basis of 
this impossibility that human reason judges something to be absurd and is ‘offended’ 
by the prospect of such absurdity. At the same time ‘the impossible’ and ‘the absurd’ 
are engendered by the play of perspectives. From the inner perspective of faith there 
is no contradiction that can give rise to the impossible and therefore to the absurd; 
the absurd can only be perceived from an outer perspective, from the position of the 
non-believer.23   
The discourse about the impossible is in fact an oblique discourse about 
foolishness. The ‘logic’ of Kierkegaard illuminates this assertion. Affirming 
something that is impossible is absurd and whoever does it is liable to be considered 
a mad person. For Kierkegaard it is God who is the impossible, and it is the coming 
of infinity into the world through the person of Christ the ‘Paradox’ that baffles the 
human mind.24 This paradoxical faith that God can and will act in the finite reality 
renders Christianity itself a kind of madness, something which Kierkegaard affirms 
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repeatedly.25 The subjective relation to the truth is madness and the one who enters 
into an existential relation with it is perceived as mad. The climax of this relation is 
called ‘passion’, the Danish word for ‘passion’ revealing an intimacy between 
religious enthusiasm and suffering. Thus ‘passion’ in Danish (Lidenskab) shares a 
root with the verb ‘to suffer’.26 Kierkegaard reaffirms here for the modern world the 
inescapable experience of suffering that is implied in the subject’s relation to truth.  
Again, passion-suffering is madness when seen in itself, overlooking the aim: ‘The 
essential existential pathos in relation to an eternal happiness is acquired at so great a 
cost that it must from the finite point of view be regarded as simple madness to 
purchase it.’27  
So far, in search of a definition of holy foolishness in the Danish context, I 
have pulled together various strands in Lutheranism, including pietism, along two 
coordinates, both meant to discern the limits to reason. First we see the ideal of a 
divine science born in the human heart, conceptualized in the medieval figure of 
Tauler’s illuminated idiot, and second we see faith as the faculty that believes all 
things, even the impossible. To the best of my knowledge before the 20th century 
Lutheranism did not enjoy a clear-cut hagiographical model nor a fictional character 
representing the characteristics of a holy fool beyond the ordinary pious Christian. In 
1910, however, the German writer Gerhart Hauptmann published his first novel, 
entitled The Fool in Christ, Emanuel Quint. The chronicler narrates Quint’s activity 
as a ‘Fool’, the term with which he is constantly referred, beginning with his first 
appearance in public as a preacher announcing the imminence of the kingdom of 
heaven and denouncing the social injustices of the rich and the rulers. Quint is then 
followed through his rise to fame within various millenarian groupings, as well as his 
subsequent fall from their favour and abject death as a solitary wanderer. The 
omniscient chronicler offers the reader access to more than Quint’s external 
manifestations, including the total neglect of his body, by opening insights into 
Quint’s inner life and mystical experiences. This psychological portrayal was shaped 
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by the author’s exposure to Moravian piety during childhood.28 It is from there that 
Hauptmann’s unrelenting introspection, and interest in unworldiness, enthusiasm, the 
practice of love and self-sacrifice, as well as his anti-clericalism, originate. As Quint 
progressed towards a consciousness of his identification and ultimately identity with 
Christ as the son of man, he dispenses with the use of the Gospel, which provided 
him the sole guidance in his spiritual feats initially. Recognising no authority outside 
his personal experience, this ‘seeker of God’ ends up being his own authority, 
outside the confines of any Christian denomination. 
Could Hauptmann’s holy fool represent a Lutheran representation in the same 
way Dostoevsky’s idiot does in the Russian context? To start with, both are creations 
of a particular era. It has been noted that the difference between Prince Myshkin and 
Emanuel Quint springs from the fact that the latter was conceived in an age in which 
religious certainties had collapsed, which better allowed for his identification with 
Christ.29 Along the same lines it has been suggested that, under the influence of F. A. 
Dulk’s Irrgang des Lebens Jesu (1884), which presented Jesus in strictly human 
terms, Hauptmann disguised under the mask of a holy fool his potentially offensive 
portrayal of Christ as man, a claim supported by his strict following of the biblical 
narrative, translated from Palestine to modern Silesia.30 More likely though is that the 
author intended to post through his hero a ‘mighty challenge to the indifferent world 
of the twentieth century’, confirmed by the episode at the end of the novel, where the 
narrator ponders what fate would face the people the fool encountered if he were 
indeed Christ himself.31 In this case Quint functions similarly to Myshkin as 
unraveling the moral state of society in his time. Perhaps even more so than The Idiot 
Hauptmannn’s novel offers a sociological glimpse into the religious situation, pitting 
established Lutheranism on the one hand against dissenting pietist groups on the 
other.  
A number of aspects arising from this treatment of the fool in Lutheran culture 
are pertinent for discussion of the Danish cinematic holy fool. First, it is important to 
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note the tradition in Lutheranism that regards complete trust in human reason as 
suspicious, harking back to Luther but also older medieval authorities such as Tauler, 
the scholar shamed by the illuminated idiot. The possibility of the impossible 
challenges human reason, turning on its head what was regarded as foolishness. 
Secondly, it is worth observing the high status of Kierkegaard in Danish culture, 
whose critique of reason went hand in hand with the critique of society. For the 
philosopher reason reinforced the established order, participating in its self-
deification through justifying its authority and status.32 This insight is useful for 
understanding how socially sanctioned ideas of righteous belief and behaviour are 
offended by the holy fool. In this respect holy foolishness, being intimately 
connected to weakness, functions by unmasking the structures of power, be they 
religious or secular. The roots of these concepts can be seen in the way holy 
foolishness is represented in Danish cinema from the early cinematic era to the 
present day.  
 
Carl Theodor Dreyer’s Holy Fools 
A preoccupation with religious themes was a common feature in early Danish 
cinema, and reached a climax with the career of the Copenhagen born director Carl 
Theodor Dreyer (1889-1968). The theme of holy foolishness is a recurring issue in 
his films, and they are created at the point where the various preoccupations in 
Dreyer’s mind intersect. Throughout his work, the theme that incessantly surfaces in 
various forms, and in different genres, is the clash of the individual with the 
deliberate or voluntary cruelty engendered by his/her fellow humans.33 It is related to 
a question that Dreyer was intensely preoccupied with: how man is led to 
intolerance.34 His first feature film, Leaves from Satan's Book (1919), announces this 
theme: the four independent episodes of the film are linked by the motive of betrayal, 
taking as prototype the biblical relation between Jesus and Judas. Tellingly, the 
following instances are set during the Spanish inquisition, the French Reign of Terror 
(1793-4), and the Russo-Finnish war (1918), which each bring misfortune upon 
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innocent people through the alliance of their trusted friends within a power structure, 
be it religious or political. The theme of power then features in most of his 
subsequent dramas: Love One Another (1922), The Passion of Joan of Arc (1928), 
Day of Wrath (1943), The Word (1955), Gertrud (1965), as well as in his comedies: 
Parson's Widow (1920), Master of the House (1925).  
One theme directly related to intolerance and persecution is suffering which, 
when set in a religious context, can attain the intensity and drama of martyrdom, as 
in The Passion of Joan of Arc. The person that suffers is always an innocent, 
engaged in a moral fight which ‘seeks first of all to eliminate the innocence, to 
engage it in the evil and make it admit to be evil’.35 As with Tarkovsky and Bresson, 
the innocents are invariably weak, incapable or unwilling to provide any resistance 
by using force. In spite of this they are victors in another order of things. Their 
weakness leaves room for the manifestation of a kind of power which is mysteriously 
derived from another realm than the physical. Through them we can discern a force 
that is stronger than evil and its embodiments makes its presence known.  
In this way, the suffering of the innocent becomes a means of deconstructing 
the powers of this world. Speaking about his Day of Wrath, Dreyer clearly states his 
intentions: ‘I want to criticise the whole social structure of its time, of which the 
Church is just a part. (…) It is the cruelty and stupidity of the whole society which I 
want to show.’36 This statement is as valid for all his films, but criticism of the 
Church is only present in those films where action is set in a religious context. In 
order for his criticism to be effective he needs to launch his critique from a position 
of authority and impartiality. The character that is placed outside of and in opposition 
to the system, and derives his/her authority from his/her own spiritual power is the 
holy fool and hence Joan in Joan of Arc and Johannes in The Word are cast in this 
mould.  
The theme of holy foolishness is naturally grafted onto Dreyer’s Lutheran 
background. Both Joan of Arc and The Word deal with ‘the irreconcilability born out 
of profound differences between the official religiosity, represented by Church as an 
agglutinating structure and the spontaneous religiosity, manifested without any 
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external mediation’, which is the hallmark of Protestant spirituality.37 This 
corresponds both to an anticlericalism - not only inferred from Dreyer’s works but 
also documented - and a search for a spiritual reality through his cinematic 
discourse.38  Kierkegaardian undertones are pronounced in both these aspects. The 
method that Dreyer deems ideal for the latter tendency is the ‘abstraction’. He 
defines it as ‘something that demands of the artist to abstract himself from reality in 
order to strengthen the spiritual content of his work.’39 Dreyer’s characters who bear 
the marks of holy foolishness all achieve this quality of abstraction from life since 
they seem to inhabit two worlds at the same time. By the will of the director, further 
replicated by the will of his holy fools, a new reality comes into being, as Dreyer 
explains: ‘Abstraction will give him [the director] a chance of…replacing objective 
reality with his own subjective interpretation.’40 The universe that is obtained has an 
‘intentional reality’ in the sense that it is directed towards something different from 
itself; it is meant to reveal imperceptible presences beyond the limits of this world.41  
The Passion of Joan of Arc (1928) 
It is striking that Dreyer needs to look abroad for a model holy fool, and as 
did Bresson, he found this in the hagiographical figure of Joan of Arc. Surprisingly 
for a silent film, The Passion of Joan of Arc manages to make reference to the theme 
of holy foolishness twice in its intertitles. First time round these bring into discussion 
the classical locus from St Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, which contrasts the 
wisdom of God with the foolishness of man. Reprimanded by her judges for her 
religious convictions: ‘Don’t you feel that these learned doctors are wiser than you? 
Joan replies: ‘Yes…But God is even wiser.’ In a second instance they suggest that 
her obstinate attitude verges on madness: ‘The arrogance of this woman is insane’, 
without giving her the benefit of real madness, which would have saved her from the 
stake. While they strive to convince her that what she claims is impossible, she 
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knows that ‘His [God’s] ways are not our ways’. Throughout the trial Joan becomes 
the living proof of docta ignorantia (learned ignorance) and of a God who reveals 
Himself in the purity of one’s heart. And indeed, Joan manages to counter the sly 
traps that her judges devise for her by offering simplistic answers. If under Bresson’s 
direction Joan is characterized by a simplicity of manner, in Dreyer’s rendition she 
comes across as rather simple-minded.42 While in Bresson’s film the alert rhythm of 
questions and answers is suggested by quick successions of shots and reverse shots 
framing Joan from a distance, Dreyer makes the camera linger on Joan’s suffering 
face in extreme close-ups, disclosing a confused, emotional, and frightened figure 
rather than a cunning woman thinking on her feet. 
In his preparations for the film, Dreyer made extensive use of the real records of 
the trial, which themselves bear out the threefold challenge that Joan, willingly or 
not, posed to her judges’ authority: she is a woman but dressed in man’s clothes; an 
illiterate who struggles to sign her name or remember her age, but who claims to 
have certain knowledge of God; and finally she is a lay person who claims to be the 
recipient and interpreter of divine messages. The film emphasizes the sexual politics 
of the trial on the one hand and the obstinacy with which Joan remains faithful to her 
own truth. At the intersection of the two stands Joan’s passion or her ‘martyrdom’ as 
Dreyer has her say in one of the few lines that are not in the records.43 While the 
historical figure was declared by the Catholic Church venerable (1903), beatified 
(1909) and canonized (1920) as a virgin, Dreyer is very keen to promote his 
protagonist as a martyr, that is a sufferer and a confessor of her own faith. This 
innovation widens the gap between her and the Church by revealing irreconcilable 
spiritual visions. 
Dreyer is interested in establishing a relation between Joan and truth which for 
her is the truth of the inner spiritual voice.44 This relation between truth and 
subjectivity is very close to the vision upheld by Kierkegaard. In contrast to her 
judges Joan is the subjective individual who ‘has a foundation for the self that cannot 
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be justified by appeal to the criteria embedded in the practices and discourses of he 
social establishment’.45  She can only swear to the truth of her visions and she finally 
decides to remain faithful to them, in spite of the threat by her judges to use torture 
and to refuse her the Holy Communion. Apparently turning her face away from 
‘mother Church’, she is left isolated and can only appear irrational from the outside. 
As with Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, she is incapable of communicating her 
experience since it has no grounding outside of her own interiority. However, it is 
exactly this inwardness that Dreyer wants to capture on the screen. The innumerable 
close-ups are meant to venture beyond the skin, serving as a Protestant device that 
focuses on the individual’s inner passion rather than on the institutional context.46 In 
Bazin’s terms, the face becomes a ‘privileged area of communication’.47 By contrast, 
whereas the director focuses on Joan’s inwardness, through the same technique of 
the close-ups he captures the grotesque physicality of her judges, depriving them not 
only of their names but also of any interiority beyond their grimaces. In spite of 
seeing themselves as the defenders and repository of truth, Dreyer suggests, no truth 
inhabits them besides their sheer evilness and craftiness.  
In setting Joan up as a fool in the eyes of the Church, Dreyer increases her 
critical power as an opponent of the established order. The opposition between Joan 
and her judges is also rendered by the opposition between the oral and the written 
word. Using the classic Pauline distinction between the spirit and the letter, the 
scholars are seen as the representatives of the former. In David Bordwell’s words: 
‘Illiterate, she [Joan] is closed off from the written contract. Hers is the expressive, 
personalized word, an inspired speech opposed to the ossification of the written 
record, transcending the systems of political and religious exchange.’48 Her judges 
are shown as interested in recording her answers and making her sign the recantation. 
Ultimately they are depicted as trying to kill her spirit as a way to protect the 
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established political and religious order. Even if apparently passive, by suffering all 
the evilness unleashed on her, Joan reveals all the monstrous coalition of the political 
and religious powers.  The opening scroll announces the politics of the film: it 
presents the ‘amazing drama’ of a ‘young pious woman confronted by a group of 
orthodox theologians and powerful judges’. Let us consider how Dreyer captures 
these relations in the scene that follows the defiant admission of one of the 
theologians that ‘For me she is a saint’ and his prostrating in front of her and his exit 
from the court. In contrast to previous scenes in which the camera represents the 
abstract viewer, in this one the shots suggests that the action is watched through the 
eyes of a character – one of the few judges favourable to Joan. The camera shows a 
medium close-up of his face, cuts to the English captain speaking to his subordinate, 
both dressed in contemporary army uniforms, then cuts to the judge who turns his 
head to watch behind. What he sees is suggested through a cut to the subordinate 
engaged in a verbal exchange with Cauchon. The judge’s attitude to their plotting is 
given through a cut to a close-up of his disapproving face. The sequence emphasises 
the alliance between the religious and political authorities against the innocent, each 
of the two pursuing, with the assistance of the other, its own purposes. If the British 
authorities are motivated by a political interest, the French theologians want to see 
her recant. 
The chasm between Joan and the men of the Church suggested by the 
camerawork is then replicated in terms of passion (as living experience and 
ultimately martyrdom) and logos. Dreyer, following in Kierkegaard’s footsteps, 
critiques a slippage from the Logos whereby the Logos is replaced by the logoi, God 
by the words about God. He asserts the passion, the subjective experience, as the test 
for truth. In a world in which alternative truth-statements make claim to truth, he 
anchors Joan’s claims in her own passion. By so doing, Dreyer brings the body into 
the foreground, in a confrontation of the body as pathos with the word as logos or as 
reason.49 It is worth underlying here that it is the female body that is subjected to 
suffering, an idea which will reemerge, literally or symbolically, in the work of other 
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Danish directors. As for Dreyer, he suggests clearly that the passions render Joan 
Christ-like, not in the sense of a need to purify her body but from a personal choice 
to share in His passions if this is the price to be paid for telling the truth.50 As Christ 
was mocked as a fool king, Joan is shown mocked by her wardens, in a faithful 
recreation of the famous icon Christ in the Crown of Thorns. 
Dreyer does not intend a period-drama reconstruction, otherwise he would 
not have dressed the English soldiers in contemporary army clothes. Neither does he 
fashion his heroine in a way in which to cater for the taste of those who admired Joan 
for patriotic reasons, nor does he allow the riot that Joan’s death causes to have the 
last word over her sacrifice.51 Dreyer concentrates on Joan’s plight as she enters in 
conflict with the patriarchal order represented by the theologians not because she 
could usurp their authority but because she transgresses the established order. In fact 
her beliefs are dogmatically orthodox. It is her spiritual experience and clothes that 
appear foolish and challenge the prescribed ways of divine communication and the 
dress code. Without upholding any particular religious agenda, Dreyer is primarily 
interested in the issue of subjectivity and how forces are pitted against it.  
Ordet/The Word (1955) 
Dreyer’s preoccupation with the tension between the individual of faith and the 
structures of power continued to be present in his work, as did his use of the holy 
fool as a vehicle for expressing this tension. In his Ordet (1955) the plotline revolves 
around the Borgen family, with the issue of faith at heart of the story, and the holy 
fool represented by the figure Johannes. Anders, the youngest son of an old farmer 
Morten Borgen, asks the hand of Anne, the daughter of Peter Petersen, and is refused 
because he belongs to a rival religious group. In addition to this blow to Morten’s 
pride, a second one appears, grieving the whole family: Inger, the wife of Morten’s 
second son Mikkel, dies in childbirth, in spite of the doctor’s assurance that she is no 
longer in danger. The tragedy reconciles the Borgens and the Petersens who come to 
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Inger’s wake to bring Anne as a replacement for Inger. In the presence of everybody, 
including the priest, Johannes, Morten’s third son, whom everybody believes to be 
mad, resurrects Inger after the intervention of little Maren, her daughter. 
Adapting for the screen Kaj Munk’s play, Dreyer draws an accurate picture 
of the different positions held in the Church of Denmark around Kierkegaard’s time. 
The minister represents the established Church, which, under the influence of the 
Enlightenment ideas, had embraced a rational approach in matters of faith. Old 
Borgen, with his optimistic faith had been conceived by Munk as a vehicle of the 
Grundtvigian ideas in opposition to the gloomy Calvinist faith of Peter the Tailor.52 
Historically, the latter was professed by the Inner Mission. While Dreyer retains the 
sympathy which Munk had displayed towards both, and particularly towards 
Grundtvigianism, he is more interested in the question of intolerance rather than 
proving any of the parties right.53 On the contrary, he showed them both falling short 
of a real understanding of faith. Outside these issues lie Inger, Johannes and little 
Maren. As opposed to the doctrinal positions already mentioned they represent the 
core of faith. They don’t possess the necessary distancing from faith that would 
allow them to engage rationally in theological arguments. Significantly, they stand 
for femininity, madness and childlikeness, the three ways to access the divine in 
Dreyer. Apart from these characters, at the other end of the spectrum is Borgen’s 
second son, Mikkel, who is an agnostic, and the doctor who treats Inger: a positivist 
who only believes in the ‘miracles’ performed by science.    
The dialogue between these characters reveals a preoccupation with the 
(im)possibility of miracles, faith, and the position of reason. In Borgen’s discussions 
with Inger, believing in miracles functions as a test for faith:  ‘But I prayed because I 
thought it was worth trying. If a father can’t pray with faith for his child… miracles 
do not happen’. Miracles attest the possibility of the impossible and believing in 
them is on a par with affirming the divine presence and intervention in this world. 
Borgen’s distrustful ‘Miracles no longer happen’ is countered by Inger’s ‘Nothing is 
impossible for God if we pray to Him’. Furthermore, with Borgen’s wondering, with 
the condition of his son in mind: ‘How can one tell madness from sense?’ we are 
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‘drawing nigh to God’, as Johannes puts it, but also to the central problem that the 
film poses by presenting Johannes as a riddle. The question of faith comes to be 
explored through Johannes’ madness. The attitudes the characters have towards him 
define their personal position in relation to faith. He is conceived as the mouthpiece 
of God, announcing His judgment of people’s hearts: ‘People believe in the dead 
Christ but not in the living one. They believe in the miracles two thousand years ago 
but they do not believe in me now.’  
The remarks that Johannes’s condition provokes reveal much about the nature 
of the religious commitment those around him have. Borgen is incapable of seeing 
that Johannes is the reformer, the renewal of faith they have prayed for, because he 
no longer believes that the prayers can be miraculously answered. In other words his 
faith has lost the passion of subjectivity. Instead, Borgen blames the predicament of 
his son on too much deep reading of Kierkegaard. He fails to see that the diagnosis 
the philosopher-theologian reached about faith in the Church is similar to Johannes’s 
own castigations. In his turn the pastor represents the rationalistic position that the 
official Lutheran church adopted with the Enlightenment:       
Doctor: You too believe in miracles, pastor? 
Pastor: Naturally miracles are possible since God is the Creator but even if 
God can perform miracles he doesn’t do so. They would break the laws of 
nature. God doesn’t break His own laws. 
Doctor: What about Christ’s miracles? 
Pastor: Those were special circumstances. 
At the same time, he is shown as having the mindset of a man of science, who needs 
proof before believing, forgetting that the creed he professes is unverifiable and if 
verifiable it can no longer be a matter of belief: 
Johannes: My name is Jesus of Nazareth. 
Pastor: How can you prove that? 
Dreyer shows that the pastor suffers from the same lack of spiritual receptivity as 
Borgen but his fault is even graver as a representative of the established Church. 
While Borgen tries to confine Johannes at home the pastor is the first to suggest that 
Johannes should be institutionalised. Dreyer depicts representatives of the 
establishment as ready to discredit or stifle any alternative religious discourse. In the 
resurrection episode it is the pastor that reiterates the label of insanity, just as an 
apparently mentally recovered Johannes is ready to perform a miracle: 
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Borgen: Has your reason returned?  
Johannes: Yes, my reason returned. 
Johannes: Inger, you must rot because times are rotten. 
Pastor: He is insane. 
Johannes: Is it insane to want to save lives? 
The pastor’s reaction is more vehement than any other character’s. Even 
Mikkel, who is an atheist, is ready to embrace the miracle without further 
questioning. He understands better than the pastor that a miracle is an event that 
cannot be explained because it belongs to another order of things. In this sense 
Dreyer’s position is similar to Kierkegaard’s regarding the limiting nature of 
rationalism. If it weren’t for his Joan of Arc one might say that he owes it to Munk, 
who drew heavily on Kierkegaard for the shaping of Johannes’s character: he is the 
embodiment of true religion; he is in opposition to the institutional church; he has 
performed the necessary ‘leap of faith’.54 But Dreyer’s long interest in such matters 
sustains the connection. The fact that Johannes’s state is traced to his Kierkegaardian 
readings has wider implications, even if this direction of investigation has remained 
unexplored. Kierkegaard’s sustained efforts to defamiliarise his readers with those 
Christian doctrines they took for granted is well known. Time and again he asserted 
the paradoxical nature of Christian truth: that is it only appears reasonable from a 
position of faith, whereas from the outside it can only be perceived as madness. For 
this reason Christianity and madness come to be coextensive, and radical sanctity 
takes the form of madness.  
Kierkegaard’s distinction between the aesthetic, moral and religious spheres 
can also be useful in discerning whey the centre of gravity in Dreyer’s film is found 
in holy foolishness. Given Dreyer’s marked sympathy and interest in the female 
characters, Inger is usually taken to be the character that most merits Dreyer’s 
approval, striking the right balance between the intolerant attitudes of old Borgen 
and Peter on the one hand, and Johannes’s religious mania on the other. In this 
interpretation she would be the representative of an enlightened type of Christianity, 
a Christianity in which the heart settles down the disputes of the mind. For Raymond 
Carney, for example, Johannes represents the ‘abstract and abstracted prophet of 
biblical truths’ by opposition to Inger’s ‘expressions of grace and love in the forms 
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of the world and within the relationships of an actual family’.55 Coming from another 
perspective, David Bordwell expresses a disparaging opinion of Johannes the holy 
fool, stating that as long as he is mad he is incapable of working any miracles.56  
I would like to suggest that, in a Kierkegaardian reading, it is not Inger who 
primarily stands for the religious sphere, but Johannes. Johannes inhabits this sphere 
up to the end: even when he admits to have recovered his reason he is still animated 
by the same uncompromising faith in the possibility of the impossible. 
Narratologically, there are two universes that coexist from the very beginning. On 
the one side there is the patriarchal saga with the old Borgen at the center trying to 
solve the problems that arrived to ravage his family and failing systematically. On 
the other there is the alternative universe of Johannes’s madness. Given his liminal 
position between two worlds the holy fool is ideally equipped to act as a mediator, a 
bridge between the two.57 It is through Johannes and his foolishness that the presence 
of the Kingdom impinges on this world and is manifested in Inger as the ‘chosen site 
of the revelation’.58 And, at the same time it is at the contact with Johannes that the 
kind of faith of those around is revealed. 
 
Holy Fools after Dreyer: Babette’s Feast (1987) 
Dreyer achieved in his depiction of holy foolishness a critical edge that owed 
much to the influence of Danish cultural debate about reason and the impact of 
Kierkegaard. The resulting depictions of holy fools relied strongly on Christian 
settings, emphasizing the linkage with St Paul’s dictum that faith in Christ is 
foolishness to the world. The religious context for representations of holy foolishness 
has continued in Danish cinema after Dreyer. In one of the more striking recent 
representations, the director Gabriel Axel has probed further the consequences of the 
Danish dichotomy between reason and folly. His Babette’s Feast is a faithful 
adaptation of Isak Dinesen’s eponymous novella, in which Axel allowed himself 
only a few moments of directorial license. The plot is relatively simple: the action is 
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set in a pietistic community during the second half of the 19th century. The 
inspirational figure of the spiritual leader, the Dean, and his two extraordinarily 
beautiful daughters – names Phillippa and Martine in remembrance of the religious 
reformers Phillip Melanchthon and Martin Luther - detach themselves from the 
unadorned, grey context. As the story progresses marital opportunities present 
themselves to the two girls in the persons of the young lieutenant Lorens 
Lowenhielm and the Parisian opera singer Achille Papin, the latter offering the 
promise of a successful musical career to Philippa. However, the girls reject their 
advances in order to remain dedicated to their father’s mission and Lowenhielm and 
Papin return to their worldly former lives in pursuit of social success and artistic 
glory. Fifteen years later, after having dedicated their lives entirely to their father and 
then to the community, the sisters receive in their household as a servant Babette, the 
‘Papist’ friend of Achille, a political exile from France, who has lost both her 
husband and son in street protests. The story makes a jump forward another twelve 
years later when Babette, having won the lottery, insists on preparing and funding 
herself the  dinner that is to commemorate the Dean. The dinner, a culinary feast, 
brings back the grace and forgiveness in the community, while Babette’s identity is 
finally revealed: she was once a famous Parisian chef.  
Axel departs from Dinesen’s narrative on just a few occasions, out of which 
two instances are particularly significant, regarding the location of the action and the 
character of Babette. The first such instance attracts the viewer’s attention from the 
very beginning. Originally, Isak Dinesen - the pen name of the Danish female writer 
Karen Blixen (1885-1962) – placed the action of her story in Norway. Gabriel Axel 
moves it to Jutland, the Danish hotbed of pietism and, incidentally, the ancestral 
hearth of Kierkegaard’s family. This is not only a more familiar environment for the 
Danish audience but was also a more natural choice for the Kierkegaardian 
interpretations or polemics that Dinesen’s prose invites us to consider.59 On the other 
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hand it facilitated the contrast between an extremely austere Protestant, disembodied 
spirituality, and a Catholic incarnated sacramentality.60  
Strikingly, the theme that frames the story is the ‘the possibility of the 
impossible”. It is a variation on that Kierkegaardian idea discussed above, but with 
polemic undertones. Incapable of expressing his most ardent desire, Lowenhielm 
explains his haste and definitive departure to Martina by saying in a resigned voice 
that ‘in this world there are things which are impossible!". Returning after many 
years to the sisters’ house to take part in the commemorative dinner and confront his 
past decisions from the position of his present situation, he is the one for whom the 
feast prompts the greatest revelation. Martine is returned in an unexpected way to 
him, "if not in the flesh, which means nothing, in spirit, which is all…. For tonight I 
have learned, dear sister, that in this world anything is possible." In the same way the 
deferred reality of the celestial kingdom is sacramentally granted to the members of 
the community that share Babette’s ‘eucharistic’ feast.61 Not even in the initial 
enthusiasm that animated them when the Dean was still alive were his followers 
experiencing a foretaste of the Kingdom. Evoked in hymns, ‘Jerusalem, my happy 
home/name ever dear to me’ was never hoped for in this world. But, with Babette’s 
feast, for the first time, ‘Mercy and truth have met together; righteousness and bliss 
have kissed one another,’ in an actualization of the messianic times. 
Babette has been typically seen as a ‘universal type for innocent suffering’62 
and a Christ-figure63 rather than a holy fool figure. This could be partially due to the 
restrained style that Axel professed for most of the film. However, the feast that 
Babette prepares is in stark contrast with the rest of all the other episodes. The 
emphasis is clearly not on the golden means of Lutheran virtues but on overflowing 
abundance of the feast and divine grace, an excess that baffles human expectations. 
This lack of moderation is advocated in rather the manner expressed by Kierkegaard 
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that ‘the corrective exaggeration will not lead to the virtue of moderation but rather 
the scandal of the absurd’.64  
While sharing in all the characteristics of the Christ figure, Babette is also 
fashioned as a holy fool.  Gabriel Axel adds a few touches to her portrayal which 
emphasize the radical character of her meekness and selfless sacrifice. In order to 
achieve this he omits the biographical details present in Dinesen regarding her past a 
communard and tones down the remarks pointing to her artistic ego. At the same 
time, as in Tarkovsky’s Andrei Rublev, the artist and the holy fool are conflated to 
bestow on human creation a liturgical dimension. The cry of the artist ‘Give me the 
chance to do my very best’ is answered with the chance of making once again 
possible the actualization of personal talent and its transformation into a free gift.  
 To illustrate this detachment from social norms, Babette is a destitute 
foreigner, a ‘Papist’, which renders her an outsider to the Lutheran community by 
ethnicity, faith and substance. Without being eccentric in a blatant way, she is, in her 
stylish dress and boots, still at odds with the plain dressing style advocated in the 
community. A great culinary artist, she effaces herself by hiding her gifts and 
choosing to live incognito and remain for good in the remote Danish village even 
after she is given the possibility to leave and start a new life. For years, it is her 
humble devotion that ensures that the food is cooked for the sick and the needy, and 
which frees Martine and Phillipa from the daily chores so that they can dedicate 
themselves to the community. And when the time comes she sacrifices all her 
substance, without expecting anything. The gesture seems even more extravagant as 
she is not in any way liable to the moral norms of the community.  
In exchange, she arouses suspicions of preparing a ‘black sabbath’, an 
ambivalence which is not far from the reputation a Byzantine holy fool would get by 
the scandal s/he creates.  In comparison with the kind of spirituality promoted by the 
Dean and his daughters, Babette’s is of a transgressive, excessive type in its 
manifestation and its challenge to the austere principles of the community. But this 
disruption of the established order, apparently produced by ‘irrational’ forces, is 
necessary in order to allow the irruption of the divine. The freely given love and 
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forgiveness disrupts the economy of scarcity that no longer ensured a connection to 
the transcendent.65 It is Babette’s self-sacrifice that offers a sharp criticism of the 
failings of the society around her. As Lorens explains, she has the skills to turn a 
dinner into a kind of ‘love affair that made no distinction between bodily appetite 
and spiritual appetite.’ As a true love it is self-giving and once again, as in Joan 
d’Arc, it is ‘ultimately the woman’s own body that is offered up, in displaced form, 
through her Eucharistic culinary corpus’, symbolized by the Cailles en 
sarcophages.66 The underlying feminist undertone that is present in Dinesen is also 
taken over by Axel. The different visions are structured on oppositions that do not 
only pit Catholic against Protestant, but also male against female. The figure of the 
Dean and of Babette are inspirational in different ways. In opposition to the Dean’s 
ultra-spiritualized version of Christianity, Babette proposes an embodied spirituality, 
in which the material is valorized as a way of accessing the transcendental.  
 
Breaking the Waves (1996) 
If Axel looked back in time to explore the relation between reason and folly, 
more recently the Danish director Lars von Trier has set the problem in a very 
modern context. Nonethless, like Dreyer and von Trier, his preoccupation with a 
religious context for his exploration of holy foolishness is marked.67  In von Trier’s 
Breaking the Waves the issues of religion and faith are the driving force behind the 
story. Bess is a devout young girl from a puritan Calvinist community in Scotland 
who gets married to an outsider, Jan, who works on an oilrig. Devastated by his long 
absence while on the oilrig, she prays that he returns home. The prayer is answered 
in a cruel way, for it is a terrible work accident that brings him to her, paralyzed from 
head down, which makes her feel responsible. With no hope of recovery he wants 
her to continue with her life and asks her to have relations with other men as a way to 
cure his sense of guilt. Hesitant, Bess does what she is told, attracting opprobrium 
and ostracism from her family and community. As Jan’s condition deteriorates she 
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risks and sacrifices her life by going to a ship notorious for the violence of the sailors 
towards women. jan miraculously recovers after her death, saves her body from a 
shameful burial and delivers it to the sea from the oilrig. The last shot of the film 
vindicates her self-sacrifice showing in a divine setting a pair of bells tolling for her 
in the sky.  
There is some controversy over von Trier’s intention here: one reservation 
over his genuine interest in religious questions stems from whether his use of 
religion is merely a dramatological tool which aids the narrative conventions of 
melodrama and sentimentality.68 A close inspection of von Trier’s manuscript for the 
film, however, shows that it underwent several revisions over time, and evolved 
significantly in terms of the narrative details and the characteriological depiction of 
Bess. At an initial stage the main female character, Caroline, lived a conventional life 
in a European capital, as mother to a child and married to a language professor. This 
initial figure was not particularly religious and manifested a rather perverted 
sexuality in her encounters with men after her husband becomes disabled. It is clear 
tht von Trier added religious elements in later stages for functional reasons, as a 
means to enhance the conflict and criticize social conventions.69   
Von Trier does not himself exclude the conscious manipulation of religious 
elements as part of a director’s work: ‘…if you want to create a melodrama, you 
have to furnish it with certain obstacles. And religion provided me with a suitable 
obstacle’.70 At the same time he makes it clear that, without being an introduction to 
religion, Breaking the Waves is an expression of his own religiosity.71 At the time 
von Trier liked to declare himself a Catholic.72 However, it would be a mistake to 
view von Trier as a traditional Catholic producing a directorial vision informed by 
his religious affiliation. His writings indicate that religion offered him a sense of both 
belonging and of defiance, the latter directed toward his bourgeois atheist family and 
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their convention-free lifestyle. The emphasis falls rather on defiance that it was to be 
a Catholic in modern Denmark. His religiosity functions in a Christian framework, 
but as he states, it is essentially ‘humanistic’, very much in the vein of Dreyer, in the 
sense that ‘Religion is accursed, but not God’.73 This transgressive religiosity is 
transparent in his works around that time. 
The character of Beth in Breaking the Waves is so intriguing that it has given 
rise to several controversies and conflicting interpretations. In what follows I will 
propose an interpretation of her as a holy fool, which fits her character better than the 
already contested interpretations as martyr and saint. I will situate myself on the side 
of the feminist critique that proposes her madness as a site of free expression and 
identity for female subjectivity and will show that rather than being an ideological 
victim of a male dominated society she is the victor. Drawing on a model of holy 
foolishness established in Danish cinema she exposes and critiques, from her twice 
disadvantaged position as a mentally unstable woman, the inherent violence that 
lurks in the established order – be it religious or secular.  
As Irena Makarushka points out, criticizing different perceptions of Bess, she 
is ‘neither a tragic nor saintly heroine.’ Looking at her through the feminist lens 
offered by Louise J. Kaplan, who argues that submission and purity are culturally 
encoded expectations that function as constraints on women, Makarushka extends 
Bess’s unique situation to the majority of women ‘caught between two patriarchal 
paradigms: the virgin and the whore’.74 I would like to suggest that Bess would be 
better and more effectively defined as a holy fool. It is in this capacity that we 
understand better the challenge she poses to the patriarchal order represented by the 
elders of the community and the social order.  From the marginalised position of 
someone who is female, mentally unstable and married to an outsider, she threatens 
to destabilize the system with her unconventional views. The elder’s static 
interpretation of the law – which stands here for the rational and the ethical – stands 
in stark contrast with Bess’s more dynamic, existential interpretation of it. In fact 
Bess develops a threefold attack on the established order: aesthetic, ethical and 
religious. Aesthetically, her secular and religious preferences go in opposite 
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directions: she likes the music of the outsiders Jan and his group of friends, and the 
chiming of the bells banned by the elders but which she hopes to bring back one day. 
Ethically she breaches the law of submission to the elders of the community, posing 
a threat to stability. She not only behaves like a sexual being in private but she is a 
sexual scandal in public. She also challenges directly the theological foundations of 
the Calvinist faith of the community, opposing their static veneration of the Word as 
the letter of the Bible with an existential dedication to the embodied Word and the 
immediate consequences this has for human relationships: ‘You cannot be in love 
with a word. You can love another human being. That’s perfection’, she says. The 
effrontery is double as Bess asserts herself not only as a voice in a community where 
women are not allowed to have one but also as someone who can make theological 
claims. Like Dreyer, von Trier draws on the Pauline subversion of human reason by 
divine folly. And like Dreyer’s Joan who is illiterate, Bess has a learning disability, 
which mocks the elders’ theological knowledge. 
Bess is also a challenge for secular rationality to the extent that her ‘madness’ 
cannot be contained and the categories used to define it fail. From the point of view 
of a society privileging reason, and all the reason-based virtues, Bess’s excessive 
sensibility should be repressed. On two occasions institutionalization is suggested as 
the best way to deal with her excessive feelings: first when her brother dies and later 
when she is trying to save Jan by prostituting herself. Von Trier shows that Bess’s 
strength springs from her heart rather than her mind, which shortcuts the rational 
categories of understanding. Dr Richardson – who can be sees as ‘a symbol for the 
kind of rational, white, middle-class masculinity’ – when asked during the court 
investigations over her death about his diagnosis says that Bess suffers from ‘being 
good’ but withdraws it later as a scientifically not tenable assessment.75  In a previous 
episode when he is trying to reason with Bess, pointing out that she carries out the 
desires of a husband mentally disturbed by his illness, he gets very irritated by her 
explanation that, to make up for her stupidity, she has a gift from God to believe.  
The biblical prototype for such a heroine is Mary Magdalene – whom Bess 
herself mentions in her defence, but she also resembles Sonia Marmeladova in 
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Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866), the latter being a literary model for the 
coexistence of sanctity and sinfulness, which seem to be an idea specifically Russian. 
This idea, however, can be itself traced back to the Byzantine holy fools’ antics, 
which play with the same discrepancy between essence and appearance. One 
sequence in particular suggests Bess’s striking affinities with these fools. In a red 
mini-skirt, her top torn and her hair disheveled, she is walking her bike up the hill to 
church, crying, while the village children are following. The shots change from 
medium long to medium as the children draw near and start throwing stones at her, 
calling her a ‘tart’. When she finally collapses in front of the church the priest 
appears, dismisses the children but abandons her, not daring to break the rules of the 
community that has ostracized her for her scandalous behaviour. The difference, 
itself transgressive, is that while with the hagiographic holy fools the scandal they 
produce is based on a misunderstanding of their acts, for women such as Sonia or 
Bess their physical involvement is real. In the first case the moral is that God’s 
judgments are inscrutable for humans76. In the latter case a suspension of the ethical 
is necessary. 
Viewing of Bess as holy fool adds a further layer of criticism of the status 
quo which is not invalidated by the arguments put forward by most feminist 
interpretations. Alyda Faber reads the film within a theoretical framework offered by 
Julia Kristeva and Katharine MacKinnon, in which patriarchy has no real 
transgressive ‘outside’ and therefore any act of abjection ultimately results in 
strengthening the male social dominance as rational power: ‘This common recreation 
of femininity as weakness …recreates male power over against feminine power as 
fascinating debility’. 77 What is at stake here is the idea of power, worldly power and 
how it could be distributed genderwise. The holy fool breaks open the mechanics of 
power – and arguably in Bess’s case this mechanics of power is most violently 
inscribed on her body – but s/he will not constitute him/herself in a pole of power on 
the same level with the power s/he opposes. The criticism of the holy fool is directed 
against the structures of power but not from a position of power which would 
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neutralize the very criticism of power. The ‘outside’ then is radical ‘outsideness’, 
revealing a tension between this world and the other world.   
In fact what the film suggests through Bess is non-conformity to the laws 
endorsed by the power structures. She follows her own ideas of what goodness is but 
in so doing so she is confronted with the boundaries imposed by society. She is a 
woman of independent mind when it comes to interpreting religious injunctions and 
she assumes them existentially to the last consequences. Her deeds can only be said 
to be self-destructive to the extent that she obstinately pursues her aim. But at no 
point is the harm self-inflicted. The violence is lurking out there, threatening the 
vulnerable at any time and its manifestation is itself a condemnation of the social 
system that engenders it. From a point of view that advocates the empowerment of 
the weak Bess’s sacrifice cannot be effective. However, it points to a solution that 
rather suggests the disempowerment of the powerful. Bess stands in a tradition that 
aligns foolishness and weakness and reveals God as the ultimate deconstructor of the 
powers that be, ‘because the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness 
of God is stronger than men.’ (1 Cor 1:25) 
This suffering is not required by God but by those power structures pitted 
against God and mimicking his authority. The true voice of God is only heard in the 
end in the bells chiming and his work is seen in what appears to be Bess’s 
assumption to heaven. From Bess’s point of view it is a way to express her love for 
Jan. Even if from the outside it seems misguided, this certainly doesn’t render it 
valueless.  Kierkegaard offers insights that can prove useful in settling the 
controversies raised by Bess’s sacrifice, and help us understand von Trier’s 
depiction. The first point refers to an understanding of suffering as ‘the qualitative 
expression of disparity [of man] with this world’.78 Applied to Bess, whose 
description in terms of excess points towards the proportions of this disparity, it 
means that the clash with the power structures of the world is inevitable. The greater 
the disparity, the greater the pressure exercised on the individual; at the same time 
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the more exposed the inherent violence in the repressive system.79 The clash 
happens, however, in the terms of Bess’s own personality and specific situation, 
hence the idiosyncratic character of her experience.  
Adam’s Apples (2005) 
The most recent tendency in the Danish cinema has been to explore religious 
questions in totally unconventional ways. From Dreyer to von Trier and Anders 
Thomas Jensen the transition is not only one from auteur films to genre films but 
also to increasingly more ambiguous, if not irreverent, approaches to religion.80 The 
irreverence does not slip into hostility but rather expresses an ambivalent attitude, 
allowing space for the viewers to form their own judgments. Jensen’s black comedy 
Adam’s Apples illustrates this tendency, its disrespectful humor being no obstacle for 
reading it as ‘a tongue-in-cheek parable about redemption, unselfishness, and faith’.81 
On the contrary, as in The Word, Breaking the Waves or Babette’s Feast, it can be 
seen as proposing an alternative narrative enunciation, in this case supporting a 
reading of a supernatural world impinging on the everyday one.82 This becomes 
apparent in retrospect, competing with the first enunciation but not necessarily 
contesting it. This second reading is not forced on the text but rather proposed as a 
matter of choice – a choice to believe.  
The storyline is relatively simple: a neo-Nazi ex-convict, Adam, is released 
on condition that he does community service at the church ministered by Ivan, a 
believer in human goodness. ‘There are no evil people’ he tells Adam on their first 
official encounter. This intrigues Adam from the very beginning, who then 
endeavours to make him realize the contrary in a variety of often disturbingly brutal 
ways. This proves to be very difficult since Ivan ascribes all the misfortunes to Satan. 
As is later revealed, his brain blocks out memories of being molested as a child by 
his father and of his wife having committed suicide as a result of giving birth to a 
                                                
79 Becky Mclaughlin, ‘Playing Ball with God: Breaking the Law in Breaking the Waves’, in Textual 
Ethos Studies, or Locating Ethics, ed. by Ann Katrin Jonnson (Amsterdam: Radopi, 2005), pp. 85-100 
(p. 92) 
80 Eskjaer, p. 36 
81 Nick Schager, ‘Adam's Apples’ <http://www.slantmagazine.com/film/film_review.asp?ID=2810> 
[accessed 2 June 2009] 
82 Ehrat, p. 332 
212 
child with Down’s syndrome. He refuses to acknowledge any misbehavior on the 
part of Adam or the other two convicts under his care: Khalid, a Pakistani burglar 
who occasionally holds up petrol stations as a form of political protest, and Gunnar, 
an alcoholic kleptomaniac convicted of rape. Strange coincidences such as the Bible 
repeatedly falling on the floor and opening at the Book of Job, or an ongoing plague 
affecting the tree whose apples Adam is supposed to use for making a pie as part of 
his rehabilitation programme, make Adam even more aggressive, but they also erode 
his confidence to such an extent that ultimately he experiences a complete change of 
heart. The pastor’s tactics seem to have been effective – not in the sense of 
miraculously reforming the ex-convicts - but by keeping their destructive inclinations 
to a minimum. Turning a blind eye to their weaknesses is a way of showing tolerance 
and understanding:  "If we listen to reason all the time the world would be a gloomy 
place", the minister says. He tries to ease the conscience of a former Nazi officer, 
whose inhuman behaviour in the concentration camp comes to haunt him on his 
death bed. Divine retribution and justice are blatantly rejected in favour of mercy and 
forgiveness. 
The radical and unflinching nature of Ivan’s faith make him seem a fool to 
those embedded in the conventions of the modern world. Adam’s Apples can be read 
as a film about the very possibility of faith in a world in which innocent people are 
confronted with deeply traumatic events.  Its theodicy is very simple and it seems to 
offer a way of coming to terms with such traumas: if the evils in the world are not 
God’s doing, and the only possibility to keep faith in people is to affirm their 
fundamentally good nature, then it follows that all negative agency is from the devil 
and should be interpreted as trials to be overcome. Ivan takes this to such an extreme 
that he denies factual reality. This rhetoric of exaggeration is very similar to 
Kierkegaard’s hyperbolic understanding of love in 1 Cor 13:7: ‘To believe all things 
means precisely, even though love is not apparent, even though the opposite is seen 
to presuppose that love is nevertheless present fundamentally, even in the misguided, 
even in the corrupt, even in the hateful’83. 
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The boundary between madness and holy foolishness is therefore blurred, as 
in many other representations discussed so far. In Adam’s Apples the scientific 
explanation for the minister’s constant goodness and inability to see evil is 
apparently due to a brain tumor. Still, the final irony of the film seems to stand this 
explanation on its head.  After Ivan’s ‘miraculous’ recovery, as the tumor is removed 
by a bullet shot by Adam’s neo-Nazi friends, yet he continues to function as the same 
person and, in an even more baffling twist, Adam decides to become Ivan’s assistant 
working with the convicts. More than with any other holy fool analysed so far, Ivan 
carries here the banner of otherness. He implicitly upholds the right to be different 
and proposes an alternative to the dominant ideology, as regards both to the 
rehabilitation system for the criminals and belief in the corruption of human nature. 
Significantly, the alternative is not predicated on self-gratification but on self-
sacrifice.  
In line with the iconoclastic turn in the Danish cinema Ivan’s foolishness is 
treated in a comic vein dictated by the rules of the genre. This is facilitated by the 
very rhetoric of exaggeration just mentioned which is put to comic effect. This does 
not undermine the seriousness of the situation. Ivan’s blind faith in the goodness of 
people is as uncompromising as Adam’s opposite belief. If Ivan denies all that may 
be described as evil in reality, Adam denies all that is good, trying to expose it as 
make-believe. In so doing he thinks he has realism and science as his allies. Yet 
Adam’s universe is continuously disturbed by the puzzle he is presented with in the 
person of the minister as well as the bizarre coincidences for which he cannot find a 
rational explanation. As we have seen in other Danish cinematic treatments of holy 
foolishness, the idea of the impossible becoming possible is a critical theme, creating 
a permeable crack in a universe otherwise impervious to the divine presence. The 
possibility of an alternative spiritual reading insinuates itself when a miraculous 
event happens in relation to the ‘impossible’ and casts a fresh perspective on the 
whole narrative. This poses a challenge to the viewer by requiring a ‘leap of faith’ 
into a different interpretation.    
We have seen from this analysis of the representation of holy foolishness in 
Danish cinema the powerful influence of Kierkegaard and cultural debate over the 
nature of folly and reason. The holy fool figure has been therefore developed by 
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directors, often in an unambiguously religious context, as part of a critique of the 
established order and its understanding of faith. There is a significant gendered 
dimension here. All three female holy fools analysed above share a common trait: 
their determination to assume their self-sacrifice as an integral part of their existence, 
aware of its redeeming value. They enter into conflict with the norms around them 
while following a decision that springs from their own ‘heart’ rather than any 
conventional morality. While their suffering in confrontation with the forces that 
oppose them is willingly assumed, it exposes and criticizes the injustice and violence 
at the foundation of many existing religious and social orders and to which women 
are particularly vulnerable. It can be said that while the bodies of the female fools are 
destroyed – either physically as in the case of Joan and Bess, or metaphorically as in 
the case of Babette – they also deconstruct the kind of power that exerts itself 
through the aggression of the individual. These female holy fools offer a glimpse in a 
world that reveals through their faith to be the advent of the impossible. 
At the same time the male holy fools – Johannes and Ivan – enact the possibility 
of the same world of the impossible and the miraculous, revealing a leap of faith 
foolish to the outside world. In Johannes’s case, his criticism of an order that falls 
short of faith – in the form of the established church, dissident pietism, or modern 
secular ideology – is delivered both in his prophetic words and the miracle he 
performs at the end. With Ivan, given the collection of misfits that surround him, his 
trust in the inherent goodness of human nature creates the possibility of the 
manifestation of the supernatural and also the rehabilitation of socially irredeemable 
individuals. Ultimately, the otherwordly representation of the holy fool in Danish 






Idiocy as technique: the Dogme 95 movement 
 
At the end of the twentieth century Danish cinema developed a new 
movement that was to take cinematic exploration of foolishness in a fresh direction. 
While the tradition of using holy fools as critical voices by Danish directors has been 
well established, the group of directors associated with the Dogme 95 movement 
revisited the concept of idiocy, transforming the figure into a modern countercultural 
character. Inspired by Lars von Trier, this cinematic movement has developed an 
influential and international dimension, frequently using the critical device of the 
fool as a way of expressing their dissatisfaction with contemporary culture and 
filmmaking. Through von Trier’s obsession with the concepts of idiocy and the 
outcast, the movement has brought to life a peculiarly modern form of the fool that, 
while retaining a sense of the spiritual, bears a cinematic function that transcends 
national boundaries and religious traditions. In so doing, it appropriately leads us to 
examine the future of holy foolishness in twenty-first century cinema. 
To explain the relation of development to holy foolishness it is worth 
recalling an episode from the early spiritual literature. ‘We have an idiot within’ was 
the reply that the ‘saintly anchoret’ Piteroum was given by the female monastic 
community he was visiting. He was searching for a woman that an angel had praised 
– intriguingly - as more religious than himself. This story is recorded by Palladius in 
his Lausiac History, written in 419-420 AD, and presents us with perhaps the first 
female holy idiot figure in the monastic literature of the early church. Michel de 
Certeau interprets the ‘within’ mentioned by the nuns as ambiguously designating 
both a physical space - the monastery - and an inner space, by which he means ‘our 
innermost secret, a madness within ourselves’1. Drawing an arch in time, this old text 
is echoed by the explanation of the ideologue Stoffer about the unconventional 
behaviour of his ‘anti-bourgeois’ commune in Lars von Trier’s The Idiots (1998) as 
he declares: ‘They are searching for their inner idiot’.  
                                                
1 de Certeau, p. 37 
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This chapter will trace the vestiges of this madness within the Danish Dogme 
95 cinematic movement and ask about the significance of this rediscovery of the 
idiot figure: in what way can we read this rediscovery not only as form of societal 
critique but also as carrying a transcendental value? In order to investigate this 
phenomenon, I will proceed with an outline of Dogme 95 as a countercultural 
movement and offer an analysis of its manifesto. I will suggest that the behaviour of 
Lars von Trier, the principal initiator of the movement, and the manifesto lend 
themselves to a reading within the holy fool phenomenology. To illustrate this 
argument I will then offer an evaluation of the Dogme 95 film canon to demonstrate 
the significance of the figure of the fool and its functions. 
Dogme 95 has proved to be a prolific enterprise and with influence well 
outside the sphere of Danish cinema. Up to four waves of film-makers have been 
noted who have chosen to work within the rigours imposed by the manifesto.2 The 
initial brethren of Danish directors released their Dogme films between 1998 and 
2000: Thomas Vinterberg: Festen/ The Celebration (1998), Lars von Trier: 
Idioterne/The Idiots (1998), Søren Kragh-Jacobsen: Mifunes sidste sang/ Mifune 
(1999) and Kristian Levring: The King is Alive (2000). A second wave followed, 
with new Danish directors working within the constraints imposed by the Dogme 
manifesto, the first film being Lone Scherfig’s Italiensk for begyndere/ Italian for 
Beginners (2000). By this time the movement had taken on an international 
dimension, a third wave with directors inside and outside Europe experimenting with 
the project. A fourth ‘dogmatic’ offspring is represented by those directors who have 
been loosely inspired by the project but do not follow the manifesto.3 It is worth 
noting that the first Dogme films were issued with a certificate of authenticity, but in 
2002 the secretariat was dissolved, ostensibly due to the fact that ‘the manifesto of 
Dogme 95 has almost grown into a genre formula, which was never the intention. As 
a consequence we [...] are therefore closing the Dogmesecretariat’.4 However, this 
has only resulted in the dissolution of the institutionalized form of Dogme 95. From 
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then on the director himself was at liberty to decide whether he/she had made a 
Dogme film, without needing to obtain sanction from a higher authority.  
Since it has moved outside any form of control, Dogme 95 has become a 
virtually open franchise since any director could now make a Dogme film by 
formally following the rules. Since it is beyond the scope of this project to assess the 
achievements of every Dogma production, I will proceed by analyzing the founding 
documents – the ‘Manifesto’ together with the ‘Vow of Chastity’ – and I will refer 
afterwards to the films made by the four Danish father figures behind the movement. 
Reference to other films will depend on two criteria: their aesthetic quality and the 
extent to which the contents of the film conform to the interests of this thesis in holy 
foolishness. The underlying assumption here is that, in spite of the apparent emphasis 
of the ‘Manifesto’ on the technicalities of the filmmaking, the impulse behind 
Dogma 95 is not a strictly formal one.  This is in line with von Trier’s claim that 
following the rules does not automatically lead to a meaningful result.5 As Von Trier 
does not conceptualise the nature of this imponderable he is seeking, my aim will be 
to determine the significance it bears for him and the Dogme project.  
In what follows I will proceed by analysing the different aspects at play in 
understanding the significance of Dogma 95 movement for the concept of holy 
foolishness in film. In addition to the cinematic texts, the movement, in the best 
avant-garde tradition, provides us with a written manifesto which gives voice to their 
dissatisfactions as well as states their creed. My aim throughout the chapter will be 
twofold: first, to highlight the affinities between the impetus behind the Dogma 95 
and the provocative behaviour of the holy fool, and second to analyse the trope of 
idiocy as it appears in some of the cinematic products of the movement and how it is 
used to challenge the status quo. 
 
The Manifesto 
The Dogme 95 manifesto was not the first constructed by Lars von Trier. 
Almost all his early work was prefaced or accompanied by manifestoes.6 However, 
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the Dogme 95 manifesto stands out as by far the most influential for the history of 
modern cinema as a result of the popularity it has enjoyed among film-makers. It was 
co-authored with Thomas Vinterberg but it was von Trier who announced it, together 
with the so-called ‘Vow of Chastity’, on 20 March 1995 in the Odeon Cinema in 
Paris at the international symposium ‘Le cinéma vers son deuxième siècle’, on the 
centennial anniversary of the Lumières’ primary cinema screening in the French 
capital.7 As acknowledged in Jesper Jargil’s documentary De Lutrede/The Purified 
(2002) by Vinterberg, the manifesto was intended as a ‘political statement’. Couched 
as a ‘rescue action’, it was meant to describe the predicament of the old cinema, 
proclaim its death, and pave the way for the rise of a new one, which was to fulfill 
what, in the opinion of the authors, were the still unachieved aspirations of the 
1960s.  
The new vision provided by the manifesto was stark and challenging. From 
the very beginning the document expresses its oppositional stance, stating that its 
goal is to counter ‘certain tendencies’ in contemporary cinema. It then moves 
forward taking as a point of reference the year 1960. In this year an attempt was 
made to escape from the supposed staleness of mainstream filmmaking, but without 
result since ‘the goal was correct but the means were not!’. Individualism and 
freedom created fresh works for a while but without substantive changes to the 
format and technique of filmmaking. Because the theories of cinema, so von Trier 
suggested, were based on ‘bourgeois’ principles the purported anti-bourgeois cinema 
had morphed into the bourgeois. Particularly arraigned by von Trier was the auteur 
concept. By contrast, Dogme 95 is not individualist. Technological progress, he 
argues, has made possible the ‘ultimate democratization of cinema’. Under these new 
circumstances the role of the avant-garde becomes even more important. Therefore 
Dogme 95 announces the introduction of a new set of rules known as the ‘Vow of 
Chastity’, designed to counter individualism by ‘putting our films into uniform’. 
The manifesto continues with a second line of criticism, bringing into 
discussion another failure of the generation working in the 1960s: they did not put an 
end to the malign ‘cosmetic’ movement in film. On the contrary, since then the 
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cosmetic effect has exploded, with the result that the audience is now tricked into 
believing illusions via those emotions which are communicated through the free 
choice of the individual artist. The next point to be criticized is superficial action due 
to the predictability embedded in traditional dramaturgical practices. Frequently, the 
manifesto argues, the plot is not justified though the character’s inner lives. The 
result of these failures was an ‘illusion of pathos and an illusion of love’. But, what 
was really at stake here in Vinterberg’s and von Trier’s views was the elimination of 
truth from cinema, through the illusions that had been made possible by new 
technologies. Under these circumstances the Dogma 95 movement took it upon 
themselves to counter these tendencies via a new set of rules called the ‘Vow of 
Chastity’, which takes the form of ten commandments, out of which seven refer to 
modes of production and only three (6-7) to the intrinsic characteristics of the film. 
The commandments are: 1. Shooting must be done on location; 2. The sound must 
never be produced apart from the images or vice versa; 3. The camera must be hand-
held; 4. The film must be in color. Special lighting is not acceptable; 5. Optical work 
and filters are forbidden; 6. The film must not contain superficial action; 7. Temporal 
and geographical alienation are forbidden; 8 Genre movies are not acceptable; 9. The 
film format must be Academy 35 mm; 10. The director must not be credited.8 In a 
direct continuation from the last commandment, the last passage in the ‘Vow’ 
contained the pledge of the director to ‘refrain from personal taste’ and also to 
‘refrain from creating a “work” as I regard the instant as more important than the 
whole’.  The supreme goal was to ‘force the truth out of the characters and settings’ 
at the ‘cost of any good taste and any aesthetic considerations’.  
At the time it was launched the Dogme 95 brethren also included Søren 
Kragh-Jacobsen and Kristian Levrig, but von Trier can safely be credited with the 
paternity of the idea following a series of challenges he had set himself. After 
exploring a whole range of technical virtuosities in his earlier films, especially the 
trilogy Europa – The Element of Crime (1984), Epidemic (1987), and Europa (1991) 
- he had reached a point where he felt he ‘couldn’t get any further’ using technical 
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cinematography.9 When technical progress stagnates one possibility of renewal is by 
returning to the primitive. The return to the very basic techniques of filmmaking 
advocated by von Trier can be seen as an attempt to avoid mannerisms at the level of 
technique. At the same time von Trier pointed towards a more profound reason for 
this move, it being a ‘question of liberating oneself from the inconsequential, in 
order to be able to focus on the essential’.10 The following section of the chapter will 
try to establish the nature of this ‘essential’ and its relation to holy folly by taking 
into account the intentions of Dogme 95 as expressed in its founding documents and 
the cinematic products toward which the rules have led. 
 
Foolishness and Dogme 95 
 Von Trier’s religiosity is no less unconventional than his film-making. In an 
interview given in 1982 von Trier spoke of his wish to make religious films and 
defines what he understood by religiosity: ‘religiosity is a lot about being able to 
seek out the essentials in life’11. At the same time, in his personal viewpoint, religion 
almost overlapped with goodness even if its ties with traditional morality were 
limited.12 This is important because his characters, with the exception of Bess, are 
not seen as openly professing any religion. Goodness, von Trier suggests, is a 
manifestation of religiosity and in this sense Karen’s goodness in his The Idiots, to 
which I will refer later, can be seen as an expression of her religiosity. 
A few observations are in order here about the affinities that von Trier’s 
public persona, if not his personality, has with the holy fool. The ‘provocateur’ label 
has been attached many times to Lars von Trier for either his unorthodox public 
appearances or the latent provocations contained in his works. The Dogme 95 
movement has been just one of many instances. Like the holy fool’s ascetic 
practices, this provocation is designed first for his own development, and only then 
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for the audience.13 It is never gratuitous. In common with the holy fool type von Trier 
thrives in situations of controversy and scandal, which are superficially taken as 
publicity stunts.14 Moreover, there are points of similarity in terms of aesthetics: in an 
interview given in 1982, one year before his graduation from the Danish Film 
School, Lars von Trier saw the aesthetic of the ugly as his forte and his mission.15 In 
the light of this, von Trier’s professed Catholicism, in spite of his statements, seems 
grafted onto a sensibility that was resolutely Protestant (in the sense of being 
iconoclastic and eschewing the beauty of holiness), certainly by the time he was 
involved in Dogme 95. 
These characteristics were continued in the movement von Trier initiated. A 
useful approach to understanding the connection with holy foolishness comes from 
the cultural theorist and slavist Mikhail Epstein. He highlights the affinities between 
the avant-garde and holy foolery in its Russian manifestation, to the point that allows 
him to define the latter as a ‘religious phenomenon’.16 Epstein has in mind the 
particular case of the conceptual artist, but his argument is fashioned in such a way 
that makes it applicable to avant-garde movements in general. He draws various 
parallels between the avant-garde and holy foolery based on the anti-aesthetical 
perspective they promote, and particularly the moral and religious implications of 
holding such views. The thrust of his argument lies in discovering the same impetus 
for self-denial that lies behind both avant-garde art and holy foolery. As might be 
expected, institutional religion is not a key dimension here, given the nature of avant-
garde movements, which are typically represented as iconoclastic and anti-
traditionalist. Epstein argues, however, that in spite of not expressing any explicit 
religious content, the avant-garde is acting upon a premise that is essentially 
religious: the self-humiliation of art as a religious act. This self-denial is 
symbolically predicated upon an imitation of a divine model in which ‘Art becomes 
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impoverished, pathetic in order to partake of God’s fate, to follow his path of 
degradation and mockery.’17  
This aspect of self-denial plays an important role in the Dogme 95 manifesto. 
It refers both to the director and his/her art. The first reference is made in the context 
of the critique of bourgeois art. The two problems that are pointed out are 
individualism and freedom. As a result ‘The wave was never stronger than the men 
behind’. This seems to suggest that the failure with the neo-realism of the 1960s was 
the emphasis it gave to the personalities of the directors at the expense of the 
movement as a whole. This suggestion is further emphasized by the last rule of the 
Vow: ‘The director must not be credited’. The idea is continued in the next 
paragraph which contains the pledge of the director to refrain from personal taste. 
This sounds like a return to the anonymity of the Middle Ages, when humility and 
the observance of the artistic canons took precedence over the artist’s personality and 
personal glory.  
Von Trier was attracted from the beginning of his artistic career by an 
aesthetic of the ugly, stating that his ‘mission is to elevate the ugly’, so we could 
safely assume that this last paragraph of the Manifesto was chiefly his own input.18 In 
the final sentence he pledges to force the truth out of characters and settings ‘at the 
cost of any good taste and any artistic considerations’. Such a gesture can be read, as 
Epstein puts it, as ‘renew[ing] in all sharpness the sense of crisis that casts away 
aesthetic and moral values before the Supreme Value of something strange and 
unthinkable.’19 Von Trier’s intent, I suggest, is to destabilize the common visual 
perception of the viewer and together with this the whole set of axiological 
assumptions encoded in the cultivation of the beautiful forms. 
These manifestos are not clearly elaborated pieces of theory. Their aim is 
primarily provocative rather than explanatory. As a result, the significance of terms 
such as ‘illusion’ and ‘truth’ are still debated. In general ‘truth’ is explained by 
pairing it with ‘illusion’ Even if it is not mentioned explicitly in the manifesto, the 
chief target of criticism is the mainstream cinema of Hollywood. The ‘technological 
storm’ refers almost certainly to the Hollywood productions that, beginning in the 
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late 1970’s, espoused simulation to various degrees thanks to the new possibilities 
offered by computer enhancement and editing.  Observing the rules prescribed by the 
Vow, one can surely be closer to reality than by simulating it. But it seems that this is 
just one form of truth, which does not exhaust all possibilities. As von Trier has 
written: 
To hang a mike up in a tree, to use a couple of toothpicks instead of 
a gigantic technical apparatus, this provides one form of cinematic 
truth. Or at least it gets more real. Truth is about searching an area 
in order to find something, but if you already beforehand know what 
you are looking for, then it’s manipulation. Maybe truth is finding 
something you are not looking for…20 
What von Trier is expressing is the way in which truth is not so much a conceptual 
issue but something that is experienced. This is one reason why the idiot figure is so 
important in the Dogme 95 movement, for it is through the powerful experiences of 
the fool on the margins of society, outcast and humiliated, that we find an affirmation 
of reality beyond the visible. In search of ‘truth’, the fool provides a suitable vehicle 
for critiquing the flaws and illusions of modern culture, while offering a glimpse of a 
transcendental humanity. In order to evaluate how this was developed in the Dogme 
movement I will not turn to those films inspired by the Manifesto. 
  
The Celebration (1998) 
The figure of the fool was present from the very first films produced under 
the manifesto by the Dogme brethren. Thomas Vinterberg’s film The Celebration, 
was the first of the Dogme films to be released. It is a commentary on the Dogma 
rules, but it lacks the avant-gardist manner of von Trier’s The Idiots, released in the 
same year. The plot is relatively simple, respecting the classical unities of time, space 
and action, and it follows the classic dramaturgy developed along four phases: 
presentation, complication, confrontation and resolution.21 However, the story is 
unconventional. It focuses on a family reunion occasioned by the party organized for 
the father of the family’s sixtieth birthday. Apart from the guests all the members of 
the family are present to celebrate with Helge, the father: Elsie, his wife, Christian, 
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the elder son, Michael, the other son, Helen, his daughter. We find out that the 
second daughter, Linda, committed suicide. The reunion is arranged to the minutest 
details, from the social conventions such as the customary toasts to the family 
traditions like the march around the house and the breakfast next day. All of these are 
designed to give the appearance of a normal happy bourgeois family. Soon the norms 
of propriety are breached by Christian whose speech alludes to Helge’s sexual abuse 
of him and his sister Linda. He goes even further and proposes a toast to his father as 
Linda’s murderer and then accuses his mother of being aware of the abuse and 
turning a blind eye to it. Thrown out of the house he is finally vindicated when Helen 
reads Linda’s letter and the truth is reveled without a possibility of denial. Helge 
confesses his crime at the next day breakfast and, having lost the support of the 
family, leaves the scene presumably to commit suicide. 
 In exposing his father, Christian plays the fool. At the dinner party for his 
father he stands up and asks to be allowed a toast. In a middle shot the hand-held 
camera follows his movements as he takes out two notes and give his father the 
choice to choose between them. In an even voice he remembers how his father used 
to rape himself and his sister. The camera cuts to the guests’ faces, lacking any 
expression, then to his mother who intervenes to change the subject. Family and 
guests conspire to repress the inconvenient truth and redirect the attention back to 
Helge’s public persona. It is not only the authority of the patriarch of the family that 
is challenged and ultimately revealed to lack any moral legitimacy. The rules of the 
bourgeois family are challenged as well, and indirectly the elitist hierarchy that 
Helge represents as an esteemed member of the Freemasons. This replicates the way 
Dogme 95 challenges the legitimacy of the old cinema: ‘the bourgeois family 
parallels the bourgeois cinema’.22 The film is more ambitious though as its attempt to 
unmask not only the wrongdoings of an individual but the collaboration of the 
society in reinforcing the authority invested in social roles regardless of any 
individual merit. Truth struggles to emerge because everybody plays their own social 
roles mechanically without ever questioning the qualities of the human being behind 
the social mask. The reaction of the guests around the dinner table is revelatory: the 
terrible sexual abuse to which the father submitted Christian and Linda fails to make 
                                                
22 Berys Gaunt, ‘Naked Film: Dogma and Its Limits’, in Purity and Provocation, pp. 89-100 (p. 96) 
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any impression on the guests who expect the toast to follow the customary address. 
The downfall of the patriarch and his world however announces the beginning of a 
new order. In the fight to usurp the authority of the patriarch the class differences are 
leveled. The servants inhabiting the underground rooms and the masters become 
allies: Pia, the servant, follows Christian to Paris, for a continuation of their idyll.  
It is worthwhile noting the name of the protagonist: Christian. No direct 
reference is made to religion but Christian’s attitude is one open to apparitions from 
the otherworld. Whether the apparition of his dead sister is supposed to be for real or 
just a dream, Christian is seen to believe in this presence. The camera work, 
however, appears to confirm the objectivity of his perception at times by opposing 
the usual nervous, agitated shots with some calm and static ‘ghost views’ meant to 
belong to the deceased Linda.23 The connection established between Christian and 
the spirit of his dead sister renders him a Hamletian figure striving to reveal the truth 
about the death of his sister and expose the hypocrisy of the father. There are also 
other aspects that contribute to the ‘metaphysical dimension’ of the film: Linda’s 
letter reads ‘I know that there is light and beauty on the other side’. Events happen 
which are inexplicable within the usual cause-and-effect logic: Helen’s shouting 
‘boo’ at the receptionist after discovering the suicide letter initiates a sequence of 
cross cuttings which show Michael falling in the shower, Kristian losing his glass 
and Pia’s breaking out of the water in the bathtub. This signals the importance of the 
discovery of the letter but is nevertheless beyond causality.24 The camera work 
concurs with the diegesis to convey a sense of transcendence.  
 
The Idiots (1998) 
Released shortly after The Celebration, Lars von Trier’s The Idiots has been 
called the ‘quintessential’ Dogma film because of the correspondence between form 
and content.25 It is also the only Dogma film that can be considered avant-garde, with 
all the others distributed on a continuum between art cinema and genre film, in spite 
                                                
23 Thomas Lind Laursen, ‘The Agitated Camera: A Diagnosis of Anthony Dod Mantle’s Camera 
Work in The Celebration’, p.o.v.: A Danish Journal of Film Studies, 10, 2000 
http://imv.aau.dk/publikationer/pov/POV.html [accessed 8 February 2009] 
24 Palle Schantz Lauridsen, ‘The Celebration: Classical Drama and Docu Soap Style’, p.o.v.: A Danish 
Journal of Film Studies, 10, 2000 <http://imv.aau.dk/publikationer/pov/POV.html> [accessed 8 
February 2009] 
25 Schepelern, p. 88 
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of the rule no. 8 which bans genre films.26 Furthermore, it stands alone as the only 
film with extensive commentary and documentation, such that in 1999 Jasper Jargil 
releaed the documentary The Humiliated/De ydmygede, shot at the same time with 
The Idiots which made use of von Trier’s diary during filming that was recorded on a 
dictaphone. Its subject matter is, of course, of immediate interest, particularly given 
von Trier’s increasing fascination with holy fools and the functions of the figure. 
The Idiots is certainly the most competent meta-commentary on the 
‘Manifesto’ and the most faithful to the ‘Vow of Chastity’, in spite of von Trier 
confession of four violations of the rules. The film follows a hippy commune set up 
in a vacant house situated in the posh neighbourhood of Søllerød. The group is 
formed by disaffected middle class individuals who simulate mental disability by 
‘spassing’ (adopting spastic behaviour). Stoffer, as the leader and ideologue of the 
group, describes their purpose as ‘finding their inner idiot’. The film opens with 
members of the group in the restaurant, spassing and disturbing the other customers. 
Karen, who is sitting alone at a table, willingly follows them out as one of them 
holds her hand refusing to let it go. She realizes the deception but she decides to join 
them. Throughout the film she functions as the moral conscience of the group while 
eschewing participation in their activities. She is the only one who doesn’t spass with 
two exceptions: she spontaneously breaks into a spass after the group is confronted 
with people that suffer from the Down’s syndrome and secondly at the end of the 
film when, taking Stoffer’s challenge, she returns home to spass, which causes her 
husband to hit her. She is actually the only one that has the courage to spass in front 
of the people that have known her before joining the commune. We also find out on 
that occasion that she had lost her child right before joining the group.  
Birger Langkjaer identifies five levels of reality in the film: ‘being’ – the true 
characters; ‘playing’ – playing the idiot; ‘reflexivity’ - the interviews with members 
of the group, though it is never clear whether it is the real actors; ‘becoming’ – the 
film-making process revealed by seeing the film crew, the camera and the 
microphones; ‘incoherence’ – caused by people being and/or acting themselves like 
the people suffering from disabilities, or by the impossibility to separate the 
                                                
26 Birger Langkjaer, ‘What was Dogme 95?’, Film International, 19 (2006), pp. 34-43  (p. 40) 
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character from the actor.27  As a result the boundaries between acting and real life get 
blurred. At the same time, The Idiots is a film about playing by the rules, a 
commentary on the ‘Vow of Chastity’ and ultimately about its own making.28 It is 
not difficult to draw a parallel between the protest of the brethren with the Idiot 
group’s anti-bourgeois attitude, or to compare Stoffer with von Trier, since, as von 
Trier says, practicing the ‘idiot technique’ doesn’t mean necessarily that something 
will come out of it.29 And in this sense Karen is the only one for whom the rules 
acquire an existential meaning. From the formal point of view, the spassing in the 
story replicates the ‘spassing’ on the technical level: the shots are out of focus, the 
image often wobbles, the editing is abrupt, to enumerate only a few of the 
incompetencies on Gaunt’s inventory.30 The correspondences can go even further: 
the back-to-basic cinema is paralleled by the return to a stage of innocence 
symbolized by the idiot figure.31   
The trope of idiocy is a versatile tool in von Trier’s hand and he can use it on 
two simultaneous levels: both as a critique of this world and as part of a search for a 
higher truth. The commune can be seen as a secular version of the Feast of the Fools, 
the carnivalesque practice that occurred over much of Europe in the Middle Ages, 
including Denmark.32 Stoffer, as the Lord of Misrule, licenses behaviours that are 
disrupting socially and excessive privately, involving the functions of the lower body 
– digestive and reproductive - very much in the carnivalesque tradition. His aim is 
twofold: to expose the hypocrisy and the self-sufficiency of the Danish middle-class 
bourgeoisie, and to critique identity politics as promoted by the state by ‘playing out 
the commodification of identity-as-difference as a form of political transgression’.33 
This is obvious in the reaction of the middle-class couple that come to see a house 
for sale and are told that the ‘retarded’ folks next door use its garden for recreational 
purposes: although they don’t admit it, it is clear that the couple are deeply unhappy 
                                                
27 Lohgkjaer, p. 41 
28 Schepelern, p. 64, Gaunt p. 93 
29 von Trier, ‘The Man Who Would Give Up Control’, p. 123 
30 Gaunt, p. 94 
31 Von Trier got his inspiration from an idea of Rudolf Steiner according to which people with 
Down’s syndrome are like angels sent as a preset to mankind, cf. Bodil Marie Thomsen, ‘Idiocy, 
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32 Clement A. Miles, Christmas Customs and Traditions, Their History and Significance (New York: 
Dover Publications), 1976, p. 308 
33 John Roberts, ‘Dogme 95’, New Left Review, I (1999) 141-149 (p.145) 
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at the prospect of living next door to those with disabilities and their political 
‘empowerment’ is not of much consequence. In contrast, the working-class people 
offer more sympathy for the ‘retarded’ when they visit their factory.   
The flaw with Stoffer’s commune, however, is that it is just another social 
experiment, directed under a certain ideology, which, like the French Wave that the 
‘Manifesto’ criticises, started well but failed to achieve its own aims due to the 
means used. Stoffer himself has no sympathy for the cause of the truly mentally 
disabled; he merely confiscates it for its political power to denounce the 
‘conservative sameness that maintains the orderly surface of our culture and firmly 
positions and imprisons the subject within it’34. This is obvious when a councilman 
comes to bribe Stoffer into taking his group out of Søllerød, the poshest district of 
Copenhagen. The leader of the group loses control and runs naked after the 
councilman screaming and calling him a ‘Søllerød fascist’. However, just a few 
sequences earlier Stoffer himself was reminded, by his remark, of the fascist 
eugenics programme, when his group invited a few people suffering from the 
Down’s syndrome for a luncheon lawn party. Confronted with real disabilities 
Stoffer gets irritated with the others for enjoying their company. He tells off his 
fellow comrades for being too sentimental and, in a sarcastic tone, he suggests: ‘Hey, 
let's measure their skulls and gas them’. His faking of idiocy is revealed lacking in 
authenticity and only serves to vent his resentment. He legitimates his behaviour 
from a powerful cultural practice but it is not supported by an authentic existence. 
While Stoffer’s behaviour preserves its subversiveness through his refusal to 
participate in the exchanges of the consumerist society, it is rendered existentially 
inefficient since it is ultimately devised as a means of self-gratification. As Cecilia 
Sjöholm puts it, there is no ‘moment of sacrifice in which pleasure is given up: there 
is no decapitation of the revolt.’35 
It is important to recall that von Trier proposes the idiot figure as a 
counterweight to rationality. He conceives of rationality as having its origin in 
anxiety. What he means is that anxiety is the product of chaos and in order to counter 
chaos humankind uses rationality as a defensive mechanism. Human rationality 
                                                
34 Tim Walters, ‘Reconsidering The Idiots: Dogme95, Lars von Trier, and the Cinema of Subversion?, 
The Velvet Light Trap, 53 (2004), 40-54 (p. 46) 
35 Cecilia Sjöholm, Kristeva and the political (London: Routledge, 2005), p.106 
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therefore eliminates any conflicts and contradictions from the world and, what is 
more important, blocks the expression of irrationality.36 It is by means of rationality 
that chaos can be controlled and von Trier had developed a reputation, prior to 
Dogme 95, as a control freak. His technical virtuosities were an expression of a 
precise and ordered mindset. With Dogme 95 Von Trier challenged himself into 
ceding such perfectionist control, thereby offering a provocation to his fellow 
directors. He hoped that through the process of relinquishing control some kind of 
‘truth’ will emerge that is not fabricated. The idea is very similar to the spiritual logic 
that underlies the conception of holy foolishness: by giving up your rational mind 
you make room for a kind of illuminated irrationality. 
Idiocy, for von Trier, is also a way to recuperate a state of purity. Nudity as a 
way to play the idiot means ‘giving up vanity’, in other words to return to a state of 
purity or at least naturalness.37 Trier also refers to nakedness as the state of humanity 
at creation, adding one further significance to his idiot: ‘if you want to try to get back 
to that starting point, you have to use nudity to get there’38. The idiot then points to a 
primordial state of naturalness and innocence. As Stoffer puts it ‘In the Stone Age, 
all the idiots died’, meaning that it was the beginning of civilization that bought 
about the loss of innocence. And still, Stoffer hints to more than a celebration of the 
‘romantic conception that children, idiots, and, especially sensitive women have 
particular easy access to human primordial feeling’.39 Strikingly, he says that the 
idiot is ‘the man of the future’. The remark can be taken ironically but it also 
discloses an eschatological dimension: if a future kingdom of true justice is to 
appear, it will belong to the ‘pure in heart’.  
Unfortunately, Stoffer’s desire for purity is rhetorical, and indeed the true 
holy fool lies elsewhere. It is only Karen in the film that has the purity of heart to 
meet von Trier’s ideal, becoming in the process a holy idiot. Karen is twice an 
outsider, a counterculture within the counterculture. On the one hand she breached 
social conventions when she failed to attend the funeral of her child and on the other 
she does not participate fully in the commune’s activities, questioning the rules of the 
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37 Björkman, p. 216 
38 Björkman, p. 207 
39 Schepelern, p. 89  
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commune both verbally and through her behaviour. From this point of view she 
functions as the moral compass of the film. Paradoxically, she refuses to play a role 
but she is the only one that ultimately finds an existential meaning in the game and 
the only one that ‘spasses’ when it involves accountability. Her last words addressed 
to the group: ‘I love you all more than I have ever loved anybody… Maybe with one 
exception’ and the final spassing bring out the two principles that constitute von 
Trier’s holy fools and his idea of religion: goodness and passion. The fact that Karen 
misses her baby’s funeral is not without significance. She can find more meaning and 
possibilities to deal with her grief in the commune than in the formality of the church 
ritual. The former offers her an experience that transcends the immediate reality. Let 
us look at the confrontation with her family. After being given a cold reception from 
them, including her husband who remarks that not having attended the funeral means 
she was not too upset, she sits on the sofa. All the members of the family are 
gathered for afternoon tea. The hand-held camera pans dizzyingly from one to the 
other and cuts to close-ups to capture expressions. Nobody offers words, merely 
helping themselves to the cake. The camera zooms in as Karen starts to let the cake 
come out of her mouth, pans to the stunned expressions of the family and returns to 
Karen who continues to spass until her husband hits her violently. Keeping silent she 
leaves her home. As Hanna Laakso observes ‘truth lies in silence’ not in words.40 In 
this respect Karen resembles Palladius’s holy fool incapable of communicating 
anything besides self-abasement. For Karen spassing is as much liberation from 
conventions as it is a form of recuperating authenticity. At the same time it is a way 
to expose the formalism of personal relations and to critique the state-promoted 
identity politics.  
 
Mifune (1999) 
The third Dogme film by director Søren Kragh-Jacobsen is a comedy in the 
form of a fable about the humanity to be found in idiocy and its power to instill 
authenticity in life. Kersten is newly married to his boss’s daughter and has a 
successful career in Copenhagen. News arrives about the death of his father and he 
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has to return to the farm where he was raised in order to attend his father’s funeral. 
Before he can return he needs to make arrangements for his retarded brother Rud. He 
hires Liva, a former prostitute as s housekeeper and falls in love with her. In spite of 
losing his wife and his job he finds real happiness. The role of Rud is to lay bare the 
role-playing of the other characters as he is the only one that is identical with 
himself.41 Kersten is playing the city boy, concealing his humble origins by 
pretending he is orphan. At the same time, in private, he impersonates Toshiro 
Mifune, the Japanese actor famous for playing a bogus samurai of peasant origin. 
This fantasy world that he creates for himself helps to pacify Rud. Liva plays 
alternatively the prostitute and the housekeeper. Only when they abandon their social 
roles, the director suggests, do they regain a childlike state and discover their real 
identity.42 
What Rud has to offer is the lost simplicity of life, which is seen as more 
authentic than the hypocrisy of social relations in Copenhagen. At the same time 
official religion is contrasted with Rud’s childish faith. At the funeral he appears to 
be the only one distressed about the father’s death. In his simple-mindedness he 
believes in the immortality of his father’s soul, but his supernatural world is 
populated with aliens and cartoon characters. He is the embodiment of goodness and 
naivety and his faith, erroneous as it is, is vibrant. This does not prevent the pastor 
from reproaching Kersten about his brother’s ignorance of official religion, saying 
that ‘even the idiots can be religious’. Rud’s belief in the existence of aliens will 
nonetheless be vindicated in one of the last sequence of the film. We first see Kersten 
in middle length shots looking for Rud through the woods and then fields, guided by 
his clothes left hanging on the way. We then see a birds-eye view showing circular 
patterns in the field, presumably left by a UFO. Through Rud the possibility appears 
of another life and a different perspective on it. This is reinforced by the last 
sequence on which Rud is shown holding the recording camera, a half-ironic 
reference to the ‘idiot technique’ and the ‘idiot’ director. 
  
 
                                                
41 Simons, p. 57 
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‘95’, p.o.v. 10 (2000) (para. 18 of 19) 
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The King Is Alive (2000) 
The idea of the fool continued to be explored in the fourth of the Dogme 
films, directed by Kristian Levring, but this time using a classic reference to 
madness. In The King Is Alive Levring places in the foreground a very interesting 
play-within-film situation. A coach finds iteslf adrift from the right route and as a 
consequence a group of American, British and French tourists find themselves 
stranded in the dunes of the Namibian desert. Fortunately they stumble across a 
deserted diamond mine where they encounter a solitary native, Kanana, who has 
been living there for years. Even more luckily the place has some food to offer in the 
form of very old tins of carrots. The most experienced of the tourists, an army man, 
them decides to leave in search of help. While they are waiting for him, a former 
actor, Henry, invites them to take part in the play he is rewriting from memory: King 
Lear. He first proposes the role of Cordelia to Catherine, a young French woman. 
She is interested both in the part and in Henry, but considers the others not an 
intellectual match so she refuses. Instead the naïve young Gina accepts, attracting 
envy for the rest of the film. She also attracts the sexual interest and the hate of 
Charles, a middle-age man. The two cause her early death, while at the same time all 
coupled relationships in the film become disheveled. The finale brings a moment of 
reconciliation and transcendence prompted by the deaths of the military man and 
Gina.   
As in The Idiots, The King is Alive is a commentary on the usefulness of 
rules. First, there are the rules of survival that those stranded in the desert need to 
learn. They can only ensure the survival of the body through the simple preservation 
of biological life. But soon they realize the fragility of their own situation: Jack, the 
desert savant who has taught them rules of survival becomes the first victim of the 
desert. If the rules of nature cannot offer a real escape, then the rules of culture are 
the next option. With an initial degree of reticence they decide to take part in the 
play. For the Namibian hermit, unable to understand the foreigners’ language, the 
performance of King Lear seems a kind of madness that has affected their minds, a 
manifestation of their fear of the desert. He sees the play as yet another survival 
strategy devised to banish the thought of their hopeless situation and postpone their 
confrontation with the desert and the thought of death. He is right in his observation 
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that they initially ‘speak without speaking to each other’ but in time the process of 
rehearsing becomes much more than a futile exercise.  
The play offers a possibility to assume a different identity but also licenses 
foolish behaviour that would be unacceptable in a normal social context. The desert 
itself functions a place where all the relationships, preserved by social conventions, 
collapse, either in order to be renewed, as in the case of Liz and her husband, Ray, or 
to be lost irremediably, as in the case of Amanda and her husband Paul. The 
characters are confronted by their own repressed selves.43 In a sense, the desert 
means a return to an original situation from which life needs to be restructured upon 
different foundations.  As with The Idiots, life itself encroaches on fiction, changing 
its course and the play also alters life when the parts are existentially assumed. Gina, 
who is playing Cordelia, is poisoned in reality by Catherine, envious that she is not 
playing the role, thereby reenacting the literary conflict between Lear’s daughters. 
Henry, who temporarily assumes the role of Lear when the original actor suffers a 
stroke, has himself an unresolved issue with his own daughter and while 
impersonating Lear he is also bonding with Gina.  
It is Gina who offers the most spectacular surprise. She begins as a stereotype 
for a shallow bourgeois American girl and evolves into a Christ-like figure. Her 
naivety, verging on simple-mindedness, is contrasted from the outset with 
Catherine’s intellectual sophistication. Taking advantage of Gina’s complete 
ignorance of the French language she mocks her friendly and trustful manner. Again, 
mind and heart are played against each other to the former’s disadvantage. The 
second force that leads to her destruction is vanity, embodied by the middle-class 
pedant Charles. Gina’s behaviour in relation to him is intriguing, but its significance 
is only disclosed at the end. She submits herself to his sexual fantasies not only to 
make the play possible but also in order to reveal his vanity and self-centeredness. 
Old enough to act as a paternal figure for Gina, he takes his sexual instincts to be an 
expression of love, only to reveal himself as a polar opposite to Henry. Once exposed 
for what it is, his sense of vanity cannot suffer any reminder of his own humiliation 
and so he applies to Gina the coup de grace, drowning and desecrating the mouth that 
has uttered the truth. Thus Gina, like Karen in The Idiots, assumes her role as 
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Cordelia to the ultimate degree. The role she plays is existentially assumed, which 
projects her as both a Christ and a holy fool figure. Her Christ-like quality results not 
only from her being an innocent victim but is also alluded in Charles’s remorseful 
gesture to take his own life by hanging himself in a manner similar to Judas Iscariot. 
Still, her transformation into a holy fool takes place when the word turns into self-
sacrifice. Here Kristian Levring reiterates von Trier’s privileging of the act over the 
word.  
There is a transcendental element here. Death, and particularly the death of 
the innocent, seems to be the only possible awakening experience, capable of 
effecting a breach in the immanence of the everyday routine that stifles any 
metaphysical concern. The first instance when they act in solidarity is when they face 
the perils of the desert in order to find the desert savvy’s corpse and give him a 
Christian burial. The second is occasioned by Gina’s death, which, I suggest, is more 
than a form of catharsis. Gathered round the fire for a spontaneous mourning 
ceremony they experience a moment of transcendence. In his expressions Henry not 
only plays Lear empathically but is Lear voicing his despair at the loss of Cordelia. 
While in the first sequences the group were preoccupied by the unfinished business 
left behind they are now transported into a state of awe which opens the possibility 
of something beyond the immediate reality. If King Lear is about losing and 
regaining a kingdom, The King Is Alive can be read as being about losing one 
kingdom in order to discover the possibility of another. The new experience 
suspends the feeling of fear that has accompanied them all along, and their physical 
salvation, which is realised in the end, becomes less important in comparison to the 
‘truth’ they have experienced.  
In Levring’s film the form matches the content in a similar manner to The 
Idiots: complying with the ‘Vow of Chastity’ to a large extent, on a formal level it is 
‘a form of cinematic purity, a return to cinema’s origin’44; this is replicated 
diegetically by a return to an original form of humanity in which the characters are 
stripped off their social masks and recover the lost sense of solidarity and even 
innocence. As Martha P. Nochimson notices it is not the content of the narrative in 
King Lear that operates the change but the ‘play’s ability to confer on the almost 
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hopeless group a continuous, collaborative, spontaneous, humanizing act of 
narrative, the foundation of human community’45. I suggest that actually this act of 
humanization and purification is perfected through self-sacrificing and suffering, 
which is the lesson that Gina, in spite of her simple-mindedness, can teach the others. 
In her expression of a foolishness that is transcendental and holy, she offers the 
possibility of a new and more hopeful reality. 
   
Truly Human (2001) and In Your Hands (2004) 
Two further Danish films are worth examining from later waves of the 
Dogme movement, which demonstrate the continuing influence of the fool figure. 
Åke Sandgren’s film Truly Human is a fantasy supposed to challenge our uncritical 
assumptions and takes for granted an understanding of our social rules and 
conventions. The story is probably the most unrealistic of all Dogme films, and it  is 
unlikely that the Dogme 95 strictures would have allowed for instances such as that 
where the teenage P gets materialized out of the wall where he has lived for years. 
However, the film manages to present a compelling parable. When 6-year-old girl 
Lisa dies in a car accident her (imaginary) older brother P who is living behind the 
wallpaper enters into real life. He is actually the aborted son of Lisa’s parents but 
they don’t recognize him and he is delivered to a refugee center. He is totally 
inarticulate and ignorant of all things human and as a result of a misunderstanding he 
is thought to be called Ahmed. Soon he begins to talk and eventually is considered fit 
enough to live by himself in society. Outside he is met with suspicion and abuse, his 
bonding with children is taken for pedophilia. This makes him decide to withdraw 
where he came from and time returns to the moment before Lisa’s death. 
Sandgren’s intension was to imagine how the world would receive an 
unspoilt person.46 The film builds on the idea that the otherworldly presence in this 
world cannot but appear idiotic. Only an idiot can embody the absolute idea of 
goodness and innocence. That P stands for more than Lisa’s brother may be inferred 
from her relationship with him, which takes the form of worship with ritual candle-
lighting; from the mysterious presence of a boy choir that appears and disappears 
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around him, as if a host of angels; from his repeating that he wants to become ‘truly 
human’, in a language reminiscent of the incarnation dogmas. Strikingly P is 
completely ignorant that social decorum bans nakedness in public; this appears in the 
film as a mark of innocence and equality, a stripping off of the social status 
embedded in clothes. The film is again a meta-commentary on the Dogma and its 
stripping off contemporary cinematic conventions. If on one level idiocy designates 
that which remains incomprehensible, possibly the divine, on another social level the 
idiot becomes an emblem for difference and the difficulty to fully comprehend it. 
By contrast, Annette K. Olesen’s 2004 Dogme film In Your Hands, is 
probably the most overtly religious film that has emerged from the movement, and 
looks backward to the Danish films explored in the previous chapter. The protagonist 
is a female priest Anna whose first assignment is in a women’s prison. She is a 
liberal vicar, well-intentioned and initially full of enthusiasm for her mission. She 
has a rationalist approach to miracles and when questioned by an inmate whether she 
believes in the miracles performed by Jesus she replies that they should be taken in a 
metaphorical way, meaning that miracles are theoretically possible. Soon a new 
inmate arrives at the prison, Kate, who soon acquires a reputation as a miracle 
worker with the drug addicts. Her visionary gifts are revealed when she guesses that 
Anna is pregnant, in spite of her alleged incapacity to conceive. Intrigued, Anna 
discovers that Kate is guilty of having left her daughter to die of thirst when she was 
on drugs. When Anna finds out that there are chances to give birth to a disabled child 
she desperately turns to Kate for help but loses faith in her powers and throws her 
crime into her face. The other inmates overhear the conversation and start to 
persecute Kate who intentionally takes an overdose and dies. Anna decides not to 
take any risks and has an abortion.  
 Anna and Kate represent two different channels for the works of God: the 
ordained minister, legitimated by the Church’s appointment, and the charismatic 
miracle worker who has no official legitimacy and not even personal sanctity. Anna 
has just finished her seminary training and knows how to preach well about 
responsibility. Kate is completely ignorant in religious matters: she doesn’t even 
know the Lord’s Prayer but she is rumored to have had a vision, a personal encounter 
with God. She is an illumined idiot. The representative of established religion feels 
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challenged by this free manifestation of grace which escapes the rational. It cannot 
explain reasonably either the real occurrence of miracles or the possibility of grace to 
work through a sinful person. Kate stands here for the possibility to experience 
transcendence outside the established order, and her endorsement of truth is not 
dogmatic. Standing outside the boundaries of common morality and rationality, she 
represents the critical power that foolishness has in exposing truth to power. 
On a different level the film is also about the Dogme rules, and how the old 
institution of film-making was incapable of containing genuine meaning and 
emotions. It also brings to light the reason why the idiot is such a potent figure in 
Dogma 95. One can say that it embodies its spirit in an exemplary way. The idiot 
figure and Dogme 95 correspond in at least two respects: marginality (Dogma 95 
defies itself as outside and against mainstream Hollywood cinema) and simplicity 
(through a return to the basics of film-making). The awkwardness of the filmmaking 
techniques used appears idiotic in comparison with mainstream cinema. In this 
respect the idiot figure can function as a stylistic emblem for the whole movement 
and their ‘counter-hegemonic aspirations’47. At the same time the holy fool figure 
makes its appearance in the diegesis as well, with important critical functions.  
 
The critical power of the idiot in the Dogme films 
In all the films discussed so far the trope of idiocy or foolishness functions by 
drawing on attributes traditionally ascribed to idiots and fools through various 
religious traditions. Assuming or being ascribed the position of the fool involves a 
collapse in status which renders unstable all other social relationships.48 This lays the 
ground for an egalitarian society in which the individuals stripped off their social 
roles and can achieve a greater degree of authenticity or a more unified identity. In 
The Idiots the commune functions as a temporary, willed, suspension of socially 
ascribed roles. In the other films, the idiot figure invites a renunciation of social 
hierarchies. This facilitates the formation of new relationships by rediscovering the 
lost sense of humanity and community. In this connection Brian Gibson writes about 
                                                
47 Walters, p. 40 
48 Orrin E. Klapp, ‘The Fool as a Social Type’ in The Pleasures of Sociology, ed. by Lewis A. Coser 
(New York: New American Library), 1980, p. 252 
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‘transcendental humanism’: ‘an effect or aim, revealing a holiness or secular 
spiritualism rooted in human community – friendship, a sexual relationship, or 
merely an attempt at social interaction or integration – that not only transcends the 
everyday, material world.’49  
Is the idiot in these Dogme films the representative of this ‘transcendental 
humanism’ or something more divine? The ‘Manifesto’ does not state explicitly any 
such intention but it does mention the term ‘bourgeois’ three times: a term that has 
often caused critics to imagine this is a juvenile relic from von Trier’s socialist 
upbringing. Jack Stevenson, however, draws the attention to the fact that in The 
Idiots the target of von Trier’s criticism is not the bourgeoisie per se, as the 
manifesto suggests, but what he calls ‘The Group’, in Danish ‘velfaerdsdanskere’, 
which indicates the membership of the Danish welfare state.50 Thus the group 
designates everybody, regardless of wealth or the social status; it is ‘an anonymous, 
monolithic and disembodied presence – just a state of mind’.51 What is then the 
significance of ‘bourgeois’ for von Trier and these directors then? Given the 
religious undertones of the manifesto, I will turn to Kierkegaard for whom the 
‘bourgeois’ designates not only a social category, but a spiritual one. The bourgeois 
spirit is one impervious to the divine because it is completely grounded in the trivial 
practicalities of this world: ‘the philistine-bourgeois mentality lacks every 
qualification of spirit and is completely wrapped up in probability, within which 
possibility finds its small corner; therefore it lacks the possibility of becoming aware 
of God’52. In this sense, ‘The Group’ can be considered generalized ‘bourgeoisie’ but 
in a religious context different from Kierkegaard’s age. 
A recent sociological investigation confirms this picture of the Danish 
society. As far as religion is concerned we come across a paradox: More than 80% of 
the population and 90% of the ethnic Danes are registered with the Danish Lutheran 
Church, which is a state church; still, the church attendance in about 5%. The 
                                                
49 Brian Gibson, ‘Ringing The Bells in Celebration: Red, Breaking the Waves and Transcendent 
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50 Jack Stevenson, Lars von Trier (London: British Film Institute, 2002), p. 128 
51 Stevenson, p. 129 
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sociological investigation comes though to even more intriguing conclusions: in spite 
of identifying themselves as Christians, the majority of the Danes do not have a 
strong belief in the existence of God, let alone the teachings of the Church. The 
situation is termed by Phil Zuckerman as ‘cultural religion’ and an apathy which 
involves occasional engagement in ‘ostensibly religious practices, without truly 
believing in the supernatural content thereof’.53 At the same time there is a reticence 
on the part of those who admit they do not believe in the existence of God to 
recognize that they are atheists. Some would still admit they believe in ‘something’ 
without being able to define what exactly that is.54   
With this picture in mind the indictment of the ‘bourgeois’ would sound less 
dated if understood as directed towards a world searching blindly for new meaning. 
In this sense idiocy represents a challenge to the rationality of this world, threatening 
to throw it into chaos. The effect is destabilizing and a breach is created through 
which the possibility of transcendence of sorts appears. The critical power of the fool 
therefore not only exposes the conventions and fragile order that bind contemporary 
society, but also is capable of pointing to a transcendental or holy realization of truth. 
The attempt to overcome conventional ‘reality’ has been emphasised in my study of 
the Dogme films. In The Celebration there are clear instances when the shots suggest 
the real presence of the protagonist’s dead sister; in The Idiots the commune is in 
search of their inner idiot, envisioned as a return to a primordial purity; in Mifune 
there is a clear suggestion that Rud, the idiot figure, might not be entirely wrong in 
his beliefs in aliens, while in Truly Human an entity who could be anything form 
divine to imaginary takes centre stage. What is on offer here is more than a study of 
psychological states, as Berys Gaunt argues.55 The intimations of another reality in 
the films mentioned indicate that it would seem the supernatural is in fact an 
important constitutive of this ‘realist’ project. 
What the Dogme 95 movement has achieved is to launch the holy fool into a 
twenty-first century context, in a way that loosens its ties to religious culture, 
whether in Denmark or elsewhere. I do not share John Orr’s opinion that ‘Dogme’s 
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contentment, (New York: New York University Press, 2008), p. 155 
54 Zuckerman, p. 163 
55 Gaunt, p. 98 
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moron-siblings are thus variants of [Dreyer’s] holy fool in Ordet, but with little trace 
of the sacred in sight’.56 As I have shown, the Dogma 95 films are a more ambitious 
undertaking, especially when set against the context of an apathetic ‘cultural 
Christianity’. The forty years that separate Ordet from Dogma 95 have seen the end 
of modernism, the development and, according to some accounts, possibly the 
demise of postmodernism. In this secularized world, operating outside the traditional 
ways of theologizing, this meant a dramatic change in views on religion and the 
theories of truth it upholds. The holy fool has returned, burdened with history, to 
criticize the ways of the world and bring vestiges of transcendence. This 
transcendence is however no longer predicated from the now inconvenient position 
of the religious master-narrative, a setting condemned by postmodern criticism.  The 
‘truth’, or at least a more meaningful set of values, is located in the humble figure of 
the idiot. Humbleness and suffering go hand in hand. For von Trier it is the sacrifice 
that ensures the meaningfulness of an existence.57 The ‘truth’ he is concerned with is 
precisely to be found in this instance in which the character, at the highest state of 
his/her passion, is willing to make a sacrifice; in other words when the ‘idiot 
technique’ is internalised.58 The idiot then bears the marks of suffering. This is true 
not only of Karen but of characters in other Dogma 95 films: Gina in The King Is 
Alive, P. in Truly Human, Kate in In Your Hands.  
What the Dogme films promise is a new mode of holy foolishness in cinema. 
It is clear from the above analysis von Trier’s ‘stunt’ has opened a model offered by 
the performance of the holy fool, but pointing to a new kind of common aesthetics, 
using the fool or idiot as a means of critiquing society and conventions. The 
significance of this interpretation for the future of the holy idiot in cinema is twofold. 
On the one hand it allows us to reconcile two apparently contradictory dimensions 
which frequently appear in discussion: the irony and the seriousness of the whole 
Dogme project. While holy foolishness preserves playful elements, seriousness is 
rescued by reinterpreting the game on a higher level. On the other hand, not only 
does the holy fool offer a model figure for critiquing dysfunctional societies in many 
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contexts, but also the figure points towards the possibility of transcendence in a 







This thesis is grounded in an understanding of European holy foolishness as 
rooted in its various Christian cultures. In the light of this understanding I began by 
sketching a cultural history of the phenomenon through a selection of its most 
pertinent theoretical accounts and figures: either real practitioners, as framed by the 
hagiographic writings from Antiquity to Middle Ages, or fictional polemic characters 
as conceived in philosophical and literary texts. I took as the starting point St Paul’s 
First Epistle to the Corinthians in which the weak, the foolish and the low of this 
world are exalted over their opposites. In line with my investigation I proposed a 
reading of the text as a cultural critique. The expression ‘foolishness (moria) of God’ 
is used here rhetorically as a way to stand the epistemological assumptions of the 
apostle’s audience on their head, as well as their worldly wisdom. The ‘fool for 
Christ’ as a follower of this paradoxical wisdom of the cross, is neither one initiated 
in a kind of Christian gnosis, nor one given to practising moderation, but is rather the 
one who willingly suffers tribulations for his/her truth. Therefore two relevant 
characteristics of holy foolishness derive from this foundational text: it is a relative 
concept, in the sense that it becomes apparent in relation to customary practices as 
either a deviation or a correction, and secondly it implies practical consequences, 
rendering the one who embraces it susceptible to suffering through the body, in 
imitation of the divine model.   
St Paul’s understanding of divine folly in theatrical terms, with the apostles 
becoming a spectacle for the world, was developed into a dramatic form by later 
Christian cultures, particularly those indebted to the Byzantine tradition. The use of 
the holy fool to critique the existing political and social order became an ingrained 
cultural practice with variants from the yurodivy in Russia to the cult of St Francis of 
Assisi. These forms emerged on the canvas of a world settled in its Christian 
convictions and hierarchical structures; a world in which the canons of representation 
still retained their power. The modern age, however, brought with it a ‘prodigious 
event’ that shattered this order: secularism and the ‘death of God’ recorded by 
Nietzsche. Taken not in an ontological sense, but in a social-psychological one, the 
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proclamation indicated that the existence of God had lost its significance for 
Christian society and the individual self. In this context of a secularizing world, three 
emblematic figures emerged in the second half of the 19th century to comment on this 
troubled background, whose profile would percolate into the cinematic world, 
breaking the traditional canon and enriching the holy fool morphologies. 
Dostoevsky’s idiot, Prince Myshkin, was employed to launch an attack 
against the excessive rationality promoted by the medical sciences of his day. At the 
same time his holy fool bears the marks of his time: while his simple presence 
exposes the moral corruption of his circle, his goodness is ultimately devoid of 
redemptive power. If Dostoevsky described the symptoms, Nietzsche spelled out the 
diagnosis. His fool comes to interrogate people about God: a God who is soon 
announced to be dead because Christianity itself has ceased to believe in His 
existence. For Kierkegaard the situation is similar, facing a Christendom that no 
longer understands the meaning of a living God. His foolish knight of faith, ‘great by 
that hope whose form is madness’, is pitted against this spiritual wasteland, in an 
attempt to reintegrate faith into the realm of divine madness. These three figures of 
Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have offered different models for the critical 
function of the modern holy fool. These are: the benevolent fool whose holiness is 
understood as goodness in contrast to the world; the maximalist fool, in which faith 
and sacrifice come together in defiance of the social order; and the minimalist fool, 
who still keeps the memory of God forgotten by all others. These models, as 
interpreted by various national cultures, ensured that the figure would retain its 
artistic utility as a means of critiquing the failings of the contemporary order.   
The secularisation of European societies provided a watershed moment in 
culture with ramifications for performative art, including the cinematic holy fool. In 
my exploration of three distinct European cinematic traditions in Russia, France and 
Denmark, encompassing respectively elements of Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant 
Christianity, it has been possible to observe the continuities and discontinuities 
between the hagiography-based holy fools, supposedly real but determined by their 
own literary conventions, and the cinematic holy fools.  This allowed me to examine 
thoroughly the critical function of the cinematic holy fool. The first object of my 
exploration was Soviet and post-Soviet Russian cinema. My selection of 
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representative films came mainly from Russia. Russian culture and by extrapolation 
Russian cinema present us with a unique situation. Nowhere else in the cinemas of 
nominally Orthodox countries has the holy fool figure developed such a pervasive 
presence as a tool of cultural interpretation. This is due to the fact that the holy fool, 
as a knot of contradictions, was seen as the perfect expression of the tensions 
embedded in the religious-nationalistic identity narrative known as the ‘Russian 
Idea’, primarily the tension between institutionalised power and the ideal of a Christ-
bearing commune. This historical opposition between the holy fool and the tsar 
empowered the figure for future social and political criticism. The widespread use of 
the figure does, however, present a disadvantage in that its overuse and familiarity 
can blunt its critical power. This is the case with the first category of fools which I 
have designated as ‘hagiography-inspired’; in other words those that use historical 
figures for their inspiration. Eisenstein, Bondarchuk, and Klimov offered episodic 
characters in this form who are pitted against those in power, delivering the 
customary critique. The notable exception is Pavel Lungin’s The Island, which, with 
its overt affirmation of the Orthodox faith, was only possible after the collapse of the 
Soviet regime. The film elaborates on the figure of the holy fool, and makes him the 
protagonist. In this way, I argued, Anatoly is conceived as a spiritual guide for the 
new post-Soviet era, embodying the ancient values of Orthodoxy in an exemplary 
way. While Anatoly is critical of state atheism and of the ecclesiastical offices, he is 
critical in a somewhat reconciliatory manner, a consequence of him being a 
conflation of two types: the holy fool and the spiritual father.  
A second category of ‘stylized holy fools’ departs from the strict territory of 
hagiography and appears instead as cultural reworking. I have shown that such 
representations have a more acute sense of context, be it recent or eschatologically 
anticipated. In Soviet cinema direct reference to religion was often repressed as a 
result of state-sponsored atheism, but the proposed worldview endorsed by the holy 
fool was useful for indicting the mainstream ideology. For instance the underlying 
principle of kenoticism renders both protagonists in Todorovsky’s Wartime Romance 
and Kaidonovsky’s Kerosene Seller’s Wife at odds with the ideology of the 
regimented Soviet ‘new man’. In Abuladze’s Repentance the holy fool is employed 
to explore the traumas of the Stalinist past but also to herald a way forward towards 
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the society’s spiritual and ideological renewal, which was soon to be initiated with 
the advent of the age of glasnost. With the fall of the Soviet Union the stylised fool 
has been used to turn the attention towards the still unresolved spiritual problems of 
the individual and of society at large as in Russian Symphony and Ward No. 6, or 
recent political issues as in House of Fools where Konchalovsky uses Janna, the 
innocent patient of an asylum, to question the sanity of a world outside, against the 
background of the First Russian-Chechen war of 1994-96.    
Arguably nowhere in Russian cinema do we witness a more devastating 
critique of modern society than in Tarkovsky’s films. This arises in part as a 
consequence of his overtly religious commitments, but is especially due to his 
creative ability to transform the holy fool figure into a direct opponent of what he 
perceived as a godless society not only in a Soviet context but also in the West, 
which he came to know much better during his final years of self-imposed exile. I 
have argued that the idea of holy foolishness can be traced throughout Tarkovsky’s 
entire artistic period, starting with Andrei Rublev, continuing through Stalker, 
maturing in Nostalgia and reaching an apex in The Sacrifice. Tarkovsky attempted to 
render the figure universal by shaking off the particularities ascribed by Russian 
history and moved towards an existentialist understanding. The result was a holy fool 
who begins from the position of a secularised person and grows towards a self-styled 
fool of God. It is not by chance that the self-sacrifices in his last two films Nostalgia 
and The Sacrifice lend themselves to an interpretation through the Kierkegaardian 
category of the absurd. But what was Tarkovsky ultimately after with his holy fools? 
I have argued that his object was to counter the cold logic of the rationalism that he 
believed had engulfed all spheres of life, from religion to technology, in favour of a 
faith for which nothing was impossible and had the potential to rescue the world. In 
spite of the dramatic transformation of the holy fool under Tarkovsky’s direction, the 
figure, animated as it is by apocalyptic pathos, remains essentially framed in a 
Russian mindset.  
I have contrasted Russian cinema with that in France and Denmark: nations 
that were rooted in a Western Christian cultural tradition. Here the situation is 
radically different. The holy fool is less tied to national and denominational identity, 
and cannot capture the public imagination in the same vivid way. The dominant 
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characteristic of holy foolishness in French cinema is constituted by the notions of 
self-sacrifice and suffering – self-inflicted or caused by external agents. I have 
suggested this is due in part to the legacy of a particular Catholic inheritance, 
revisited and rethought for the French historical context through the doctrine of 
vicarious suffering promoted by Jansenists, including Blaise Pascal, and more 
recently by Joseph de Maistre. In the world of cinema, I have argued that these 
themes were most fully developed in the work of Robert Bresson. Examining 
Bresson’s work indicates an obsession with foolish characters in his Diary of a 
Country Priest, Trial of Joan of Arc, and The Devil, Probably, this last fool raising 
particularly problematic ethical issues. Weakness for Bresson is, as for Tarkovsky, 
an important feature, as is the suffering that comes through the body – a body which 
is imprisoned, beaten or consumed by illness. Bresson’s pessimism about human 
nature, acquired through a latent Jansenism, is taken to a logical conclusion when he 
confronts Charles in The Devil, Probably with the solution of suicide. Bresson’s 
departure from Catholic ethics here should not overshadow his religious interests, 
since in the universe he fabricated for his characters he is still concerned with the 
possibility of salvation: through either a quiet or protesting retreat from the world. 
Bresson’s critique of the modern world is in some ways even more devastating than 
Tarkovsky’s since he suggests there is no hope left for this world, and we must 
escape from its embrace. The picture of the political and religious state he created in 
his last film, The Devil, Probably leads towards a hopeless diagnosis: political 
nihilism, ecological apocalypticism, and religion without faith. On this background 
Charles reiterates, in his personal manner, the cry of Nietzsche’s fool. The suffering 
of the innocent constitutes itself in a criticism of the unjust ways of the world as well 
as a condemnation of it. This observation applies to a similar extent in Thérèse in 
Cavalier’s homonymous film, Donissan in Pialat’s Under the Sun of Satan and 
Félicité in Laine’s A Simple Heart.  
As with the Russian and French cinemas, the idea of holy foolishness in 
Danish cinema is powerfully influenced by the local form of Christianity: Lutheran 
Protestantism. The trajectory of this idea is rather sinuous, having been approached 
by Danish theologicans through the concepts of impossibility and the absurd. 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, I have argued, is crucial for understanding this connection 
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in the Danish context, and illuminates the existential stance of many cinematic 
characters, from Dreyer’s Joan of Arc to von Trier’s Bess. These are characters who, 
belonging to the spiritual plane, are pitted against ecclesiastical structures of power 
in order to expose the latter’s rigidity and false pretence of spiritual authority. There 
is a significant gendered dimension here. The female holy fools analysed share a 
common trait in their determination to assume self-sacrifice as an integral part of 
their existence, aware of its redeeming value. It can be said that while the bodies of 
the female fools in Danish cinema are destroyed – either physically as is the case of 
Joan and Bess, or metaphorically as in the case of Babette – they also deconstruct the 
kind of power that exerts itself through the aggression of the individual. These 
female holy fools, in a different way to the male ones, offer a glimpse into a world 
that reveals the advent of the impossible through their strong faith. 
With the Dogme 95 movement, which emerged from Danish cinema in the 
mid 1990s, a new interest in cinematic foolishness was rekindled with important 
ramifactions for the future of the holy fool on screen. The religious connections are 
less explicit in the case of the Dogme 95 films but the idiot figure becomes an 
emblem for the back-to-basics film-making adopted by the directors. Significantly, I 
argued that the allegiance of the Dogme directors to a ‘Manifesto’, and a ‘Vow of 
Chastity’ fashioned in religious terminology, represented more than postmodern 
irony. To support my case I identified the elements that inscribe von Trier’s project 
as drawing from a model offered by the performance of the holy fool, which he then 
uses to point to a common aesthetics. Unlike their predecessors, one difference that 
arises with these idiot figures is that they don’t present a clear aura of sacredness, 
except for the prisoner in In Your Hands. Rather than a conventional religious form, 
the Dogme 95 fools push instead towards a transcendental alternative, within the 
context of a secularized world. For example, in a film such as von Trier’s The Idiots 
the trope of idiocy is simultaneously used on two levels: as a critique of politicised 
disability, and as a search for some inner higher truth. In other Dogme 95 films the 
interest is also social: the critical function of fool being to focus on the 
disfunctionalities that lie behind human relations and society, and point to a better 
alternative. 
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The representation of the holy fool that I have identified in European cinema 
has been as a critic of the social, political and spiritual status quo. These functions of 
the holy fool are not new, as we have seen in discussions of their pre-modern forms. 
Yet the intrinsic versatility of the figure has allowed it to develop into a distinct 
cinematic form, which offers the possibility of expressing contemporary concerns 
and criticisms of the realities of our present age. It is clear that in Soviet cinema the 
holy fool figure, even though an emblem of the religious past, was chiefly employed 
as a vehicle of social and political dissent. Only exceptionally, and at a safe remove 
from the country’s censorship, such as found in the later works of Tarkovsky, was it 
used for strictly religious purposes, rising beyond the immediate political concerns 
into a critique of a modern civilization that has deemed the spiritual life irrelevant. 
Here, and in post-Soviet films such as Lopushansky’s The Russian Symphony, the 
figure resonates with an anti-rationalist rhetoric characteristic of modern Russian 
cultural debate. By contrast, in French cinema the concerns are often less political 
and more emphatically social. Here, the holy fool cuts a solitary figure in a hostile 
environment: one that gratuiously exerts its destructive violence on his/her 
disinterested love. More recently, in the Dogme 95 films, the political interest has 
returned in a new way. The idiot figure, often presenting an uncanny aura, is 
politicized through being framed in marginalized ways, such as a disabled person as 
in The Idiots or as a migrant as in Truly Human. In so doing, the Dogme 95 
movement has launched the fool into a twenty-first century context, in a way that 
loosens its religious context but retains the figure’s capacity for transendence and 
criticism. 
This thesis has argued that the holy fool has proven a versatile critical device 
in modern cinema. Given the continued use of the figure as a mode of cultural 
criticism, it is worth noting the way in which the cinematic medium, with its visual 
power, has revived and transformed the holy fool. One of the most striking aspects of 
the power possessed by the figure on screen is the visual emphasis that is often 
placed on the fool’s capacity for suffering. Returning to The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, we saw that St Paul placed at the core of his argument the concept of 
suffering for Truth. In connection with this, the fool for Christ’s sake, like its divine 
model, is inscribed by the tribulations to which he/she is subjected, lending a sense 
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of truthfulness and authenticity. This is important since it can offer an alternative 
way of legitimating an experience to that of miraculous divine intervention. In most 
of the films that I have analysed suffering – be it assumed, self-inflicted or inflicted 
by others – was an important component of the portrayal of the holy fool. Of all the 
arts, film is particularly well placed to show graphically the reality of the suffering 
body. It can be revealed as a locus of signification through the particularities of the 
narrative and especially the camerawork, as Dreyer exemplarily showed in his The 
Passion of Joan of Arc. As in the case of the hagiographical holy fool gaining 
credibility by subjecting his/her body to sufferings, the cinematic tormented body 
dons a revelatory role as the embodiment of a subjective truth which is legitimised 
by its very suffering. Because it is an event, suffering cannot be deconstructed; rather 
it exposes the caducity of various ideologies. In the absence of external divine 
interventions, and in the absence of any dogmatic certainties, suffering testifies to a 
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